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Abstract 
 
Ghana is considered an oasis of peace despite having the same mix of ethno-political 
competitions for state power and resources; north-south horizontal inequalities; ethno-
regional concentrations of Christians and Muslims; highly ethnicised elections; a natural 
resource dependent economy; and a politically polarized public sphere, among others, 
that have plunged other countries in Africa into violent and often protracted national 
conflicts. Use of the conflict paradigm to explain Africa’s conflicts glosses over positive 
deviance cases such as Ghana. This study used the peace paradigm in a mixed method, 
grounded theory research to examine Ghana’s apparent exceptionalism in staving off 
violent national conflicts. From the survey of 1429 respondents and 31 Key Informants, 
findings indicate Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They 
are equally divided on classifying the state of peace in Ghana as negative or positive. 
Instead, they have identified sets of centrifugal and centripetal forces that somehow self-
neutralize to keep Ghana in a steady state of unstable peace. Among the lift forces are 
strongly shared cultural and Indigenous African Religious values; symbiotic interethnic 
economic relationships; identity dissolution and cultural miscegenation due to open 
interethnic systems of accommodation and incorporation; and the persistence of historical 
multi-lateral political, sociocultural, and economic relationships. On the drag side are the 
youth bulge; emergent religious intolerance; elite exit from the state in using private 
solutions for public problems; and highly politicized and partisan national discourses that 
leave the country with no national agenda. In sum, Ghana is no exception to the rule. The 
four interconnected meso theories that this study identifies provided pointers to what 
factors Ghana needs to strengthen to avert descent into violence.    
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Statement of the Research Problem 
 
Naming the Oasis of Peace 
 
Amidst the proliferation and protraction of intrastate conflicts that have earned 
Africa the accolade of being “…the continent of conflicts” (Golaszinski, 2007, p. 5), 
poverty and disasters, Ghana has won praise  as “…an oasis of peace, harmony and 
tranquility” (UNDP, 2012; GNA, 2012); a beacon of democracy (Asante-Antwi, 2013; 
BBC News, 2013);  and an icon of economic progress “in a subregion perpetually in 
turmoil” (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). Businessmen and politicians 
compete to acclaim that “… the best thing going for Ghana is stability and peace [as it 
has managed to remain] an oasis of peace in a turbulent continent” (Gadugah, 2012, p. 1). 
However, a review of Ghana’s evolution as a nation-state would show the country shares 
the same historical fates that have underscored conflicts in other countries. Indeed, its 
image as a peaceful country disguises a multiplicity of fractious points inherent in its 
historical and contemporary political set up.  
For starters, it should be noted that the territories that constitute Ghana today 
were, until 6th March 1957, four disparate political entities independently administered 
by the British as the coastal colony (covering what is the Western, Central, the lower part 
of the Volta region comprising Keta and Denu (Bening, 1973, p. 21); and all of the 
Greater Accra region today); the Ashanti Protectorate (including the present day Ashanti, 
Eastern, and Brong Ahafo regions); the Northern Territories (covering present day 
Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions); and the Transvolta Togoland, covering 
much of the current Volta Region, which the British managed under a UN Trusteeship 
after World War I. These territorial units “…that were tied to this entity [called Ghana], 
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… had little in common apart from being part of the British Empire” (Weiss, 2005, p. 2). 
In other words, like many other states in Africa, Ghana is equally an amalgam of 
disparate peoples lumped together as a nation-state by the colonial act. Ghana therefore 
has the same history of being an artificially erected state at the dawn of independence as 
all African countries have. Hence, there is nothing inherently unifying that predisposes it 
to peace more than others.  
Additionally, this amalgam of a nation-state did not come into being without 
resistance from its constituent members. When Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples 
Party (CPP) pushed for “independence now” (Morrison, 2004, p. 423) in the late 1940s, 
the majority of the people of the Northern Territories, under the leadership of the 
Northern People’s Party (NPP) opted to stay out of the independence movement and 
union with the other constituent territories of the emergent state, citing unequal states of 
development between the north and the south (Soeters, 2012). Accordingly, the chiefs 
and political elite of the north sent a delegation to petition the Queen to have the North’s 
independence delayed to enable it catch up with the south developmentally. The 
delegation, led by S.D. Dombo failed in its mission and the north was compelled to 
participate in the pre-independence elections (Ladouceur, 1979). The political leadership 
of the Ashanti Protectorate, on its part, also opposed the idea of joining the colony for 
independence. It preferred a separation at best, and at worst a highly decentralized federal 
system that would preserve Ashanti’s autonomy and control over its natural resources 
(Bourret.1960; Brukum, 1998;Morrison, 2004). To the east, the conglomerate of ethnic 
groups in the Transvolta Togoland had to resort to a highly contested plebiscite to decide 
whether or not to join the colony for independence (Kwaku, 1976). Even after a decisive 
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majority vote to join the emerging union that became Ghana, “a violent uprising took 
place in Transvolta Togoland [compelling the Governor) to send the Ghana army in to 
quell the disturbances” (Williams, 1984, p. 358) as the celebrations of independence went 
on. The lingering discontent with the absorption of the transvolta into Ghana produced 
agitations for secession of the Komkombas (Bening, 1983) and the Ewes (Amenumey, 
1989; Brown, 1980) from Ghana. These threats of secession heightened in the 1970s 
through the early 80s. To the south west, the Buem  ethnic groups have always expressed 
their wish for secession from the union (Bening, 1983). To date, groups exist that demand 
the decoupling of the Transvolta Togoland region from Ghana so that it can be 
recognized as a “sovereign state” (Western Togoland General Assembly, 2015).  
In addition to the initial resistance to the union and subsequent threats of 
secession, Ghana also has the same geo-political and economic disparities that have 
plunged Nigeria and La Cote d’Ivoire into protracted civil conflicts and wars (Langer & 
Ukiwo, 2007). Historical and contemporary political and economic inequalities largely 
define the north south divide, as all communities in the north share a common history of 
political and economic marginalization under colonial rule and thereafter. Deliberate 
colonial policy kept the north economically underdeveloped and preserved it as a labor 
pool for the mineral mines and cocoa farms in the south (Bening, 1990) for the simple 
reason that the north was economically too unproductive to merit any investment of 
resources for its development. In the words of Governor Hodgson:  
…in place of pouring the small surplus revenue that there is every 
indication that the Colony is now likely to obtain, into such an absolutely 
unremunerative country as the Northern Territories is, and I fear always 
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will be, I should like to devote it to the development of districts within the 
colony and which are ripe for development and every penny expended on 
which would come back again in the shape of increased revenue (Bening, 
1990a, p. 251) 
 
For this reason, “The colonial administration undertook almost no infrastructural 
or human capital development in northern Ghana” (Langer, 2007, p. 8). The resultant 
deficits in infrastructure and human resource development have ensured that the north has 
remained “much poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical 
services …” (Armin, 2007, p.9). These historical tensions and regional inequalities have 
underscored the political evolution of the country. Even before it attained independence, 
the country grappled with ethno-political and regional conflicts that threatened to tear it 
apart (Anglin, 1958; Meredith, 2006, Sakyi, 2013b). In particular, Anglin chronicles a 
number of events that threatened to break up the country within the first nine years of its 
independence.  He recalls, for instance, how the National Liberation Movement (NLM), 
the main opposition party based in the Ashanti hinterland had “…resorted to violence, 
intimidation, dynamiting of houses and even political murders” (Anglin, 1958, p. 43), as 
its “Action Groupers [in Ashanti sought to counter the CPP’s] Action Troopers [that 
equally] terrorized political opponents in the South” (Anglin, 1958, p. 44). The creation 
of the Action Troopers of the CPP and Action Groupers of the NLM effectively initiated 
the institutionalization of a culture of violence in Ghana’s body politic.  
The historical differences between the geopolitical blocks that constitute Ghana 
today have continued to have relevance in the geo-ethnic politics of the country and her 
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attempts at democratic rule.  Unlike La Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, once peaceful countries 
with no histories of military coup d’états, but which suddenly found themselves under 
siege of violent conflicts, Ghana has witnessed four successful and often violent military 
coup d’états in 1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981. This is in addition to several unsuccessful 
counter coups (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), and at least one successful palace coup (Adofo, 
2012 Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012). Hence, from 1966 till January 1993, Ghana 
lived much of its political life after independence under military rule. In comparison, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya never experienced coup d’etats; and yet they descended into 
violent national level conflicts or civil wars.  
Military interventions derailed civilian rule as each attempt at democratic 
transitioning of power “…lasted only for a few years before they were aborted” (African 
Peer Review Mechanism, 2005, p. xii). All the coup d’états had thinly veiled ethno-
political divisions undergirding them (Adofo, 2012 in Ghanaweb.com, 20 February 2012; 
Agyeman-Duah, 1987). The period witnessed various forms of summary executions, 
murders, and disappearances of people that instilled fear and a culture of silence among 
the population (Oquaye, 1995; Chazan and Le Vine, 1978). Indeed, between 1979 and 
1992, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Provisional National 
Defense Council (PNDC), both under Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, legitimized and 
institutionalized the use of violence in politics when Rawlings declared the 
“democratization of violence” (Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Boafo-Arthur, 2012). In 
fulfillment of this declaration, the period between December 1981 and December 1992 
saw the systematic training and arming of civilians under the umbrella of the Peoples 
Defense Committees (PDCs) which mutated into the Committees for the Defense of the 
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Revolution (CDRs) in the late 1980s through the 90s. This militarization of civil life was 
considered necessary to contain internal dissent and rebellion. In particular, the PNDC, 
which emerged from the December 31, 1981 coup d’état, needed these ‘revolutionaries’ 
to counter the multiple counter-revolutionary military coups and other forms of civil 
discontent and agitations that challenged its legitimacy. Rawlings would later admit that 
the leadership of the PNDC had to “devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our nation's 
security instead of being there with the people” (People's Daily Graphic, Accra, 6 April 
1987 cited in Agyeman-Duah, 1987). 
Besides military coup d’états, Ghana has all the other ingredients that have 
plunged other countries with similar mixes of challenges into violent national clashes. A 
highly heterogeneous population of 24 million people divided into at least 52 different 
indigenous ethnic groups sets the stage for intense inter-ethnic rivalries for political 
power at the local level (chieftaincy succession and parliamentary elections) and national 
level positions (presidential elections, ministerial appointments, and positions in civil and 
public services). It is also the basis for interethnic contestations over access to, ownership 
of, and control over economic resources. Consequently, Ghana has been home to many 
violent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts around the issues of landownership, 
chieftaincy succession disputes, and competition for political power within and between 
ethnic groups (Arthur, 2009; Ayee, Frempong, Asante, & Boafo-Arthur, 2011; 
Nambiema, 2012; Pul, 2003), especially in the northern half of the country. Notable 
among the protracted violent conflicts are the Mamprusi-Kusasi conflict in the Upper 
East Region; and the Bimoba-Konkomba, Gonja-Nawuri, Konkomba-Nanumba, 
Dagomba-Konkomba, and the intra-Dagbona chieftaincy succession conflict, all in the 
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Northern Region. The Upper West Region has the intra-Wala Chieftaincy dispute which 
adds to the list of protracted violent conflicts in the north of Ghana that have histories 
dating back to the pre-colonial and/or colonial times, but which have periodically erupted 
violently onto this day.  Elsewhere in the country, the violent conflicts between the 
Nkonyas and Alavanyos, and the Pekis and Tsitos, both in the Volta Region also date 
back close to a hundred years or more (Ghana News Agency, 2009; Yakohene, 2012). 
The Techiman-Tuobodum conflict in the Brongo-Ahafo region also has roots dating back 
several decades. Nonetheless, like volcanoes that run different cycles of dormancy and 
activity, they continue to simmer and explode periodically in violent forms. 
Overlaying the inter and intraethnic conflicts are politico-economic policy 
challenges that perpetuate the north-south, and rural-urban poverty divides in the country. 
For instance, despite various attempts in the postcolonial era to bridge the north-south 
wealth gap,  the general trend in national development planning has been “an 
‘endogenous’ tendency to favour the south over the north in terms of the location of 
economic activities” (Langer, 2007, p. 9). Consequently, the north has remained “much 
poorer in terms of income, infrastructure, education and medical services …” (Langer, 
2007, p. 8). To date, there remains a “… very high incidence of poverty in the northern 
parts of the country” (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008, p. 107). More than half of the 
country’s poor are concentrated in the three northern regions where the poor are also 
much poorer than in the rest of the country (World Bank, 2010).  
Recent economic progress and poverty alleviation interventions have done little to 
reduce the poverty disparity between the north and the south of the country. National 
poverty reduction initiatives since the late 1980s have higher impact in the south than in 
8 
 
 
 
the north. This is partly because of the large historical development deficit in the north 
and the quantum of investment required to bridge the gap or sustain minimal investments. 
For instance, while the proportion of the population in the urban north that is poor moved 
from 45.4% in 1992 to 31.3% in 2006 (a drop of 14.1 percentage points); their 
counterparts in the south that started from 25.7% of the urban south population being 
poor dropped to 8.9% by 2006 (a 16.8 percentage point). The differences in rural poverty 
between the south and the north, and the impact of efforts to reduce them are more 
staggering. The proportion of the poor in the rural north stood at 74.2% in 1992, moving 
down to 68.5% in 2006 (i.e. a 5.7 percentage point reduction). In contrast, the proportion 
of the poor in the rural south started at 60.6% in 1992 and moved to 28.2% in 2006 – a 
large 32.4 percentage point drop in poverty over the same period (World Bank, 2010). 
Indeed, the north-south poverty gap is set to grow as  “… geographical inequalities 
further widen: by 2030, poverty could be broadly eliminated in the South, while still 
affecting two-fifths of the North‘s population” (World Bank, 2010, p. 10).  
The persistence of this north-side divide in the poverty profile of Ghana has 
geopolitical, religious, and ethnic connotations. Within the north, it heightens the sense of 
political and economic marginalization and therefore increases the stakes in interethnic 
competition for access to and control over political power and natural resources such as 
land. Underscoring this interethnic competition for political power and economic 
resources in the north is the colonial legacy of indirect rule that institutionalized political 
inequalities under the chieftaincy institution, which have been maintained in the 
administrative systems of the postcolonial state. Consequently, the north of Ghana is 
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highly volatile, with several violent clashes every year on issues of land, chieftaincy, and 
belongingness (Lund, 2003).  
The persistence and continued deepening of poverty in the north has prompted the 
voicing of concerns that resonate with the fears of the founding political fathers of the 
north in respect of the Northern Territories’ joining the rest of the country for 
independence. As one young northern politician recently put it, the North’s participation 
in the political space that Ghana constitutes has not brought it the much needed 
development. All the northerners “have gotten is hunger, chieftaincy conflicts, illiteracy 
and ignorance” (ThinkGhana.com, 2012). The increasing awareness of the north-south 
poverty gap among the youth, coupled with an equally widening youth bulge due to high 
levels of unemployment in the north, especially in the urban centers, creates conditions 
for potential violent north-south confrontations. This puts “…into doubt the vaunted 
cohesiveness and unity of the Ghanaian society” (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 49). 
Superimposed on this geo-economic divide is a religious dimension, as  the 
northern part of the country has a predominantly Muslim population, as is the case in 
Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire (Assefa, 2001). In all, 97.3% of Ghana’s Muslim population 
are found in the three northern regions of the country, with the Northern Region alone 
accounting for 35.2% of the national Muslim population (Ghana Statistical Service, 
2012). While most of the conflicts in Ghana are not about religious rivalry per se, religion 
[has nonetheless] played a role in reinforcing the fault lines in the conflict[s]” (Assefa, 
2001, p. 167). In the interethnic conflicts of northern Ghana, for instance, ethnic identities 
of the belligerent groups are often confounded with the dominant religious affiliations of 
the members of the ethnic groups. In some cases, communities at war consciously invoke 
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the emotive force of their dominant collective religious identity as the mobilizing force 
for fighters and the glue that holds them together against their common enemy (Kirby, 
2006-2007).  
In addition to the geopolitical and ethnic tensions that keep Ghana’s peace fragile, 
Ghana also has a history of civil resistance to state rule or misrule. Such mass actions 
date back to the protests by the Aborigines Rights Protection Society of West Africa 
organized against the colonial government through to violent agitations that the 
Convention People’s Party organized as it championed the strikes and demonstrations in 
the struggle for independence (Morrison, 2004). Strikes and protests against military rule, 
especially in the 1970s through the 80s, were also instrumental in forcing military 
governments to change their courses on crucial national issues. In 1979 alone, 
professionals, university lecturers, students, and politicians of all political affiliations 
joined hands to organize more than 80 separate strikes in the spade of four months to 
demand political changes from the military junta of the Supreme Military Council 
(Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1982). Similarly, spades of strikes and demonstrations by 
students and other professionals triggered and propelled the decision of the PNDC 
government to initiate a return to constitutional rule in the late 1980s through the early 
1990s, despite its initial resistance to the idea of ever handing over power.  
As a sequel to these civil actions the PNDC government initiated the 
decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other 
local government structures, in the hope that “…the democratisation of national politics 
may diffuse the incessant security threats, unify the people, and give the P.N.D.C. the 
domestic support required for social transformation” (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 625). The 
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decision was also designed to address the perceived lack of legitimacy of the PNDC 
government, which fueled the incessant attempts by armed groups to overthrow it.  
Several of the otherwise peaceful demonstrations and strikes in the country’s 
history turned violent as governments and state functionaries resorted to the use of force 
to quell them. In the 19970s, for instance, “…the excessive use of force by the 
government in subduing demonstrations on secondary school and university campuses” 
(Chazan & Le Vine, 1979, p. 187) became the norm anytime the students took to the 
streets to protest against one issue or the other.  In the 1980s, the PNDC government had 
frequent running battles with students, most of which turned violent. The government 
repeatedly closed down the country’s universities in an effort to break the organizational 
capacity of the students, keep them at home, and off the streets (Akonor, 2006). Similar 
violent government-civilian confrontations continued into the early days of the return to 
democratic governance in the 1990s. In 1994, a peaceful march to demand the liberation 
of the broadcast airwaves by supporters of Radio Eye, a private radio station set up in 
defiance of the reluctance of the government to license private FM broadcast radio 
stations to operate, turned violent when unidentified assailants, believed to be associated 
with the government, attempted to block the demonstrations (Nketia, 2013; Public 
Agenda, 2005). In 1995, popular discontent and protests against the introduction of the 
Value-added Tax system culminated in the Kumepreko (i.e. “just kill me”) and 
Siemepreko, (i.e. just burry me) demonstrations. These turned violent with several people 
killed (Osei, 2000). 
Student activism on the political front has been an epicenter of civil unrest in 
Ghana. Starting off from a position of non-engagement, it witnessed increasingly super-
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active engagement over time. Finlay (1968) remarked that before the 1980s, “…unlike 
[…] in many developing nations where students have been a significant force in making 
or breaking governments” (p. 51), Ghanaian students remained largely apathetic to the 
political life of the country. Even when students engaged the state on political grounds, it 
was usually the government that initiated the engagements (Finlay, 1968). Finlay 
attributed the absence of student activism in the 1960s, in part to “…the strong Ghanaian 
tradition of deference to authority [which had] mitigated against student hostility and 
protest” (Finlay, 1968, p. 55). It would seem, however, that cooptation in a suffocating 
political environment rather than deference may have explained the seemingly apathetic 
response of students to political life in the 1960s.  
Since the 1970s, students have been at the forefront of political agitations that 
have made and unmade governments. While students were part of Nkrumah’s support 
structure (Hettne, 1980; Chazan & Le Vine, 1979), they were in the forefront of civil 
society opposition to the Union Government concept of the Acheampong regime (Hettne, 
1980).  Similarly, under the auspices of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), 
they championed the agenda of Rawlings’  Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
; constituted the base for the June 4th Movement; and led the demonstrations against the 
Limann regime that paved the way for, and gave a legitimate voice to the junta that 
constituted the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to overthrow the Limann 
government in 1981(Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Kpessa, 2007). The students were, 
ironically, also pivotal in the demonstrations that eventually forced the PNDC to launch 
the processes of returning the country to constitutional rule (Kpessa, 2007). In these 
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strikes and demonstrations some lives were lost and organizers were subjected to human 
rights violations of all kinds, especially under the military regimes. 
In recent times, contestation for political space and power in Africa has shifted 
from the battle grounds and the use of coups d’états to the ballot boxes. Consequently, 
geo-ethnic politics have triggered election related violence in several countries in Africa 
since the re-introduction of democratic rule in the 1990s. Recourse to violence has been 
unavoidable, especially in many instances where results of presidential polls have been 
too close to call or the potential for interethnic or interregional transfer of political power 
is eminent. In Togo the sudden death of the northern political strongman, Gnassinbge 
Eyadema, while holding onto power, and without a clear successor, had revived the hopes 
of the longtime political rivals in the south to recapture power. In the compromised 
elections that followed the forcible imposition of Faure Gnassigbe as a successor, up to 
800 people died in the post-electoral disputes of the results and the violence that followed 
the declaration  of Faure Gnassingbe as the winner (France24, 2010; Noyes, 2013).  In 
Madagascar, similar elections in 2013 led to incidents of violence with some loss of life 
(Today's Newspaper, 2013). In the 2011 elections in Nigeria more than 500 people died, 
another 17,000 people were internally displaced, and 360 others were injured in post-
election violence in eight northern states (BBC News, 2011a; CNN Wire Staff, 2011). In 
Cote d’Ivoire’s election of 2000, disputes over the winner of the elections culminated in 
the first civil war in 2002 that split the country into two for eight years. Earlier in 2000, at 
least 170 people died in electoral related violence in October with another 42 recorded 
dead in the December of the same year (Skogseth, 2006). Attempts to resolve the crisis 
through another presidential election in 2010 deepened the political and social rift in the 
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country. The Independent Electoral Commission declared Alassane Ouattara as winner of 
the elections, while the Constitutional Court routed for Laurent Gbagbo as the winner 
(BBC News, 2011b; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2011).  It took another civil war, with the 
backing of the French army on the pro-Ouattara side, to oust President Gbagbo, at the 
cost of 3,000 lives, 200,000 refugees, and thousands more internally displaced (Djoman, 
2013). Kenya’s election in 2007 ended in violence when Mwai Kibaki was declared 
winner. Similarly, Mugabe’s win in Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential elections also ended 
in violence (Amnesty International, 2008).  
Violence has been part of Ghana’s, hotly contested and contentious elections 
since 1992 (The Center for African Democratic Affairs, 2012) as well. The country’s 
return to multiparty democracy compelled the PNDC to shed its military image and 
transform itself into a political party christened the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC). Other members and sympathizers of the PNDC formed other political parties that 
all retained Flt Lt J. J. Rawlings as their presidential candidate. To ensure victory for the 
PNDC coalition, the electoral process was tightly controlled with legal limitations on 
funding amounts and sources for political parties (Oquaye, 1995a). The scheduling of the 
elections was similarly configured to make the presidential elections come several weeks 
before the parliamentary one. After Rawlings was declared winner of the 1992 
presidential elections, all the major political parties, except those affiliated to the PNDC, 
boycotted the parliamentary elections over protests of perceived manipulation of the 
electoral process and the attendant rigging of the presidential race in favor of J.J 
Rawlings. The boycotts nearly derailed the redemocratization process.  
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The 2000 elections marked a crucial turning point when the constitutionally 
imposed term limit mandated the exit of J.J. Rawlings, whose name and face had 
dominated the national politics for nineteen years. With the eminent exit of Rawlings, 
however, came the prospect of transfer of power from the hitherto dominant political 
force, the Ewe supported PNDC/NDC (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), to a different party - the 
Akan-based New Patriotic Party (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). This eminent change in the 
political landscape increased the stakes in the elections, especially when J.J Rawlings 
declared that should the NPP win the elections, “…there would be a 'fight' because he 
was not prepared to hand over to 'rogues and thieves” (Oquaye, 1995, p. 263). When the 
NPP did win, the transfer of power from the NDC to its arch rival political party, the New 
Patriotic Party, was also almost aborted. A plan to fake an invasion of the country as the 
pretext for placing it under a state of emergency, and thereby cancelling the results of the 
elections was hatched. The country escaped a return to military rule only by the 
intervention of one brave military officer who reportedly sprang a surprise visit on the 
coup plotters and ordered that they abandon their scheme (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012; The 
New Crusading Guide, 2012). In 2008, the election was won by the slimmest of margins 
– 40,000 votes. The country was brought to the brink of war when the NDC, fearing they 
would lose the elections, began to mobilize its supporters and “troops …to make the 
country ungovernable” (Ofori-Adeniran, 2012).  
Of the six successive elections since the return to democratic rule in 1992, 
however, the 2012 elections was the one that brought the country closest to war. Two 
political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the Convention People’s Party, refused to 
recognize the results of the 2012 Presidential elections that the Electoral Commission 
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declared. They alleged that the results were flawed by massive and systematic fraud 
perpetrated by the collusion of the Electoral Commission and the ruling National 
Democratic Congress. To prove their case, the NPP went to the Supreme Court, as the 
Constitution prescribes, to demand the annulment of the results (Daily Guide, 12 
December 2012; Jale & Antwi, 2012) on the grounds that some “…1,340,000 votes cast 
for Mr Mahama - enough to swing the outcome in favour of Mr Akufo-Addo” (BBC 
News, 7 January, 2013) were illegitimate votes or votes wrongly assigned to John 
Mahama from the votes of other parties. Subsequently, the NPP amended its writ to call 
for the annulment of results of the presidential elections in “11,916 Polling Areas… 
instead of the 4,709 in the original petition” (Owusu, 2013, p. 3). If granted, this would 
have been enough to reverse the declared results to “bring John Mahama’s total valid 
votes cast to 39.1% (2,473,171) and Akufo-Addo’s to 3,775,552; making him (Akufo 
Addo) the clear winner by 59.69%” (Owusu, 2013, p. 3). 
Few believed the NPP would actually go to court to seek to reverse the results of 
the elections. However, when the party executed its intent and actually filed the petition, 
that act raised political tensions and the stakes for peace in the country. The outcome of 
the court decision would be pivotal for Ghana’s peaceful and democratic credentials, 
since this was the first time ever that a legal challenge tested the limits of Ghana’s 
constitution, the electoral laws, and election management systems. Many feared the 
outcome of the petition, whichever way it went, would not be accepted by the losing 
party.  
The televised election petition travelled eight (8) months in the Supreme Court, 
with FM radio stations across the country providing coverage of the actual proceedings as 
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well as soliciting and broadcasting views and comments from all parties in court. The 
contending political parties took advantage of this unbridled media coverage of the trial 
to take their case to the court of public opinion, as various spokespersons on both sides 
freely dished out their personal opinions or made statements that were sometimes 
prejudicial to the legal process. The trade in insults and prejudicial statements inflamed 
passions and heightened tensions in the country (Ofori, 2013; Yayra, 2013) . The 
Supreme Court had to invoke its power to convict and sentence people for contempt of 
court before it could rein in the press court phenomenon (Joyonline, 2013).  
So tense was the situation that before the date for judgment was announced, 
media houses brimmed with calls for peace. Mosques, churches, and other faith-based 
organizations launched prayer sessions; civil society groups organized meetings and 
workshops to call for peace; traditional rulers and all recognizable groups seized every 
opportunity by the minute to call for peace before and after the verdict was given. 
Nonetheless, media coverage of the fear of violence created so much panic that some 
people started to withdraw their monies from banks; make plans to travel out of the 
country; or stock up provisions in anticipation of a war (Adom FM, 2013). Airlines 
operating in the country to foreign destinations were alleged to be all fully booked as 
people scrambled to leave the country before or shortly after the verdict was read (The 
Herald Newspaper (2013). The government took the cue and put 32,000 heavily armed 
Police Officers and several thousands of military patrol personnel into the streets across 
the country, with particularly heavy presence in anticipated flashpoints such as Accra, 
Kumasi, and Tamale (Myjoyonline, 2013b). 
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When the Supreme Court justices delivered their verdict, a split decision saw the 
petition thrown out by a majority vote of the judges. The lead petitioner, the Presidential 
Candidate of the NPP, immediately called President Mahama, whose election he was 
contesting, to congratulate him. At a Press Conference, he announced that even though he 
disagreed with the judgment, he would nonetheless accept it, and foreswore his option for 
seeking a judicial review on the matter. Although this gesture doused the tensions, it was 
far from abetting anxiety and fear of war, as several factors contributed to keep tensions 
high.  First was a report that the judgment delivered in open court was amended in 
chambers to correct an error that gave a 6-3 ruling on one of the issues at trial. Media 
announcement of the correct ruling of 5-4 raised concerns about the accuracy of the entire 
judgment. The legality of correcting a judgment in chambers was also debated 
passionately (Baneseh, 2013).  Second, public perception that the judgment was 
politically influenced received support from no less a person than the lead counsel for the 
third respondent in the case, the National Democratic Congress. The counsel said in a 
post-trial television program that one of the judges was politically blinded in his 
judgments because he was appointed under President Kuffuor. Kuffuor was President of 
Ghana on the ticket of the NPP, whose members were the petitioners in the case. The lead 
counsel for the NDC accused the cited judge of consistently siding with the petitioners 
(Public Agenda, 2013). This accusation triggered counter accusations that three of the 
judges who consistently threw out all the cases of the petitioners were also appointed 
under the NDC regimes.  
Allegations of corruption of some of the judges who sat on the case heightened 
when a member of the legal team of the NPP also said on a hosted radio program that the 
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judgment was corrupt (Otchere-Darko, 2013; Radioyzonline.com, 2013). Another 
allegation in one of the private media that the Asantehene, the paramount chief of the 
Akans was implicated in the bribery of some of the Supreme Court judges to deliver 
judgment in favor of the ruling party (Myjoyonline, 2013c, 2013d) further fueled 
perceptions that the judgment was not without political influence. Subsequent allegations 
in a leaked tape recording from a Deputy Minister of Communication that a Minister, 
whose husband happened to have been the lead counsel for the President in the election 
petition, played an influential role in securing the pro-government judgment from the 
judges re-ignited the perception of collusion and corruption between the government and 
the judges in the determination of the case (Daily Guide Reporter, 2013; New Statesman, 
2013). This prompted the NPP to file a request for probe into the Supreme Court’s 
handling of the election petition case (Essel, 2013), despite denials put out by the person 
who was alleged to have mediated the collusion on the case (The Chronicle, 2013). 
Be that as it may, the trade in allegations of political bias among the judges who 
heard the election petition did not only give political colors to the judgment and thereby 
erode public confidence in the legitimacy of the judgment; it extended the polarization of 
the country beyond the frontiers of the last bastion of democracy – the judicial system.  
The refusal of Tsatsu Tsikata, Counsel for the NDC, to apologize for his statement that 
one of the Supreme Court Justices was biased by his political colors (T. Tsikata, 2013), as 
well as Gabby Otchere Darko’s insistence that the supreme court judgment was corrupted 
(Otchere-Darko, 2013) sparked speculations on both sides about the ability of the 
judiciary to be neutral and objective in their judgments in future electoral disputes. Some 
interpretations of the verdict in the media concluded that the Supreme Court’s rejection 
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of the petitions gave the impression that the judiciary had actually sanctioned the alleged 
irregularities as non-issues, and therefore, such malpractices can be accepted as valid 
electoral practices (Odoi-Larbi, 2013).  Regardless of the validity or otherwise of these 
perceptions, the trades of accusations and counters in respect of the perceived collusion 
and corruption in the election petition case tarnished the image of the judiciary as an 
impartial arbiter in electoral disputes. Some commentators averred that the judiciary 
could no longer be trusted as the last arbiter in future electoral disputes (Adofo, 2013). 
This view further undermined public confidence in the judicial process (Adofo, 2013; 
The New Statesman, 2013).  
While the worst for Ghana in respect of the 2012 election petition seems to have 
passed without violence, concerns over the import of the remarks by the legal experts on 
both side of the election petition pose grave questions for the future conduct of elections 
in the country. If the statement that the judgment was corrupted could be substantiated, 
what would it mean for subsequent elections? Would that mean the judiciary is to be 
ignored in the future in electoral disputes? Does this mean going to court is no longer an 
option for deciding electoral disputes? If so, what is the final arbiter in electoral disputes, 
if the judiciary cannot be trusted to deliver justice fairly?  
Away from the national capital, election related violence is common, especially in 
locations where local politicians have ridden on the back of pre-existing chieftaincy and 
land conflicts to further their political interests (IRIN News, 2008a). The Bawku conflict 
between the Kusasis and the Mamprusis, for instance, has served as the pendulum that 
determined the political fortunes of all political leaders in that constituency since 1992. 
Candidates from all political persuasions “capitalise on the Bawku conflict for political 
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gains” (Dramani, 2009). In December 2001, sixty people were reported dead, 2,500 
displaced, and at least 190 houses burnt down when the conflict erupted in relation to 
local government elections (Ghana Review, 2001; Lund, 2003). Other localities have 
reported similar recurrence of election related violence. In 2008, supporters of the two 
major political parties in the country “…vandalised registration centres on 2 August and 
gun shots were heard in Tamale, the capital of the northern region, during voter 
registration” (Ghana Elections, 2008). Similar clashes four days later in the Volta Region 
left one person wounded. In September of the same year, the re-eruption of the electoral 
violence in Tamale left several houses in char, with “…walls riddled with bullets, and 
burnt cars [marking the extent of the]  violence in the Northern Region's capital of 
Tamale” (IRIN News, 2008b). In election years, the use of violent language in the form 
of threats, harassments, and actual calls to violence in the print and electronic media 
across the country is common. However, such violent language is more pronounced 
before the launch of political campaigns and shortly after the conduct of the elections. In 
2012, supporters of the two main political parties, the NDC and the NPP, accounted for 
74.6% of the reported cases of use of election-related violent language and threats of 
violence in the media (Amponsah, 2013).  
In sum, Ghana has all the internal geopolitical contradictions and political 
tensions that have prone other countries to the eruption of violence as conventional 
theories on conflict predict. It shares the same historical, ethno-demographic, as well as, 
inter and intra-ethnic confrontations that have triggered very violent and protracted 
conflicts in many African countries. Yet somehow, the country has successfully staved 
off sustained violent conflicts at the national level. She has managed to keep her 
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protracted and violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts localized rather than escalated into 
national level ones. Electoral disputes brought the country to the brink of war in 2008 and 
2012, but the country managed to pull back from descending into the outbreak of full 
scale national level violence.  
Questioning the Peace 
 
Despite this achievement, Ghana has been through and still is going through 
multiple challenges with keeping the peace. The country is rated 71st on the 2012 
Positive Peace Index (PPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), with a score 
of 3.021. While this is below Bostwana (rated 43rd with a score of 2.561), South Africa 
(51st, with a score of 2.684), Namibia (53rd with 2.783) and Tunisia 62nd with a score of 
2.915, Ghana tops the West Africa list, ahead of Senegal ranked 88th, Mali 98th, Burkina 
Faso 102nd, and Nigeria 106. This notwithstanding, Ghana is still counted among the 
“…top ten positive peace deficit countries [which are defined as being] relatively 
peaceful but lack the institutions to adequately deal with external shocks” (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 89, Table 3.4). In other words, Ghana’s peace is very 
fragile as the country can easily descend into violence, given the right shocks. Yet, 
somehow, Ghana has always managed to pull back from the cliff of descending into 
national level violence right where other countries have taken the plunge.  
 
Statement of Research Problem 
 
The foregoing shows that contrary to the perception of Ghana as a peaceful 
country, it has had its fair share of confrontational politics (Finlay, 1968) and national 
level political agitations. Ghanaians are neither apathetic nor shy of confrontational 
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engagements in the public sphere. On the contrary, “…it is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to prevent Ghanaians from openly and forcefully expressing themselves on 
important political issues” (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The localized frequent outbursts of 
violent conflicts around the country only suggest that Ghana may have been quite 
successful in containing such violent conflicts. However, such successful suppression of 
conflicts from escalating into national level violence is neither an indication of nor a 
guarantee for peace. In contrast, Ghana’s peace is neither secured nor can be taken for 
granted. There are enough reasons for it to have descended into war; and the potential 
violent national level conflict remains real.   
Ghana’s outlier position triggers a need to find out what kinds of threads have been 
so successful at holding the stitches of nationhood together. Hence some explanations on 
why and how Ghana has managed to remain relatively peaceful despite its internal 
centrifugal ethnic, political, economic, and socio-cultural challenges are required. 
Questions that require answers are: What has made it possible for Ghana to avoid violent 
national conflicts, despite having all the ingredients that have plunged other countries 
with similar mixes of economic, social, and ethno-political challenges into violence? 
What has enabled Ghana to more successfully manage its internal centrifugal ethno-
political and geo-economic forces of division than other countries with the same or 
similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and political 
challenges? What are the constitutive elements of the threads and stitches that seem to be 
holding Ghana together? Are these threads and stitches peculiar to Ghana? If so, what 
makes Ghana’s case special, given that it has similar ethnic groupings with its neighbors, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Togo, both of which have witnessed sustained national level political 
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violence? Are Ghana’s threads and stitches replicable in or exportable to other politico-
cultural settings? If not, why not? If yes, why has the osmosis of these values across 
national boundaries, especially those contagious to Ghana, not happened? 
 
Research Questions 
 
 
The Core Research question (CRQ) that this research seeks to answer is: What 
makes it possible for Ghana to avoid violent national conflicts, when other countries with 
the same or similar mixes of historical and contemporary socioeconomic, cultural, and 
political systems of exclusion, deprivation, and disparities have descended into violent 
conflicts? Under this core question, the research uses four sub questions to guide its 
probe of the views, perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of participants on what keeps 
Ghana from descending into national level conflicts. The sub research questions (SRQ), 
which are further detailed through survey questionnaires and the guides for the key 
informant interviews, are: 
SRQ1asks: What factors have enabled Ghana to keep the peace, when it has the 
same or similar mixes of factors that have plunged other countries into violence?  
SRQ2 asks: What systems have prevented local conflicts from escalating into 
violent national level confrontations?  
SRQ3 asks: What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into 
national level electoral violence?  
SRQ 4 asks: To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and 
between Ghana’s 52+ different ethnic groups? 
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The CRQ and SQRs provide the broad framework of inquiry in this study. The 
survey questionnaires and interview guide for the Key Informant Interviews use further 
sub questions to explore answers to the CRQ and the SQRs under the following broad 
levels of enquiry:  
1. Socio-economic and political force fields level of enquiry:  What factors and 
forces have enabled Ghana to keep the peace despite having similar contextual issues that 
led other countries into violence? Sub questions to be pursued are: 
a.  How differently have the same historical and contemporary factors played 
together to avert violent national conflicts in Ghana but not in other countries? 
b. What approaches has Ghana used to more effectively manage the same balance 
of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts? 
2. Systems level of Enquiry: In the absence of a sustained constitutional order for 
much of Ghana’s life as an independent state, and amidst the proliferation of violent local 
conflicts across the country, as well as, the widespread distrust of state actors, 
institutions, and processes: 
a. What systems could have been in place that regulated interethnic 
engagements to prevent the escalation of local conflicts into violent national level 
confrontations? 
b. What contributions, if any, have individuals and/or institutional actors 
(local, national, or international; governmental, civil society, or religious) made to the 
maintenance of peace in Ghana? 
c. What kinds of threads (rules, regulations, shared values, cultural mores, 
etc.) have held together the stitches of peace for Ghana?  
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3. Elections and Contested Arenas level of Enquiry: Successive elections without 
widespread violence since 1992 have been used as a major indicator of peace in Ghana. 
Yet, elections in Ghana and their outcomes have been split along regional, ethnic, and 
religious lines. All but one have been keenly contested and largely won by very slim 
margins. Despite contestation and/or rejections of the outcomes, elections have not 
triggered widespread violence at the national level in Ghana.  
a. What makes it possible for Ghana to pull back from descending into full scale 
national level violence before, during, and after elections, despite:  
i) the contestations and local violence associated with electoral disputes? 
ii) the regionally/ethnically partisan nature of electoral processes and their 
outcomes? 
b. How have aggrieved political parties managed their dissents on elections and 
electoral processes to prevent them from escalating into national level violent conflicts? 
c. What restrains aggrieved political parties from taking their grievances to the 
street?  
4. Culture and Values level of Enquiry: The tendency towards violence or peace are 
said to be learned behaviors.  
a. To what extent is a cherishing of peace a shared value within and between 
Ghana’s 52+ different ethnic groups? 
b. What role, if any, do traditional leaders play in maintaining Ghana’s peace? 
5. Contribution of Formal Education 
a. What contribution, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in 
creating a culture of peace?  
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b. What tenets of the formal educational system of Ghana may have contributed to a 
culture of peace in Ghana? 
c. What behaviors could the formal education system in Ghana have fostered that 
promotes a culture of tolerance in Ghana more than in other countries?   
A much detailed set of questions is provided in the Appendices 5 and 6.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Explaining Ghana’s Peace – theoretical challenges 
 
Various theories have tried to explain why Africa is trapped in some of the world’s 
most violent and protracted conflicts. Theories of ancient hatreds (Kaplan, 1993); out-
group resentments (Petersen, 2002); fear-induced self-protection initiatives (Lake & 
Rothchild, 1996; Posen, 1993); or the manipulation of ethnic identities for political ends 
(Gagnon, 1994; Kaufman, 2001), among others, have been used to explain the prevalence 
of violent conflicts in some countries, especially those in Africa that have suffered violent 
and protracted unrests. Africa’s rich natural resource base has also offered a theoretical 
frame for explaining the prevalence of violent conflict on the continent (Collier, 2007). 
Others have argued that relative political and economic deprivations are the sources of 
intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts (Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Stewart, 
2005).  
Generally, relative deprivation theorists focus on the horizontal political and 
economic inequalities afflicting Africa’s multi-ethnic population groupings as the source 
of the conflicts. In particular, economic deprivation theorists emphasize a vicious cycle in 
which “… poverty begets conflict and conflict begets poverty” (Stewart and Brown, 
2007, p. 219; see also Rice, Graff, & Lewis, 2006). However, “it is not absolute poverty 
but relative poverty” (Stewart and Brown, 2007 p. 228) they argue, that instigates violent 
reactions as segments of population groupings compare their economic fortunes and 
opportunities to what their compatriots have. Political deprivation theorists, on the other 
hand, focus on political inequalities as they contend that political exclusion in the post-
colonial state in Africa is the source of conflict (Levy, 2007). According to this view, 
29 
 
 
 
after African states fought to obtain their independence “…segments of some of these 
states now fight …to make sure that their destiny is in their own hands” (Zartman, 2001, 
p. 219). 
Building off the theories of relative political and economic deprivation, other 
theorists attach a religious dimension to the conflicts in Africa by pointing out that across 
Africa “… more heavily Muslim regions are often relatively marginalised economically 
and politically and that leaves plenty of ground for radicalism to sprout” (Tostevin, 2011, 
p. 1). This argument on the pauperization of religious communities has become a popular 
framework for explaining the conflicts in Nigeria (Adesoji 2011; Herskovits, 2012; 
Tostevin, 2011), and Cote d’Ivoire (Collett, 2006; Dabalen, Kebede, & Paul, 2012). In 
both Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire the transposition of geo-ethnic poverty disparities over 
religious identities along the north-south boundaries led to the transformation of 
“religious  polarization … into identity polarization [which] made civil war inevitable  
due to the religious fault lines” (Dabalen et al., 2012, p. 3).  
Fearon & Laitin (1999) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004), however, argue that there is 
little evidence to support the ancient hatred, relative deprivation, and collective grievance 
theories of civil wars and protracted internal conflicts that the foregoing theories have 
proffered.  In their view, ethnic diversity, ethno-geopolitics, and deprivation theories do 
not seem sufficient to explain the causes of civil wars, especially since they do not broach 
the topic on why some countries with similar or the same mix of ethnic and economic 
factors do not experience civil wars whilst their neighbors do. Instead, they believe that 
weak states create opportunities for insurgencies, especially where dissent groups have 
access to commercial natural resources that can fund their rebellions. This weak state 
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theory finds support in Galtung (in Augsburger, 1992) and Wehr (1998) who consider the 
process of state formation in post-independent Africa as the genesis of much of its 
conflicts. It also finds support in Mamdani (1996) who faults colonial rule for much of 
post-independence Africa’s conflicts. In particular, Mamdani chronicles how colonial 
administrators used territorial and institutional segregation and the active promotion of 
“decentralized despotism” (1996, p. 39) to derail the evolution of Africa’s governance 
and development trajectory, thereby creating the conditions for interethnic resentments 
and rivalries.  
Ametewe (2007) builds on Mamdani’s proposition and points out that pre-colonial 
interethnic relations often “…tampered with values of mutual respect and rules for 
accommodating one another” (p. 27). However these values were often destroyed through 
the deliberate acts of the colonial administrators. Hawkins, (1996) and Lund (2003) both 
lend support to this theoretical frame when they point out that in pursuance of the system 
of indirect rule, colonial administrators tinkered with significant differences in the 
sociopolitical organization of the different ethnic groups to create the conditions for inter 
and intraethnic conflicts that have projected into the national politics of the post-
independence state. In recent times, competition for land, political, economic access, and 
religious rivalries have compounded the nature of these conflicts (Weiss, 2005). 
Taking the debate beyond the colonial legacy theories of conflicts in Africa, 
Horowitz (2000) introduces the nature and structure of political contestation in the 
modern state as the source of conflict in much of Africa. He discusses the interplay 
between ethnic parties and political systems based on political parties and argues that 
“societies that are deeply riven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage …tend to throw up 
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party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291). According to this 
frame of thought, increasing competition between ethnic groups within the post-
independence states for access to political power, economic resources, and other socio-
economic opportunities trigger and reinforce ethnic cleavages that become the footholds 
for individuals and groups seeking space and opportunities in the public sphere. As such, 
the public sphere becomes a highly contested arena where ethnic groups try to “outdo one 
another in the struggle for the scarce resources of society; be it power, wealth, status and 
prestige, education, access to land for housing and other economic ventures” (Ametewe, 
2007, p. 28). In other words, interethnic competition for footholds in the public space and 
for access to resources is the basis of conflict in Africa. Toft (2003) agrees with this line 
of reasoning and argues further that the concentration of ethnic groups in defined 
geopolitical spaces heighten the stakes and accentuates the conditions for turf wars 
between ethnic groups. 
While these theories offer some explanation on why Africa is the continent of war 
and violence, they fail to account for the fact that several countries in Africa that have the 
same ingredients of historical, economic, and political inequalities;  natural resource 
dependency; and asymmetric religious configuration of their populations have not 
descended into violent national conflicts as the theories predict. Ghana, for one, has all 
the ingredients that have plunged other countries, such as La Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Togo, to name a 
few, into violent national level conflicts. Ghana also hosts similar historical interethnic 
hostilities and “horizontal inequalities”(Stewart, 2005, p. 6), some of which still throw up 
violent confrontations periodically (Brukum, 2000-2001; Pul, 2003) or become manifest 
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in the struggle for political power in the electoral arena (Chazan, 1982; Craig, 1969; 
Morrison, 2004). Brown (1982) recalls that the existence of “…deep socio-economic and 
cultural cleavages between interacting communities produce mutual resentment and 
thence political confrontation [an argument that] has been frequently used to explain the 
north-south tensions which have dominated the politics of Ghana's eastern neighbour, 
Togo” (p. 46). Within Ghana, the same argument has been used to predict a north-south 
confrontation, with the “…assertions that, even if north-south confrontations have not 
occurred so far, they are surely inevitable and imminent […] north-south conflict is 
merely 'latent' and about to explode” (Brown, 1982, p. 46; see also Ladouceur, 1979). 
With respect to the natural resource dependency theories, it is noteworthy that since 
independence Ghana has remained “… dependent on primary resource-based products of 
gold, cocoa and timber” (Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), 2011, p. 126; see also Bank 
of Ghana, 2010; Williams, 1966). When foreign exchange earnings from timber and 
wood products and other minerals such as manganese, bauxite, and diamonds are added, 
Ghana’s reliance on natural resources for its foreign exchange earnings comes to 82% as 
of mid-2011 (Center for Policy Analysis, 2011). This is more than thrice Collier’s (2007) 
threshold of 23% as the tipping point for resource-based violent conflicts. Yet, Ghana has 
not succumbed to national level violence on account of its dependence on natural 
resources.  
Several theorists have suggested that the existence of horizontal political and 
economic inequalities is not enough to trigger violence. On the contrary, it requires the 
presence of agents of war who are capable of mobilizing the collective grievances of the 
marginalized into war efforts (Hamon, 1965; Stewart and Brown, 2007; Vreÿ, 2010). The 
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prevalence of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts; the visible, persistent, and ever-widening 
poverty gap between the north and south of Ghana; and the bitter political rivalries 
between various parties in the country certainly provide plenty of fodder for predatory 
agents of war to use to foment national level conflicts. Hence, if the postulation on the 
role of agents of war in Africa’s conflicts is true, what explains the absence of any such 
opportunistic leaders in Ghana capable of turning the fault lines of Ghana’s geoethnic and 
economic relative deprivation and horizontal inequalities into motives of war? In 
particular, why have conflicts in the north, the poorest part of the country, not spilled 
over into the rest of the country? Why aren’t there aggrieved regional groups, especially 
from the north and other deprived parts of the country, that articulate a northern agenda to 
stake claims to greater entitlements from the rest of the country? 
The argument that political parties that articulate their agendas and claims for 
access and space in the public sphere on the basis of their ethnic constituencies tend to 
“deepen and extend” (Horowitz, 2000, p. 291) the pre-existing ethnic divisions finds little 
support in Ghana, as well. For, while it is common knowledge that political parties tend 
to have their strongholds in certain ethnic enclaves; and that ethnic affiliations play 
crucial roles in the voting patterns of most Ghanaians (Craig, 1969), these facts have not 
exacerbated the interethnic conflicts to the point of widespread violence as witnessed in 
countries such as Burundi, La Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda. Not even the military 
coup d’états that had ethnic connotations nor the overt stacking of important positions in 
the army and other public services along ethnic lines (Agyeman-Duah, 1987b; Hettne, 
1980) have succeeded in polarizing the country to the point of triggering open interethnic 
violence at the national level. Hence, why Ghana’s manifest inter-ethnic competitions in 
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politics have not resulted in national level violence as in other countries on the continent 
still requires explaining.  
Ancient hatreds and historical interethnic relationships usually infuse ethnopolitical 
competition and serve as the identity marker for ethnic mobilization in the political space 
of the modern state. Even when the political elite tend to be cross-ethnic in the 
composition of their party affiliations, social relationships, and economic ties, ethnicity 
nonetheless remains a strong and emotive rallying point for their supporters who tend to 
have more homogeneity in their geographical enclaves (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010; 
Skogseth, 2006). Hence, in Cote d’Ivoire, Gbagbo’s invention of the ivoirité concept, 
later embraced by Konan Bedie, was an effective rally cry for “the  baoulisation’ of the 
political system, the economy and the army [and the concomitant marginalization and 
political exclusion of the]  predominantly Kru and northern Mande” (Meehan, 2011) 
ethnic groups. In Kenya, ethnicity has been a critical factor in the country’s democratic 
transition from the post Kenyatta-Mwoi eras in the late 1990s (Ndegwa, 1997). This 
ethnicized politics would culminate in the political violence that pitched Raila Odinga’s 
coalition of the Luo, Kalenjin, Kamba and Luhya, among others on the one hand, against 
Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu political base in the 2007 elections (Hawke, 2013; Human Rights 
Watch, 2008; Roberts, 2009).  Ironically, five years on, it is the same ethnicized politics 
that would create the “tyranny of numbers” (Kimemia, 2013, p. 1)from an unusual 
alliance of Kalenjin and Kikuyu politicians to stave off a repeat of the 2007 violence in 
the 2012 elections (Ngunyi, 2013; Kimemia, 2013). While political leaders would deny it, 
Zimbabwe’s political crises are equally mired in ethnic competition, as local politics 
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continue to be read through “ethnocentric prisms” (Dachs, 2009; Phiri, 2013; Sithole & 
Makumbe, 1997).  
As already noted, Ghana has its fair share of similar historical and contemporary 
interethnic competition for political power, with ethnicity defining membership of or 
support for political parties and the voting lines to a large extent (Fridy, 2007;  Nugent, 
1999; Nugent, 2001). Historically, the Ashantis, the single dominant ethnic group in 
Ghana, have fought wars of domination with the Dagombas and Gonjas to the north; the 
Fantes and Nzemas to the south and south-west; the Akyems and Ewes to the East, 
among others (Johnson, 1965). The north in particular has bitter memories of its 
association with the Ashantis, as the Dagomba and Gonja chiefs were bonded to provide 
1,500 and 1,000 slaves each respectively in annual tributes to the Ashantis for a hundred 
years or more. Doubtless, such slaves were supplied through raids among the other ethnic 
groups in the north (Arhin, 1967; Johnson, 1965).  In some cases, “'the Ashanti often sold 
into slavery a whole village full of his people, and […] no-one's life or property was safe 
when the Ashantees were in the country” (Gouldsbury cited in Johnson, 1965, p. 39). The 
memories of these humiliations are kept alive through traditional oral historians who pass 
them on from one generation to the next in the form of songs such as the one recounted in 
Salaga to the effect that “'Every year we had to send 1,000 of our brothers to the Kumasi 
knife, and to the Kumasi King all our money without grumbling'” (Glover cited in 
Johnson, 1965, p. 39). But somehow, these memories of ancient humiliations have not 
pitched the people of the north against the Ashantis in revenge battles; neither has it 
dragged Ghana into violent national confrontations in direct or diffused proxy wars. 
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The political split between the northerners, the Ashantis, the transvolta groups, and 
the coastal grouping in the run up to independence has already been discussed in Chapter 
1. Since independence, political allegiances have been split along ethnic lines. In the 
early years of state formation, northerners coalesced around the Northern People’s Party 
(NPP); while the Ashantis rooted for the National Liberation Movement (NLM). The 
Convention People’s Party was the only party that  provided an umbrella for a coalition 
of some of the coastal and other ethnic groups in the country (Nambiema, 2012).  It is 
noteworthy, however, that of all the historical interethnic competitions for political space 
and power in post-independence Ghana,  the “Ashanti-Ewe rivalry is [the one that has 
lasted into the modern state system and has become] one of the major political divides in 
Ghana” (Nambiema, 2012, p. 32). Consistently, the two ethnic groups have tended to 
veer towards diametrically opposed political axes since the country came together as one 
unit. And this happens under all the civilian and military regimes the country has 
witnessed.  We have noted how the political elite of Transvolta Togoland opposed the 
Nkrumah regime from start. After the overthrow of the CPP in 1966, the military regime 
of the National Liberation Council rapidly descended into the Ashanti-Ewe split when 
Kotoka, an Ewe, was killed in a counter-coup and Afrifa, an Akan, took over as head of 
state (Nambiema, 2012).  When the country returned to civilian rule in 1969, 
Gbedemah’s Ewe-dominated National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) pitched battle against 
the Akan-led Progress Party with Busia as its leader (Craig, 1969). When Flt J.J Rawlings 
took over power after the 1981 coup, the dominance of Ewes in the affairs of government 
gave rise to  “…the widespread perception that the P.N.D.C. had become the preserve of 
the Ewes” (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a, p. 624).  
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With the return to civilian rule since the 1990s, Morrison (2004) has argued that 
ethnicity is not a major factor in Ghana’s political discourse, when viewed against 
election results from 1992 to 2008. He points out that the electoral fortunes of the two 
dominant parties in the country, the NDC and the NPP, have swung with the moods of 
voters in different regions, with both parties making significant inroads into the 
traditional strong holds of their counterparts. Inchino and Nathan (2012) further contend 
that ethnic geographies are more important than ethnic demographics in the 
determination of electoral outcomes, even in remote rural communities, where “theories 
of instrumental ethnic voting” (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) do not seem to work, at least in the 
case of Ghana. According to this view, in multi-ethnic localities, the choice of candidate 
is largely based on voter perception of which candidate is more likely to deliver “non-
excludable” (Nathan, 2012, p. 1) public goods and social services such as roads, schools, 
healthcare, etc. Under such circumstances, voting for “co-ethnics as an instrumental 
action” (Nathan, 2012, p. 3) is not a valid proposition, since voters tend to migrate 
towards the candidate that is more likely to deliver development services, even if that 
candidate is not of their ethnic group. This view affirms in Morrison’s (2004) observation 
about the lack of generalizable and discernible patterns across all regions in Ghana in 
voting outcomes. He argues that differences in stability and fluidity in voting patterns 
between regions make “ethnicity …more difficult to determine, although Volta and 
Ashanti are often deemed to reflect the phenomenon” (Morrison, 2004, p. 429).  
Morrison’s argument is hard to sustained, given that the Volta and Ashanti regions 
have epitomized the ethnic tendencies in voting patterns in Ghana since the return to 
constitutional rule in 1992, with the NDC attracting the label of being Ewe-based while 
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the NPP takes on the Akan-based label (Langer & Ukiwo, 2007). Morrison’s view would 
only hold true when the criterion for making the discernment is the aggregated regional 
votes. However, this aggregated data blurs the picture. This is because discerning ethnic 
tendencies from aggregate votes of regions, especially those that have more cosmopolitan 
natures, is tricky given the masking effect of different levels of migration into the 
regions. For instance the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, and Greater Accra Regions have been 
net recipients of permanent and cyclical migrants from the Eastern, Northern, Upper East, 
Upper West, and the Volta regions of Ghana, as well as, from other countries further to 
the north such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger since colonial times. In contrast, the Eastern, 
Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and the Volta regions are net losers of migration 
(Anarfi, Kwankye, Ababio, & Tiemoko, 2003; Kwankye, Anarfi, Tagoe, & Castaldo, 
2009). Hence, the clearest way to deduce any ethnic tendencies in voting patterns is at the 
constituency levels, as ethnic groups tend to congregate around geographical enclaves at 
the micro-level.  
Viewed from this angle, it becomes obvious that the ethnic concentration of 
populations around certain geographical areas sets boundaries for electoral success of 
political parties; a phenomenon that has become known as the electoral “world banks” in 
Ghanaian political parlance (Anebo, 2001; Ghana News Agency, 2004). Political parties 
associated with the Ashantis have had very hard times winning majority votes in the 
Volta Region. Similarly, parties perceived to have Ewe dominance have had a hard time 
as well getting majority votes in the Ashanti Region.  In the 1969 elections, for instance, 
the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) led by Gbedemah, an Ewe, won 14 out of the 16 
seats in the Volta Region, while the Progress Party, which was associated with the 
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Ashantis, won only two seats in that region (Craig, 1969).  Overall, “…83.5 per cent of 
Ewe voters supported Gbedemah, and Busia got 77.7 per cent of the votes in the 
predominantly Akan regions of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Central” (Brown, 1982, p. 58). 
As Morrison, writing in conjunction with Hong (2006) would later admit, “Ethnic-based 
regional cleavages show much more complex varieties of electoral support for the two 
major parties” (Morrison & Hong, 2006, p. 623).  
This entrenched system of “ethnic block voting” (Jockers, Kohnert, & Nugent, 
2009, p. 2) in the two regions have persisted through the elections of 1980, 1992, 1996, 
2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Since 1996, “three regions remain one-party-dominant 
(NDC): Upper East, Upper West, and Volta [with the Volta Region being virtually] 
noncompetitive, with the opposition [obtaining] under 13 percent in three polls” 
(Morrison, 2004). This trend has prompted the observation that the world bank 
phenomenon and the “…long history of fraudulent voting, amounts to a dangerous time 
bomb of unresolved conflict which could explode in future elections” (Jockers et al., 
2009, p. 1; see also Sikanku, 2008).  
Added to this is the intense and entrenched political rivalry between the duopoly of 
the NDC and NPP, which have dominated the political field since 1992. Given that the 
NDC claims its roots from the Nkrumaist tradition (Kelly & Bening, 2007), it might even 
be said that this rivalry dates back to the split between Nkrumah’s CPP and the United 
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) of the Danquah-Busia traditions, which subsequently 
metamorphosed into the United Party (UP) tradition when the Northern Peoples Party and  
the National Liberation Movement merged after the 1956 elections (Langer & Ukiwo, 
2007; Morrison, 2004). However, the ever tightening competition between the two parties 
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is manifested mainly in the electoral more than the ideological levels. In a field of seven 
presidential candidates, in 2000, candidates of the duopoly (i.e. NDC and NPP) shared 
93.2% of the valid votes between them, with the remaining five candidates splitting up 
the 6.8% of the valid votes left. In 2004, in the first round of voting that had four (4) 
presidential candidates; the NPP and NDC candidates garnered 96.8% of the votes 
between them.  The 2008 presidential race had 8 candidates, but the NPP and NDC flag 
bearers shared 97.05% of the votes between them. Although the results of the 2012 
presidential elections were disputed at the Supreme Court, the trend was repeated in the 
declared and upheld results in which the NDC candidate was declared winner with 50.7% 
of the votes, while the NPP candidate received 47.74%, giving a total of 98.44% between 
the two. This means that the remaining six (6) presidential candidates shared the residual 
1.56% of the votes between them – see summary in Appendix 1. 
Despite this tight dualistic competition between the two main parties, Ghana has 
escaped widespread electoral violence even when the two dominant parties compete over 
margins of win of less than 1% of valid votes cast. In other words, Ghana although Ghana 
has had its fair share of ethnicized violent conflicts in both the northern and southern 
parts of the country; she has been successful in containing such ethno-electoral conflicts 
within localized geo-ethnic spaces (MacLean, 2004). Somehow, “…most of the conflicts 
have been limited to a particular traditional area or region and have not threatened the 
stability of the state” (Tonah, 2007, p. 3). This raises questions about what makes Ghana 
different. How Ghana has been able to do contain its ethno-electoral conflicts when other 
countries have failed is a central question for this study. Why have ancient hatreds or 
historical interethnic competition in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and other countries fueled violent 
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ethno-political conflicts but not in Ghana? Why have previously suppressed groups not 
sought to revenge the bondage they served under other ethnic groups? Why have the 
Ashantis not used their numerical strengths and economic hegemony to try to impose 
their rule on the rest of the country? In short, why has the “tyranny of numbers” 
(Kimemia, 2013, p. 1) not worked out for the Akan ethnic group, which needs only 3% 
more votes from other ethnic groups in presidential elections to add to its 47.5%  
command of the national population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012) to win outright in 
any national elections?  
In apparent response to these pertinent questions, some analysts have suggested that 
rather than engage in open and violent confrontations in the political arena, Ghanaians 
have actively chosen to avoid violence because they have lost faith in the state system. 
According to this view, the  “…great accumulation of unfulfilled promises” (Bush, 1980, 
pp. 86-87) of freedom, justice, and accelerated economic development that many 
expected from independence have bred cynicism and apathy among Ghanaians towards 
politics. In other words, due to state failure to deliver the dividends of independence, the 
majority of Ghanaians have retreated into their shells in their “…desire for a peaceful 
life” (Goody, 1968, p. 339; also see Bratton, Lewis, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) to avoid 
further disappointments with politicians. This withdrawal from the public space has 
created a culture of silence that has effectively stifled open political dissent among 
Ghanaians.  As a result, a “… community of dissent” (Goody, 1968, p. 339) capable of 
turning personal and collective grievances into war efforts does not exist. But if political 
disconnection, apathy, and a desire for peace through conflict avoidance were the only 
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things that keep Ghana from having violent national level encounters, should that earn it 
the accolade of being an oasis of peace? 
Be that as it may, the available evidence does not support the notion that Ghana’s 
peace can be attributed to the avoidance of conflicts. On the contrary, Ghanaian’s are 
politically active and willing to engage with governments, even in violent confrontations, 
to assert their rights and demand accountability from public office holders. Indeed, active 
and assertive political engagement is what enabled Ghana to emerge as the first country 
south of the Sahara to attain political independence.  Notably, Nkrumah’s declaration of 
“positive action” (Sakyi, 2013b) against colonial rule triggered a series of strikes, 
boycotts, and other forms of mass action that culminated in the shooting of ex-soldiers on 
a peaceful march to the seat of government to demand better post-service conditions. A 
desperate act of the colonial government, this 28
th
 February, 1948 killing further fueled 
the mass political activism that culminated in the British decision to grant Ghana 
independence (Austin 1964; Tordoff 1997).  In the post-independence era, students, 
workers, professional associations, and groups of ordinary citizens have not hesitated to 
embark on strikes and demonstrations to press home their demands for responsive 
governance and attention to their particular needs (Finlay, 1968; Osei, 2000).   
In respect of elections as a form of civic engagement, “Ghanaians have not yet 
become so politically disillusioned that they stay away from the polls” (Bratton, Lewis, & 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). On the contrary, active interests and participation in elections have 
often brought the country to the brink of national violence (Center for African 
Democratic Affairs, 2012). Voter turnout in elections has steadily risen from a low of 
53.75%  in 1992 to more than 70% over the subsequent five elections (Electoral 
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Commission of Ghana, 2000; Ghana News Agency, 2008); with the 2012 elections 
registering a turnout of 79% (Institute for Democrarcy and Electroal Assistance, 2012). 
Intense public interest and participation in these elections have occasioned localized 
electoral violence in several places since 1992 (Ochill, 2012). 
Chazan (1982) takes a state-centric view to explaining why Ghana is peaceful and 
attributes Ghana’s peace to the central role the state has played in creating space for civil 
society actors to engage in building peace in the country. She highlights in particular, 
civil society participation in facilitating the peaceful transitioning of political power 
between the major contending ethnic groups in the country. However, Chazan’s view 
begs the question whether state action is the only thread that keeps Ghana together, since 
the centrality of the state in the political space is not peculiar to Ghana. The state plays an 
omnipresent and directive role in all African countries. Ghana is therefore no special case 
in that respect. Indeed, Ghana shares historical and structural colonial legacies with 
countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Why has the state machinery in these 
countries not played the same neutralizing role to prevent national level conflicts in 
them? What makes Ghana different? Besides, civil society groups have been equally 
active and engaging in political transition processes in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, to name a few. Nonetheless, these countries have 
experienced violent national level conflicts during political transitions.  Why has civil 
society engagement resulted in peace in Ghana and not in these other countries? 
Hopp-Nishanka (2012) takes an institutional approach to explaining the peace in 
Ghana and attributes Ghana’s success at averting violent national level confrontations to 
the presence of “peace infrastructure [that brings together diverse agencies to work on] 
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…promoting cooperative problem-solving and institutionalizing a response mechanism to 
violent conflict” (p. 1). Like Chazan, Hopp-Nishanka credits the government for creating 
the peace infrastructure through engineering civil society participation in the public 
space. Hopp-Nishanka’s view is, however, at odds with the historical realities that 
underscore Ghana’s evolution as a nation. First, the peace infrastructure that Hopp-
Nishanka credits for Ghana’s peace is but a recent creation, having coming into existence 
only in the post 1992 democratic era. Hence, it does not explain why Ghana did not 
descent into violent national conflicts prior to 1992. Second, the history of contestations 
between civil society groups on the one hand, and sitting governments since 
independence, on the other hand, for entry into and engagement in the public sphere 
abounds (Sagoe, 2011).  In accord with the Westphalian concept of the State as the only 
and principal actor in the public sphere, Governments throughout the history of Ghana 
have tried to keep civil society groups out of the public sphere. In reverse, these groups 
have had to battle the State to assert their right to be in and to engage actively in the 
public space. The Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference; the Christian Council of Ghana; 
the National Union of Ghana Students; the Professional Bodies Association of Ghana, 
which once comprised the Ghana Bar Association, the Ghana Medical and Dental 
Council, the Nurses and Midwives Council, the Ghana National Association of Teachers; 
to name a few, have all jointly or severally engaged sitting governments on different 
contentious issues (Chazan & Le Vine, 1979). The Catholic Church, in particular, had 
head on coalitions with the Nkrumah regime (Pobee, 1988) on issues of governance and 
human rights.  Similarly, the PNDC regime of Flt Lt. Rawlings had a running battle with 
the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and organs of the church for daring to condemn the 
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military brutalities of the regime and calling on it to hand over power to a transitional 
civilian body (Agyeman-Duah, 1987a). Apart from direct attacks on the persons and 
characters of leading members of the church (Oquaye, 1995b), the Catholic Standard 
Newspaper had its “…licence […] withdrawn when it became a major channel for the 
publication of news which was politically unfavourable to the PNDC” (Rockson, 1990).  
Other faith-based organizations, especially the Christian Council of Ghana,  faced 
similar challenges of their own. The PNDC would later promulgate the  Religious Bodies 
(Registration) Law 221 and its amended version, Law 2989 in 1989, as instruments for 
muzzling the mainstream Christian churches, especially the Catholic Church, which was 
its most ardent critic at the time (Effah-Yeboah, 2012). In particular, PNDC Law 221 
required that all religious bodies, new or old be registered under the law within three 
months of its promulgation or cease to operate thereafter in the country (Human Rights 
Watch, 1990). Registration under the law would have meant submitting to regulation of 
the activities of the religious bodies by the state. Predictably, the religious bodies refused 
to comply with the law.  
Ayee (2003), on his part, credits Ghana’s success at averting violent national 
confrontations during elections to her ability to build “elite consensus” (p. 214), 
particularly through the institutionalization of the Inter Party Advisory Committee 
(IPAC), which provides a forum for political party leaders and officials of the Electoral 
Commission to dialogue on and iron out issues that would otherwise have provided the 
flares that spark violent confrontations. While the IPAC’s interventions may have helped 
to avert electoral disputes in the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, it 
appears to have failed to do so for the 2012 one, whose results have been disputed.  At 
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any rate, the tensions that push Ghana towards the abyss go beyond electoral disputes; 
and the IPAC is only a post-1992 invention in Ghana. Therefore, its existence and role 
cannot fully account for why Ghana has managed to avoid descent into national violence.  
In brief, the various theoretical frames that seek to explain why Ghana has avoided 
descent into national level violence do not fully account for Ghana’s peace. Hence, 
alternate explanations are required to understand how and why Ghana has managed to 
escape the fate of ancient hatreds; the resource curse; inter-ethnic competition for power; 
acrimonious ethno-political contestations; ethno-regional inequalities in socioeconomic 
development, among others, to maintain a face of peace.  
Part of the reason for the failure of contemporary theories to account for Ghana’s 
peace is the fact that much of the literature on why Africa fights within its countries is 
based on the use of the conflict paradigm, which unduly focuses the search for the 
negative generators of conflict rather than the positive elements that keep otherwise 
conflictual groups and communities within states from escalating their conflicts into 
national ones.  In other words, contemporary theories neglect to examine the cases of 
positive deviance in which “…intentional behaviors that depart from the norms of a 
referent group in honorable ways” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004, p. 832) provide 
explanations of why some countries are able to keep themselves from descending into 
civil wars or other forms of violent national conflicts. Accordingly, not much attention is 
given to positive deviant cases such as Ghana, “…whose uncommon behaviors and 
strategies enable them to find better solutions to problems than their peers, while having 
access to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges” (Positive Deviance 
Initiative, 2013, p.1).  
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The limited scholarship on behaviors that promote peace in some settings under 
circumstances that would have led to war in other contexts is also due to the fact that 
peace research has focused mainly on three theoretical frames, namely, integration, 
competition, and polarization (Schmid, 1968). The point of departure for such theories is 
that human interactions are generally centrifugal in nature; hence, ways must be found to 
either integrate conflicting parties, regularize the competition between them, or help them 
acknowledge and work with their polarization, which may be static or dynamic (Schmid, 
1968). However, managing conflicts or making peace through successful programs of 
integration, constructive competition, or nonviolent polarization do not constitute peace. 
Such conceptions lead to an emphasis on the maintenance of law and order or stability as 
the means for achieving peace.  Under this conception, as long as law enforcement 
agencies can keep the incidence of violence low, peace is presumed to exist. This 
conception of peace will “…obviously be in the interest of the status quo-powers at the 
national or international levels [who constantly seek ways to maintain their power, keep 
the status quo unchanged, or manipulate] the underdog so that he does not take up arms 
against the topdog” (Schmid, 1968, p. 223).  
The peace that obtains from such suppression constitutes “Negative peace [which] 
is ‘the absence of organized collective forms of violence’ or the absence of war” 
(Schmid, 1968, p. 223).  In other words, true “...peace is not merely and (sic) absence of 
direct violence (negative peace) but also absence of structural violence (positive peace)” 
(Grewal, (2003, p. 2). Nonetheless, it is this conception of peace that has underscored the 
focus on safety and security concerns in the definition of the Global Peace Index 
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012). Hence, this view of peace as the absence of 
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violence is what has ensured that much of “peace research has been organized around the 
value of negative peace” (Schmid, 1968, p. 224). But as Schmid argues, “…one of the 
important tasks of peace research is to give the concept of peace a more precise meaning” 
(Schmid, 1968, p. 224).  Hence, peace research “…should explain not how manifest 
conflicts are brought under control, but how latent conflicts are manifested” (Schmid, 
1968, p. 219) and managed before they explode into violence. In other words, peace 
research must move away from the conflict paradigm to embrace a peace paradigm that 
offers insights into how and why some communities are able to manage or transform their 
latent conflicts to prevent them from escalating into violence.  
The progression from the concept of negative to positive peace provides a broader 
framework for investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst 
others with the same or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about 
the conflict management systems of the countries in question. Ironically, the concept of 
positive peace, which has been developed as the counterpoint to negative peace, defies a 
single definition, as it is “…an umbrella concept, devoid of meaning of its own, which 
people fill with their own subjective values.”  Given is elastic scope, “positive peace 
means something equivalent to ‘the good life’ or ‘the best state of things’” (Schmid, 
1968, p. 223). The Institute for Economics and Peace (2012), however, “…defines 
positive peace as “the set of attitudes, institutions and structures which when 
strengthened, lead to a more peaceful society” (p. 69). This definition offers a framework 
for examining how peace happens in some contexts but not in others, as it provides 
indicators of “…appropriate attitudes, institutions, and structures which when 
strengthened lead to a nation’s capacity to harmoniously and non-violently resolve 
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conflict” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012, p. 70). It offers a peace paradigm as 
an alternative to the conflict paradigm that has dominated research in peace and conflict 
studies. The peace paradigm emphasizes the fact that “…peace research shouldn’t merely 
deal with the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence at a direct or structural level 
but seek to understand conditions for preventing violence” (Grewal, 2003, p. 4) or 
resolving violence conflict. Secondly, unlike research on conflicts, peace research 
“…values theoretical consistency of norms and values more than empirical validation” 
(Grewal, 2003, p. 2) of some externally determined criteria. In other words, it enables us 
to look beyond the tangible causes of conflict to see the underlying intangible values and 
norms that hold otherwise fractious societies together. 
Byrne and Keashly (2000) use the theory of Social Cubism to provide a 
comprehensive six dimensional approach to examining the interrelationships of factors 
that affect the generation or resolution of conflicts, especially those deriving from a 
protracted and interethnic or inter-territorial nature. This multi-dimensional approach 
compels analysis to move away from the single-strand explanations that often 
characterize the description of the causes of conflicts and the solutions that are usually 
prescribed. It also enables researchers to look across time boundaries to examine how the 
ever changing interactions between historical, economic, religious, demographic, 
political, and psycho-cultural factors interplay to sustain intergenerational conflicts in 
particular. The theory brings out the point that conflicts are not static, but dynamic; hence 
explanations of any one conflict must adopt non- static perspectives.  
Besides providing a multidimensional view of the issues at stake and how they 
interrelate to create and perpetuate the conditions that fuel and sustain conflict or promote 
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peace, the social cube approach recognizes that conflicts are dynamic and the different 
factors affecting any conflict “…will interrelate in dynamically different ways” (Satya, 
2004, pp. 21-22) to influence the evolution of new phases of the conflict.  This is because 
the issues that drive them may take on different meanings and levels of emphasis from 
one period to another. In other words, conflicts do not happen in a vacuum, neither do 
conditions of peace exist out of context; conflict and peace are both creators and creatures 
of the social cube constructed of the six inter-related dimensions of “history, religion, 
demographics, political institutions, non-institutional behaviour, economics, and psycho-
cultural factors” (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1). Hence, given the same set of 
circumstances, the gravitation towards violence or peace is a function of how the mix of 
factors is managed. Managed in certain ways, these factors underscore the triggers and 
sustenance of conflicts. Managed differently, they constitute the basis for peaceful 
coexistence of otherwise conflictual groups. 
Social cubism therefore forces us to “… isolate key factors to show how they 
combine to form complex patterns of ethnic politics” (Byrne & Carter, 1996 p. 1) and by 
extension, its impact on conflict or peace. This acknowledgement of the multi-
dimensionality and dynamism of conflicts sits well with the progression of the perception 
of peace from negative to positive peace, as it provides a broader framework for 
investigating why nations with certain sets of conditions fight whilst others with the same 
or similar conditions do not. It leads us to consider questions about the conflict 
management systems of the countries in question. It brings into focus the nature and role 
that various actors play in the conflict management system of the country since, from a 
systems perspective, conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play 
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different roles in initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). It is 
within this framework that it is pertinent to ask in what ways have the interaction of the 
same factors of historical and contemporary relevance played to keep Ghana from 
degenerating into violent national conflicts? What has Ghana done differently in 
managing the same balance of forces to prevent violent national level conflicts when 
other countries have succumbed to the same pressures?  
Consideration of the conflict management systems in Ghana and other countries is 
critical because, from the perspective of systems theory, conflicts are perpetuated or 
resolved only when members of the conflict system cooperate in some way or the other to 
keep the chain reactions or feedback loops functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007) or alter 
them for an alternate desirable outcome.  By extension, change in the conflict pattern 
such as gravitation towards violence or peace has to be initiated by one or several of the 
parties. Otherwise, the system will keep feeding itself, as  “…patterns, interlocking 
sequences, function of the parties, and methods of processing information” (Wilmot & 
Hocker, 2007, p. 179) all work together to influence the dynamics of the conflict. In such 
cases, either a “morphostatic system designed to sustain the status quo or no change” 
(Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 181) prevails, or a process to move the conflict toward 
“…the runaway spiral” (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007, p. 180) or peaceful resolution emerges, 
depending on the nature and direction of the interactions between the factors.  
In respect of Ghana’s image as a peaceful country, it is essential to be reminded that 
peace is fragile (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012), given the persistence of 
multiple flash points of historical, economic, and geographical inequalities, as well as the 
contentious competition for political power in an electoral system that is the subject of 
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suspicions of collusion and fraud. Hence what is perceived as peace in Ghana may in fact 
be “…negative peace which is essentially the absence of violence” (Galtung in Baruch, 
2012, p. 1; also see Bloomfield, 2003; Schmid, 1968). That notwithstanding, the question 
that arises is – how has Ghana managed to create and maintain its negative peace when 
others with the same or similar mixes of factors have failed to keep this semblance of 
national peace? What factors stitch and hold together Ghana’s negative or fragile peace 
system? 
Since systems, including systems of protracted conflicts or  those of negative peace 
function synergistically, it is essential that we use a holistic approach  to understand “how 
the different parts of the system work together”(von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39). But 
systems are either resilient, with an “…ability to survive and persist within a variable 
environment” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or brittle. The ability of a system to withstand 
pressure or breakup is, however, dependent on its capacity for self-organization or the 
“capacity of a system to make its own structure more complex”(Meadows, 2008, p. 79). 
This, in other words, represents the ability of the system “…to create new structure, to 
learn, diversify, and complexify” (Meadows, 2008, pp. 81) by using sometimes very 
simple rules. Hence, for Ghana to have maintained its fragile peace, it must have some 
inherent capacity to complexify to meet the new challenges that she faced it in every 
generation. What gives Ghana this capacity? Where does it derive the energy for this 
capacity enhancement from? 
While the systems perspective is valid for understanding what factors come into 
play to stabilize, escalate, or resolve conflicts in most settings, it fails to fully explain 
Ghana’s persistence for peace in the absence of durable systems of governance since its 
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independence. The purpose of a system is “…deduced from the behaviors, [of its 
members] not from rhetoric or stated goals” (Meadows, 2008, p. 14). States, as systems, 
are founded on constitutions which are the basic laws, the point of interconnections, as it 
were, between the disparate groups of citizens. Constitutions and associated laws, rules, 
and regulations of the state provide the framework for regulating the behaviors of all 
citizens within the territorial boundaries of the state, as well as, provide guidance for the 
interactions of the state and its functionaries with other states and their members. Since 
becoming a nation-state at independence, however, Ghana has struggled to establish a 
basic and lasting constitutional arrangement. As previously noted, the best part of its fifty 
odd years of existence to date as a nation-state were spent under military rule, as coup 
d’états interrupted attempts to build a culture of democratic governance. From 1957 to 
1992, military juntas that overthrew established constitutions and popularly elected 
governments ruled the country by decrees. Ethnic polarizations were at their zenith 
during these periods, and popular discontent with the military rules expressed themselves 
through strikes and demonstrations that often turned violent. Yet, throughout these 
periods, the revolts did not escalate into sustained violent national level conflicts.  
Besides the military interventions, Ghana has suffered similar discontinuities in the 
development of a brand of constitutionalism as its system of democratic governance. The 
country has consistently flirted with various systems of constitutional rule since 
independence. Starting with the inheritance of the British Parliamentary system at 
independence, Ghana’s constitution changed to the Presidential system under Nkrumah in 
1960; switched back to the Parliamentary system under the 1969 constitution; and back 
again to the Presidential system under the 1979 constitution. Today, it runs a hybrid 
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system that combines elements of a separately elected Executive Presidential system and 
the parliamentary system in which the majority of ministers are chosen from parliament. 
Hence, in the absence of sustained constitutional orders and practice, what systems could 
have been in place that regulated interethnic engagements in the public sphere to prevent 
the degeneration of the tensions into war? 
This notwithstanding, an important contribution of systems theory to our 
understanding of stable chaos or negative peace is the role that subsystems play in 
keeping an otherwise dysfunctional macrosystem staggering along, albeit inefficiently. 
The stability and growth of a system depends on the existence and effective functioning 
of hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing subsystems that accept and 
operate by coordinating instructions from higher level subsystems to create “stable, 
resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82). The hierarchies facilitate the 
work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities are, in turn, directed to help 
achieve the overall goal of the whole system.  Hence, to the extent that the subsystems 
keep functioning, albeit inefficiently due to inadequate guidance from the central system, 
some form of functionality or system performance is still possible. In this regard, it is 
essential to interrogate what role, if any, state and non-state subsystems such as the 
variegated traditional authority systems; religion and faith institutions and systems; 
political parties and their operations; the electoral system; the judicial system; the 
educational system; the family systems; systems of inter-ethnic marriages and migration, 
culture and traditions, economic systems of the formal and informal sectors, among 
others, have played in maintaining Ghana’s peace, however, negative. 
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It is for this reason that the shortcoming of systems theory in explaining Ghana’s 
peace on its face value notwithstanding, its use “gives us the freedom to identify root 
causes of problems and see new opportunities” (Meadows, 2008, p. 2). In this, a key 
guiding principle is that we must look for the most effective and sustainable changes in 
systems at the level of interconnectedness and/or purpose/functions of the system. 
Changes in elements alone will not lead to profound and lasting changes in the behavior 
patterns of the system nor its outcomes,  “unless changing an element also results in 
changing relationships or purpose” (Meadows, 2008, p. 17). Merely changing the people 
involved would not lead to any profound changes. This is why, from the experiences of 
Ghana, changing the leadership of a country alone, whether through the ballot box or the 
bullets of coup d’états has not led to lasting and impactful changes in the way that the 
country operates nor its status as a peace deficient country. Every one of the civilian and 
military regimes that Ghana has had come into office on the promise of righting the 
fundamental structural and systemic deficiencies that have afflicted the country’s 
governance and national development processes. Despite their best efforts, all succeeding 
governments have cited exactly the same reasons to justify taking their turn in governing 
the country. If these leadership changes since 1957 have not succeeded in moving Ghana 
from a perpetual state of fragile or negative peace to a more positive place, what accounts 
for the country’s ability to maintain a kind of equilibrium in balancing the otherwise 
fractious forces that should have torn it apart? Beyond the conceptions of negative and 
positive peace, is there another frame that explains Ghana’s peace? 
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Goals of Research 
 
This research is designed to contribute to the theories of peace. It hopes to create 
greater insights into how and why Ghana has managed to stave off national level violent 
and protracted conflicts when its neighbors in West Africa and other parts of the 
continent have failed to do so. What factors have contributed to sustaining peace in 
Ghana? By focusing on the example of Ghana, the research hopes to initiate the 
unearthing of positive deviant factors that contribute to our understanding of why 
countries that have the same or similar mixes of centrifugal historical backgrounds; 
socio-demographic distributions; ethno-political rivalries and competitions for power; 
and incidents of economic marginalization or exclusions from the development 
processes, do not fight. What factors restrain them from fighting? How are they able to 
manage their internal dissents to prevent them from escalating into national level 
conflicts in the form of violent and protracted civil wars? Insights from Ghana’s 
experiences should inform a search for the constitutive elements of the threads of peace 
that peacebuilders can fall on to stitch together otherwise fractious communities and 
countries in Africa. 
 
Contribution of the Research to the Field of Peace Studies and Peacebuilding  
 
Peace research tends to take statist approaches, placing emphasis on understanding 
what states do or do not do right to promote peace or escalate conflicts into violence. 
While this focus on how states create enabling or disabling environments for peace is 
important, it portends two levels of risks. First, it risks masking how sub-state level 
actions and inactions of citizens, acting as individuals or in groups, impact on a country’s 
peace. Secondly, it leads to the prescription of statist solutions such as constitutional 
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reforms, legal reforms, institutional reforms, organization of elections, and other state-
managed processes as the remedy for conflicts or the prophylaxis for preserving whatever 
peace is in place. In the process, the contribution of nonstate processes such as the stock 
of values, beliefs, and attitudes of citizens between themselves and towards the state; the 
voluntary actions or inactions of groups of citizens within and outside the state 
mechanism that impact, negatively or positively on the conflicts or the peace 
environments are glossed over.  Incidentally, the only way of surfacing such subnational 
processes is to ask the people who operate outside the state system or work from the 
outside into the state system to maintain or escalate conflicts or promote peace.  
By using the peace paradigm to directly engage a broad range of Ghanaians to 
explore their perspectives on how and why Ghana has staved off descent into violence, 
this study hopes to contribute to enriching the literature on what subnational cultural, 
socioeconomic, and ethno-political strands have held Ghana together. Broadening our 
understanding of the sources of Ghana’s peace beyond the state centric process should 
provide signals to how the field of peace research can be enriched through in-depth 
contextual studies of deviant cases such as Ghana’s. For peace practitioners, insights into 
Ghana’s strong and weak points in the causal chain of forces and factors that have 
sustained its peace should provide pointers to other states and societies on what to look 
out for in their specific contexts as potential retooled instruments for peacebuilding or 
resolving conflicts. For Ghana, the findings should provide a framework for re-evaluating 
her peace, and determining what can be done to sustain or enhance it. Hence, this 
research stands to contribute to the literature on peace from both a theoretical and a 
praxis perspective.  
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
General Thrust of Research 
 
Following from the contextual analysis and the review of the literature above, this 
study uses a systems-based peace paradigm as its theoretical frame for investigating 
Ghana’s peace for several reasons. First, “A peace paradigm does not conform to nor 
accept the status quo…” (Yesufu, 2009, p. 83).  On the contrary, it pushes the boundaries 
of investigation to dig into the constructive elements of peace to unveil the nature of that 
peace (negative or positive); how that peace is constructed; who are its architects or 
maintenance agents, among others. Hence, the use of the peace paradigm provides a more 
holistic platform for understanding what keeps Ghana from descending into nationwide 
conflict despite being a positive peace deficit country, with a fragile capacity to absorb 
conflict shocks.  
The holistic approach to this research aligns it with the use of systems thinking in 
peace research. No other theoretical frame has influenced peace research as much as 
general systems theory has (Mesjasz, 1988). Indeed,  “Peace research has long been 
closely linked with General Systems Theory” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 296). As a result, an 
original and lasting “…mutual relationships [exists] between systems theory and peace 
research [as] systems thinking [seems to have] been programmed into the future 
directions of development of peace and conflict studies” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 327) . Hence, 
the intricate  “…interdependencies of systems theory and peace research” (Mesjasz, 
1988, p. 327) provide a comprehensive platform, especially in peace research that adopts 
a grounded theory approach, to unearthing what makes Ghana peaceful when others with 
the same conditions have failed. Harnessing the “…long-standing interdependencies 
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[between peace research and]  systems theory, may stimulate some new solutions, and 
certainly, posit new questions …” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 325) that inform our understanding 
of why Ghana is peaceful.  
Second, from the epistemological and methodological perspectives, the theories that 
have been offered to date to explain Ghana’s peace have been based largely on 
speculative theorization, rather than being empirically rooted in the voices and views of 
Ghanaians to offer insights into how they have managed to keep the peace. This research 
therefore differs from previous ones in its use of multiple frameworks and meta-data 
from desk studies, quantitative surveys, and key informant interviews to bring in the 
voices and views of ordinary Ghanaians on how they have managed to stitch together and 
keep their peace, however, fragile, going.  
Third, in contrast to previous research on why Ghana is peaceful, this research used 
the grounded theory approach to allow the voices and views of Ghanaians to speak for 
themselves on whether they agree on why Ghana is peaceful and how the country has 
managed to stave off violent confrontations at the national level to keep the peace. 
Consistent with the Type 3 peace research categories (Mesjasz, 1988), rooting the study 
in the lived experiences of respondents allows the research to probe and explore the 
deeper meanings and cultural underpinnings, as wells as, the values, beliefs, perceptions 
and attitudes, that more appropriately capture and describe respondents’ views on the 
subject of study. It permits the identification of “Situations in which interconnections are 
cultural, situations dominated by the meanings attributed to [the] perceptions by 
autonomous observers” (Mesjasz, 1988, p. 302) on why Ghana has been successful in 
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staving off violent national level conflicts. This would be the first time anyone has tried 
to explain Ghana’s peace from the perspective of the people.  
Choice of Approach to Research  
 
This study used the grounded theory methodology because it is best suited for this 
research for several reasons. First, the methodology provided an opportunity for the study 
to adopt an open mind in the quest for answers on why Ghana is peaceful. Second, 
grounded theory is concerned with the “fitness” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 164) of the 
theory generated to the context or situation it purports to describe. Consequently, it 
ensures that “the theory [that emerges from the study] should fit the data” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 2010, p. 261), since they would have derived from the data. Thirdly, the existing 
theories that seek to explain why Ghana is at peace are not grounded in the lived 
experiences of the ordinary men and women in the country. The use of the grounded 
theory approach in this study would make the findings reflect the lived experiences of 
ordinary Ghanaians (Glaser & Strauss, 2010). Fourth, use of the grounded theory 
methodology in this study allowed for the simultaneous processes of “generating theory 
and doing social research” (Glaser in Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 159).  
Though the grounded theory approach is more frequently used for the 
development of substantive theory, it can also be used for general theory development 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as it allows for the generation of theory that is best “suited to 
its supposed uses” (Glaser & Strauss, 2010, p. 3).  It also permits the generation of new 
theories, or the modification of existing ones. Hence, findings from this research can lead 
to the validation of existing theories through cross-matching of the data (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) or the emergence of new theoretical perspectives to explain Ghana’s 
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apparent exceptionalism as an oasis of peace. Finally, grounded theory uses the same 
sources of data as other study methodologies. More importantly, the approach is 
amenable to using a wide range of primary and secondary sources of data (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998) that other research approaches may cut out.  Hence, within the broad frame 
of grounded theory methodology for the study, the following approaches were used for 
the collection and analysis of the data: 
Use of Mixed Methods for Data Collection, Analysis, and Reporting: The study 
used both quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures. Mixed method research 
was the best match for the grounded theory approach in this study because it allowed the 
study to “…tap into participants’ perspectives and meanings” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004, pp. 17-18) on the issues under investigation in this research. It also permitted the 
inclusion of “a broader and more complete range of research questions [that provided 
multiple sources of data to enable the researcher to] generate and test a grounded theory” 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp. 21). Used in a grounded theory study, mixed 
methods data collection techniques also provide the possibilities for the use of multiple 
tools and “…documents of all kinds” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 160; see also Creswell 
& Clark, 2011) as data sources, since grounded theory “…encourages the use of multiple 
worldviews, or paradigms (i.e. beliefs and values)” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 13). 
Mixed method research also brings out the voices and views behind the numbers that 
quantitative research alone would otherwise have left out.  
With respect to feasibility and validity of the mixed method approach, Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004) reject the incompatibility thesis which posits that qualitative 
and quantitative methods of research “…cannot be mixed” (p. 14) in the same study. On 
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the contrary, mixed method research draws on “...the strength and minimize[s] the 
weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies” (pp. 11-15). Hence, the 
qualitative component of this research highlighted the context for the responses to the 
quantitative questions. In sum, it provided more evidence for the research findings than 
only either of the methods would have done standing alone.  
Choice of Mixed Method Research Design: Creswell & Clark (2011) identify two 
approaches to designing mixed method research. The “typology-based approach” 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 55) stresses the cataloging of mixed method designs that can 
be useful to the research before choosing or adapting one to suit the research goal. The 
dynamic approach to mixed method research design, on the other hand, picks and 
chooses from an array of mixed method typologies to suit the research needs. Two 
subdivisions emerge from the latter approach – the “systems-based approach” and the 
“synergistic approach” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 59). Systems approach is iterative and 
emphasizes the interconnection between various components of the research process. The 
synergistic approach, on the other hand, allows for the combination of two or more 
research approaches that ensures that the end product of the research is greater than what 
a quantitative or qualitative method alone would have achieved (Creswell & Clark, 
2011).  
With respect to the structuring of the data collection process, Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, (2006) point out that research questions can be structured to allow data to be 
collected concurrently, sequentially, or iteratively. Creswell and Clark (2011), also, 
suggest there are three timing arrangements for data collection – the concurrent, 
sequential, or multi-phase combination.  This notwithstanding mixed methods design for 
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data collection is a continuum of processes. Hence, mixed method research may “…fall 
somewhere in the middle with both fixed and emergent aspects to the design” (Creswell 
& Clark, 2011, p. 55) alternating.  
This study used the “cross-stage mixed-model design” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004, p. 20) or what Creswell and Clark (2011) call the “embedded design” (p.71) in 
which qualitative and quantitative data were collected in the initial phase, through a desk 
study to provide themes and categories that are used for a quantitative survey and a 
qualitative key informant interviews. This multi-phase research process permitted the use 
of multiple methods to unearth the voices and views of a cross section of Ghanaians on 
how and why they have managed to keep the peace in the country. Besides providing 
“convincing answers to the question that the investigation is intended to settle (Thomas, 
2003, p. 7), this approach also enabled the research to generate results that are 
“meaningful to both the researcher and the people in the researcher studies” (Thomas, 
2003, p. 10). The triangulation and saturation of data from multiple sources in the 
research provided a broader range of answers on how and why Ghana has survived the 
temptations to degenerate into nationwide violent conflicts. Hence, apart from creating 
“structure and flexibility” (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 60) for the study, this synergistic 
approach ensured that the combined outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative data are 
greater than the sums of each method standing on its own (Creswell & Clark, 2011). 
 
Data Collection and Study Architecture  
 
To ensure ampleness, constant comparison, complementarity, and data saturation, 
the study adopted the following architecture for the collection and analysis of quantitative 
and qualitative data. 
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i) Desk Study: The study first carried out a review of available documents on 
conflicts and their management in Ghana. These included but were not imited to the 
review of Reports of Commissions of Inquiry into various conflicts in the country since 
the 1980s; library and electronically archived academic literature on conflicts in Ghana 
immediately before and after independence; and newspaper reports from the 1980s. This 
helped to establish the types and nature of conflicts that could have plunged Ghana into a 
nationwide violence and what accounted for their diffusion or non-escalation. 
Preliminary markers of themes and categories emerging from the desk study were used to 
frame questions for the quantitative survey and the key informant interviews. In this way, 
findings from the survey and key informant interviews were used to validate, drill down, 
or reject emergent themes and/or categories from the desk study. 
ii) Quantitative Survey: A nationwide survey on the perceptions, knowledge, 
attitudes, and behaviors of a sample of 1,429 out of the targeted 1,500 interviews 
provided the quantitative data that complemented and reinforced the findings in the 
qualitative data from the study desk study and key informant interviews.  The survey 
collected data that enabled the study to gauge the depth and spread of views, perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviors of a representative sample of Ghanaians on factors that have 
enabled Ghana to maintain the peace. Survey questionnaires were administered in 50 
Polling Areas nationwide selected through the use of the cluster sampling methodology, 
as detailed below and in Appendix 2. The survey questionnaires captured the profile of 
respondents, enabling the research to establish the spread and depth of views expressed 
across the demographic spectrum of respondents. On the substantive aspect of the study, 
the questionnaires covered broad areas related to respondents’:  
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1. Knowledge and Perceptions of whether Ghana is peaceful 
2. Assessment of the role of development on the peace in Ghana 
3. Evaluation of how the respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law impact on the 
peace in Ghana 
4. Views on the effect of the state of gender equality, equity, and parity in the country 
on the achievement and maintenance of peace in Ghana.  
5. Perceptions on the role of democratic participation on the peace in Ghana 
6. Observations on the role of Government in promoting peace  
7. Thoughts on the relationship between religion and peace in Ghana 
8. Opinions on how culture, traditions, and customs impact on the peace in Ghana; and 
9. Attitudes, behaviors, and practices as indicators of the presence of a culture of peace 
in Ghana.  
10. The role of formal education and the schooling system in Ghana in promoting a 
culture of interethnic tolerance, coexistence, and peace among Ghanaians.  
 
Hypotheses for Quantitative Survey 
This study used 14 hypotheses as the frame for a broad investigation into how and why 
Ghana is considered a peaceful country. Table 1 presents the statement of the null 
hypotheses and their associated key variables for the study.  
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Table 1:   
List of Variables and Associated Hypotheses for Quantitative Study 
Variables of the Study Associated Hypotheses 
Participants Knowledge 
and Perceptions on 
peace in Ghana 
Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of 
respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country 
Ho2    There are no differences in the level of perception of 
respondents on the nature and sources of peace 
Ghana enjoys.  
Role of Development on 
peace 
Ho3 Disparities in the distribution of development in 
Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country 
Impact of respect for 
Human Rights and Rule 
of Law on peace 
Ho4   There is no difference in perception on how the practice 
of respect for the rule of law by ordinary citizens and 
public officials contribute to peace in Ghana 
Ho5   There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial 
system in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace 
of the country 
Impact of gender 
equality, equity and 
parity on peace 
Ho6 The level of experience of gender equality and equity 
has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys 
Role of democratic 
participation on peace 
Ho7 The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no 
effect on the peace that the country enjoys 
Ho8   There is no difference in perception of how the 
freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed to the 
peace of the country 
Role of Government on 
peace in Ghana 
Ho9 The role that Government plays in mediating 
conflicts have no effect on the peace that Ghana 
enjoys.  
Impact on religion on 
peace in Ghana 
Ho10 Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana 
enjoys. 
Influence of culture, 
traditions and customs 
on peace 
Ho11 The culture, customs, and traditions of the various 
ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on the peace 
that Ghana enjoys.  
Respondents’ attitudes 
and behaviors on peace 
Ho12 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward 
people of other ethnic or religious groups have no 
effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.  
Role of formal 
education and schooling 
system on peace in 
Ghana 
Ho13 Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on 
the peace that the country enjoys 
 
Personal attitudes, 
behaviors, and practices 
on social cohesion and 
peace  
Ho14 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of 
Ghanaians toward people of other ethnic or religious groups 
have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.  
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iii) Key Informant Interviews: The findings from the desk study provided the basis 
for framing questions for the Key Informant interviews. Besides providing an opportunity 
to confirm or reject themes and categories from the desk study, the key informant 
interviews were used to reach out to representatives of institutions and groups whose 
active engagements in the public sphere may have contributed to the disturbance or 
maintenance of peace in the country. The arcane knowledge of such institutional 
representatives enabled the study to assess the nature and extent of the role of civil 
society organizations and individual actors in developing the peace infrastructure that has 
contributed to peace in Ghana. The key informant interviews also provided the 
opportunity for the analysis of the role of cultural values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes 
that contribute to Ghana’s peace.  
The sequencing of the various stages of the study was designed to provide 
complementarity and triangulation of the data and findings. The various research 
instruments were therefore mutually reinforcing in their design. Qualitative data 
collection was the primary focus of this study. Hence, the study deployed various 
qualitative research tools to capture and categorize the information provided. The 
multiple data sources allowed for the triangulation and saturation of data in the search for 
answers on how and why Ghana has survived the temptations to degenerate into 
nationwide violent conflicts.  
 
Sampling and Sample Size considerations 
 
a) Sample Size for the Survey component: To ensure representativeness and 
high level of confidence in the data generated in the survey, a multi-stage cluster 
sampling approach was used to select respondents. In nation-wide surveys, such as the 
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Afrobarometer studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is usually determined to be 
adequate for ensuring representativeness of the study population and validity of the 
outcomes. This “…substantially larger sample size [is required] to achieve the same level 
of accuracy as a simple random sample” (Murphy & Schulz, 2006, p. 6). For Ghana, 
Afrobarometer’s “randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allows inferences to national 
adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3 
percent with a confidence level of 95 percent” (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p.).  
In this study, a sample size of 1,500 (i.e., n= 1,500) was used. The sample frame 
(N) was the total registered voter population for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary 
elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012). Hence, the 
survey used the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling. This is 
because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the 
population statistics per localities were not yet available at the time of design of this 
study. In contrast, the Electoral Commission compiled a fairly detailed biometric 
electoral register of voters, which provided population data down to community levels in 
all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the country. The electoral register 
and boundaries of the Polling Stations therefore provided a more accurate and up to date 
database for the selection of respondents.  
The survey adapted the 30-cluster sampling methodology that John Hopkins 
University (JHU) developed for use in Knowledge, Practice, and Coverage (KPC) 
surveys. This is a multi-stage cluster sampling approach used to select respondents for 
large population groups.  In this study, the methodology allowed for a fair representation 
of all communities across the country.  Given the wide variation in population sizes 
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between Polling Areas (ranging from n < 500 to n > 150, 000), instead of 30, this study 
selected a cluster of 50 Polling Areas out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas in the country as 
study sites. This larger number of study sites is necessary to compensate for the 
clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socio-
economic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban; 
differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions; 
cultural variations across regions, etc. (Murphy & Schulz, 2006). Appendix 3 provides 
details of the procedures used in the selection of the 50 Polling Areas.  
Level two of the participant selection process was carried out at the 50 selected 
Polling Areas. The study had planned to use electoral registers for the selected Polling 
Areas as the sub sample frame from which interviewees were to be selected. However, 
the Electoral Commission cited legal reasons for its inability to make the register of 
voters for the selected Polling Areas available to the researcher. Hence, to select the 30 
respondents at each Polling Area, the researcher used the spin the bottle method (Core 
Group, 2008; Espeut, 2001) to randomly select the first household from which the first 
interviewee would be identified and interviewed. Details of the procedure is provided in 
Appendix 3.  
 
Sampling Precautions: Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics (Sakyi, 
2013a; Citifmonline News, 2011).  Given the legal challenge to the 2012 Presidential 
election results that pitched the two major parties in a political battle, it was essential that 
all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan bias in the selection of 
the interviewees be dispelled upfront and transparently. In fulfillment of this, Polling 
Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected Polling Areas were 
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invited to participate in the procedure for selecting the first household for interviews as 
outlined under Appendix 3. They were briefed on the purposes, as well as, the apolitical 
and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all political 
parties helped to eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of the 
interviewees. 
b) Sampling for Key Informant Interviews: The inherent iterative processes 
of data collection, analysis, and collection of more data for constant comparison that 
grounded theory research demands implies that the best  cutoff point for recruiting 
research participants is established when no new data codes emerge from repeated data 
collection.  Hence, the sampling frame and procedures for the Key Informant Interviews 
followed the advice in the use of “theoretical sampling” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pp. 
176) which holds that sample sizes and “sampling [processes] cannot be planned before 
embarking on the study” (Bitsch, 2005 p. 79). Nonetheless, Creswell (1998) suggests that 
between six and 30 participants would be adequate for a grounded theory study. With 
respect to the purposive choice of respondents, this study followed the advice for 
qualitative researchers to “…choose those interviewees who can give you the greatest 
possible insight into your topic” (Esterberg, 2002, p. 93). Accordingly, the research used 
the snowball sampling methodology to identify potential respondents for the interviews. 
However, given the potential wide variation in the kinds of people to be interviewed in 
this study, the researcher targeted interviewing a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 50 
respondents across the spectrum of population groups. This provided a data range wide 
enough to allow for saturation of the data for categories and themes that emerge during 
the research. Appendix 4 provides a list of a broad category of institutions and 
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organizations from which the 30 to 50 key informants were drawn. The categories 
include the Ghana Medical Association, Ghana Bar Association, Ghana Nurses and 
Midwives Council, Ghana Registered Nurses Association, Ghana Association of Bankers, 
Ghana National Association of Teachers, among others. Collectively known as the 
Professional Bodies Associations, these institutions have been individually or collectively 
active in engaging state actors on issues of national interests. Representing the highly 
educated class of citizens, their engagements in the political sphere may have contributed 
to the creation of the “elite consensus” that Ayee (2003, p. 214) credits for the peace in 
Ghana. Interviews with this category of respondents unearthed the reasons why they 
chose to engage or not engage in the political sphere and how that contributed to the 
peace in Ghana.  
Similarly, the leadership of labor unions, represented by the Trade Union Congress 
and its affiliates, as well as, other collective workers unions were contacted for 
interviews. Collective workers groups have played very active roles in Ghana’s politics 
before and after independence. Their alignments with one political grouping or the other 
have often defined the boundaries of political contestations and electoral fortunes in 
democratic eras. Worker agitations and confrontations with governments over conditions 
of service have also been vital in determining the temperature of the political sphere, and 
in some cases, have contributed to changes in governments, through coup d’états or the 
ballot box. Understanding the motivations of workers in the political choices they have 
made over the years, and how these have affected the peace of Ghana, was essential for 
the objectives of this study.  
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Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of the 
governance systems of Ghana. They have championed campaigns, strikes, and 
demonstrations for or against governments, with some engagements turning violent. 
Their historical record of making and unmaking governments has made students a vital 
part of Ghana’s body politic. Past and present student leaders were interviewed to 
document their voices and views on why Ghana has remained peaceful. The interviews 
sought to find answers to the following questions: What roles have students played in the 
stability and peace in Ghana? How do they perceive the role of youth groups in 
stabilizing the balance of power between and across political entities such as political 
parties? To what extent are students bridges of peace across the ethnic divides in the 
country? What makes them effective bridges, if any? 
Faith-based and civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing 
national Christian and Islamic Councils (i.e. The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH), the 
Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference (GCBC), the Islamic Council, the Pentecostal 
Council), and other affiliated faith-based organizations have been instrumental in shaping 
the political space in Ghana. Representatives of these institutions, among others, were 
considered useful in the study because of their  i) arcane knowledge and perceptions on 
why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level confrontations ii) recollections 
and experiences on the role of Faith-based Organizations (FBOs) and Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs), if any, in creating and maintaining peace in Ghana iii) perceptions 
on the role of culture, values, and faith in Ghana’s ability to maintain peace. 
Finally, Lederach (1997, p.94) points out that localized knowledge and institutional 
frameworks for change management are “the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the 
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long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture”. To tap into this 
indigenous knowledge base on why Ghana has managed to avoid violent national level 
conflicts, traditional leaders comprising of the chiefs, queenmothers, and elders of ethnic 
groups were contacted for interviews. In line with the advice of Esterberg (2002), the 
researcher targeted respondents from the pool of recommended participants based on 
their roles and participation in managing/mediating some of the national conflicts in 
Ghana; their personal knowledge and association with events that held the potential for 
national level violence; their positions with the regional and national houses of chiefs, 
among other criteria. From them, the research sort to understand the role that customs, 
traditions, and values have played in creating a culture of peace within and between 
ethnic groups. The role of traditional authorities in promoting peace and the challenges, if 
any, they faced in this exercise were explored. This enabled the research to assess the 
nature and role that the “sociocultural resources” (Lederach, 1997, p. 93) have played in 
holding Ghana together.  
Instrumentation 
 
i) Survey: The survey component used 77 largely closed ended structured Likert 
scale and multiple choice questions to gauge the respondents’ views, knowledge, and 
perceptions on why Ghana has remained peaceful in spite of the challenges the has 
experienced. The last 11 questions assessed respondents’ personal attitudes, behaviors, 
and practices that provide insights into how individual beliefs, actions, and behaviors 
might have contributed to the building of social cohesion in Ghana. Appendix 5 presents 
the questionnaire that was used in the study. 
74 
 
 
 
ii) Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews: Based on the outcomes of 
the desk study, the researcher developed and used structured questions to guide the 
interviews with key informants. The open-ended questions were designed to tease out 
respondents’ views and voices on the study topic. Appendix 6 provides the interview 
guide that was used in this study. Although the guide provides a structuring of the 
questions, the sequence of questioning was varied to ensure that the interviewee followed 
leads in the thoughts of the respondents to provide coherence and consistency in the 
responses. More critically, the interviewer probed the responses, with follow-on 
questions not included in this guide, to create the opportunity for respondents to deepen 
their thoughts and reflections on issues raised in the course of responding to listed 
questions. In this way, the guide did not serve as foreclosure to the open-endedness of the 
interviews. On the contrary, it merely provided a frame for structuring the thoughts of 
respondents and the data collection process. This open-minded approach to engaging the 
respondents enabled the researcher to triangulate, validate, and saturate data in order to 
confirm, strengthen, or reject concepts, themes, and categories that had already emerged 
from prior segments of the study or interviews.  
 
Data Collection Process 
 
 
i) Prior Consent of Respondents:  All interviewees reviewed and signed a 
consent form prior to participating in the interview. Where the interviewee was unable to 
read, write, and/or understand English, the pre-translated and approved consent form was 
read out to him or her in a language that he or she appeared to understand. The consent 
form explained the purpose of the interview and assured interviewees of the 
75 
 
 
 
confidentiality of the information they provided in the course of the interview. It also 
guaranteed the anonymity of their participation in the study. Interviewees were also 
informed of their right not to answer any question, should they find that too invasive of 
their privacy, too emotional to recount, or painful for their memories. 
 
ii) Data Collection Processes for Quantitative Survey: The research used the 
PoiMapper comprehensive mobile geomapping, data collection, and management 
software mounted on android cell phones, Ipads or Ipod Touch platforms for the 
collection of data. The researcher procured the software as well as vendor technical 
support services in migrating the MS Word-based questionnaires into the PoiMapper 
platform. The researcher and the assistant were equipped and trained to use the devices 
on which the survey forms were mounted for the collection of the data. The researchers 
moved in a team into selected clusters for the selection of respondents and the data 
collection process to ensure quality and integrity of the data collected. Daily uploads and 
synchronizing of data on a central field server was carried out to minimize risk of data 
lost due to equipment failure. The use of the PoiMapper software eliminated the need for 
paper-based data collection. With the PoiMapper data collection mechanism, the data 
collected was recorded electronically, and uploaded into a central database at the close of 
day. This eliminated the need and cost for transporting bulky papers to the field and time 
for entering data after the field work. Data entry errors were minimized and the cost of 
data entry was eliminated as well.  
 
76 
 
 
 
iii) Recording of Data: With prior consent of the interviewees, key informant 
interview data was collected using both a digital audio recording device and hand written 
notes. Audio-recording was necessary not only to allow for the complete capture of the 
proceedings; it also provided an opportunity for the researcher to focus attention on the 
interviewee to provide positive feedback and show respect. This enabled the researcher to 
capture any nonverbal data and cues (such as body language cues in the form of hand 
gestures, eye movements, shifts in views, etc.) that interviewees let out in the course of 
the interview, and which evinced emotional states or reactions in relation to issues being 
discussed.   
iv) Field notes and memoing: The researcher took down notes by hand during the 
desk study and in the course of the field work. Field notes were particularly important 
during the key informant interviews, where notes on verbal and non-verbal cues, as well 
as, body language of respondents were captured in note form. The handwritten field notes 
from the desk study and Key Informant Interviews were typed out in Microsoft Word and 
incorporated in other notes for the textual analysis.  
 
 
Procedures for Data Capture and Preparation for Analysis  
 
 
i) Data Capture: Quantitative data collected using the PoiMapper software was 
downloaded as Excel Spreadsheets. Questions that had been presented in table form on 
the questionnaires had their responses downloaded in columns rather than rows. Hence, 
considerable time was spent translating the responses from columns into rows.  Due to 
challenges with internet connectivity in the field, as detailed below, several of the 
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interviews lost significant portions of responses during upload of completed interviews to 
the cloud server. Hence, time was spent verifying completeness of interviews and 
eliminating uncompleted ones. The final data set was then exported into Version 20 of 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) platform for analysis.  
ii) Transcription of Audio Recordings: The audio recordings from the key 
informant interviews were transcribed, using the help of professional transcription 
services. The researcher verified all transcribed texts against the initial audio recordings 
to ensure fidelity of the texts to the original recordings.  Verified and/or corrected 
transcribed texts were then analyzed to isolate emerging categories and themes. 
Additionally, the audio recordings were downloaded and converted into WAV format for 
upload into the Atlas/ti software for analysis. I then used the Atlas/ti Software to code the 
texts of the transcribed interviews and to generate open and axial codes, families, and 
networks of data. Appendices 4S1 through 4S4 present the data maps, which served as 
the frame for the scrutiny and analysis of the data. 
 
Encounter and Resolution of Field Level Challenges  
 
 
Distribution of data collection location for the quantitative survey: The country 
wide cluster sampling methodology produced a wide geographical distribution of the 
selected study sites. Several of these were in very remote locations with limited road and 
transport infrastructure and far away from urban centers. Hence, accessing such locations 
was difficult and time consuming. 
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Community Cooperation: In general, community members in the study sites were 
cooperative and willingly participated in the interviews. In one case, however, a 
prospective interviewee challenged the motive of the interview, insinuating that it was for 
political purposes. However, when he finally agreed to review the consent form and the 
questionnaires, he changed his mind, willingly participated in the interview, and 
apologized afterwards for his initial objections. He subsequently supported the 
recruitment of other interviewees in the community through explaining the purpose of the 
survey.  
Internet connectivity for GPS data verification: The POI Mapper data collection 
platform provided for the collection of GPS coordinates of the locations where the 
interviews were conducted. This was to support the production of a distributional map of 
the data collection points. It also provided a guarantee that the data is collected in the 
selected study area. Appendix 7 provides a map of the distribution of locations of the 
sampled clusters where the data for this survey were collected. Interviews were stored on 
the cellphones and uploaded to the cloud database on return to the urban areas.  
POI Mapper also allowed data to be uploaded to the service providers cloud 
server. Data upload and the collection of GPS coordinates, however, required that the 
data collection instrument (cellphone or notebook running on Android platform) has 
internet connectivity at the start of the data collection. The only source of internet 
connectivity in Ghana outside office environments is via cellphone data services. Hence, 
access to cellphone connectivity was crucial for the internet access. In several cases, 
however, the selected communities did not have cell phone coverage at all, or had 
technical problems with the cellphone service providers at the time of visit for data 
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collection. Consequently, it was not possible to collect the GPS data at the time of the 
interviews for such locations.  
Data Clean Up Process and Outcomes: The quantitative survey targeted to 
interview 1,500 respondents in 50 Polling Areas across the country that were pre-selected 
using the cluster sampling methodology. Interviews were conducted using POI Mapper 
Software, in lieu of paper-based questionnaires, to electronically capture and document 
the responses that participants gave. Captured responses from each interview were 
uploaded using cellphone-based internet connections. Data upload faced challenges in 
areas where cellphone connectivity bandwidth was small or the signal was weak. As a 
result, upload error messages prompted the re-uploading of the same interviews, even 
though in effect the data would have been uploaded. Consequently, several interviews 
were uploaded multiple times. Multiple uploads for the same interview was traceable 
using a combination of the interviewee unique data identifiers, the POI Mapper data 
identifier, the date and time of the interview, and/or the GPS coordinates. This process 
allowed the cleaning up of the data to eliminate the repeated interviews.  
In other instances, responses to a set of questions in an interview failed to upload 
to the server. This created data gaps. To resolve this, a rule of thumb decision was made 
to eliminate any interviews that had responses to five consecutive questions or more 
missing in the dataset. This data cleanup process pruned down the data to a fairly 
complete set of responses for 1429 interviews. This represents 95.3% of the target of 
1500 interviews. As indicated in earlier under considerations for sampling and sample 
size determination, sample sizes of at least 1,200 are considered adequate for nationwide 
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surveys. Hence, the sample of 1429 interviews was considered more than enough to 
proceed with the analysis of the data for this study.  
Regional representation in the dataset did not suffer much from the data clean up 
exercise. The Central and Volta Regions were the only ones which had 85 and 81 per 
cent respectively of their interviews included in the study. All other regions had more 
than 90% of their interviews included. However, to ensure the adequacy and 
representativeness of the data for a national level study, additional verification and 
validation steps were used. Of the 125 variables in the study, responses to the question on 
whether Ghana is an oasis of peace had the lowest number of respondents (n=1369). 
Given that this is a key variable in this study, the n value for this question served as the 
threshold for a test to establish how representative this sample size would be of the larger 
Ghanaian population who might answer to the same question. In other words what 
proportion of Ghanaians in the actual population of the country would respond to the 
question on whether Ghana is an oasis of peace? To determine an estimate of the actual 
proportion of the Ghanaian population that would agree that Ghana is an oasis of peace, I 
generated descriptive statistics on the variable “Oasis of Peace” using SPSS Version 20. 
The variable is an ordinal level one with more than four categories; hence I used the 
descriptive function to generate the basic statistics for this estimation (Healey, 2012, 
Kindle Edition).  Table 2 presents the results.  
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variable with Lowest Response Rate 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Oasis of Peace 1369 1 4 1.64 .848 
Gender 1414 1 2 1.46 .499 
Valid N  1354     
 
Since the standard deviation of the larger Ghanaian population is not known, I used the 
procedure in the formula below to compute the confidence interval based on the mean of 
the sample (Formula 7.2 in Healey, 2012, Kindle Version) to determine the confidence 
interval of a large sample. Table 2 provides the Mean of the sample, the standard 
deviation and the sample size used in the computation. The procedure for the 
computation was as follows: 
Confidence Interval =  X ± Z(        s     )    
                                                     N-1       
From the descriptive statistics in Table 2: 
i) The sample mean of the variable belief that Ghana is peaceful = 1.64 
ii) The Standard deviation      = .848 
iii) The Sample Size       = 1369 
iv) Given a Pu     = 0.05, therefore Z = 1.96 
Substituting the above in the equation, 
Confidence Interval = 1.64 ± 1.96(.848) 
                  N-1         
 
N-1 = 1369-1 = 1368      1368 = 36.986 
1.96(.848) =  1.64± 1.96(0.0229) =  
              36.986 
Confidence interval = 1.64 ± 0.0449  
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 The foregoing means if multiple samples were taken from the Ghanaian population 
to gauge the extent of their belief that Ghana is an oasis of peace, in 95% of the times, the 
mean will fall between 1.595 and 1.685. Since the sample mean of 1.64 falls within this 
range, we are confident that the sample used in this study is representative of the 
Ghanaian population. Based on this, we can say that we are 95% confident that the 94.5% 
of the survey respondents who agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that 
Ghana is an oasis of peace are also representative of the wider Ghanaian population. In 
other words, we can say with 95% confidence that 94.5% of Ghanaians would agree to 
varying extents that Ghana is an oasis of peace.  
Field Challenges with Key Informant Interviews: The Key Informant Interviews 
(KIIs) took place in two time slots between breaks for the conduct of the quantitative 
surveys, work, and securing appointments with prospective interviewees. Lot 1 covered 
fourteen (14) interviews conducted between 5 February and 5 March, 2014, while Lot 2 
comprised nineteen (19) interviews carried out between 15 October and 14 December 
2014. Pinning down interview schedules with identified interviewees was the major 
challenge, as all interviewees ran very busy schedules.  
Interview Transcriptions: Transcription of the interviews also took longer than 
expected, given the emphasis I placed on verbatim transcription of every interview. 
Procuring of professional transcription services to support the process became necessary.  
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Ethics and reflexivity section 
 
Ethical Concerns: This research used open and close ended questions for collecting 
data. Consequently, substantial portions of the data collected came from participants’ 
recollection of their personal and collective lived experiences, events, and knowledge of 
personalities that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. These recollections were done 
through multiple lenses that included the cognitive, semiotic, experiential, ethical, and 
hermeneutic ones (Fox, 2006). Hence, participants’ input into the data collection process 
came from the “… fusion of both historical and fictional” (Fox, 2006, p. 47) recalls of the 
events, people, and values that have shaped and contributed to the peace in Ghana.  
The multi-layered data collection process and the use of triangulation in the analysis 
of findings provided opportunities for interrogating data from different sources. This 
enabled the research to isolate fictional accounts of individuals from the shared realities 
of the generality of participants. Triangulation of data sources also provided opportunities 
to isolate consensual, as well as, contested themes that emerged from the analysis of the 
narratives from the interviews. It provided the forum for participants “…to dissolve [the 
perceptual] boundaries [that divide their viewpoints], to break down barriers and to 
reinterpret [their] two-dimensional dichotomies” (Fox, 2006, p. 56) in order to build a 
common narrative of why and how Ghana finds itself peaceful. 
Reflexivity: As a Ghanaian who has been actively engaged in the development and 
peacebuilding field in Ghana and across Africa for more than 25 years, I had some views 
and perceptions on why Ghana is at peace while other countries with similar 
characteristics are not. Therefore, I was keenly aware that “the political and personal 
perspectives of researchers [can] inform the intentions we have for the research” (Gilles 
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& Alldred, 2002, p. 33 in Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, and Miller). Hence, my personal 
knowledge of some of the people that were interviewed; their experiences of the wars or 
violence in other contexts; my own perceptions of the issues being discussed; and my 
reflections and discussions with colleagues on the subject of peace in Ghana, all risked 
introducing biases into the selection of my sample; the structuring of the interviews; the 
way interview questions were chosen and framed; and the interpretations that I put to 
some of the findings. Therefore, I needed to be constantly aware of these potential 
intrusions of personal views into the design and outcome of the research. Aware of these 
dangers, I took care at every stage of the study design, conduct, analysis of the data, and 
reporting to ensure that my personal impressions did not intrude into the data.  I 
constantly strove to make the data speak for itself as I bracketed my personal views. 
Additionally, Ghanaians are literally split in two halves along the lines of the two 
main political parties in the country – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP). Against this polarized political arena, the caution of Gilles 
and Allred to researchers against allowing our political biases to infiltrate into the 
research agenda is pertinent. Hence, in dealing with research participants, it was essential 
to constantly remember that research of this nature can become “explicitly [a] political 
tool [that some participants would attempt to use] strategically to make political 
interventions” (Gilles & Alldred, 2002, p. 32). To forestall this, I took care to make the 
research process and outcomes as neutral, objective, and transparent as possible.   
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Results or Analysis 
 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative results were analyzed and are reported in the findings.  
Quantitative Data Analysis: The quantitative results focused on aggregating perceptions, 
views, and experiences of survey respondents, using descriptive statistics. This allowed 
for the disaggregation of findings from the survey to isolate any differences in 
perspectives that emerged due to differences in age, gender, levels of education, 
geographic region of origin, ethnicity, among others, of participants. The study used the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to analyze the quantitative data 
collected from the survey. Preliminary data generated provided descriptive statistics on 
the profile of respondents, as well as, on some of the non-profile responses to the 
questions. This initial descriptive statistics guided more in-depth data analysis. Chi-
Square values derived from the cross-tabulation of study responses with various 
categories of participants helped determine significant differences in responses as a result 
of demographic variations among respondents. Independent Sample t-Tests were carried 
out when the independent “variable [had] exactly two categories” (Healey, 2012, Kindle 
Edition, Location 7209). Although gender is the only independent variable in this study 
that potentially presents two categories, the question on the gender of participants 
allowed for a third gender category. However, respondents responded to only two 
categories. Hence, a T-test was not conducted to determine if there were any differences 
of opinion on the various dependent variables as a result of gender differences. ANOVA 
tests were, however, carried out, using the remaining independent variables such as age 
categories, educational levels, region of origin, and occupation of respondents, where 
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necessary. This was to determine whether any differences in opinions, perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviors existed within and between these categories that would help 
explain why Ghana is peaceful.  
 
Analysis of Qualitative Data: Reporting on the qualitative aspects of the study 
focused on capturing and documenting the voices and views of respondents. However, 
triangulation with other sources of data, such as the desk study and key informant 
interviews, enabled the report to draw out theoretical conclusions reflective of the full 
range of data sources. For the analysis of the qualitative data from the Key Informant 
Interviews, a choice was made between the Glaserian versus the Straussian approaches to 
the analysis of data emerging from grounded theory field studies. While Glaser prefers 
“abstract conceptualization” which focuses on “units of meaning”(Lamp & Milton, 2007, 
p. 2) derived from the data, Strauss and Corbin prefer more detailed analysis of 
interviews based on “word by word analysis” ( Strauss & Corbin, 1990  in Lamp & 
Milton, 2007, p. 2). Both approaches have their merits, depending on the kinds of 
research being conducted. Given the focus of this study, however, the “Glaserian 
approach [was] more applicable here as it [tried] to see the reality by collecting and 
fixing the needed data” (Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349). It allowed data 
collected at any stage to “…guide and suggest the next level data requirements” 
(Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011, p. 349).  
In accordance with this approach, qualitative data from the desk study, key 
informant interviews, as well as, field notes of the researcher, were incorporated into one 
set of typed notes to provide a complete set of data for the analysis. The data was then 
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analyzed using open coding techniques to sort and categorize the themes emerging from 
the data. Major themes that emerged from this round of analysis were organized into 
categories. The study then identified associations between categories to create “broader, 
more general explanations from the categories and their relationships” (Willis, 2007, p. 
307). Where applicable, the study linked emerging categories to create overarching 
categories that provided a broader view of the issues participants were raising. The 
triangulation of the findings from the key informant interviews with the responses from 
the desk study and quantitative data enabled the research to unearth and engage any other 
pieces of information that may not have emerged already. 
To ensure depth and consistency in the analysis, the study used ATLAS/ti research 
software for the analysis of the qualitative data. ATLAS/ti was selected because it allows 
for the analysis of transcribed interview texts in ASCII format, sound in the WAV 
format, as well as, graphics. The software helped to create codes, memos, and networks 
of text elements using “…individual letters, words, phrases, sentences…” (Lewis, 1998, 
p. 4). Coding was done manually or automatically, and once produced, codes were 
grouped into families, merged or searched (Lewis, 1998). Compared to NUD*IST 
software, ATLAS/ti’ offered a more intuitive coding system (Lewis, 1998). The 
generation of super codes allowed for higher level analysis and the creation of networks 
between coded data. Methodologically, ATLAS/ti was best suited for this study because 
the grounded theory approach influenced the development of the software (Smit, 2002). 
Hence, it “provides the tools to be consistent and rigorous if the user wants to follow a 
grounded theory (or type of) approach” (Contreras, 2009).  
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Analysis of the KII produced four (4) major nested webs of positive and negative 
cultural and religious factors that, in the view of respondents, explain Ghana’s state of 
peace. The family of codes related to the effect of culture on Ghana’s peace came up with 
27 nodes; the contribution of religion to peace had 14 nodes, while the classification of 
Ghana’s peace had 10 nodes. A fourth cluster related to the coping mechanisms or exit 
strategies respondents believed have helped to maintain Ghana’s peace in its current 
state. Citizens’ disengagement/resignation; recourse to using private solutions to 
addressing public problems; migration out of poverty areas, either temporarily, cyclically, 
or permanently; entry into politics as a means of accessing public resources, legitimately 
or illegitimately; youth occupation of the streets of urban areas to sell anything they can 
lay their hands on, also known as streetism in NGO parlance; and finally the recourse of 
the youth to regulated or illegal small-scale mining, logging, and other forms of natural 
resource exploitation constituted the unexpected finds under this category.  Details of the 
findings are incorporated under each hypothesis of the study. They provide explanatory 
insights into the findings of the quantitative survey. 
 
Reliability and Validity 
 
 
Ensuring Data Reliability: In the use of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss have  
pointed out that the process of collecting data and cross-checking it multiple times allows 
the researcher to have a detached enough perspective on the issues to formulate 
“…workable guides to action and therefore [provide] credibility” (Glaser & Strauss, 
2010, p. 227) to the findings. The extensive nature of the data that this study collected, 
coupled with the multiple levels of comparison, verification, and reworking of the data 
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provided the degree of detached emersion with the data that led to the “conceptual 
density” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 161) required to lend credence to the findings of this 
research. 
Reliability of quantitative data resides on how consistent, stable, and dependable the 
data collection process is. Hence, to ensure reliability of the data in this survey, the same 
set of questions was used for all the interviews. In the few cases where translators were 
needed to mediate interviews, the researcher worked with the translators to develop a 
lexicon of words that ordinarily do not have direct equivalents in the local languages. 
These working dictionaries, where developed, were then used for the translation of such 
technical words to the interviewees. In all cases simultaneous voice recording of the 
interviews was taken and used later to double check the accuracy of the entries made 
during the course of the interview.  
 
Ensuring Validity in the Data: The validity of any theory is time and context 
specific, as changes in the matrix of conditions under which a theory was developed 
“affects the validity of [such] theories” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 171). Sandelowski 
(1993) further notes that validity in qualitative research outcomes is a function of 
judgment. Hence, the use of standardized objective, and repeatable procedures in 
qualitative research to establish scientific rigor of findings is unrealistic and 
“…completely alien to the concept of narrative truth” (Sandelowski, 1993, p. 4).  Willis 
(2007) defines two levels of validity of research findings, namely internal and external 
validity. While internal validity deals with the reliability of the data collected, issues of 
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external validity raise “the question of generalizability”(Willis, 2007, p. 216) of the 
findings of a study.  
The overlapping use of desk studies, survey results, and key informant interviews in 
this study, was designed to address the concerns of validity. The multilayered data 
collection, analysis, constant comparison, and theory validation processes in this research 
aimed “to build a theory that fits every set of data and thus is generalizable” (Willis, 
2007, p. 306). The constant comparison of findings between data sets ensured that the 
data was kept current, complete, and therefore reflective of the changing contexts in the 
course of the research. This enhanced the validity of the findings from the qualitative 
survey.  
To ensure validity of the data from the quantitative survey, the study developed and 
used a matrix of the hypotheses, the definition and operationalization of the variables, 
and the statement of indicators for each of the variables tested in the hypotheses - See 
Appendix 8. Each set of indicators was tracked to a question in the survey instrument. 
This ensured that the questions asked in the survey collected the intended data.   A pre-
test of the questionnaire was done to provide opportunities for revising them and their 
associated variables, definitions, and indicators. This was to ensure that the quantitative 
component of the research generated the data it needed to have for assessing the factors 
that contribute to Ghana’s peace.  
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Chapter 4:  Findings from Field Research 
 
Profile of Respondents 
 
A total of 1429 interviews form the basis for the analysis of the quantitative 
survey outcomes. However, not all the respondents answered all the questions in the 
survey. Out of the 1,414 respondents who reported their gender category, 651 (i.e. 
45.6%) were females and 763 (i.e. 53.4%) were males. Regionally, the Central Region 
had the highest female participation rate of 51% (52/102) in the interviews, with the 
Upper West Region having the lowest participation rate of 23.3% for women. The 
Northern Region, however, recorded the highest male dominance in the interview at 
64.8%. Age-wise, of the 1382 respondents who gave their ages, 49.3% were 35 years or 
younger. The mean age of respondents was 38.88, with a standard deviation of 36 – see 
Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3  
Percentage of Respondents 35 years old or younger 
Age <= 35 (FILTER) 
Case Selection Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 705 49.3 51.0 
Selected 677 47.4 49.0 
Total 1382 96.7 100.0 
 Missing System 47 3.3  
Total 1429 100.0  
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Table 4  
Mean Age of Respondents 
N 
Valid 1382 
Missing 47 
Mean 38.88 
Median 36.00 
Std. Deviation 14.239 
 
The majority of respondents (55.1%) had some education not exceeding the 
middle school or Junior High School levels. In all, 38.8% of respondents (554/1429) 
indicated that they had an education from the Primary up to the Middle School or Junior 
Secondary School, while , 16.3% (233/1429) had less than six years of education at the 
primary school level. Additionally, 15.5% of the respondents (221/1429) said they had 
never been to school. Respondents who said they had a secondary school level education 
accounted for 18.7% of the respondents (266/1429), while those who indicated they had 
tertiary level education (i.e. university or polytechnic level education) represented 10.6% 
of the total number of respondents in the study. While 99/1429 (6.9%) said they had a 
diploma or a Higher National Diploma (HND) from a tertiary institution, 44/1429 (3.1%) 
indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree from a university; 7/1429 had Master’s level 
education and only 1 person reported holding a PhD Degree. By gender and educational 
levels, women respondents constituted 56.4% (255/452) of the total number of 
respondents who indicated that they had either never been to school or had less than six 
years of primary education.   
By religion, 75.7% of respondents (1068/1410) who provided information on their 
religious affiliations indicated that they were Christians, while 18.5% said they were 
Moslems. Adherents of Indigenous African Religion came third with 70/1410 or 5.0%. 
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The remaining of respondents either did not indicate their faith tradition or mentioned 
other faiths such as Buddhism, Hinduism, or combinations of different faiths. While 
35.7% of respondents (504/1429) said they lived in villages or rural areas, 44.6% said 
they lived in either the district capitals (18.4%); regional capitals (15.8%) or national 
capital (10.5%). However, 19.6% respondents indicated that they lived in towns outside 
the national, regional, or district capitals. In all, 95.7% (1367/1429) indicated the regions 
they called home regions i.e. regions they consider their native regions even though they 
may not have been living there at the time of the interview.  Compared to the data on the 
regions where interviews were actually carried out, six (6) regions (Central, Eastern, 
Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta) recorded more people claiming them as 
home regions than the total number of valid interviews in the study that were carried out 
in those regions. This implies that respondents living in other regions were claiming the 
Central, Eastern, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Volta Regions as their home 
regions. Noticeably, Greater Accra Region, had the lowest percentage of respondents 
(30%) who claimed it as their home region, even though 20.5% of all valid interviews 
(293/1429) were conducted in this region. This means the majority of interviewees in the 
Greater Accra Region are natives of other regions in the country – see Table 5.  
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Table 5  
Distribution of Respondents by Region of Residence and Region of Birth  
Region 
Valid 
Interviews 
Home 
Callers 
% 
Home 
Callers 
Ashanti 268 250 93.3% 
Brong Ahafo 114 106 93.0% 
Central 102 123 120.6% 
Eastern 150 170 113.3% 
Greater Accra 293 88 30.0% 
Northern  142 210 147.9% 
Upper East 60 81 135.0% 
Upper West 30 42 140.0% 
Volta 121 163 134.7% 
Western  149 134 89.9% 
 
Occupationally, respondents who described themselves as self-employed private 
businessmen or women who own and manage their own businesses or persons who are 
self-employed individuals in the informal sector such as Masons, Carpenters, 
Hairdressers, Seamstresses, Traders, etc. accounted for 36.7% of interviewees 
(524/1429). Those who said they were farmers engaged in crop production, animal 
husbandry, fishing, etc. constituted 28.4% (406/1429) of the respondents in the study. 
Respondents who described themselves as employed in “other sectors” represented 7.1% 
(102/1429). Students in Polytechnics, Universities, or other Tertiary or Secondary level 
educational institutions accounted for 4.9% (70/1429). Employment categories with less 
than 5% representation in the study sample were - Academics such as  Lecturers, 
Researchers, or Teaching Assistants in an Academic institution (1.6%); Civil or Public 
Servants working in Government ministries, departments or agencies (3.6%); Corporate 
Business Executives including Managing Directors, Managers, Chief Executive Officers 
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of medium and large scale companies or businesses (0.3% - 5/1429); Elected or 
Appointed Political Leaders including Members of Parliament, Government Minister of a 
Sector, at the Presidency, or Region; as well as, Metropolitan, Municipal, or District 
Chief Executives (0.1% - 2/1429); House wife (4.7% - 67/1429); Members of the 
Security Services including the Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Immigration 
Services, Fire Service; Customs, Excise, and Preventive Services (0.8% - 11/1429); 
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive of a Political 
Party). Others included Professionals (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, 
Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.); Religious leaders 
(Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion); Traditional chief or 
queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or Village; Worker in the NGO Sector; and 
employee in the Private Sector – see Table 6. Compared to the population census results, 
the profile of respondents represents a cross-section of the general population of Ghana.  
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Table 6   
Primary Occupation of Respondents 
Primary Occupation Frequency Valid 
Percent 
System Missing 7 .5 
Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an 
Academic institution) 
23 1.6 
Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, 
department or agency) 
52 3.6 
Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, 
Chief Executive Officer etc.) 
5 .3 
Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of 
Parliament, Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency, 
Region); Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief Executive 
2 .1 
Employee in the Private Sector 62 4.3 
Farmer (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.) 406 28.4 
House wife 67 4.7 
Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police 
Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and 
Preventive Services) 
11 .8 
Other(specify) 102 7.1 
Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency 
Executive of a Political Party) 
6 .4 
Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, 
Medical Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher, etc.) 
48 3.4 
Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African 
Traditional Religion) 
15 1.0 
Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman 110 7.7 
Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, 
Seamstress, Trader, etc.) 
414 29.0 
Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary 
level 
70 4.9 
Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, 
or Village levels 
6 .4 
Worker in the NGO Sector 23 1.6 
Total 1429 100.0 
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Study Results from Hypotheses testing and Key Informant Interviews 
 
The quantitative component of the study set out to test fourteen (14) hypotheses that 
examined the extent to which various factors may have contributed to the peace in Ghana 
– see Appendix 8. Data analysis therefore focused on testing all the fourteen (14) 
hypothesis of the study to establish whether or not they can be rejected. Results of the 
tests are presented in the sections below. Additionally, results from the qualitative 
component of the study provide complementary insights for the assessing the issues 
raised under each hypothesis. Perspectives from the Key Informant Interviews therefore 
provide complementary or qualifier insights on the statistical data from the quantitative 
testing of each hypothesis  
 
Perceptions on Ghana as an Oasis of Peace 
Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a 
peaceful country 
 Under this hypothesis, the study assessed the degree to which respondents with 
different socioeconomic characteristics (age, regions of origin, gender, educational levels, 
religious affiliations, occupations, and places of residence) agreed with the perception 
that Ghana is a peaceful country. Table 7 shows that 90.5% of respondents (1294/1429) 
agreed, strongly agreed, or very strongly agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country. In all, 
52.6% of all respondents “very strongly” agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country, with 
30.3% indicating strong agreement as well.  
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Table 7 
Degrees to which Respondents Agree that Ghana is a Peaceful Country 
Oasis of Peace Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Mildly Agree 75 5.2 5.2 
Agree 109 7.6 7.6 
Strongly Agree 433 30.3 30.3 
Very Strongly Agree 752 52.6 52.6 
Skipped  55 3.8 3.8 
Missing 5 0.3 0.3 
Total 1429 100 100 
 
Figure 1 shows that more than 94% of respondents in all regions of Ghana, irrespective of 
their educational levels, gender, and age categories agreed, strongly agreed, or very 
strongly agreed that Ghana is an oasis of peace.  
Figure 1 
Percentage Of Respondents Who Said Ghana Is An Oasis Of Peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal experiences influence the perceptions on whether or not a country is peaceful. 
Since age differences greatly influence personal experiences, and therefore, respondents’ 
90% 92% 94% 96% 98% 100%
Age Category
Gender
Educational Level
Region of Interview
94.4 
94.6 
94.6 
94.5 
5.6 
5.4 
5.4 
5.5 
Agreed, Strongly Agreed, Very Strongly Agreed Mildly Agreed
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perception of peace, a One-Way ANOVA test was conducted under the following 
assumptions:  
a. Model: The data for the survey is based on Independent Random Samples 
b. Interval-ratio levels of measurement is used 
c. Populations are normally distributed  
d. Population variances are equal (Healey, 2012, Kindle Version) 
The descriptive statistics of the ANOVA test in Table 8 shows variations in the 
means for all age categories are sizeable, ranging from a high of .915 for the 28-37 years 
age category to a low of .558 for the 78-87 years age category, with equally sizeable 
differences in the standard deviations for different age categories. This indicates that 
variations within and between the age categories in their agreement that Ghana is an oasis 
of peace are not small.  
Table 8 
 
Within and Between Age Variations on Perception of Peace in Ghana 
 
Age 
Categories of 
Respondents 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
18 - 27 years 313 1.78 .827 .047 1.69 1.87 1 4 
28-37 years 409 1.76 .915 .045 1.67 1.84 1 4 
38-47 years 290 1.62 .857 .050 1.52 1.72 1 4 
48-57 years 166 1.47 .728 .056 1.36 1.58 1 4 
58-67 years 93 1.31 .675 .070 1.17 1.45 1 4 
68-77 years 47 1.34 .815 .119 1.10 1.58 1 4 
78-87 years 5 1.40 .548 .245 .72 2.08 1 2 
88-97 years 1 1.00 . . . . 1 1 
98 years or 
older 
1 2.00 . . . . 2 2 
Total 1325 1.65 .851 .023 1.60 1.69 1 4 
 
The One-Way ANOVA test of the hypothesis that age categories of respondents 
has no effect on their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace produced a mean square 
of 3.962 at 8 degrees of difference for an F statistic of 5.618 – Table 9. Since the 
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associated significance level of 0.000 is less that the decision point of 0.05, we can reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the age categories of respondents 
and their agreement that Ghana is an oasis of peace. In other words, differences in age 
categories do affect the agreement among Ghanaians on whether their country is an oasis 
of peace or not.  
Table 9  
 
Effect of Age of Respondents on Perception of Peace in Ghana 
 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
31.699 8 3.962 5.618 .000 
Within Groups 928.112 1316 .705   
Total 959.811 1324    
 
 Table 10 presents the Chi Square values from the cross-tabulation of the responses 
to the question on whether Ghana is a peaceful country with different socioeconomic 
characteristics of respondents. Apart from results for cross-tabulation of the responses to 
the question with gender categories, all scores returned two-tailed significance measures 
of less than 0.05 for their respective chi square values. Hence the hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a peaceful country can be 
rejected. In other words, there are differences in the perceptions of respondents of 
different age categories, regions, religious affiliations, employment categories, and for 
those living in different localities that Ghana is peaceful. For gender, however, the 
hypothesis cannot be rejected since the Chi Square value of 8.936 has a two-tailed 
significance of .538. In other words, the finding is coincidental and we cannot reject the 
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hypothesis that there is no difference between the perceptions of men and women that 
Ghana is a peaceful country. 
Table 10 
 
Significance Of Socio-Economic Characteristics Perception Of Peace in Ghana 
Level of Measurement Chi 
Square 
Value 
Difference Two-tailed 
Significance 
Perceptions of different age categories of 
people on  why Ghana is peaceful 
114.419
a
 45 .000 
Perceptions of respondents from different 
regions on  why Ghana is peaceful 
580.059 45 .000 
Perceptions of different gender categories of 
people on  why Ghana is peaceful 
8.936
a
 10 .538 
Perceptions of respondents with different 
levels of formal education on  why Ghana is 
peaceful 
94.745 45 .000 
Perceptions of respondents of different 
religious affiliations on  why Ghana is 
peaceful 
364.223 50 .000 
Perceptions of respondents of different 
employment categories on  why Ghana is 
peaceful 
107.961 85 .047 
Perceptions of respondents living in different 
localities on  why Ghana is peaceful 
189.253 30 .000 
 
Analyses of responses to the same question from the key informant interviews 
confirm the existence of differences in opinion among Ghanaians on whether or not the 
country is peaceful. Similar to the results from the survey, while participants in the key 
informant interviews generally agreed that Ghana enjoys some peace, many of them 
promptly provided qualifiers to underscore that they do not  “…agree a hundred percent” 
(Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) with the view. On the contrary, they agreed largely that 
“…Ghana is a relatively peaceful country, relative in terms of comparison with our 
neighboring countries” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February, 
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2014). While “to the extent that we have not had violent national level conflicts or wars, 
we can say Ghana is peaceful” (interview 201, 15 October, 2014), the peace is “… also 
relative in terms of when you look within the country that the country as a whole may be 
described as peaceful but there are areas in the country that cannot be described as 
peaceful” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In 
brief, Ghana’s peace is relative i.e. in comparison to other countries and when viewed 
only from the total national perspective. Otherwise, there are areas in Ghana that cannot 
be described as peaceful.  
Nature and Sources of Peace in Ghana 
Ho2   there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of 
peace Ghana enjoys. 
The hypothesis is tested using two independent questions. Question 9 in the 
interview protocol assesses participants’ classification of the type of peace Ghana has, 
while question 10 assesses participants’ assessment of the factors that contribute to the 
kind of peace they have observed in Ghana.  On the type of peace, the hypothesis defined 
negative peace as the absence of direct or physical violence even though there may be 
other forms of violence such as structural and cultural violence that cause suffering, pain, 
and death.  Positive peace, on the other hand, was defined as the absence of direct, 
structural, and cultural violence. In all, 79% of respondents indicated that Ghana enjoys 
positive peace. For the 1409 respondents to the question who also indicated their gender 
category, the Chi Square value of 1.330 gives a two-tailed significance test result of 
0.514 for the cross-tabulation of responses on the type of Ghana’s peace with gender 
categories of respondents. By age categories, the test result showed a Chi Square value of 
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22.244 with a two-tailed significance measure of .135. Cross tabulation of the responses 
with respondents’ religion gave a Pearson Chi Square value of 24.848 with a two-tailed 
significance of 0.732. 
Since all three measures of significance are greater than 0.05, the findings in all 
three cases are insignificant and we conclude that there is no difference between men and 
women, age categories, and the religious affiliations of respondents in their classification 
of Ghana’s peace as positive or negative. Indeed, for gender about the same percentages 
of men and women believed that Ghana’s peace is positive (79.7% for men and 78.7% 
for women). Similarly, more than 75% of respondents of all age categories indicated that 
Ghana has positive peace. At least 78% of respondents who declared their religious 
affiliation as atheists, adherents of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous 
African Religion or combinations thereof said Ghana’s peace was a positive one. It is 
observable that by creed, 78.0% of Christian respondents (833/1068), 80.5% of their 
Moslem counterparts (210/261), and 85.7% of believers in Indigenous African Religions 
(60/70) said Ghana’s peace is positive.  
With respect to the level of educational attainment and respondents’ perception of 
the type of peace that Ghana has, the cross tabulation returns a Pearson Chi Square value 
of 28.280 with a two-tailed significance of 0.029. Similar significant findings are 
reported for cross-tabulations of the perception of the type of peace in Ghana with 
respondents’ region where the interviews were conducted (two-tailed significance 
measure of .000 for a Chi Square value of 49.81); and locality of residence of 
respondents (Chi Square Value of 91.042 two-tailed significance measure of .000). Since 
for these cases, as well, the significance values are less than the p-value of 0.05, the 
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findings are significant and we can reject the assertions that there are no differences 
between the level of educational attainment of respondents; respondents of different 
regions; and rural/urban dwellers in their assessment of the type of peace that Ghana has. 
Age and gender cross-tabulations, however, turned up insignificant findings of Chi 
square value of 22.244 with p = .135 for age, and 1.330 with p = .515 for gender – Table 
11.  
Table 11 
 
Significance Levels of Respondents’ Perceptions on Type of Peace in Ghana 
 
Level of 
Measurement 
Chi Square 
Value 
Difference Two-tailed 
Significance 
Gender 1.330
a
 2 .514 
Religion 9.184
a
 14 .819 
Age Category of 
Respondents 
22.244 16 .135 
Educational Level 28.280
a
 16 .029 
Region of interview 480.850
a
 18 .000 
Locality 79.098
a
 10 .000 
 
Respondents in the KII were, however, less sure about the degree to which 
Ghana’s peace can be described as positive or negative. Asked to indicate whether 
Ghana’s peace was positive or negative peace, the majority of participants indicated that 
Ghana’s peace is such that “…sometimes it is difficult to even rule the line between the 
negative peace and the positive peace” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). More than half 
of the participants in the KII (16/31) said Ghana’s peace is “… a mixture of both 
[negative and positive], but increasingly, in recent times, the negative dimensions are 
outweighing the positive” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). To illustrate this 
perception, another respondent indicated that “if I were to put a range positive 1 to 10 
[and then the] negative 1 to 10 I will give positive may be 4 or 5 [out of 10) and I will 
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give negative 6 or 7” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014), also out of 10. In other words, 
while Ghana can be considered to be a 40-50% positive peace country, it has to be 
classified as a 60-70% negative peace country.  
These ratings derive from the fact that even though “seen from the outside it may 
look peaceful […] there are areas in the country that cannot be described as peaceful” 
(Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Hence, “even though from a national perspective you 
may consider Ghana’s peace to be positive, when you look at it area by area, you will 
definitely see it as negative peace” (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014).  In other words, 
although Ghana has escaped the ravages of war, its peace is “… a lot more on the 
negative side because we do have institutions that have sort of mediated and which have 
drawn the country from the brink of war” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Hence, even 
though Ghanaians may not have “… taken up arms on a large scale against each other 
[and] are not shedding blood, but it is an uneasy peace” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). 
This is probably why another participant found “…it comfortable and easier to describe 
Ghana as negative peace.  Why because poverty is still very pervasive; and you can check 
the figures, in fact in some instances we can even say that poverty is growing” (interview 
2, 7 February, 2014). One respondent believed that whatever there is of negative peace in 
Ghana it “…is largely because of weakness in the social protection thing” (interview 217 
13 December 2014). This tilting of Ghana’s peace to the negative is in spite of the 
cultural abhorrence of conflict and strife which mandates “…leaders in the traditional set 
up [to constantly find] ways and means …to bring about peace and then reconciliation” 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). This suggests that but for the interventions of various 
institutions and actors, Ghana would not have been any different from its neighbors.  
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Notably, however, eight (8) out of the 31 respondents categorically stated that 
Ghana’s peace is positive, since “we are able to name what is going on, [and] we are able 
to struggle to overcome that” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) or because “Ghanaians 
have tended to absorb them, [because of] the attitude of ooh leave it to God one day there 
will be a solution” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). Access to “...an enabling 
environment that allows you to exercise your fundamental human rights” (interview 213, 
9 December, 2014) was also cited as a reason for classifying Ghana’s peace as positive. 
On the other hand, participants who placed Ghana categorically under negative peace 
cited “…structural underpinnings in the system that can easily lead the country to 
explode” (interview 215, 10 December, 2014). Poverty and corruption were frequently 
cited as structural and systemic roots of negative peace. In particular, persistent high 
levels of poverty which make people suffer and die “…even though you may not hear of 
it [because] it’s not reported in the media (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014); and the 
“…injustice in the system which is leading to unnecessary deaths of children [or creating 
the conditions for] many people [who are] suffering in silence” (Interview 201, 21 
November, 2014) were cited to support the classification. In brief, respondents in the KII 
who had an opportunity to discuss Ghana’s peace are more definite in their assessment of 
the type of peace Ghana enjoys – it is more negative than positive.  
Ho2 also assessed respondents opinions on the extent to which the level of civic 
awareness among Ghanaians; the degree of agreement among political leaders on 
important issues affecting Ghana; the presence of strong, efficient, and neutral 
institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the public and civil Services; the value of 
peace in the cultures of all ethnic groups; the level of  influence of religious beliefs on 
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peace; recourse to prayers and intercessions by religious groups; the strength of bonds of 
intermarriages between ethnic groups; Ghanaians’ degree of respect for the rule of law; 
and the fear of being singled out for punishment, contribute to peace in Ghana.  To 
ascertain the degree of convergence on the responses from the survey, a construct of the 
mean of responses for all nine (9) variables was computed. Table 12 below presents the 
results of the construct, which indicates that on average 55.3% of all the respondents 
agreed from a moderately high to a very high extent that all the nine variables contributed 
towards the peace that Ghana has.  
Table 12 
Means for Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace 
Case Selection: 
FacsCon >= 7.5  Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Not Selected 635 44.4 44.7 
Selected 787 55.1 55.3 
Total 1422 99.5 100 
Missing 7 0.5   
Total 1429 100   
 
Figure 2 presents a summary of the responses on the contribution of various 
factors to Ghana’s peace, filtered at  6.5 on the 9 point Likert scale to represent 
responses that ranged from moderate extent to very high extent for the nine (9) factors for 
the variables detailed above. The results show that more than two thirds of all the 
respondents in the survey (at least 66.9%) agreed that all the nine factors contribute in 
large measure’s to the peace that Ghana enjoys. Of the nine, however, prayers and 
intercessions by religious groups for peace recorded the highest rate as a contributor to 
peace (88.9%), while the culture of peace among ethnic groups in Ghana comes up next 
at 84.5%; with religious beliefs that value peace coming close with 81.6% rating by 
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respondents. The contribution of the level of civic awareness among Ghanaians attracts 
the least mention of all the nine indicators (66.9%). This suggests that received or 
socially engrained religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to 
peace in Ghana than the knowledge of civic awareness gained from the public sphere. 
Between religion in the form of prayers and intercessions and culture, however, the 
former trumps as a stronger contributor to peace. Notably, the contribution of religious 
leaders to peace closely matches that of culture; giving religion an overall higher rating as 
a contributor to Ghana’s peace than culture.  
Figure 2 
Summary of Responses on Factors Contributing to Ghana’s Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 9 presents a summary of the Chi Square test results for the individual 
variables when cross-tabulated with the profile of respondents. Only four out of the 45 
tests did not report significant findings. These were in respect of the cross-tabulation 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Level of civic awareness among Ghanaians…
Degree of agreement among political leaders…
Presence of strong, efficient, and neutral…
Cultures of all ethnic groups value peace (n=1421)
Influence of religious beliefs that value peace…
Prayers and intercessions by religious groups (n =…
intermarriages between ethnic groups (n=1411)
Degree of respect for the rule of law among…
Fear of being singled out for punishment (n=1415)
66.9 
73.6 
74.2 
84.5 
81.6 
88.9 
79.7 
78.6 
75.8 
33.1 
26.4 
25.8 
15.5 
18.4 
11.1 
20.3 
21.4 
24.2 
Selected Not Selected
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between level of civic awareness among Ghanaians and age categories of responses (p = 
.067), as well as, for gender (p = .074). The cross-tabulation between the presence of 
strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and the Public 
and Civil Services and religious affiliations of Ghanaians also turned up a two-tailed 
significance level of .054, while “Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic groups” 
produced a two-tailed significance level of .088 when cross-tabulated with gender. In 
other words, the study cannot reject the hypothesis that age and gender differences have 
no effect on participants’ perception of the contribution of citizens’ level of civic 
awareness on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Similarly, we cannot reject the supposition 
that both men and women respondents did not find that the existence of strong bonds of 
intermarriage between different ethnic groups had an effect on the peace that Ghana 
enjoys.  Respondents of different religious backgrounds did not also find that the 
presence of strong, efficient, and neutral institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and 
the Public and Civil Services had any effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Besides 
these 4/45 cases, all other Chi Square test results have produced significant findings, 
thereby suggesting that on the whole, other demographic factors influence respondents’ 
appreciation of the extent to which the nine different factors have contributed to the peace 
in Ghana. Except for the nuances detailed above then, we can reject Ho2 that there are no 
differences among respondents in their perceptions of the nature and sources of peace in 
Ghana.  
Results of the key informant interviews confirm the trends in the assessment of 
the role of prayers as an anchor for Ghana’s peace. As one responded noted, Ghanaians 
“…do pray a lot for the country [and] that also is very very important [in attracting] the 
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mercies of God” (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014) to keep Ghana peaceful. Indeed, it 
has become “…a standard practice for many years … that many people pray for peace” 
(Interview 218, 14 December, 2014) during times of national crises. In the run up to 
every election since 1992, “…there is an overwhelming mobilization from a religious 
perspective about why the elections must be peaceful including organizing all night 
prayer sessions, prayer camps, errm all manner of religious activities for the elections to 
be peaceful” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This mobilization for prayers cuts all 
religious divides, as Christians, Muslims, and people of other faiths are known to hold 
prayer sessions to pray “…for the peaceful elections” (Interview 217, 13 December, 
2014).  
Praying for the nation is perhaps, the only place participants have credited women 
with a frontline role in the quest for peace in Ghana.  It was noted, for instance, that 
“Women’s Aglow … hold a monthly intercession pray at the independence square for the 
peace of this country and it’s something that we need to recognize” (Interview 203, 28 
October, 2014). Another interviewee would add that “…if it comes to mobilizing people 
for prayers, fasting, and all that most of them are women [and] ...most of the prayer 
meetings we attend they are mainly women [because] at the end of the day they are 
[concerned] more about their maternal instincts, fending for their spouses and the 
children” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; see also, Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). In 
brief, interviewees credited divine interventions in part for the peace of Ghana due to the 
role of prayer and active engagement of faith-based organizations in intercessions for, 
and the preaching of peace before, during, and after elections. The National Chief Imam 
sums up this view in respect of the 2012 elections when he observed that:  
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Before the 2012 general election, we cried before Allah to make a choice 
for us without any bloodshed, we prayed for peace before, during and after 
the election. Yes, our prayer was answered and there was no bloodshed, 
no blows on the street and no insult but the dispute rather in 
court.”(Sharubutu, 2013). 
 
While the efficacy of prayers as a contributor to Ghana’s peace remains beyond 
the realms of objective verification, several ancillary benefits of Ghanaians recourse to 
divine interventions lend themselves to verification. For instance, respondents have noted 
that joint prayers of different faiths during public functions “…helps [us] to identify 
ourselves with each other and [reinforces] the bonding” (Interview 218, 14 December, 
20014) among the different religious and ethnic groups in the country. Beyond promoting 
interfaith tolerance, respect, and peaceful coexistence, the religiosity of Ghanaians 
endows religious leaders with legitimacy that political leaders can only envy. As one 
respondent indicated because “…religion plays a big role in all sectors of society in 
Ghana, we still listen to our religious leaders; we listen to them when they come up with 
an issue… we flock to them, and they have played [and] they do play a strong role in 
promoting peace. (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). This legitimacy has served as strong 
footholds that have anchored the intrusion and engagement of Ghana’s faith leaders and 
institutions in the public sphere. Hence, since the coming into being of Ghana as a nation-
state, faith leaders in the country have leveraged the legitimacy they have from the 
population to intervene directly and proactively in matters of state to ensure that duty 
bearers at all levels live up to their responsibilities in ensuring peace. At all times, “…the 
religious bodies, the Catholics, the protestants have often stood up for social justice; they 
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have stood up, commented on, advocated for, or supported issues on social justice but not 
issues on partisan basis” (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).  
KII participants strongly endorsed the adherence of Ghanaians to a culture of 
peace as a major contributor to the country’s ability to stave off violent national level 
conflicts. They pointed out that despite the fact that the country is made of more than 50 
ethnic groups with different cultures, a certain level of cultural osmosis and 
homogenization has resulted in the development of a set of shared core values that prize 
peace over violence. As one respondent summed up the view:  
Even though we have many different ethnic groups with different cultures, 
we have over the years seen a convergence or commonalities in some 
cultural values and practices; so in a way you can say we have a Ghanaian 
culture, which is hospitable, welcoming. It’s part of the culture to give 
whatever we cannot manage to God (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). 
 
Respondents cited intermarriages, the ability of Ghanaians to migrate to and settle 
anywhere of their choice in the country without fear; as well as, friendships struck from 
shared educational, work, and religious affiliations as indicators of the intercultural 
accommodation, and even assimilation, across all ethnic groups in Ghana. This strongly 
underscores the culture of peace in the country. Explaining why Ghanaians will find it 
difficult to engage in widespread national violence, a respondent pointed out that 
“…where you have people from different tribes mixing and they see themselves as 
brothers and sisters, and not as somebody coming from the north or from the south; that 
we live together, we eat the same food (smiles), if you cut me it is the same blood that I 
will shed, it is the same blood that you would shed” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014); that 
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is enough to restrain people from fighting. To illustrate the culture that underwrites 
Ghana’s peace, another respondent recounted an incident of confrontation between the 
Police and a youth group during the tensed moments in 2008, when the election results 
were inclusive. The scene was set for a violent confrontation as the youth “...charged on 
the Police.  [But] “All of a sudden they stopped and started chanting:  ‘We want peace; 
we want peace; we want peace’ (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).  This kind of situation, 
in the view of another respondent, demonstrates that Ghana’s cultural predisposition is 
“…not the culture of violence, but the culture of peace” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).  
Probed on how it can be said that Ghana has a culture of peace when the country 
is host to several protracted violent intra and interethnic conflicts, respondents were quick 
to point out the fact that these conflicts are quickly contained and not allowed to spread. 
This, in their view, is proof that the wider Ghanaian culture abhors violence and would 
do anything to quell it before it engulfs the entire country. One respondent took a 
philosophical twist to the question in saying in the Akan language that “ yie sie  tu a 
nu na ma a yie  y d” meaning, it is the brawl at a funeral that lightens the 
atmosphere. In his view such isolated cases of localized conflicts do not represent general 
disposition to violence. On the contrary, “there are other factors that are coming into play 
that make Ghana so solid I don’t see how we can fight the way even Ivory Coast fought” 
(Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).  
Consistent with the findings of the survey, participants in the KIIs also placed 
limited emphasis on the contribution of civic education to the peace of Ghana. This is 
essentially because the state institutions, including the educational system and the 
National Commission for Civic Education were faulted for failing to live up to their 
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expectations of developing and prosecuting programs that would inculcate the culture of 
peace among Ghanaians. Citing specifically the National Commission for Civic 
Education, a participant observed that “… Ghanaians want to see them more present in 
the type of civic education about elections.  I don’t want to sound too critical of them, but 
I thought they were absent in the [2012] election” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). 
Echoing the sentiment, another respondent advocates that Ghana needs to “… find a way 
either through actual peace education as we know elsewhere or strengthening civic 
education, democratic education so that these can become the tools for pursuing peace” 
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). In brief, the findings from the KIIs support the views 
from the survey that religious and cultural beliefs and values are stronger contributors to 
peace in Ghana than the acquired knowledge of civic awareness. In other words, the 
propensity of Ghanaians to avoid violence is more innate and socio-culturally engrained 
from their cultural and faith upbringing than cognitively acquired from the state 
sponsored civic and formal educational systems. 
 
Contribution of Development to Peace in Ghana 
Ho3 Disparities in the distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the 
peace in the country 
This hypothesis tested respondents’ view on the extent to which horizontal 
inequalities or the geopolitical disparities in economic development in the country affect 
the peace in Ghana. It examined respondents’ perceptions on the contribution of the 
overall level of economic development of Ghana to its peace; perceptions of the impact 
of geographical (north-south; rural-urban) disparities in the level of development on the 
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peace in Ghana; the contribution of transparent and equitable contracts for natural 
resource exploitation and management to peace; the effects of perceived equitable returns 
on Ghana’s natural resource contracts on peace; perception of equitable allocation of 
revenue from natural resources to development in all parts of the country; and the 
perceived effects of effective and efficient use of proceeds from natural resources for the 
common good or the development of the country as a whole on peace in Ghana.  
The survey used six questions hinged on national policies, programs, and 
procedures for development to gauge the views of respondents on the said variables. 
Figure 3 summaries the 4.5 midpoint responses to the six 9 point Likert scale questions. 
For five variables, more than 60% of respondents agreed very strongly, strongly agreed, 
simply agreed, or mildly agreed that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the 
country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government. The same 
proportion of respondents also believed that transparently negotiated natural resource 
management contracts contribute to Ghana’s peace. Similarly, the equitable and fair 
returns to Ghana on the exploitation of her natural resources contribute to the peace in the 
country. In the same way, the equitable allocation of revenue from natural resources to 
development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana. They also 
agreed that proceeds from the exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources are used in ways 
that benefit the whole country. Noticeable, however, more than 30% of respondents 
disagreed on all scores. Similarly, with respect to the statement that Ghana is more 
peaceful than its neighbors because it has a high level of economic development, only 
51.5% of respondents agreed with the statement, while 48.5% disagreed to various levels 
– see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
 
Perceptions of Contribution of Economic Development to Peace in Ghana 
 
Put together, the construct of means for all six variables shows that 68.2% of 
respondents who provided answers to the questions for all the variables agreed to various 
extent that the policies, programs, processes, and outcomes of economic development in 
Ghana have contributed to the peace that the Ghana has – see Table 13. 
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Table 13  
Construct of Mean of responses on Effect of Economic Development on Ghana’s Peace. 
 
Case Selection:  
DevCon <= 4.5 
(FILTER) 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 451 31.6 31.8 
Selected 967 67.7 68.2 
Total 1418 99.2 100.0 
 Missing System 11 .8  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
Disaggregated by socio-economic characteristics of respondents and the different 
variables, however, several nuances emerge.  On the effect of the state of economic 
development in Ghana as compared to other countries as a contributor to peace, 
significant findings (p < 0.05) among respondents of different educational level, regions 
of interview, and primary occupation. However, gender and age categories reported 
insignificant findings (p > 0.05). A review of the data shows that while 44.3% of male 
respondents (321/609) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply with the statement that 
Ghana’s level of economic development has contributed to its peace in comparison to its 
neighbors, only 37.9% of women (206/543) had the same level of agreement on the 
subject. With respect to the impact of regional disparities in economic development, 
significant findings emerged for only the educational levels and regions of residence of 
the respondents. Age category, gender, and primary occupation of respondents turned up 
p-values > 0.05. On the level of transparency in the management of natural resources, 
significant findings emerged for all socio-economic characteristics except gender, 
occupation, and educational level of respondents. Gender alone recorded insignificant 
results when cross-tabulated with respondents’ perception on whether Ghana is receiving 
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equitable returns on her natural resource exploitations. Similarly, it is also only gender 
that came up with insignificant findings (p > 0.05) on the question on how effectively 
proceeds from natural resources are used for development purposes – see Appendix 10.  
In brief, the study finds mixed reactions from respondents on the notion that the 
level of economic development in Ghana, and how the processes associated with the 
management of its revenue base – natural resources – have contributed to the peace of the 
country. While about two thirds of respondents agree in some measure that Ghana’s 
peace is attributable to its level and processes of development, a third of the respondents 
do not agree with this suggest. These nuances notwithstanding, since the p-values on the 
Chi Square measures for the hypothesis report significance results > 0.05, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis (Ho3) that disparities in the distribution of development in 
Ghana has no effect on the peace in the country. 
The Key Informant Interviews provide insights on the apparent lack of agreement 
among survey respondents on the role of economic development on Ghana’s peace. The 
participants brought up four categories of responses to the question on whether or not 
Ghana’s state of economic development is a contributor to its peace: the affirmative, the 
dismissive, the ambivalent, and the false-positives. Respondents who agreed that Ghana’s 
level of development has contributed to its peace (the affirmatives) cited increased access 
to education and communication technology, specifically cellphones and television, as 
major development factors that have contributed to the peace in Ghana. This is because 
increased information flow through these media is facilitating changes in perceptions and 
attitudes, especially among ethnic groups that once exhibited repressive attitudes towards 
others (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Others suggested that official State 
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acknowledgment of the existence of the development gap between the north and the 
south, and the visible attempts of governments to bridge that gap through various 
interventions are attenuating factors to the emergence of any collective grievance that can 
trigger north-south conflict (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In particular, 
respondents cited visible state efforts such as Nkrumah’s accelerated educational 
development policy (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014); the agricultural development 
initiatives of the Acheampong era , which saw the development of large scale irrigation 
projects, as evidence of conscious efforts to bridge the north-south divide in 
development. They also averred that recent initiatives for the accelerated development of 
the north such as the proposed Northern Development Authority in the NPP era that was 
subsequently rechristened the Savannah Accelerated Development  Authority under the 
NDC, have all signaled to northerners that there is a national intent to bridge the 
development gap, even if the outcomes from the implementation of these projects have 
fallen short of expectations.   
Overall, respondents noted that the country’s educational systems and level of 
infrastructural development seems to be ahead of many other countries in West Africa.  
To emphasize the point a respondent recalled that on “…the few occasions when I had 
the opportunity to travel outside … and anytime I came back to Ghana, I felt I had come 
to heaven; that is the way I felt” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). And that feeling of 
pride in the comparative advancement of the country, in the view of respondents, held 
Ghanaians back from taking up arms at the national level.  Finally, there is a heightened 
awareness among Ghanaians, dating back to the pre-independence era that all the 
territorial units that eventually came together as Ghana must function together for the 
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survival of the country and the common good. As one  respondent pointed out, the sitting 
Governor had made this clear in 1951 when he said “That the Gold Coast cannot function 
as a country, except the three parts come together [and that northern] Chiefs in the Gold 
Coast Legislative Council, [subsequently] made it abundantly clear that the Colony 
cannot stand alone.  Ashanti cannot stand alone.  The North cannot stand alone; our 
future lies in unity” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). In the view of the respondent, this 
recognition on the part of the traditional and political leadership of Ghana of the need for 
unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the mutual benefit of all has 
underscored the conscious effort at national integration. It engrained the consciousness of 
economic interdependencies in the national psyche.  
Respondents who did not agree Ghana’s level of economic development had 
anything to do with its peace (the dismissives) subscribed to the view that even though 
“development does influence conflicts, but [the impact is generally] not much... [because] 
we have also seen situations where people are living in very deplorable conditions and 
yet they are not fighting among themselves or against other people.” (Interview 201, 15 
October, 2014). Another respondent would add that “…There are countries that are 
stable, you don’t hear about them not because they are more prosperous [and] there also 
very prosperous countries” (Interview 203, 28 October, 2014) that are trapped in violent 
conflicts. In view of this category of respondents, the state of development does not seem 
to be an indicator that a country will not fall into violence. They cited the counterfactual 
example of “Cote d’Ivoire [which was comparatively] well-developed, and yet political 
tensions erupted” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). If the state of development were a 
factor for peace,  “Nobody would have thought that in West Africa that Cote d’Ivoire 
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would have had the problem they had” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014).  Respondents 
also cited Kenya as a counterfactual argument.  
The Ambivalent among the KII participants held that with respect to the impact of 
development on Ghana’s peace “it’s difficult to measure that in Ghana; it’s very difficult” 
(interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the view of this category of respondents, this is 
because it is not the total development of the country or the north-south divide in 
development that are risk factors for conflicts; it is the perceived inequities in the 
distribution of development resources at the interpersonal levels that creates tensions and 
conflicts (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). In the view 
of another respondent: 
It is very difficult to say that development has played a positive or 
negative role because frankly speaking if you look at the disparity in the 
development certainly there is that divide between the north and the south 
and the north has been underdeveloped since colonial time… the north has 
been highly underdeveloped …lagged far behind the south in development 
terms; you see very little effort being made to address that” (Interview 3, 7 
February, 2014).  
 
For this group of respondents, even recent development such as the Savannah 
Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) which was set up to bridge the 
development gap between the north and the south has failed and poverty between the two 
is widening. Hence, if “the development divide was a contribution to conflict in the 
country then you should have seen a lot more antagonism between the north and the 
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south [but] we don’t see that kind of antagonism…” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). 
Explaining the lack of mobilized antagonisms in the north against the south on account of 
the horizontal inequalities cited a number of factors. According to one of the respondents, 
the lack of mobilization of the north against the south is attributable to the resignation of 
the northerners to their fate of underdevelopment, as “the north has been made to accept 
[…] second rate status in the country” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Another opines 
that the north that could have been the “…flash point” for relative deprivation related 
conflicts has not triggered the kind of geo-ethnic conflicts witnessed elsewhere on the 
continent because the north is “…still caught up in the euphoria of party politics [as]  the 
parties have in the way blurred the lines between north-south” (Interview 4, 12 February, 
2014).  Besides, we “…have people in the northern elite who benefit if one’s party is in 
office.” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). As a result, the opportunity to satisfy one’s 
personal and family needs without having to deal with the wider question of north-south 
economic disparity and deprivation has “blurred the lines and it is difficult to build 
consensus within the north” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).  Another respondent 
insinuated that northern leaders, especially the chiefs, have not been as assertive as their 
counterparts in other regions who are seen to be “pushing…more assertively than the 
northerners have done” (Interview 3, February, 2014) to project the needs of their citizens 
and use same to mobilize their constituents for action. 
Other respondents pointed out northerners, especially the younger ones have 
found escape routes out of their poverty traps through seasonal migration to the south or 
elsewhere during the off-farm seasons in search of jobs and income. As a result, there is 
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no critical mass of angry young people who can mobilize to instigate a north-south 
confrontation. Illustrating the point, a respondent in this study cites the case where: 
…in Pusiga for example, you go during the harshest part of the year and 
almost all the young men have migrated to the south. So you don’t then 
have this group of angry young men in the community saying that this, 
that, that, but they’ve found other measures to cope” (Interview 4, 12 
February, 2014).  
 
Complementing this view on the anger displacement effect of migration, another 
respondent noted that the freedom of movement and settlement of Ghanaians across the 
country creates opportunities for “people in the north who may be peeved or angry that 
they are marginalized in terms of the economic divide” (Interview 215, 10 December 
2014) to relocate and work in the south. This gives people in the north “…a stake in what 
goes on well in the south because it helps to take them up; in the same way that you have 
people from the south who also invest and do business in the north”. Hence, even though 
the north-south divide in terms of development exists, the possibility of migration to and 
from the south, and the attendant economic benefits and interests is “…an insurance that 
sort of helps us to avoid conflict” (Interview 215, 10 December 2014), especially related 
to violent reactions to the development gap between the north and the south. In other 
words, ease of cross regional migration and access to economic opportunities in the south 
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; Interview 215, 10 December, 2014; Interview 210, 21 
November, 2014), is effectively a disincentive to the people of the north to mobilize to 
fight those in the south, since doing so could jeopardize their ability to access the 
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resources of the south. Be it as may, the combination of these factors have created the 
situation where the opportunity for anyone to latch onto the “frustration-aggression” 
potential energy of the north, and especially of the youth in that part of the country and 
channel that into “anger-driven behavior” (Ametewe, in Tonah, 2007, p. 26) against the 
south is lost. Other respondents suggested that self-complacency among those most 
affected by relative deprivation attenuates their anger. According to this view, the non-
materialistic nature of Ghanaians sets a low material satisfaction threshold for most 
people. As a result, people are happy with the little that they have; they do not depend on 
external others, especially government to satisfy their needs; and “they are not comparing 
themselves to other people; they are satisfied with whatever they have and they depend 
upon whatever they have to survive; [therefore], they are not ready to go and indulge in 
violence before they survive, they are satisfied (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). 
Respondents cited the activities of nonstate development actors in the north as a 
major shield against this anger-driven behavior that Ametewe has indicated. As one 
respondent put it, although unequally distributed, the investments of development-
focused Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) provide substantial relief and 
development services to the north. This, in the view of the respondent, has contributed to 
the mollification of communal anger against the state for its failure to right the wrongs of 
policy failures of the past and the present that perpetuate the development gap between 
the north and the south, and for that matter other parts of the country that receive similar 
non-state development support. In the words of the respondent, “NGOs have found a way 
of calming [community anger]…rather than being organizations that facilitate citizens’ 
agency, their voices, we rather serve as a palliative, we go in and you know calm down 
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things” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Citing the case of the eastern corridor of the 
Northern Region, another respondent noted that the peacebuilding efforts of NGOs have 
equally been effective in helping communities at conflict to contain their grievances, 
without exploring the wider structural and systemic factors that may have exacerbated 
their grievances in ways that lead them to violent conflicts (Interview 6, 18th February, 
2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014). According to these respondents, by shielding 
the state from the potential anger of marginalized citizens, development NGOs are 
temporary displacing the anger of the deprived.  
Beyond the north-south development divide, issues of relative deprivation exist in 
other parts of the country. Even though there is some development in the south in 
general, it’s not evenly distributed. Large differences exist between the rural and urban 
areas, and within the urban areas as well. As one respondent noted, “over the past 20 
years the gap is widening between the very poor and the very rich” (Interview 12, 4 
March, 2014) as evidenced by the “…abundant display of wealth” in some areas, 
especially in the urban areas, in comparison to the dire poverty in the same cities. 
Consequently the incidents of violent conflicts are concentrated in and tend to be 
contained within poor rural areas and urban slums. The attendant threat to the peace of 
the country lies in the fact that “a country is as strong as it is able to take of its vulnerable 
and I am not yet sure that we have done, (pause) we have worked sufficiently to protect 
our weak and our vulnerable; and so we have social justice issues” (Interview 12, 4 
March, 2014). 
Respondents who believed that the contribution of Ghana’s state of development 
to its peace is a false-positive essentially argued that the impact of development on peace 
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in Ghana is a mirage. This is because the contribution of Ghana’s state of development on 
peace in the country is “Not very much in the positive domain as far as I am concerned 
… if you go to certain rural areas in this country, they still live in the same conditions, 
excuse my language, huts, mud houses, errm, that our ancestors, our forefathers lived in 
over 100 years ago” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). In the view of this category of 
respondents, the state of development in Ghana has not been the trigger for conflicts 
because of the existence of multiple escape routes that allow aggrieved citizens to mortify 
their anger against failures of the state and other duty bearers.  For the elite and middle-
class, a conscious distancing, disengagement, or even exit from any confrontational 
engagement with state institutions and officials who have failed the citizenry is the 
escape route. In the words of a respondent, “…the so called middle class in Ghana [that 
should have championed the collectivization of citizens’ anger against the failures of duty 
bearers, have rather] opted for private solutions to public problems” (interviewer 4, 12 
February, 2014). Rather than take on political leaders and other duty bearers for failures 
in the delivery of social services and public goods, they disengage and try to fix the 
problems privately. Hence, “… if water is not working rather than engaging to find out 
what we need to do, you go and sink boreholes; … The roads are not working [you buy] 
bigger four wheel drives; … no electricity, you go for a generator” (Interview 4, 12 
February, 2014). Those who do not want to go through the trouble of finding their own 
solutions to state failure and inadequacies simply exit the state system through migration 
to other more functional countries, usually Europe and North America. Even when they 
stay back, they send their children to schools outside to escape the challenges with the 
educational system; when the local health insurance is collapsing, “…we are going in for 
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private insurance” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) instead of engaging the system to 
make sure that it functions. Those who can afford it fly out for medical attention since 
they cannot rely on local health services. In parallel, “…the other social groups I think 
they also have found ways of disengaging from the state” (Interview 4, 12 February, 
2014) through refusal to pay taxes or resort to occasional demonstrations that have little 
to no effect on changing the situation. Buttressing the point on elite recourse to the use of 
private solutions to address public problems, another respondent highlights the 
individualism and exclusivism that cocoons the middle class, not only from the state, but 
from engagements with their peers for more effective ways of managing state failures for 
a greater common good. Citing his own example the respondent notes that “I have a 
borehole, it cost me GHC7,500 to do the borehole, I pump it once a week, and the water 
is underground, why can’t the five of us, come together, and pump the borehole and share 
the water, the cost and the water and agree on how it is managed? (Interview 217, 13 
December, 2014). 
A career in politics is another escape route, respondents indicated. In their view, 
citizens without the means to solve their problems by themselves find refuge in politics as 
the route for private wealth accumulation and exit from the poverty trap. This, according 
to respondents, is why “…you see young people come [out of school] and go into politics 
and within two three months he’s already starting a house” (Interview 207, 29 October, 
2014). Even party activists such as the “foot soldiers” who have no direct access to power 
and state resources , “have a way of benefiting” when their party is in power. For those 
who cannot access the spoils of power, they take their refuge in the wanton exploitation 
of any natural resource that lies in their way, without due regard for its effect on the 
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environment, the communities, the economy, or any other negative consequences their 
acts may wrought (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014; also, Interview 215, 10 December 
2014). In parallel, the horde of unemployed youth in the urban areas latch onto any 
“…type of business being labeled as lucrative …Whether it is [selling] pure water as they 
call it or selling phone cards, or pushing trucks, any type of buying and selling, you see 
people engaged in those things [to try to] make a living out of it” (Interview, 9, 26 
February, 2014). In sum, rather than engage with duty bearers to demand that the right 
things are done to improve their conditions of living, Ghanaians tend to avoid conflict by 
fending for themselves, using whatever means is at their disposal.  
Respondents, however, observed that the younger generation of citizens is 
increasingly linking their economic fortunes and livelihood conditions, especially in the 
provision of electricity, roads, and other social amenities to public policy making 
processes, including elections. In election years for instance, it is common to see in some 
communities protest billboards such as “no electricity, no vote; no road, no vote” 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, such community anger at state failures is not 
sufficiently galvanized to have a direct and large scale impact on peace.  
In sum, respondents have emphasized the geo-ethnic interdependencies as a key 
factor for the accommodation and cooperation between northerners and southerners in 
Ghana for the country’s peace to prevail. This economic interdependencies between the 
north and the south that has served as a stitch for peace, has historical antecedents, in the 
view of one respondent (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). As he illustrated, the geo-
ecological composition of Ghana constituted natural trading blocs between the people of 
the coast, the central forest belt, and the northern Savannah, dating back to the pre-
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colonial times. Being business-oriented, the Ashanti kingdom in the center took 
advantage of the differences in economic resources that this natural geographical and 
environmental partitioning of the country wrought to organize a unified trade system that 
inured to its benefits. They leveraged their location in the center;  their wedge between 
the coastal areas with its access to the Whiteman and his goodies; and their access to the 
northern savannah countries with their demands for kolanuts and other forest products, as 
well as, their offer of woven cloth, to create economic interdependencies that greatly 
benefitted the Ashantis. The same interdependencies remain today, even though the 
commodities of trade may have changed in their composition and values.  
Other interviewees have referenced the same regional economic 
interdependencies and asserted that Ghana’s peace is possible largely because private 
businesses want to have a peaceful environment for their businesses to thrive. As one 
respondent noted,  “…if you have property  …that is [worth] about a hundred thousand 
dollars you don’t want it to be destroyed; [besides] businesses know that their businesses 
will prevail when there is peace, so they are interested in ensuring peace” (Interview 206, 
29 October, 2014). In sum, state-initiated development interventions have not had much 
impact on the lives of people. As such “the majority of Ghanaians are apathetic with 
political governance or activity.  Most of them will say “country broke or country no 
broke we de inside” (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In other words, it does not matter 
what happens to the state of development in the country, all citizens have to fend for 
themselves. The best then is for peace to prevail so that everyone can try to irk out a 
living (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014). 
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State’s Respect for Human Rights, Rule of Law and Peace in Ghana 
Ho4 The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no 
effect on the peace that the country enjoys.  
This hypothesis sought to establish the extent to which perceived respect for 
human rights and freedoms of the citizens affects the peace in Ghana. Accordingly, 
respondents were asked to state their level of agreement or disagreement on whether 
Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa because Ghanaians have more 
freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested; Ghana is peaceful because 
Ghanaians enjoy more political freedom than their neighbors in other countries; and 
Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and disappearances of 
political opponents are minimal.  
The frequency run for the variable on respect for freedom of expression shows 
that 87.7% (n=1419) of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply 
agreed that Ghana’s peace is in part due to the ability of Ghanaians to express themselves 
freely. An additional 7.0% mildly agreed with the statement.  On whether the level of 
political freedom in the country is a contributor to peace in Ghana, 83.3% of the 
respondents (n=1420) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the statement. 
Similarly, 87.4% of the respondents (n= 1423) very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed 
that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, torture, and 
disappearances of political opponents are minimal. The construct of means for the three 
variables with a 4.5 level cut off to include respondents who mildly agreed as well shows 
that 94.4% of respondents to all three questions very strongly, strongly, simply, or mildly 
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agreed that Ghana’s peace is in part attributable to respect for human rights in the 
country.  
Table 14 
Effect of Respect of Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace 
 
Selection of Cases 
HRCons <= 4.5  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 74 5.2 5.2 
Selected 1349 94.4 94.8 
Total 1423 99.6 100.0 
 Missing System 6 .4  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
In a cross tabulation of the three variables with the age category, gender, 
educational level, region in which interviews were conducted and the primary occupation 
of respondents, all the tests turned up significant findings with two-tailed significance 
levels less than or equal to .05 – Appendix 11. This means that a the  hypothesis that 
there is no difference among respondents in their perception of the level of contribution 
of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana has on the peace that the country 
enjoys can be rejected. In other words, the findings that 94.4% of respondents agree to 
vary the extents that Ghana’s peace is attributable to the level of respect for human rights 
and the rule of law is a significant find. Therefore, Ho4, which posits that the level of 
respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no effect on the peace that the 
country enjoys can be rejected.  
KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that respect for the freedom 
of expression and political freedoms, as they currently exist have contributed to 
sustaining Ghana’s current peace. However, this has not always been so historically. In 
the view of respondents, it is the liberalization of the air waves in the late 1990s and the 
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repeal of the libel laws in the mid-2000s that has created the new dispensation of 
freedoms (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). Otherwise, many respondents recalled the 
periods when the freedom of speech and the media were suppressed or were tightly 
controlled to serve the interests of the governments of the day, especially when the 
culture of silence reigned in the 1980s (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014).  
Respondents saw the current political dispensation as largely positive, but with 
inherent dangers for the peace of the country. First, the guarantees of human rights have 
not necessarily translated into the creation of opportunities for the attainment of those 
rights. Hence, for example, “…there is a difference between having the space [or] 
freedom of education or rights to education, however, if you are not given the means to 
school, if you don’t have a school near your home, you don’t have access to it, it makes it 
difficult” (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). This brings back to focus the question of 
development opportunities and its impact on peace in the country. Beyond the physical 
and financial ability to access their rights, however, respondents also raised a wider 
question of the cognitive ability of citizens to claim their rights and live out their 
responsibilities, as a result of the dearth of knowledge on such rights. As one respondent 
summed it: 
we talk about human rights in the system [but] people don’t even know 
what that means. I do take educated people and talk to them about human 
rights, even workers’ rights and sometimes I am surprised that they don’t 
know even the rights of workers as spelt out in our constitution, as spelt 
out in the labor act and errr, and women’s rights issues, we talk about 
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them on platform but no one, they do not mean anything; it’s not acted 
on…(Interview 206 29 October, 2014). 
 
With respect to the contribution of the absence of extra judicial arrests, detentions, 
torture, and disappearances of political opponents to the peace in Ghana, respondents said 
it is not so much what is happening now as the memory of what happened in the past that 
is contributing to Ghana’s ability to eschew national level violence. They frequently 
recalled the periods of military rule in 1960s, 70s, 80s and the 90s, when human rights 
abuses held sway. Accordingly to respondents, the experiences from these periods 
“…have taught us lessons that it does not pay for the Military to take their guns and seize 
power.  That is why the average Ghanaian will go for democratic governance rather than 
opting for military rule” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). In particular, they recalled “the 
experiences of ’79 and early 80 [when] a lot of blood was shed in the name of the 
development of the country and … have taken a lesson [that] they would not want to see 
that happen again (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In the words of another respondent: 
…the remembrance of those times make us not want to sink into state of 
anarchy where the military will take over, people will be shot; [Ghanaians 
do not] want a repetition of that. So if something happens we say let’s live 
together we are brothers lets live together so that we don’t go to the past 
where we suffered;  so yeah, the past reminds us and it informs us to live 
in peace” (Interview 203, 28 October 2014).  
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Added to this is the deception that Ghanaians suffered under the military, who 
came to power under the cloak of bettering the lot of Ghanaians only to enrich 
themselves and their immediate friends and families. People now understand that “…the 
military always [had] their own reasons …people accepted it and they realized that what 
the military people were telling them they saw its more easily said than done” (Interview 
214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of respondents, the military in power became as 
corrupt, if not more corrupt than the civilians they overthrew. Mindful of these, most 
Ghanaians want to “… be careful so that we don’t create the space for the military to 
come in to take us back;  and so even when we get to the tipping point, we try to manage 
that”  (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014). In brief it is not the respect for human rights 
as currently experienced that contributes to Ghana’s peace; it is more the fear of returning 
to military rule where respect for human rights cannot be guaranteed that keeps 
Ghanaians from fighting.  
 
Private Citizens’ and Public Officials Respect for the Rule of Law 
Ho5   There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for 
the rule of law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana 
This hypothesis tested the extent to which respondents’ perceptions on citizens’ 
respect for the laws of the land; public officials’ respects for the laws of the land; and 
citizen’s respect for decisions of the courts, have contributed to the peace in Ghana. 
Responses to the three questions that assessed the three variables constituted the basis for 
this assessment. The frequency run of responses to the three variables show that more 
than two thirds of respondents very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed 
with the various statements in respect of their contribution to the peace of Ghana. For 
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instance, 82.1% of respondents (n=1418) said Ghanaian’s respect for the decisions of the 
courts is a contributor to peace. Notably, 40.1% of the respondents fell in the “very 
strongly agree” response category. However, 67.0% (n=1425) said public officials’ 
respect for the laws of the land is a contributor to the peace of Ghana; meaning a third of 
the respondents (33%) thought otherwise. On citizen’s respect for the laws of Ghana, 
62.1% of respondents (n=1422) agreed from a very strong to a simple degree that this 
contributes to the peace of Ghana. Again, more than a third of respondents did not agree 
with the statement.  
A cross-tabulation of the results for the three variables by age category of 
respondents, gender, educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation of 
the respondents shows non-significant findings of Chi Square Values for the following: 
respect for the rule of law and age categories (p = .075); respect for the rule of law and 
gender (p = .142); respect for the rule of law and educational levels (p = .155). Public 
officials’ action in accordance with the law turned up a two tail significance of p = .229, 
while the cross-tabulation of citizens’ respect for the laws of the land with gender also 
gave a significance p-value of .285 – See Appendix 12. In other words, we cannot reject 
the view that no differences exist between respondents’ assessment of the degree to 
which these factors contribute to the peace of Ghana.  
A closer examination of the cross-tabulated results of age categories with the 
variable on respect for the rule of laws of the country shows that older respondents were 
more likely to agree with the assertion than younger ones. For instance, 72.7% of persons 
aged between 68 and 77 years very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or simply agreed 
that citizens’ respect for the rule of law accounted in some ways for Ghana’s experience 
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of peace. However, only 60% of those in the 78-87 age bracket, and between 63% to 
64.9% of those in the 18 through 67 years’ bracket expressed similar levels of agreements 
with the role that the respect for the rule of laws has played in Ghana’s peace. Notably, 
29.9% of respondents in the 28-37 years age bracket disagreed to various degrees with 
the assertion on the role that the rule of law plays in Ghana’s peace.  
With respect to gender differences, only minor differences exist between men and 
women who agreed strongly and very strongly with the suggestion that the Ghanaian’s 
respect for the rule of law contributes to the peace of the country. While the men came in 
at 62.8%, the women stood at 61.12 % with n=1407. However, the differences between 
men and women showed at the level of disagreement. While only 3.9% of women 
strongly disagreed, disagreed, and merely disagreed with the statement, as much as 10% 
of men expressed the same levels of disagreement with the statement – Appendix 13. 
Overall, however, 90.5 of the respondents (n = 1426) agreed very strongly, strongly, 
simply agreed, or mildly agreed with the three statements that evaluated their perceptions 
on the contribution of the reign of the rule of law to Ghana’s peace, as illustrated in the 
construct of means for the three variables in Table 15. This suggests that despite some 
reservations along age and gender lines, the majority of respondents believed that 
Ghana’s peace has a lot to do with the respect that Ghanaians in their private and public 
lives have for the rule of law.  
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Table 15 
Effect of Respect for the Rule of Law on Ghana’s Peace 
 
Selected Cases 
RoLCons <= 4.5  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 133 9.3 9.3 
Selected 1293 90.5 90.7 
Total 1426 99.8 100.0 
 Missing System 3 .2  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
KII respondents endorsed the idea that Ghanaians in general respect the laws of 
the country and the decisions of the courts. This is because as part of the socialization 
process in all cultures, most Ghanaians “were brought up to respect law and order, to 
respect authority, [and] to respect older people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a 
result, “there is a general level of law abiding sentiment” (Interview 202, 2 October, 
2014) among Ghanaians. The colonial administration noted this compliant disposition of 
the people and christened the land and the people that now constitute Ghana “…as the 
model Colony, one because we were peaceful, generally law abiding.  We were the 
model colony, peaceful people, generally law abiding.  And fortunately, the country was 
paying for its administration. (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). 
It is this predisposition to respect law, order, and peace in the Ghanaian culture 
that gives religious leaders and their civil society counterparts the legitimacy and 
convening power to bring together political leaders at critical moments in the country’s 
history in order to facilitate consensus building among political parties that led to the 
avoidance of election related violence. Respondents cited examples of how  religious 
leaders who have chaired the National Peace Council, since its inception, have been 
instrumental in organizing fora such as the Presidential debates for candidates in the 2008 
138 
 
 
 
and 2012 elections, and particularly, the meeting of political leaders in Kumasi in 2012, 
where they signed “the Kumasi Accord [in which they] all promised to be law abiding” 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and to accept the results of the 2012 elections, 
irrespective of who won or lost. It is this Accord that gave the religious leaders the lien to 
engage the leadership of the NDC and the NPP to ensure that they got their supporters off 
the streets and into the court rooms for the resolution of the disputes over the 2012 
presidential elections.  
The law abiding upbringing has also been credited with the willingness of 
political leaders to respect the law, accords, decisions of the courts, and the rules and 
regulations governing elections. As one respondent summed it, “… our political leaders 
have been very very errm (pause) understanding and they respect the laws of the land and 
that has helped us because no political party has taken the law into its own hands, as far 
as I am concerned” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Similarly, respondents commended 
political parties for using the courts, and not the streets, to resolve electoral disputes. As a 
respondent framed it, political parties would usually say “…lets go to court and let the 
court decide instead of taking the law into our hands; and so because of that instead of 
resorting to violence they followed the appropriate channel for addressing their 
grievances” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 11, 3 March, 2014; and 
Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is evident in the decision of the two major political 
parties to use the courts in 2008 and then in 2012 when they had issues with the 
presidential elections. Even though in both cases the decisions of the Supreme Court went 
against the wishes of the petitioners, they nonetheless accepted the results.  In particular, 
respondents cited Nana Akufo Addo, the Presidential Candidate of the NPP in the 2012 
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elections for his respect of the rule of law when, after the Supreme Court had given its 
verdict on the election petition he and others brought before it, he said that even though 
he disagreed with the ruling of the Supreme Court, he nonetheless accepted and respected 
it. In the words of one respondent, that “…wonderful speech [he made] changed the 
whole thing” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014); turning an otherwise very volatile 
situation into a nonviolent outcome. This example summed the view of respondents that 
the law abiding nature of Ghanaians has sustained the peace of the country. Even when 
they do not agree with a rule, they nonetheless accept to work with it and to work 
according to the rules to change it, if possible.  
Some respondents, however, opined that Ghanaians’ respect for institutions of 
state and rule of law is important for Ghana’s peace, but not sufficient to account to a 
significant extent for its peace. For such respondents, it is the attitudes and actions of 
people that have determined and will continue to determine the kind of peace that Ghana 
gets (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Adding another cautionary note, one respondent 
recalled what Governor Guggisberg once said of the law abiding nature of Ghanaians. He 
paraphrased the Governor to have said that “Ghanaians are nice people, law abiding, but 
malcontents, we should watch out for malcontents” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). 
Another respondent would add Ghanaians may have shown respect for the rules and 
institutions of the law because “…we were not pushed to the wall enough for us to 
become confrontational and become violent to get it” (Interview 11, 3 March, 2014). In 
otherwise, the respect that public officers and ordinary citizens show for the rule of lawa 
and the courts could be breached if people are pushed to the wall.  
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Perceptions on Contribution of Freedom of the Press to Ghana’s Peace 
Ho6   There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana 
has contributed to the peace of the country 
This hypothesis tested how the freedom of the print media, the liberalization of 
the electronic media, and the unrestricted access to news and information from the 
internet may have contributed to Ghana’s peace. The dimensions that measured freedom 
of the press included the presence or absence of legal and administrative controls on 
newspapers and other print media of information dissemination;  the ability of the press 
to carry news stories without fear of repression or censorship by the state and other 
interest groups; as well as, the abolition of libel laws. Freedom of expression on radio and 
television for all citizens is measured by how the liberalized airwaves for radio and TV 
broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in 
programs, have contributed to the peace in Ghana. Finally, unrestricted access of 
Ghanaians to news and information on the internet, as well as, their unrestricted use of 
social media platforms to freely access and share news and views through the internet 
constituted part of the set of variables for testing the hypothesis.  
The survey results show that with respect to freedom of the print media, 86.9% of 
respondents (n = 1422) agreed very strongly, strongly, or simply agreed with the 
statement that the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves in the print media 
without fear of being cited for libel has contributed to peace in Ghana. Of this, 36.8% of 
the respondents were in the “very strongly agreed” category. For freedom of the 
electronic media, 81.8% (n= 1418) said they very strongly agreed, strongly agreed, or just 
agreed that  freedom of expression on radio stations and televisions through broadcasts of 
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news, debates, hosted discussions, and interactive SMS and phone-in programs has 
contributed to the peace in Ghana. The majority of the responses (40.4%) were in the 
strongly agreed category.  On unrestricted access to the internet and social media, 
however, it was 78% of the respondents (n = 1419) who very strongly agreed, strongly 
agreed, or simply agreed with the statement that unrestricted access to news and 
information from the internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana’s 
peace; with 32.2% of the responses falling in the “strongly agreed” category.  
A cross tabulation of all three variables with respondents’ age category, gender, 
educational level, region of interview, and primary occupation all returned two-tailed 
significance p values of less than .05 for their respective Chi Square values – See 
Appendix 14. Since these results are not coincidental, we can reject the hypothesis that 
there is no difference among respondents in their perception of how the freedom of the 
press in Ghana has contributed to the peace of the country. The construct of means with a 
4.5 midpoint filter of responses show that 93.3% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed that 
the existence of freedom of the print, electronic, and internet-enabled media have 
contributed to Ghana’s peace – Table 16. In sum, most respondents believed that the 
freedom of the press in Ghana has contributed significantly to the peace that the country 
enjoys.  
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Table 16 
Effect of Free Media on Ghana's Peace 
Case Selection 
FreeMed <= 4.5  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 96 6.7 6.7 
Selected 1328 92.9 93.3 
Total 1424 99.7 100.0 
 Missing System 5 .3  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
 Respondents in the KII however saw the current state of the media as a double-
edge sword (Interview 7, 19 February; Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; Interview 6, 18 
February); as it has both positive and negative effects. Positively, the liberalization of the 
airwaves and increased access to information and communication platforms were 
particularly noted as being instrumental in getting Ghanaians to let off their steams in 
ways that avert the build-up of anger and subsequent recourse to violence to address pent-
up grievances. In the words of one respondent: 
I believe very strongly that in a political situation where people are not 
gagged to speak their mind, when they speak and air their views I believe 
that the tension, the greater portion of the tension in them is quite released 
and it does not foster (sic) them to go at each other’s throats and have 
violent conflicts; that’s how I see it (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). 
 
Secondly, respondents indicated that the media’s exposure of wrongdoings by 
public officials has a soothing effect on the population. They get the feeling that 
someone, at least, is watching the public purse on tier behalf. The ability to freely discuss 
these issues also allows people to vent out their views and frustrations. Media penetration 
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into rural areas, especially via the local FM Radio Stations broadcasting in local 
languages, has increased access to information in those areas. This has served as a 
conflict early warning mechanism, especially during elections when those stations flag 
potential areas or issues of conflict (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). During elections, the 
announcements of election results on the airwaves as the counts are completed at the 
polling stations “…make it almost impossible for people to cheat because their reporters 
are everywhere” to provide live coverage of the events (Interview 207, 29 October, 
2014).  
On the negative side, respondents noted that partisan reportage, sensationalism, 
provocative statements, and biased or judgmental reporting often skews views and raise 
political temperatures.  Hence, some respondents worried that the new found freedom of 
expression and the media is a potential risk to the peace and stability of the country, 
especially since “…individual politicians are beginning to set up their own newspapers 
and radio stations as a way” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; see also Interview 213, 9 
December, 2014) to serve their parochial and partisan interests.  In the 2008 elections, for 
instance, some radio stations “almost went overboard in agitating the public towards 
possible conflict” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014; see also Interview 215, 10 
December, 2014) or in the propagation of hate speech as was the case in 2012 (Interview 
213, 9 December, 2014). Respondents fear this unbridled and unscrupulous use of the 
media through the machinations of politicians is a key flashpoint of violent national level 
conflict (Interview 202, 27 October, 2014).   
Another worrying trend is the increasingly partisan postures of most newspapers 
and radio stations in the country. Most of them “…are aligned to political parties … and 
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they don’t ever see any good from any other political party apart from their party, which 
is very very bad” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 
2014). Because of this development, we now have decidedly “…pro-government press, 
and we have anti-government press, which is not good for the development of the 
country” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The politically polarized and partisan nature of 
most media houses make them unconstructive in their contribution to the political 
discourse in Ghana. The consequences of their disruptive approaches have only been 
mollified by the work of other actors (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).  
The irony of double negatives also operates to attenuate the effects of the partisan 
press. In the view of respondents, because Ghanaians are heavily politicized, they are 
quick to label and stereotype media houses and their outputs. As a result, people then 
readily discount, discredit, and disregard media content coming from their ‘chosen other’ 
media houses. This selective stereotyping and discounting of views from the other side 
has the positive effect of dousing anger and averting conflicts because people just brush 
what is being said aside, “…dig in their heels and say, leave them alone […] so that has 
been helpful, but if it were just left to just their messages and so on it would have become 
trouble” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014). 
Other respondents were worried that press freedom and the freedom of the media 
is being taken to the excess to breach personal freedoms. In their view, some people are 
taking advantage of the removal of the libel laws to mount radio stations or use the 
internet to say or write “…certain things that is not good for public consumption” 
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) or that border on outright defamation of characters 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 13, 5 March, 
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2014). This has led some respondents to caution that “…the freedom of speech in Ghana 
is too much [but unfortunately] …the Media Commission [has no] teeth to bite” 
(Interview 213, 9 December 2014) to bring such errant persons or media houses to order.   
In sum, while the ability of Ghanaians to freely express themselves may have 
helped in preserving the peace, there are inherent dangers to the peace of the country if 
the unbridled use of the press to prosecute partisan political agendas or personal 
vendettas are not checked.  
 
Perceptions on Role of the Judicial System to Ghana’s Peace 
Ho7   There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a 
major contributor to the peace of the country 
This hypothesis assessed the perception of respondents on the contribution of the 
judiciary in Ghana to the country’s peace, using three variables, namely, perceptions of 
the independence of the courts as measured by respondents’ perceptions on the ability of 
judges to dispense justice without interference from state officials or other influential 
persons;  the perceived impact of corruption in the judiciary on the peace in Ghana, as 
measured by respondents’ perception on the ability of judges and court staff to administer 
justice without being influenced by personal interests or gains. The third variable focused 
on perceived equality of all citizens before the law and its contribution to peace in Ghana, 
as indicated by the level of agreement among respondents on the equal treatment of all 
citizens before the law.  
The frequency of responses shows that on the perception of independence of the 
judiciary, 70.60% (n = 1424) very strongly agreed (38.1%), strongly agreed (19.1%) or 
simply agreed (13.4%) that the independence of the judiciary contributes to peace in 
146 
 
 
 
Ghana. On the other hand, only 50.90% of respondents (n = 1424) agreed very strongly, 
strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that the level of perceived corruption in the 
judiciary is a contributor to peace in Ghana. With respect to equality of all Ghanaians 
before the law, 62.8% of respondents (n = 1421) agreed very strongly (29.9%), strongly 
(21.7%) or merely with the statement that the fact that all citizens can expect to be treated 
equally before the law contributes to peace in Ghana. 
Appendix 15 presents the Chi Square values and associated two-tailed 
significance levels for the cross-tabulation of responses for the three variables with the 
profile of the respondents. Apart from gender which showed significance levels > .05 for 
the cross-tabulation of gender and judicial independence, as well as, gender and 
perceptions on the corruptibility of the judiciary, all other tests turned up significance 
levels < .05. Scrutiny of the results of cross-tabulation on judiciary independence and 
gender shows that 71.90% of the female respondents (n = 650) very strongly agreed, 
strongly agreed or simply agreed that Ghana has peace because the courts are 
independent from political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or 
favor. This compares to 69.3% of men who gave similar levels of agreements with the 
statement. Similarly, a review of the data for the cross-tabulation between gender and the 
perceived corruptibility of the judiciary, shows that while 51.90% of female respondents 
(n = 649) agreed very strongly, strongly, or merely agreed with the assertion that Ghana 
is peaceful because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly, only 
49.9% of male respondents (n=760) committed to the same degree of answers on the 
question. Conversely, while 23.7% of men disagreed, strongly or very strongly disagreed 
with the statement, 19.8% of female respondents expressed the same level of 
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disagreement with the statement. The foregoing suggests that respondents make 
distinctions between the courts as institutions and their perceptions of the actions of 
judges as individual officers. Since the cross-tabulation between gender of participants 
and their perceptions of the independence of the judiciary on the one hand, and the 
incorruptibility of judges on the other hand both produced p-values > .05, we cannot 
reject Ho7 which states that there is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system 
in Ghana is a major contributor to the peace of the country. The construction of means for 
the responses to all three questions, however, indicates that 77.6% of all respondents (n = 
1426) agreed in various degrees to the statement that the judicial system in Ghana is a 
major contributor to the peace of the country 
Table 17 
Perceptions about the contribution of the Judicial System to the Peace in Ghana 
 
Selected cases: 
Judicon <= 4.5  
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 319 22.3 22.4 
Selected 1107 77.5 77.6 
Total 1426 99.8 100.0 
 Missing System 3 .2  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
 
While the judiciary is generally commended for trying to make the laws work, 
some respondents in the KII have cited the increasing politicization of the judiciary, 
especially through appointments and direct interference, as a critical factor to watch in 
the operations of the rule of law. In the view of one respondent, “… the judiciary… have 
the power to do almost everything but politics is one thing in the judiciary [as] it is also 
perceived that politics plays a role there” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). As a result, 
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“Respect for Courts is eroding because people do not see them as fair arbitrators” 
(Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). Hence, despite the general tendency of Ghanaians 
to abide by the rules and the law, respondents see a high risk that Ghana could face a 
breakdown of the rule of law due to political interference and corruption in the judiciary. 
According to this view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice 
from the courts, they will take the law into their own hands. One respondent relates a 
conversation he had with a friend who is a judge: 
 … I told the judge one source from personal experience that people would 
find reason to fight is the breakdown of our judicial system. When they 
[citizens] begin to feel that when you go for justice [and] through bribery 
and corruption you cannot get justice, that’s when people will begin to 
take arms for they know that they have to settle issues directly; the rule of 
law would break down because the judges have broken down the rules and 
the law (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).   
 
This view correlates with statements by some political parties that in the next 
elections, people would seek to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level, 
as they have lost confidence in the ability of the Supreme Court to be able to deliver 
justice. This waning confidence in the courts notwithstanding, respondents believe by and 
large Ghanaians still have confidence in the judiciary, despite perceptions of bias and 
corruption. As one respondent summed it:   
people have complained a lot about the judiciary, it is in favor of the rich, 
it is this; but the judiciary has also played a key role; a lot of respect for 
the judiciary; they still think that you can get issues resolved through 
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them. For instance if the NPP had not felt confident that they would be 
given an impartial hearing if they took the case to the Supreme Court and 
that the case was doomed at birth if it went through the judiciary system I 
don’t know that they would have been able to control their people from 
taking the law into their hands and that would have errm … resulted” in 
violence (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014) 
 
 
Ho8 The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace 
that Ghana enjoys 
This hypothesis tested respondents’ perceptions of gender issues on the peace that 
Ghana enjoys. Specifically, the study used seven questions to assess the level of 
agreement of respondents with the suggestions that Ghana is a peaceful country because  
i)  men and women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making 
processes; ii) of the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; iii) women have 
the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, markets 
for their produce, etc.) as men; iv) women have the same opportunities for education as 
men; v) women have the same employment opportunities in the public and civil services 
as men; vi)  women play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level; and vii) 
the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace at the 
national level is an important contributor to the peace in Ghana. 
Figure 4 presents the differences in levels of agreement and disagreements on the 
contribution of various gender associated factors to the peace in Ghana, when the 
frequency run is filtered at 4.5 to include some of the responses in the mildly agreed 
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Gender equality in public fora
Women in Parliament
Gender equity in economic opportunities
Gender equality in educational opportunities
Gender equality in employment
Role of Women in Media
Role of Queen mothers in peacebuilding
85.5 
63.9 
81.1 
89.9 
86.6 
90.8 
93.1 
14.5 
36.1 
18.9 
10.1 
13.4 
9.2 
6.9 
Agreed Disagreed
category. More than 80% of respondents consistently agreed that all but one of the 
gender-based variables have contributed to peace in Ghana. Only 63.9% of respondents 
agreed that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that women occupy in 
parliament. 
Figure 4 
Distribution of Responses on Women’s Contribution to Peace in Ghana 
 
Appendix 16 presents Chi Square values and significance levels for the variables 
measuring perceived contribution of gender-related factors to peace in Ghana. It shows 
that insignificant findings were reported for the cross-tabulation of age category with 
women in parliament (p = .393); and the equal opportunities that women in the country 
have in economic life (p = .057). Cross-tabulation with gender categories also turned out 
insignificant findings for gender and equal access to public fora, as well as, equality of 
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economic opportunity for women (p = .181). Similarly, the cross-tabulation on whether 
men and women have equal access to educational opportunities in the country by gender 
gave p = .055. With respect to whether men and women have equitable access to 
employment opportunities in the public sector of the country, p value was = .121. 
Likewise, the cross-tabulation of the role of women in mediating conflicts in Ghana with 
gender turned up a p-value of .110. Other variables reporting insignificant Chi Square 
values on cross-tabulation with profile of respondents were equality of access of gender 
groups to public fora cross-tabulated with educational level of respondents (p = .084); 
and to the perceived role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the traditional 
systems of governance to contribute to peace in the country (p = .156). All the measures 
above lead us not to reject Ho8 which states that the level of experience of gender 
equality and equity has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
Table 18 presents the results of a cross tabulation of age categories against case 
selection of responses at 4.5 to include views that mildly agreed was carried out. The 
results show that in general more than 60% of respondents in all age categories agreed to 
some degree that the current level of representation of women in Ghana’s parliament 
contributes to peace. However, more than a third of respondents between the ages of 18 
and 77 disagreed that the extent to participation of women in Ghana’s parliament 
contributes to the peace of the country. At least 40% of respondents in the 58-67 years 
age category did not agree with the statement.  
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Table 18 
Views on Women’s Participation in Parliament filtered at <= 4.5 by Age of Respondents  
 
 Selection 
Age Category of Respondents 
Total 18 - 27 
years 
28-37 
years 
38-47 
years 
48-57 
years 
58-67 
years 
68-77 
years 
78-87 
years 
88-97 
years 
98 
years 
or 
older 
Not 
Selected 
  112 150 114 65 41 21 1 0 0 504 
  34.70% 35.80% 37.70% 38.50% 40.60% 38.90% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 36.70% 
Selected 
  211 269 188 104 60 33 4 1 1 871 
  65.30% 64.20% 62.30% 61.50% 59.40% 61.10% 80.00% 100% 100% 63.30% 
 Total 
  323 419 302 169 101 54 5 1 1 1375 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100 % 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
In Table 19, the construct of means for all seven variables indicate that 91.3% of 
all respondents (n=1426) agreed that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and 
women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes. Other 
aspects included the number of seats that women occupy in parliament; as well as the 
gender equality in access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial services, 
markets for their produce, etc.); educational opportunities; and employment opportunities 
in the public and civil services. The active roles women play in mediating conflicts at the 
national level; and the role of queen-mothers and female chiefs in the promotion of peace 
at the national level were also considered important contributors to the peace in Ghana. In 
sum there is general agreement that women play a crucial role in the peace that Ghana 
enjoys.  
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Table 19 
Women’s Contribution to Peace In Ghana 
Selected Cases: 
Gendcon <= 4.5 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 124 8.7 8.7 
Selected 1302 91.1 91.3 
Total 1426 99.8 100.0 
 Missing System 3 .2  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
Under gender, respondents to the KII raised several issues related to the equality 
of opportunities for men and women to participate in public decision making processes; 
the participation rate of women in Ghana’s parliament; and the equitable access of 
women to economic, educational, and employment opportunities. In particular, they 
explored the roles that women play in mediating conflicts at the national level, and more 
specifically, the role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play in the promotion of peace 
at the local and national levels. Findings from the interviews generally reflect those from 
the quantitative survey i.e. that the women in Ghana are major contributors to the 
country’s peace. However, respondents provided different types of qualifiers to explain 
how and why they viewed the contribution of women to the peace in Ghana. Three 
categories of responses emerged: women as peacebuilders; patriarchy and the subordinate 
role of women in peacebuilding; and women as instigators of violent conflicts.  
Women as Peacebuilders 
On the positive side, respondents commended the increasingly visible roles that 
women are taking in the national governance structure as a major contributor to peace. 
They noted that women are now occupying key positions in the country: The Chief 
Justice; the Attorney General and Minister of Justice; the Minister of Education; the 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice; and the Government Statistician, among others are all women. Additionally, there 
“…are many women who are CEOs who are in charge of, you know, large industries” 
(Interview 203, 28 October, 2014). In the view of respondents, these are key positions 
that allow women to play important roles in the delivery of services that contribute to the 
peace of Ghana.  
At the community levels, gender-based development programming and donor 
requirements are increasing opportunities for women’s involvement in peacebuilding. 
These initiatives have helped to create the spaces for increased participation of women in 
promoting peace. Through these programs, “…women are encouraged to go into political 
elections; women are encouraged to [participate in the] district assembly elections; 
women are encouraged to be educated so that they can also rub shoulders with men” 
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Even in “…the traditional settings we are beginning to 
see the role of women, either as queen mothers or whatever titles they may give them” 
signaling increasingly visible roles of women in decision making.  
Respondents’ views on the specific contribution that women make, aside from 
these visible national and community level positions, however, ranged from the 
uncertain, through the doubtful or minimalist, to the negative.  Asked what role women 
play in securing Ghana’s peace, one participant first sighed, took a long pause, and then 
started the response rhetorically: “…have they played any role? It’s a difficult question 
(laughs). I haven’t seen them play any role in pushing for conflict because traditionally 
women have been in the background in terms of decision making, influencing decisions” 
(Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). On the converse side, another respondent questioned the 
155 
 
 
 
role of women in peacebuilding in stating that: “I haven’t actually seen women clearly 
playing any serious role because we don’t see it; the way our culture is women are 
usually at the background so even if they do, like exercising influence on their husbands 
or many leaders and all that it’s not in the public domain and you would not actually 
know” (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). The respondent in Interview 4 wavered 
between the potentiality and actual roles of women in Ghana’s peace in stating that:  
I think they have potentially important roles to play in bringing about 
peace, but whether they have actually played that role is something that I 
would not be able to say for sure because within the communities, you 
know, do their voices matter so that they are able to be a restraining 
force?...at the national level errm most of the women’s voices that have 
been heard at the national level are really those who are seen as the elite 
middle class – errm you know, and the extent to which they have an 
influence on […] women in the rural areas I don’t know”. (Interview 4, 12 
February, 2014). 
 
The vanguard role of women in praying for peace has already been noted in the KII 
responses on the role of religion in Ghana’s peace. In addition, respondents noted that 
women are usually restraining forces for their men and youth who would prefer to settle 
disputes through violence. Beyond prayers, therefore, respondents who affirmed that 
women do play a role, however, confined women’s role in Ghana’s peace to their 
biological functions of nurturing and caring for their children; their natural disposition to 
peace and nonaggression; as well as their natural peaceable instincts which trigger their 
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nurturing roles of socializing and influencing their children not to engage in violence. In 
the words of a female respondent, the preoccupation of a woman in crisis situation is to 
do “…everything she can to keep the peace in their homes, first and foremost, and then of 
course, publicly and in within both the private and public spheres” (Interview 213, 9 
December, 2014).  Corroborating this, another respondent held that such roles are played 
behind the scenes “So the women are not really errr (laughs) neglected; they play a very 
critical role in the background; they may not be seen, they may not be visible, but they 
play a very significant role because men do consult them before taking decisions in most 
cases” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).  
This background role of women in peacebuilding is perceived to extend beyond the 
household and community levels to national level – the Presidency. As one respondent 
put it, “even the President when he is making appointments he listens to the wife 
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). A female respondent confirmed the “behind the scenes” 
nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles of women in Ghana’s peace. Women, in her 
words, “support community systems any time there are community activities, they are the 
ones behind the scenes who hold it together” (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). In other 
words, they are not seen as frontline activists for peace; instead they play the moderating, 
mediatory, and conciliatory roles behind the scenes.  
While playing the backstage nurturing roles, the contribution of women have 
focused more on interrogating and pushing for actors to consider the future implications 
of current political decisions and actions (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). However, the 
reverse of backstage negative influences is also true, in the view of respondents. Queen 
mothers, some of whom now have the statuses of paramount chiefs, are said “…to play a 
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role, a very strong role; if they want to cause conflict they can cause conflict” (Interview 
206, 29 October, 2014). Even then, respondents observed that despite this power to make 
or unmake peace, queen mothers play out their roles in the form of advising the male 
chiefs, rather being the direct protagonists. Similarly, within political parties, respondents 
thought that the creation of  “…women’s wings can be both positive and negative, 
because there are tendencies to just tell the women to wait and just take positions in the 
women’s wings” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014) of the parties, instead of vying for more 
executive leadership positions within the parties. This is in spite of the fact that women 
actually played avant-garde roles in pre-independence politics when “Women took an 
early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and organize 
Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement (Interview 208, 30 October, 
2014). That history notwithstanding, the summed up view is that: 
where women have played a role they have contributed a lot in bringing 
out the substantive issues that should invite people to listen to and I have 
noticed that the women have always talked more in terms of the future and 
they’ve asked questions about the future of their children rather than the 
ethnic group of their children and so women by and large have been major 
bridge builders (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014) 
 
Patriarchy and the Role of Women in Peacebuilding 
 
The behind the scenes role of women in the public sphere, especially in respect of 
peacebuilding is largely because “…most of our cultures are patriarchal cultures where 
norms, ideas, all those things rather uphold the man and then downgrade the woman” 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). Women are particularly scared off the competitive 
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arena of politics not only because of the “…tension, the name-calling, and the abuses, 
[but more because of] the culture and society seem to be harsh on women who take part 
in these really competitive political game.  They are given names and if you do not want 
those names just stay at the back” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). At the level of 
traditional governance systems, women are assigned similar backstage roles. Citing the 
case of the traditional chieftaincy structure of the Dagombas, a respondent noted that in 
that structure: 
…we don’t have queen mothers but we have the worigyira, the first wife 
concept; the first wife of the chief, and sisters of the chief, princesses; they 
play a strong role in the governance structure mostly, albeit, behind the 
scenes… but they play a strong role, advising on matters that bother on 
community development but also peace; when they speak people listen” 
(Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).  
 
Even in the matriarchal cultures of the Akans, the women chiefs played background 
roles, as they usually would transact business in the presence of, or through the 
intermediation of male chiefs or linguists. Thankfully, educational policies and 
interventions and donor requirements have institutionalized inclusion of gender 
sensitivity and gender-based programming that have created spaces for women’s 
participation in decision making in an otherwise patriarchal social system. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donor driven microeconomic development 
initiatives also create economic opportunities for empowerment for women. Other NGO 
and donor-sponsored initiatives are targeting empowerment of the girl child through 
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educational support initiatives. Similar initiatives target reduction in domestic violence 
and the promotion of women’s rights (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).  
Additionally, a respondent believed that the existing women’s leadership structures 
at the traditional authority level through the increasing inclusion of queen mothers, as 
well as, the increasing visibility of women in the national governance structures are entry 
points for engaging women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These positions are 
platforms that can be leveraged to break into the patriarchal structure at the community 
levels (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). However, respondents recognized that breaking 
the patriarchal jinx to create spaces for women for frontline participation in peace work 
will take some doing. A female respondent summed up the frustrations of women on 
societal confinement of the role of women in public life to the background in the 
following words: 
Women have played a very important role, but one that has not been 
recognized. I think that women have been very influential in our political 
process, but they have not been given the space to be in front, to be 
actually seen to be making that but behind the scenes, in the homes, in the 
bedrooms, in the quite spaces, women have a voice and are able to speak 
some sense. However [even] in political parties, [where] the women 
leaders […] are asked to lead the women’s groups, … most at times they 
are the ones doing the cooking and the singing of the praises, you know, 
but when it comes to decision making, you don’t see women being given a 
role (Interview 213, 9 December, 2014). 
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Despite all the rhetoric of inclusivity of women in public decision making 
processes, respondents believed that patriarchal world views have continued to induce 
gender-blind policy formulation and implementation. To make the case, a respondent 
cited the particularly poignant example of the legal framework that legitimated and 
institutionalized the National Peace Council. In the view of the respondent, the 
composition of the National Peace Council Act has reduced the role of women on the 
Council to a token representation – by design and by default, simply because policy and 
lawmakers were gender-blind in the selection of the institutional representations on the 
council. In the words of the respondent, “… the Act has been done in such a way that it 
does not favor the inclusion of women. People have to be nominated by the various 
institutions; institutions that are usually dominated by men” (Interview 8, 24 February, 
2014). Section 4(1) of the National Peace Council Law (Act 818) stipulates membership 
of the Governing Council. Of the thirteen members of the Council, eight (8) are expected 
to come from the leadership hierarchy of male-dominated Christian, Muslim, and African 
Traditional religious institutions, with a ninth person coming from the National House of 
Chief, another male-dominated institution. Of the four members left, the Law only 
requires the President to mandatorily appoint one woman among them. This, obviously, 
does little to ensure equitable representation of women on the Council, as men by default 
and by design would dominate on the council.  
 
Women as instigators of violence 
 
Respondents also noted the agential role of women in instigating or fanning 
conflicts (Interview 215, 10 December, 2014), especially the localized intra and 
interethnic conflicts that Ghana has experienced. When the question on women’s 
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contribution to peace was posed, one of the respondents first laughed and then answered 
“A woman can build a house and woman can break a house. So sometimes, they start, 
and they are always at the background, and when trouble starts, then they run back. So 
they can be a source of conflict too (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Hence, women, 
like the media, play a double-edged sword role in which “when husbands are 
misbehaving it is women that can calm them down [but] when the women decide that 
there should be war the men hardly resist” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Respondents 
recounted “…occasions where a woman will just come and say you you are a coward;  
bring your [genitals]  and take [mine]” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014; see also 
Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) as a way of provoking the men into going to war with 
their perceived enemies. Among the Dagombas, even though the wives and sisters of the 
chiefs play background advisory roles to the chiefs, they are noted to have the potential to 
“…cause conflict if they want but most of the time they try to be patient and look at the 
bigger picture [as] they are seen as custodians of our customs and they want to maintain 
that customs (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). Tracing the chain of causality for 
conflicts and the role of different actors, another respondent recalled how his community 
level engagements in a decades’ long intra-ethnic episodically violent chieftaincy 
succession conflict revealed that men go to fight because women insult them. According 
to the respondent, when he contacted the women, they confessed that they instigate men 
to fight because they (the women) have lost contact and control over their children 
(nurturing concerns) as the children, especially  the young men, are out of the house in 
times of crisis (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). They are therefore pushing the men to go 
and fight to bring their children back home. Another respondent cited the example of   
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“…places like Bungkpurugu where I know the Konkombas and the Bimobas have fought 
in those communities where the women have been aggressive; they have tended to cause 
very frequent outbreak of conflict” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014) 
In sum, although women play a role in Ghana’s peace, positively or negatively, 
much of it is played out behind the scenes. Hence while the effects of their actions may 
be surmised or felt, women are generally not seen as active peacemakers beyond their 
backstage places in the pews, mosques, and homes. Increasing visibility of women in 
public offices create opportunities for more forefront role for women in promoting 
Ghana’s peace. However, continued gender-blind policy formulation and 
implementation, especially in ensuring equitable representation of women in 
policymaking platforms, risk undermining this opportunity.  
 
Practice of Democracy and Peace in Ghana 
Ho9 The state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace 
that the country enjoys 
Five questions representing an equal number of variables provided the platform 
for testing this hypothesis. Collectively, they assessed the extent to which respondents 
agree or disagree that the regular organization of elections that are said to be free, fair, 
and transparent; political freedoms related to the freedom of citizens to stand for 
Presidential, Parliamentary, District Assembly or Unit Committee elections; freedom of 
Ghanaians to join any political party of one’s choice; and the degree of influence of 
ethnic considerations in the way Ghanaians vote at elections, all contribute to peace in 
Ghana.  
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Responses captured in Figure 5 indicate that more than 80% of respondents 
believed that Ghana’s ability to stave off violent national level conflicts is due to its 
ability to organize relatively freed, fair and transparent elections; the freedom of its 
citizens to stand for election at any level within the political structure of the country; the 
freedom of citizens to vote in all elections, as well as, the freedom to join any political 
party of one’s choice. Also, voter behavior and attitudes count in Ghana’s peace, as most 
respondent indicated that they do not focus on the ethnic background of candidates when 
making their choices for candidates for any given position in the political structures of the 
nation.  
Figure 5 
Percentage Distribution Responses on Effect of Democratic Practices on Ghana’s Peace 
The study also probed the nature of Ghana’s political culture by examining why 
electoral disputes have not escalated into national level violence. For this, the study asked 
respondent to indicate the extent to which factors such as the fear of war; apathy towards 
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who wins; capacity of the courts to handle electoral disputes effectively; and political 
parties abhorrence of violence, affect the peace in Ghana. The measures also included the 
extent to which lack of support for violence-mongers mitigate the spread of violence over 
electoral results for parliament; extent to which the inability of political parties to 
mobilize fighters; the recourse of political parties to court; intervention by traditional 
leaders; intervention by religious leaders; and the willingness of Ghanaians to die for 
politicians and their courses all contribute to the peace in Ghana.   
Asked which factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary 
elections do not spill over into national level conflicts 52.3% of respondents (n=1405) 
said Ghanaians are afraid of war while 34.2% indicated it is because the courts in Ghana 
are effective in handling electoral disputes – see Table 20. Five respondents who cited 
other reasons for the non-escalation of electoral disputes at the parliamentary level said it 
was “Because of love for the country” (2/5); “Ghanaians are God fearing”; “Ghanaians 
do not like bloodshed”, and “God is merciful.” 
Table 20 
Responses on why Electoral Disputes do not lead to national level violence 
Reasons Why Elections do not lead to national 
violence 
Frequency Valid 
Percent 
 Ghanaians are afraid of war 735 52.3 
Courts effective in handling electoral disputes 480 34.2 
Political Parties do not support use of violence 92 6.5 
Ghanaians do not really care who wins elections 65 4.6 
Those who want violence are ignored 31 2.2 
 Other 2 .1 
Total 1405 100.0 
 System Missing 24  
 Total 1429  
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Similarly, when respondents were asked what factors best explain why disputes 
over results of presidential elections do not escalate into national level violence, 66.9% of 
respondents attributed it to the fact that political parties usually opt to take their electoral 
grievances to the courts for resolution. Another 13.6% of respondents cited the 
intervention of traditional rulers to prevent fighting over electoral results. A further 9.4% 
credited religious leaders for intervening to mediate peaceful resolution of the conflicts – 
see table 21. Four respondents who cited other reasons for the non-escalation of disputes 
over presidential election results cited “Fear of losing family members”; “God is 
merciful” (2/5) and “the rule of law is supreme and people are aware of that” (This Study, 
20).  
Table 21 
Reasons Why Disputes Over Presidential Elections Do not lead to Violence 
 
Reasons Assigned Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Political parties take their case to court 939 66.9 
Traditional Rulers prevent fighting 191 13.6 
Religious leaders mediate peaceful 
resolutions 
132 9.4 
Ghanaians won't fight and die for 
politicians 
101 7.2 
Political Parties can't mobilize people to 
fight 
37 2.6 
Other 4 .3 
Total 1404 100.0 
System Missing 25  
Total 1429  
 
Cross tabulations of the responses to the seven questions with the profile of 
respondents yielded Chi Square values with two tailed significance levels < .05 for all the 
variables except for the cross between age categories of respondents and why disputes 
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over parliamentary elections do not lead up to national level violence. For this, the Chi 
Square value of 45.724 had a significance level of .810. The cross between the same 
variable and gender produced a significance level of .810 for a Chi Square value of 2.275. 
The cross between age categories and why disputes over presidential elections do not 
escalate into national level violence also yielded a two-tailed significance level of .193 
for a value of 47.512, while responses on the freedom to stand elections when cross-
tabulated with gender produced a Chi Square value of 11.301 with a two-tailed 
significance p-value of .185. Educational level of respondents also produced two 
coincidental outcomes when crossed with freedom of citizens to vote (p = .060) and 
freedom to choose one’s political party (p = .110). The findings suggest that  we cannot 
reject a plausible hypothesis that the contributions of these components of respondents’ 
characteristics to the state of democratic practices in Ghana has no effect on the peace 
that the country enjoys. 
Notably, the cross tabulation of the variable that Ghanaians do not take into 
account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during elections 
yielded a p <.05 for respondents of key socioeconomic backgrounds  – see Appendix 17. 
In other words, the finding that 90.2% of respondents agree that Ghanaians do not take 
into account the ethnic background of the candidates they choose to vote for during 
elections is not a coincidental finding. This suggests that the voting behavior of 
Ghanaians that puts little weight on the ethnic background of candidates to various 
political offices does have an effect on the peace that Ghana has. Indeed, a construct of 
means of responses for five of the variables (role of free, fair, and transparent elections; 
freedom to stand elections; freedom of citizens to vote in elections; freedom of 
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Ghanaians to join any political party of their choice; and consideration of ethnic 
backgrounds of candidates in voting choices) indicates that 96.8% of the respondents 
agreed in varying degrees that the foregoing elements of Ghana’s democratic culture has 
contributed to the peace the country experiences – Table 22.  
Table 22 
Effects of Democratic Systems and Practices on Ghana’s Peace 
Case Selection at 
ElecDemo <= 4.5  
Frequen
cy 
Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 45 3.1 3.2 
Selected 1379 96.5 96.8 
Total 1424 99.7 100.0 
 Missing System 5 .3  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
KII respondents agreed with their survey counterparts that Ghana’s ability to hold 
six successive general elections since 1992 has contributed to the peace in the country, 
despite the imperfections witnessed in each successive election. They noted that given 
“…some of the democratic closeness we have had in terms of elections, many countries 
should have tipped over” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Respondents, however, cited 
several reasons why these very tight elections did not spill over into violent national level 
conflicts. First, they credited Ghanaians’ early embrasure of the use of the ballot box to 
decide who governs them for creating a culture of democracy in the country. According 
to this view, the colonial administration’s use of elections, referenda, and plebiscites to 
enable Ghanaians “determine whose idea prevails and who therefore should form 
government [or how they should be governed made Ghanaians see] elections to be a 
conflict resolution mechanism” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). This is why all military 
dictatorships had to confront and eventually cave in to popular demands for the 
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organization of elections as the means to choose who rules them. Second, having 
embraced elections as a decision making tool, Ghanaians developed “the political psyche 
that once the elections are well organized we would accept the results” (Interview 12, 4 
March, 2014). Hence, political leaders have adopted the mindset that even though “…we 
are fighting for political power, you have won, if I do my homework well, I can come 
back to power the next time; so why destroy what we are looking for (Interview 13, 5 
March, 2014). As a result, the politicians in Ghana “…have exhibited good leadership, 
rallying their people behind them all in the hope that if they lost this time, they could win 
the next time; that has kept us together” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).  
Thirdly, Ghanaians recognize that their democratic experimentation since 1992 is 
a piece of work in progress. They understand that “If we’ve all learnt anything from the 
last election, we have learnt that the system is not foolproof; it must be more equitable, 
more just, more transparent, and we believe that we can work towards a cleaner and 
better elections”  (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Besides, they have witnessed the 
efforts the Electoral Commission has made since 1992 to make the electoral process more 
transparent, free, fair, and inclusive. As a respondent recalled:  
From 1992 when we had the Voter ID with just thumbprint; when we had 
the Ballot Box which was not transparent; situations where the 10
th
 person 
goes to vote and the ballot box is full; we have move to having transparent 
ballot boxes, to having picture Voter ID Cards in the cities; to biometric. 
You cannot get anything better than that.  There may be a few infractions, 
a few disagreements, but the Electoral Commission has done very well, 
collaboration with stakeholders like the donor community, and the IPAC, 
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the Political Parties Forum (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014) to improve 
the credibility of the electoral processes. 
 
Much of these reforms, in the view of respondents, have happened because of the 
agential role of the leaders of faith-based organizations of all creeds who proactively 
engaged with all duty bearers to ensure that elections do not become the excuse for 
violent encounters. As one respondent framed it, “…our faith-based organization in 
Ghana have never shied away from involving, proactively engaging in the electoral 
process with the view to containing peace and broad acceptance of the population of the 
election results, and as much as staying nonpartisan. (Interview 2, February, 2014). As a 
respondent recalled, the late President Evans Fiifi Atta-Mills officially commended 
religious leaders for intervening in electoral disputes to ensure peace prevails. With 
reference to the tensions surrounding the 2008 elections in which he was eventually 
declared winner, the late President is reported to have  “… said that he knew the role that 
the church played, especially the Cardinal (Peter Kodwo Appiah Turkson) to have that 
election being peaceful and not Ghana going to war” (Interview 14, 5 March, 214). As 
noted earlier, irrespective of the contribution of religion to Ghana’s peace, all the direct 
engagement was in parallel to the FBOs preaching peace to their congregations and 
mobilizing their faithful to pray and act for peace, and to seek God’s divine interventions 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). 
Political education by the churches and politicians also played a role to keep 
citizens from over reacting to the result of the elections. As respondents noted, politicians 
are keenly aware that, win or lose, they need a peaceful environment to govern or 
reorganize themselves for the next round of elections. Therefore, in the tense moments 
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before, during, and after the elections, they are heard crying at the “…top of their voices 
and calming people and telling people that to be a political opponent doesn’t mean you 
are enemies” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). This political education, coupled with the 
significant role the churches and mosques “…play in preaching and teaching members of 
the churches that peace is very very important” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014) helps to 
douse the political passions and keep aggrieved groups from taking up arms. 
With respect to the role of ethnicity in voting behavior and its contribution to 
Ghana’s peace, respondents recognized that in Ghana, “….ethnic differences are strong, 
they’re quite high, let us recognize that” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). However, 
Ghana’s interethnic animosities are not as intense and divisive as in other African 
countries. Referencing the north-south divide in Cote d’Ivoire; “the competition between 
the Ibos, the Hausas and the Yorubas for supremacy” in Nigeria; and “…the divisions 
between the Americo-Liberians and the native Liberians in Liberia”, among others, a 
respondent argued that “…yes, we do have ethnic differences, yes we do have ethnic […] 
competitions in Ghana but it is not at the same level as those other countries.” In his 
view, whereas the interethnic “…hostility has been very high in all those countries” 
(Interview 3, 7 February, 2014), Ghana is blessed to have cross-ethnic voices of reason 
that champion the cause of peace any time the potential for violent conflicts emerge.  
This, in part, is attributable to the Constitutional requirement that political parties 
be representative of all regions. This has served to minimize ethnic exclusivity in the 
composition of any of the political parties in Ghana. Hence, while the NDC may consider 
the Volta Region as its World Bank, it is not an exclusive party for people of that region. 
Similarly, “even the NPP which has been criticized or been tagged as an ethnic party has 
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a lot of key members coming from the other ethnic groups” (Interview 3, 7 February, 
2014; see also Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 2014; Interview 
202, 27 October, 2014, and Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).  
Added to this is the high degree of interethnic settlements, integration and 
incorporation across all regions of the country. As a respondent remarked, the reality in 
Ghana “… is that we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of 
where we actually come from” (Interview, 19 February, 2014). As a result, no region in 
the country is a pure enclave of any particular ethnic group. Therefore respondents cited 
fears of reprisal actions, should any one group decide to use violence to redress electoral 
grievances. This, in their view is a sufficient deterrent for people to “…handle the 
situation coolly, in the hope that my brothers and sisters also living there will be treated 
likewise” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). A layer of restraint in this respect is the 
intermarriages across ethnic groups, which creates the situation where in the event of a 
war I could be “…fighting against my in-laws, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and so on 
and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). 
Successful alternation of power between the two main political parties has 
reinforced a culture of acceptance of electoral results, if clarity and credibility can be 
demonstrated (Interview 12, 4 March 2014).  In general, Ghanaians are willing to accept 
the defects of a system, defer their perceived gains, or conversely accept their perceived 
losses, and work towards the improvement of the system, rather than fight for immediate 
gains. That notwithstanding, respondents noted that losing elections with very narrow 
margins does not make the acceptance of the results easier for the losers. There is a lot at 
stake down the chain of party activists when a party loses elections. For it is usually 
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“…not just a matter of somebody losing political power, but it is losing my economic 
means of living as well” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014).  
For this reason, respondents cited the practice of the Winner Takes All approach 
to the access and control of political power as a risk factor, especially since margins of 
win have been so narrow and constantly narrowing over electoral seasons. In their view, 
this is the reason for the “Do or Die” approaches that sometimes breach the peace, since 
it essentially means that “…if I lose, we are going to lose our jobs”. This is what 
underscores the notion that “It is better to be a messenger in a party in power than to be a 
Chairman of a Party in Opposition” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). To manage this 
risk, some respondents have advocated for a more inclusive system through proportional 
representation, especially at the local government level to ensure that there is dispersion 
of power and allocation of political resources among different political groupings to 
increase the sense of belongingness. It is also a way to create space for smaller political 
parties to cultivate, grow, and showcase their capacities for governance at the national 
level. This is the way to help break the duopoly in the country. This is also a way to 
attenuate the building and perpetuation of the negative consensus phenomenon (Interview 
12, 4 March, 2014), which respondents say has come to characterize Ghana’s political 
landscape. 
The Saving Grace of Ghana’s Democracy 
A saving grace for Ghana, respondents noted, is the presence of a conjunction of 
forces between faith-based organizations, civil society, and the media that creates a 
powerful coalition of convening forces and organizing agents for peaceful elections. This, 
incidentally, is not part of the formal institutionalized national peace architecture. On the 
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contrary, it is merely a coalition of the willing; a group of peace-loving individuals using 
their personal commitment to peace and their respective institutional platforms to create 
the spaces and processes of dialogue and engagement between the political parties and 
other duty bearers in the electoral processes. This coalition becomes yet stronger than any 
political party when the National Peace Council grafts its initiatives onto this platform to 
create a much bigger voice that can speak for citizens, convene political leaders, and 
construct alternative pathways for overcoming the electoral disputes (Interview 8, 24 
February, 2014). In 2012, when one party unilaterally declared victory, this coalition, led 
by the Chairman of the National Peace Council was able to make a counter 
announcement to annul the declaration and by that act, calm the nerves of members of the 
other party and citizens at large. This platform was then able to convene a meeting of the 
two contending political parties and got them to agree that the Electoral Commission 
would exercise its mandate of announcing the results, and when that is “…announced and 
somebody is not happy, they should use the courts instead of violence (Interview 8, 24 
February, 2014; see also Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to seek redress for their grievances. 
This, in the view of respondents, paved the way for the use of the courts instead of the 
streets to resolve the electoral impasse in 2012. 
 
Role of Government in Ghana’s Peace 
 
Ho10 The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the 
peace that Ghana enjoys. 
Criteria for assessing this hypothesis consisted of five elements, namely, the role 
of government in creating peace in Ghana; collaboration between government and civil 
society for peace; successful resolution of conflicts by government before they escalate; 
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neutrality of Government in managing ethnic and communal conflicts; and collaboration 
between Government and faith-based organizations in securing the peace of the country.  
Asked to indicate to what extent they agreed that it is the deliberate and proactive 
actions of government that has created the peace that Ghana enjoys, the case selection at 
4.5 on a 9 point Likert scale question indicates that  68.8% of respondents (n = 1418) 
agreed from a partly moderate to a very high extent with the statement. The remaining 
31.2% of respondents did not agree with the statement from a partly moderate to a very 
low extent. For all other variables, more than 90% of respondents agreed that 
government’s actions and engagements have contributed to the peace in Ghana – see 
Figure 6.  
Figure 6 
Reponses on Government’s Role in the Peace of Ghana 
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agreed in various degrees that government’s engagement in activities that promote peace 
have contributed to the peace in Ghana, 31.8% of respondents disagreed. In other words, 
about two thirds of the respondents agreed that the government of Ghana has deliberately 
taken actions that have created the peace the country enjoys. It also consciously created 
identifiable platforms for civil society groups and organizations to engage in building a 
culture of peace in the country; as well as, taken deliberate and proactive actions to 
prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. The government has also been neutral in 
the way it intervened in ethnic or communal conflicts. It has also actively engaged faith-
based organizations to resolve or prevent conflicts at all levels from degenerating into 
violence. However, a good third of the respondents did not agree with these statements.  
Table 23 
Perceived Contribution of Government Actions to Peace in Ghana  
 
Case Selection for 
EconDev <= 4.5 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 451 31.6 31.8 
Selected 967 67.7 68.2 
Total 1418 99.2 100.0 
 Missing System 11 .8  
Total 1429 100.0  
 
 KII findings provide some insights into the split in views among survey 
respondents on the role of government in Ghana’s experience of peace. Respondents 
spoke to the intentional policies, programs, and actions of the executive arm of 
government in promoting the peace of Ghana. Among others, their responses touched on 
the collaboration between government and civil society for peace; successful resolution 
of conflict by government before they escalate; neutrality of Government in managing 
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ethnic and communal conflicts; and the collaboration between Government and faith-
based organizations in securing the peace of the country.  
Natural and Legal Reality Checks 
Respondents observed that ensuring geo-ethnic equity in participation in 
governance is one way governments have contributed to peace in Ghana. Be it under 
military or civilian rule, all governments have made visible efforts to ensure that all geo-
ethnic regions of the country are represented in the governance structure. Reality and law 
have ensured this national orientation. At the level of reality, respondents pointed out that 
the ethnic composition of the country is such that no one ethnic group has a numerical 
dominance to annex power. Even “the Akans [who] constitute about 48% [and are 
therefore] the largest ethnic group […] cannot form a government and impose themselves 
on all the others”. Assuming all Akans voted en bloc for a given party, they would still 
need other ethnic groups to make the 50% plus one cut off for annexing the Presidency of 
Ghana. As a result, “it has become part of our political culture, [and] people realize that if 
you form a political party you will have to form alliances, you have to form interethnic 
alliances” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).  
In addition to this structural reality, the constitution of Ghana mandates equitable 
representation of all geo-ethnic regions in the composition of political parties, as well as, 
in government appointments. Observance of this requirement means that political power 
is also dispersed across geo-ethnic and religious lines by law and by convention. Hence, 
all governments that have been in power since independence have endeavored to acquit 
themselves well on these natural realities and legal requirements. For this reason, “when 
it comes to appointments, a President is by law obliged to [to ensure that] his 
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appointments [--] have a national character addressing all regional needs, [hence] the 
effort has been made to preserve the national character of us as a people even though 
these ethnic and religious undertones are there” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). On the 
religious front, in particular, all political parties make overt efforts to showcase manifest 
presence of Muslims and members of other minority faith groups at the top of their party 
hierarchy, as well as, in ministerial and other appointments when they are in power. As a 
result, “You go into the government and you have Christians, you have non-Christians, 
you have Ashantis, you have Ewes, you have this, you have that.  So I think we have 
relatively integrated” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). 
 
Erratic State Engagement in Conflict Resolution 
There is, however, a down side to this structural reality and constitutional 
requirement for geo-ethnic representation in government. Latching onto the underlying 
principles, appointing authorities in government often come under intense pressure to 
appoint certain people irrespective of their competence for the simple reason that they 
come from a certain geo-ethnic region. Respondents noted situations where sitting leaders 
have had “…to give into certain pressure groups or kingmakers to ensure that he also 
stays in power, [and Presidents have had to] meet most of these demands as part of the 
package” for their own candidature in subsequent elections (Interview 13, 5 March, 
2014). Under such circumstances, political patronage, party activism, and other partisan 
considerations take precedence over merit in the appointment of people to key national 
positions. As a result, parties in government are reluctant to reach out to qualified persons 
in opposing parties who are better suited to handle certain portfolios. Apart from 
fostering mediocrity in state institutions and a win-at-all-cost in elections, the practice has 
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institutionalized job insecurity, as all government appointees fear to lose their jobs when 
their party is out of power (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). 
 
State Response to Conflicts 
On the security front, respondents note that Governments have ensured that “… 
the rule of law always comes into play very strongly to ensure that people with 
dissentments (sic) do not go beyond bounds and misbehave into violent conflicts; [and 
where the need arises] “security officials have enforced the rule of law” (Interview 5, 18 
February, 2014) even handedly. Respondents credited governments’ rapid response to 
conflicts for the ring-fencing of localized conflicts to stem escalation and spread across 
the country. In the words of one respondent, “the response of the Government, [is rapid, 
as] they send Police and Military there quickly” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). 
Deployed law enforcement agencies were also credited with being generally fair and firm 
in their dealings with the citizenry. In particular, respondents commended the neutrality 
and professionalism of the security services, especially the military and the police during 
moments of high tension in the country, as major institutional contributory factors to 
Ghana’s peace. In the view of a respondent, “…we have been lucky to have a united 
armed force, a united security service … a professional and disciplined security up to this 
point… (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). As a result, “…their security role can be seen as 
dispassionate, as objective, [and directed] towards national peace” (Interview 2, 7 
February, 2014). In brief, a strong collective desire for peace has ensured localized 
conflicts are contained and prevented from escalating. As one respondent put it,  “…  the 
national agenda for peace has been very very strong … such that anytime there was a 
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pocket of conflict arising out of either inter-ethnic conflict or chieftaincy or whatever, the 
security agencies were very smart and swift to move to those areas to quell the conflict” 
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2015).  
Confirming that rapid state response has helped to stem the spread of violent 
conflicts, another respondent cited a counter factual instance where delays in the 
deployment of security agencies fueled conflicts. In the view of the respondent, the 
escalation of the 1994/95 Guinea Fowl War in northern Ghana was precisely because 
government failed to respond quickly to the rumours and later the onset of the violence. 
Rather, in that particular instance, statements from government officials gave the 
impression that government was “…lining up with one side against the other” (Interview 
206, 29 October, 2014). Respondents also cited the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis which is so 
“…infested with the interplay of competition of the two main political parties to the 
extent that when you talk about Abudu, Abudus themselves will tell you that yes, 
majority of us are allied to the NPP and when you talk to the Adanis, the majority of us 
are allied to the NDC” (Interview 12 4 March, 2014). When this political polarization of 
local conflicts happens, the hands of the government and, indeed, other political parties 
are tied. Consequently, they lose their moral authority as disinterested arbiters and are 
incapable then of helping the parties resolve their conflicts. 
Government involvement in the resolution of local conflicts is often further 
complicated when state-centric approaches are employed in the resolution process. As a 
respondent captured it, “…from our independence the central government was simply the 
continuation or at best the existing legacy of the colonial administration; our colonial 
system always saw the center to be the provider of all solutions to the periphery so even 
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if you fought, even if you fought, the solutions lies in Accra” (Interview 12, 4 March, 
2014). This Accra-centered approach to conflict management persists partly because 
“…we have concentrated all our national institutions in Accra” (Interview 201, 15 
October, 2014). Hence, the first manifestation of the state-centered approach to managing 
local conflicts is the dislodgement of the conflict resolution processes from the natural 
environment in which the conflicts occurred, as feuding parties are brought to Accra or 
elsewhere to resolve the conflict.  
The second is the attitude of state officials who assume the know-it-all approach 
to engaging the feuding parties. Using the lenses of their training and offices, they focus 
on the dyadic and legalistic conflict resolution frameworks that usually discount the use 
of indigenous knowledge, practices, and resources for resolving conflicts. Accordingly, 
the customs, traditions, values, and beliefs of the feuding parties seldom count. Such 
practices do not only distance the conflict resolution process from those who need to 
participate, it effectively alienates the people from the process and its outcomes. 
Incidentally, most of these conflicts are rooted in indigenous beliefs systems, customs, 
and traditions.  
Several respondents cited the decades old Nkonya-Alavanyo conflict, which 
“…has been going on for 91 years now” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014) for different 
illustrations of the dynamics of state-centric conflict resolution. From the state 
perspective, a respondent noted that “… at any given time when there is violence, it is the 
security officials who go in there, they impose curfew, and after some time you see that 
sanity comes back , even though the situation may not be completely resolved” 
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The process is repeated as often as the violence re-
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erupts. Non-security approaches to addressing the conflict have equally been state-
centric. In a recent recurrence of the conflict, another respondent cited the case where 
“…the minister of interior [invited] the Alavanyos and Nkonyas to Accra for them” 
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014) to resolve the conflict. In the view of the respondent, this 
portrayed the government to feuding communities that “I am your solution”; an 
impression which encourages the conflicting parties to externalize responsibility for the 
search for a solution to their conflict and to look outward to the Minister, and the 
government for that matter, for the solution to their conflict. Even if the Minister 
managed to broker a solution, the challenge in the view of the respondent, is that these 
people “are going to leave your office and go back home [without any mechanisms in 
place to] support them in their own environment to talk [next time] rather than [wait for 
government to come and] take them out of their environment and be the solution 
provider” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014).  
To buttress the inutility of the state-centered approaches to conflict resolution, a 
responded cited a counterfactual example of the building of local capacity for peace  in 
the same conflict system when “…church leaders [got] involved in committees, peace 
committees, to go and speak to them” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). According to the 
respondent, that initiative opened the doors for the youth to take leadership roles in 
finding lasting solutions to the problem. It created the opportunity for:   
the youth [who then] played a very important role in the peace process to 
the extent that it is the youth who went up physically to open up the path 
that had been closed to the two communities [for decades]; it is the youth 
who culturally celebrated their unity and the youth said we want to go out 
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in the night and look for our girlfriends on the other side; we don’t care 
where the girl comes from, I am a boy and I’m at an age in which I’m 
looking for love; I don’t want the barrier to stop me (Interview 12, March 
4 2014).  
 
The lesson learned, in the view of the respondent, is that a conflict that was once an 
issues-based conflict (land) is now refocused on the interests of the people who live daily 
the consequences of the wars. They no longer need an external body, government or its 
functionaries, to provide them a solution; they generate, implement, and monitor the 
solution by themselves.  
 
Forced Spaces of Engagement 
Respondents also cited the regular communication and interfacing between 
government and the faith-based organizations as an important contributor to the peace of 
the country. They recalled instances where the Christian Council, the Catholic Secretariat 
or Catholic Bishops’ Conference and other religious councils usually come together, 
deliberate on issues of national interest and present common fronts to government 
(Interview 203, 28 October, 2014; Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). These open 
channels of communication have effectively brought the voice of faith into matters of the 
state. Respondents, however, pointed out such engagements between the State and faith-
based organizations have not always been the product of mutual consensus. On the 
contrary, they have not always been receptive of the interventions of the FBOs to 
advance such courses. In general, governments have often been wary of the engagement 
of the FBOs in the public sphere and often invoked the principle of separation of church 
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and state in attempts to scare them off the public sphere. Hence, the FBOs have had to 
bulldoze their ways into national discourses in order to express their perspectives on the 
way forward as they deem fit. In many instances, governments have waited to act on key 
public interest issues only under pressure from the religious bodies and civil society 
organizations. For an example, respondents indicated that there have been cases where 
sitting governments have not shown interest in pursuing proposed electoral reforms or 
providing the requisite resources for the needed changes that would enhance Ghana’s 
democratic credentials. They also cited government’s reluctance to send the Political 
Transition bill to parliament for passage, as well as, Parliament’s feet dragging when the 
bill came before it. Eventually “the Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference pushed very 
strongly, had meetings with Parliament and persuaded them to pass the act” (Interview 2,  
February, 2014). Similarly, the mentioned Governments reticence on the need to provide 
the budgetary resources for the implementation of the biometric voter registration and 
identification exercise in the run up to the 2012 elections, as the two main political parties 
bickered over the issue. Again, it would take the Catholic Bishops’ Conference and other 
Civil Society groups to push government into action on the matter.  
Respondents further recalled that even the creation of the National Peace Council, 
which has been lauded as the base for the national peace architecture, is a post hoc 
reaction from government to institutionalize hitherto private initiatives of faith-based 
leaders for peace; it was not an ab initio intentional creation of government. In other 
words, government never conceived of and implemented the idea of establishing the 
National Peace Council; it merely followed the lead of civil society and faith-based actors 
who had already self-organized and were engaged in structured actions for peace in the 
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country. As one respondent described it, “Certain people got themselves together and 
because they did a good job, the Government saw to it that we would make it a statutory 
body; and the UNDP also contributed immensely towards the establishment of this peace 
architecture, peace initiative, peace council, and all that” (Interview 8, 24 February, 
2014). Even then, respondents questioned government’s commitment to make the 
National Peace Council functional and effective. They decried the fact that even after the 
National Peace Council became institutionalized through Act 818; it has not been 
adequately resourced to carry out its functions. In the words of a respondent “the Peace 
Council also they have no money. I was just with [name withheld] the other day and he 
was saying there is no money given to them that’s making the work difficult” (Interview 
5, 14 February, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). 
Respondents also identified several risk factors for Ghana’s peace, as a result of 
actions or inactions of government. For instance, the lack of transparency and honesty in 
explaining government’s persistent failure to deliver public goods and services 
efficiently, in the midst of what seems to be deliberate deceit of the public, is seen as a 
high risk trigger for violence in Ghana (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). In particular, they 
pointed out that the major risk factors for descent into violence are economic 
marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment.  They made the 
case that the youth have unmet needs in the midst of observable unresponsive and 
unaccountable government systems and structures that seemingly superintend over the 
misappropriation of public resources for private gain and at the expense of the common 
good. The youth are exasperated by this and are beginning to demand accountability, 
sometimes in not so peaceful ways (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014; Interview 210, 21 
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November, 2014; and Interview 2011, 5 December, 2014). The risk of outburst from the 
youth is particularly high when they endure unemployment and other economic hardships 
“…in the midst of opulence displayed by corrupt government officials” (Interview 2013, 
28 October, 2014; see also Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 213, 9 December, 
2014).  
 
Collective National Amnesia 
Other respondents argued that Ghanaians have a high conflict tolerance 
capacity embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people 
accept otherwise intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on 
with their lives. Alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that 
they can’t expect anything good from governments. In a somewhat confirmation of 
the concept of negative consensus rooted in the system of political patronage that 
pervades the Ghanaian society, a respondent believes Ghanaians have lost hope in 
the ability of their government to deliver on the common good. Instead:   
What they see Government after Government doing is treating the 
economy to give a semblance of improvement.  But the underlying issue 
leading to unemployment, better infrastructure, limited opportunities and 
growth, pervasive growth that will impact on growth are still limited 
irrespective of the ideological foundations of the Government that comes 
into power.  It becomes more or less a Government by the elite, for the 
elite.  It has no political partisanship.  What it has is a system of political 
patronage that both sides seek, whether in power or out of power 
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) 
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Having witnessed the repeated failed promises of government’s, Ghanaians have 
simply chosen to ignore government’s failures and inactions and move on with their lives 
(Interview 214, 10 December, 2014). In the view of many, “At the end of the day the 
politicians, they are the same group of people […] That may be a negative consensus 
because whatever concerns them at the end of it they all know what game they are 
playing (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, while the politicians can be ignored, 
the dangers that loom for Ghana’s peace cannot. The caution that the National Security 
Apparatus has served signals that the tendency to play ostrich has come to an end. 
Recalling his engagement with the security agencies, a respondent reports that:  
…One of the things we heard from the National Security, talking about 
peace, they said their greatest fear in this country is not political or even a 
Military Coup d’état. Their greatest concern is this socio-economic 
inequality, injustice that may be the [breaking] point.  When the hungry 
man is angry and he takes the law into his hands, then he does not care 
because his life does not mean anything to him.  So when the Security 
Forces said those things we asked them and I have also observed more and 
more, that may be the point. This unemployment, the hardships, people 
who have lost their livelihood, they have nothing to lose.  So for them, 
guns, bullets do not make any difference.  If they can kill and eat, they will 
do it (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). 
 
The reality and urgency of this concern is brought home when another 
respondent referenced the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria where poorly or 
under-educated, unemployed youth have served as the recruitment pool for the 
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fighting forces. The respondent then remarked that even though “…we have not 
experienced it [in Ghana yet] the population is growing, the population of that class 
of lowly educated, school dropouts, frustrated, low self-esteem youth is growing 
and that is what makes me feel that over the next five years if there was a minor 
skirmish, we would get out of hand” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). In brief, 
government needs to do a lot more especially in bridging inequalities and attending 
to the needs of the burgeoning unemployed youth in the country. Government may 
have done its best to create conditions for peace, but respondents feel whatever 
government has done to date is not enough to secure the peace for Ghana in the 
long term.  
 
Contribution of Religion to Peace in Ghana 
Ho11 Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
H111 Religion has an effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys 
This hypothesis gauged the role that religion, comprising the faith values, faith 
leaders, and faith-based organizations, has played in Ghana’s peace. It measured the 
extent to which i) religious beliefs and values influence the attitudes of Ghanaians 
towards the maintenance of peace; ii) extent to which Ghanaians’ observance of the 
teachings of their faith promote peace in Ghana; iii) extent to which the religious nature 
of Ghanaians affect the peace in the country; iv) presence or absence of discrimination on 
the basis of religion in employment practices and peace; v) ability of people of different 
faiths to coexist in the same spaces and its impact on peace; vi) presence or absence of 
restrictions on marriages of people of different faith traditions and peace; vii) the use of 
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religious differences to canvass for votes in national and local elections; viii) the effect of 
leaders and agents of different religious traditions working together for peace and; ix) the 
role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils such as the Catholic 
bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. 
in promoting a culture of peace. 
Table 24 presents the frequency run of responses to the question “How important 
is religion in the lives of Ghanaians”. Of the 1425 respondents who answered the 
question, 94% said religion was very important (81.3%) or important (12.7%) in the lives 
of Ghanaians.  
Table 24 
Importance of Religion in lives of Ghanaians 
Importance of Religion in 
lives of Ghanaians 
Frequency Valid 
Percent 
 
Not at all important 1 .1 
Not very important 15 1.1 
Somewhat important 67 4.7 
Important 181 12.7 
Very important 1158 81.3 
I don't know 3 .2 
Total 1425 100.0 
 System Missing 4  
     Total 1429  
 
Table 25 presents and extract of Appendix 18, which details the range of results 
for the Chi Square values and significance levels for all nine (9) variables tested under 
this hypothesis against selected characteristics of the respondents. Table 25 and Appendix 
18 both show mixed significance levels for Chi Square values for the respective 
characteristics of respondents. While the respondents of all age categories and in all 
regions of interview turned up p-values < 0.05 for all the variables, respondents of all 
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occupational categories also turned up p<0.05 except for gender, where p was > .0.05. All 
other variables showed one or two cases where p was > 0.05. Overall, then, the 
hypothesis that Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys can be rejected – 
see Table 25. 
Table 25 
Respondents’ Profile and the Perception of the Importance of Religion in Ghana  
 
 
Variable 
Age Category 
 
Region of 
Interview 
 
Primary 
Occupation 
Value p Value p Value p 
Importance of Religion 154.99 .000 300.546 .000 99.053 .368 
Respect for Faith Values 
and peace 
149.903 .000 627.541 .000 325.384 .000 
Religious nature of Ghanaians 144.164 .000 538.724 .000 218.199 .000 
Religions discrimination in 
employment 
140.541 .000 706.111 .000 259.800 .000 
Coexistence of people of different 
faiths 
122.343 .000 588.267 .000 232.173 .000 
Intermarriages between people of 
different faiths and peace 
91.196 .014 407.204 .000 211.953 .001 
Use religion in political campaigns 233.893 .000 646.095 .000 277.773 .000 
Interfaith collaboration for peace 154.818 .000 677.945 .000 324.485 .000 
Role of religion in creating a culture 
of peace 
120.912 .000 598.492 .000 223.772 .000 
 
Hence, for respondents of these profiles, the alternate hypothesis that religion does have 
an effect on the peace of Ghana is admissible. Indeed, in a midpoint case selection on a 9 
point Likert scale of the construct of means for all responses ranging from very strongly 
agreed to very strongly disagreed, 98.3% of respondents (n = 1405) agree in varying 
degrees that religion does have an influence on the peace that Ghana enjoys – Table 26.  
  
190 
 
 
 
Table 26 
Means Of Responses On Contribution Religion to Peace in Ghana  
Case Selection with  
Relicons <= 4.5 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
 
Not Selected 24 1.7 1.7 
Selected 1405 98.3 98.3 
Total 1429 100.0 100.0 
 
In other words, the majority of respondents agree that the religious nature of 
Ghanaians as witnessed through respect for their religious beliefs and values; the 
observance of the teachings of their faith in their daily lives; the absence of 
discrimination on the basis of religion in employment practices; the coexistence of people 
of different faiths in the same spaces; limited restrictions on marriages of people of 
different faith traditions; the nonuse of religious differences as an instrument to canvass 
for votes in national and local elections are important contributors to peace in Ghana. In 
the same way, the collaboration of leaders and agents of different religious traditions on 
issues of peace and the role of faith leaders (Christian and Muslim) and religious councils 
such as the Ghana Catholic Bishops Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, 
Federation of Islamic Councils, etc. in promoting a culture of peace are major 
contributors. 
KII respondents sided with their survey counterparts that religion in its belief and 
institutional form has contributed greatly to Ghana’s peace. Preceding sections in this 
chapter have already documented respondents’ views on how recourse to prayers and 
intercessions; the role of religious leaders, acting alone or using the platforms of their 
respective faith-inspired institutions; and religious institutions such as the Christian 
Council of Ghana, the Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the National Catholic 
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Secretariat, the Ghana Muslims Council, among others, have intervened directly and 
indirectly, separately or jointly, to direct the ship of state towards the port of peace. What 
has not been sufficiently raised so far is how religion informs and directs the attitudes and 
behaviors of individual Ghanaians in their interpersonal engagements, as well as, 
interactions with the public sphere to promote peace. This is the aspect this section would 
focus on.   
All KII respondents agreed that Ghanaians are deeply religious by nature. In the 
words of one respondent “the majority of Ghanaians about 99.5% are religious.  The 
greater percentage claim to be Christians”.  Whether they actively practice and live by 
their creeds or not, the “…fact that they identify themselves with some form of religion in 
itself is positive” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). From the perspective of national 
psyche, respondents also noted that this religiosity among Ghanaians is manifest in the 
writings on “on our Mammy Trucks and all that:  “Fear God and Live”, “God Lives”, 
“Give it to God” etc.  These are not things people are simply saying; it is something that 
stems from them” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Hence, respondents’, “… believe it is 
the deeply spiritual nature of the people, in the sense that whatever their persuasions, 
religious persuasions or faith beliefs, there is an underlying inherent message of peace 
and a state of peacefulness and forgiveness within the faith messages which are 
dominant” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) that account for the aversion to violence 
among Ghanaians. According to respondents, this predisposition to forgiveness, peace, 
and reconciliation is manifested in the Ghanaian maxim of “Fa ma Nyame” or “Give it to 
God”, or “Leave it to God” (interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 9, 26 February, 
2014; Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). This adage, in the view of respondents is a 
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summation of the deeply cultural and religious belief of Ghanaians that it is not in their 
place to avenge any wrongs done them. Rather than seek retaliation, Ghanaians tend to 
adopt the typical attitude of “You have done me wrong, but I give it to God – He will be 
the one to punish you”.  I leave it to Him [and] that also helps and pulls [people] back” 
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).  For this reason, most Ghanaians “…feel that even 
when a wrong is done and when they make their case they are prepared to leave the rest” 
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) or let the “Fa ma Nyame syndrome take over” 
(Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). 
Part of the tendency to avoid revenge derives from the deep seated “fear of 
spilling blood” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014), because bloodletting is a 
sacrilegious act that offends and affects not only the living, but the dead and the unborn 
as well. Bloodshed is not something that the Ghanaian spirit really goes for (Interview 8, 
24 February, 2014). Hence, “…most Ghanaians do not like spilling blood [because] in 
our tradition if you spill human blood you have to cleanse the earth” (Interview 208, 30 
October, 2014). It is this fear of God or fear of blood worldview that ensures that even 
when Ghanaians “…are pushed up to a certain point the ““Fa ma Nyame” syndrome 
takes over” and they back off” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). This is how “…religion 
plays a greater part in terms of the peaceful atmosphere we find ourselves in” (Interview 
8, 24 February, 2014). 
Some respondents, however, believe there is a risk to Ghana’s peace inherent in 
the over subscription to any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in religiosity as a pillar of 
its peace. Such respondents have pointed out that other countries such as Rwanda, 
Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were equally, if not more religious. And yet, 
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they fell into very violent and protracted conflicts (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).  
Ironically, in some cases, the violent conflicts they experienced were prosecuted in 
defense of religion. Hence, while the “Fa ma Nyame” mentality in itself is a very good 
thing, it may actually nurture some negative tendencies as it merely postpones the 
inevitable need to confront and deal with the issues that threaten Ghana’s peace. It is a 
postponement “…because for how long are people going to say that?”  (Interview 8, 24 
February, 2014).  
Yet others have argued that “…the “Fa ma Nyame” syndrome is a high digit of 
the religious language [which] has not helped in some instances.  It is that factor that not 
only perpetuates the negative peace, but also has quote unquote helped us not to go to this 
full-scale war blown…” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). However, as another 
respondent pondered, how far can the Fa ma Nyame culture sustain Ghana’s peace:  
When people feel that the system of justice only serves some,  the 
economic system only serves some, and the social privileges serve some; 
and that there is nothing for them, then what do I have to gain carrying on 
as it is?” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).  
 
In other words, can people continue to resign to their fate and leave it to God to 
sort out their temporal needs when they see that duty bearers who should have been 
creating the opportunities for them to meet their needs are rather their stumbling blocks to 
any form of social advancement? For this reason, some respondents have averred that, 
from the perspective of religion, the real fear is not that faith will begin to lose its 
restraining influence on the people when such visible exploitation of the public purse for 
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private ends continues with impunity; it will not come from the loss of legitimacy of 
religious leaders to continue to engage in the public sphere on behalf of their faithful 
simply because the faithful have lost faith in their power to secure for them their bread 
and butter; it comes from the fear that under such trying circumstances, the “Religions 
themselves [could] become hijacked and […] used for other purposes” (Interview 209, 19 
November, 2014). Should that happen, religion could become the weapon that destroys 
Ghana’s fragile peace; for “there are none who do evil with great abandon as those who 
do it in the name of religion” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).   
Another weak link in the role of religion as an instrument of peace relates to the 
question of reciprocity in opportunities for the practice of faith. Respondents observed 
that inter-faith dialogue, especially between Moslems and Christians, is challenged due to 
ongoing tensions over rights of worship of Moslem students in Church-managed schools. 
Perceived unwillingness of the Moslem to arrive at a quid pro quo arrangement on the 
matter of equal rights of worship of Christians in Moslem educational institutions has 
been cited as the potential block to a dialogue of action between Christians and Moslems. 
As a respondent remarked, the Moslems “… want their children to attend our schools, 
have their own mosque in our compounds and all that but when our children are going to 
their institutions it’s very difficult for them to allow them space to worship” (Interview 5, 
14 February, 2014). Should an amicable reciprocal arrangement not be found, this could 
proof the breaking point for Christian-Muslim relations in Ghana.  
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Contribution of Culture to the Peace in Ghana 
Ho12 The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana 
have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
The five variables used to test this hypothesis are respondents’ perceptions on the 
extent to which the values and traditions of different ethnic groups in Ghana promote 
peace; ways in which socialization processes in all cultures in Ghana inculcate the values 
of peace in their members; extent to which cultural sanction’s for the breach of the peace 
deter adherents from promoting violence; extent to which traditional rulers in Ghana 
exert their authority on their members to ensure the promotion of peace; and ways in 
which traditional rulers promote peace through accommodating people of different ethnic 
groups, faith traditions and political affiliations within their areas of jurisdiction. 
Asked to what extent they believed that the values and traditions of all ethnic 
groups in Ghana openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own 
citizens, 97.8% of the respondents said they very strongly believed, strongly believed or 
simply believed the proposition to be true. Figure 7 below presents the summary results 
of respondents on their level of agreements with the proposition that the traditions of all 
ethnic groups in Ghana are openly welcoming to strangers; ethnic groups have strong 
sanctions against the perpetration of violence; and traditional rulers have strong influence 
over their subjects’ use of violence to resolve conflicts. The graphs show that consistently 
more than 96.5% of respondents to all three questions indicate that they believed very 
strongly, strongly, or simply in the propositions.  
  
196 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Perceptions on How Culture Contributes To Ghana’s Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asked to what degree they accepted that the culture and traditions of all ethnic 
groups in Ghana train people to be peaceful, 94.5% of the respondents indicated that they 
believed this to be so from a very high to a high extent. Similarly, when asked how effective 
traditional leaders have been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups 
living within their jurisdictions feel at home, 95.6% of respondents indicated that this is done 
very effectively or effectively - see figure 8. Similar trends are reported for variables measuring 
influence of traditional leaders in preventing violence; the use of cultural sanctions as deterrents 
for anti-peace engagements of citizens, and respondents’ belief that ethnic values and traditions 
welcome strangers. 
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Figure 8 
Case Selection: Contribution of Cultural Factors to Peace in Ghana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 19 presents the results of the cross-tabulation of the various cultural 
variables with the profile of respondents. It indicates insignificant findings for gender 
against all the variables; respondents’ educational levels against the variables for 
xenophobic cultural traits (p = .501); cultural sanctions against violence (p = .268); and 
the influence of traditional rulers over the war making intentions of their subjects 
(p=.097). By primary occupation of respondents, p-value for non-xenophobic traditions 
of ethnic groups was .550, while religion reported p-values of .206, .812, and .069 
respectively for cross-tabulations with the non-xenophobic cultural traits; socialization 
for peace within all ethnic groups, and the influence of traditional leaders over their 
subjects. The p-values obtained for presence or absence of non-xenophobic attitudes in 
Ghanaian cultures (p = .248); socialization for peace (p = .113); existence of cultural 
sanctions against recourse to violence for settling differences (p = .17); preventive 
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influence of traditional rulers over warmongering (p = .144); and the effectiveness of 
traditional leaders in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and religious groups living 
within their jurisdictions feel at home (p = .133) show the different age categories of 
respondents did not affect their responses to the questions.  
Age and region of interview of respondents, however, turned up p-values of less 
than .05. In other words, it is a significant finding that, irrespective of their age categories 
or regions in which they were interviewed, there was no difference in respondents’ belief 
that the culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no 
impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys. Differences, however, exist between gender 
groups in their evaluation of all the statements. Similarly, respondents of different 
educational levels also had differences in their assessment of the statements that all ethnic 
groups have welcoming (non-xenophobic) customs and traditions; have sanctions against 
the use of violence; and that traditional rulers have a strong control on the war making 
behaviors of their subjects. People with different occupational backgrounds also 
appreciated differently the statements on non-xenophobic cultures of all ethnic groups in 
Ghana and the influence traditional rulers have in preventing war-making by members of 
their ethnic groups. Respondents with different religious affiliations also differed in their 
assessment of the statements on non-xenophobic cultures, socialization for peace, and the 
influence of traditional rulers on their subjects against warmongering; contribution of 
culture, customs, and traditions to peace in Ghana.  Given the preponderance of cases in 
which p> 0.05 for the Chi square values generated in the cross-tabulations above, we 
cannot reject Ho12’s proposition that there is no difference in respondents’ view that the 
199 
 
 
 
culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana have no impact on 
the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
 
Reporting on the findings of the KII on previous hypotheses has already 
captured different ways in which culture has contributed to the creation and 
sustenance of Ghana’s peace. The views of KII respondents also provide insights 
into the shades of opinions that may have guided the findings from the quantitative 
survey. Five clusters of views emerge from the KII participants.  
 
Cross Cultural Values for Peace 
The impact of intercultural exchanges leading to cross-fertilization, 
adaptation, and harmonization of major belief systems, values and practices across 
the majority of cultures in Ghana came up for mention in discussing the findings of 
the KII under hypothesis two. Even respondents who wondered 
…whether 50 or 60 years is enough for us to talk about a Ghanaian culture 
[nonetheless conceded that] we have cultures of the various Ghanaian 
ethnic groups that largely coincide – peace loving, give it to God, etc. and 
that bar a few small ethnic groups, we don’t have what you’d describe as a 
warlike ethnic groups or ethnic cultures” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014).  
 
As another respondent framed it, “we have over the years seen a 
convergence or commonalities in some cultural values and practices; so in a way 
you can say we have a Ghanaian culture, which is hospitable, welcoming” 
(Interview 201, 15 October, 2015). This theme of the cultural foundations of the 
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predisposition of Ghanaians to peace is taken up again under hypothesis 5. 
Hypothesis 8 discussed the cultural underpinnings of the role of gender in building 
Ghana’s peace, while hypothesis 9 dealt with questions of Ghana’s political and 
democratic culture. Hypothesis 11 raised and discussed the collective abhorrence of 
blood shedding as an attribute that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. As was 
noted, “…among many cultures it would be very absurd to draw blood and if you 
did inadvertently you needed to atone for it in many ways” (Interview 2, 7 
February, 2014). The sanctions include the possibilities of banishment or capital 
punishment for the offender. Hypothesis 9 also broached the topic of the ease of 
intercultural migration, integration, incorporation, and how this has facilitated the 
co-habitation of people from different ethnic backgrounds in the same spaces 
without fears of violence. Hence, in the view of respondents, all ethnic groups in 
Ghana share certain cultural traits which have served as binding factors in their 
coexistence and collective desire for peace.   
 
African Faith Foundations of Peace 
Respondents noted that “Africans from their traditional routes are a deeply 
spiritual people” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).  In particular, according to 
respondents, Ghanaians are very religious and religious beliefs and practices 
underwrite everything that Ghanaians do.  This is because irrespective of their 
professed creeds, the customs, traditions, beliefs, and value of Indigenous African 
Religion (IAR) provides the base for this deeply spiritual nature of the Ghanaian. 
Its tenets underwrite the lived values, beliefs, and behaviors of everyone. Hence, 
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IAR defines the world views of Ghanaians, especially in matters of interpersonal 
relationships, of which conflict management is a part.  
Respondents considered IAR “…the most tolerant religion in Ghana 
[because] it is a sort of personal relationship with God [with] the elders of the 
family [as] the main intermediaries” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). According 
to respondents, IAR is very accommodative of other faiths and traditions. 
Therefore, it has a pervasive influence on the peaceable nature of Ghanaians. In the 
view of a respondent, IAR dispenses this influence because all the cultures in 
Ghana “…believe in the Superior Being, whether it’s God, whether it’s a Jujuman 
or something […] you are actually told to love your brother, be your brother’s 
keeper” (Interview 11, March, 2014). The newer religions such as Christianity and 
Islam are transposed on this pre-existing belief system. The result is a mutually 
reinforcing religiosity deriving from the fact that “When you add the powerful 
influences of [these] dominant World Religions like Christianity and Islam, through 
all their cultural mix, [to the belief systems of IAR, religion] certainly can be relied 
on as one of the key factors” that constructs the worldviews and guides the 
behavior of Ghanaians. Respondents, therefore, identified several peacebuilding 
cultural traits and values that cut across all ethnic groups in Ghana. 
This religious foundation of the culture of most ethnic groups in Ghana 
underscores the second cultural trait – the Ghanaian penchant for discussions over 
brawling in conflict situations. According to respondents, all ethnic groups in 
Ghana encourage disputants in any conflict to talk rather than resort to violence. As 
a respondent recalled, the Akan proverb which says that “Asem biara nyi ho won fa 
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num ka” (to wit “there is no conflict or volatile situation that cannot be addressed 
through discussions” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) has its parallels in other 
languages across the country. It sums up the wisdom that talks, either by 
arbitration, dialogue, mediation, negotiation or the circle process type of 
community-supported problem-solving initiatives are prized over recourse to arms. 
Hence, “…engagement in the Ghanaian culture which usually produces good 
results has been part of the peace that we are enjoying” (Interview 13, 5 March 
2014).  
Closely associated with the preference for talk over war in resolving 
disagreements is the cultural value for patience and tolerance. As one respondent 
captured it, “tolerance is also a value that we cherish as Ghanaians” (Interview 13, 
5 March, 2014; see also Interview 5, 14 February, 2015). Indigenous conflict 
resolution processes take time, especially when extended parties such as relatives 
and ethnic groups are involved. For this reason, patience and tolerance for the slow 
processes are required. Hence, the maxim that “Abotr tutu nkokwa – to wit: 
patience moves mountains” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014) guides all participants in 
the conflict resolution processes.   
 
Intercultural Accommodation and Integration 
For both religious and humanitarian reasons, most Ghanaian cultures 
promote “…hospitality and a welcoming disposition to a person who is different 
from you” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). This is because in many cultures in 
Ghana “…you are expected to treat the stranger with courtesy and with respect 
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because you don’t know where the person is coming from; it might even be errm,  a 
reincarnate god or something, you know (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014; see also 
Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). It is this open-arm policy among the majority of 
ethnic groups that has made pervasive the internal migration, resettlement, and 
incorporation of people of different ethnic backgrounds in areas outside their home 
regions.  
Closely associated with this open-arm, open-door policy is the readiness of 
most ethnic groups in Ghana to accept intermarriages across ethnic and faith lines. 
The openness of all ethnic groups to accepting cross-cultural and cross-faith 
marriages has two dimensions. While voluntary intermarriages are the normal 
routes for building conjugal interethnic bridges, a respondent recounted a historical 
incident in which conjugal alliances transformed into military pacts, mutual defense 
pacts, as well as, treaties of non-aggression between the contending ethnic groups 
that, in contemporary public view, are political rivals. According to the 
interviewee, the Ashantis went to war with the Anlos (or Ewes) to the east simply 
because they found the women from the Eweland - statelier, fairer in complexion, 
and therefore more desirable. That “…war came to an end with a settlement that 
they would never ever fight again, and that each would come to the defense of the 
other in the event of any attack on one” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). Similar 
intermarriages between ethnic groups in the north and the Ashantis have been 
known to history as well.  
Intermarriages, either by personal volition or conquest has a deeper cultural 
value in Ghana than the immediate value of spousal relationships. All ethnic groups 
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in Ghana run one of two systems of inheritance – matrilineal or patrilineal. While 
the Akans, the largest ethnic category go by the matrilineal system, most of the 
other groups emphasize the patrilineal system. The two systems have immense 
implications for not only material inheritance, but also the right of accession to 
chiefships. For the Akans, only children born to a female royal has the right to 
ascend to the stool, irrespective of whether or not the child’s father is an Akan or 
even a royal. Hence while it was astonishing for one respondent to find an Odikro 
(a lower chief in the Akan tradition) in a village in the Western Region who spoke 
fluent Dagara (a language from the Upper West Region), the subjects of the said 
chief had absolutely no problems with it. They explained that the said chief’s 
mother was an Akan royal, although his father was a Dagao migrant from the 
Upper West Region (Interview 216, 11 December 2014). Similarly, several eminent 
Ghanaians who self-identify with one ethnic group would nonetheless trace their 
ancestry to other ethnic origins (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014).  
Finally, respondents noted that in addition to the voluntary migrations and 
marriage induced admixture of people of different ethnic backgrounds, there was 
considerable movement of people across the country during the slave trade and/or 
as a result of pre-colonial interethnic wars. People of different backgrounds 
therefore were often uprooted and replanted in different locations. This has resulted 
in a situation where the original stock of “…the population [that constitutes Ghana 
today] got so mixed up that one can hardly identify a Ghanaian who can claim to be 
purely Ga, purely Ewe, or purely Asante; and that [knowledge] makes us 
reasonably humble (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). 
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Traditional Authority Structure and Peace in Ghana 
The chieftaincy institution is one that has varied cultural origins for 
different ethnic groups in Ghana. While larger ethnic groups such as the Akans, 
Dagombas, Ewes, Gonjas, Mamprusis, and Nanumbas among others had 
established hierarchical chiefships before the advent of colonialism, others such as 
the Dagara, Gurune, Konkombas, among others, mainly in the north, ran more 
dispersed authority structures. The latter were mistakenly described as acephalous 
(Interview 208, 30 October, 2014; Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Based on this 
classification, the colonial administration either regrouped the so-called acephalous 
ethnic groups under pre-existing chiefs or replicated the hierarchical structure of 
the cephalous groups among the acephalous ethnic groups. This effort to harmonize 
the traditional governance system for the ulterior motives of indirect rule 
culminated in institutionalization of the structured chiefship system across the 
country. Hence, all ethnic groups now have chiefs after the structure of the 
cephalous ethnic groups.  
Even without a harmonized structure, respect for the authority and 
legitimacy of traditional institutions of governance and their officers, however 
organized, is another trait that cuts across all ethnic groups in Ghana. Respondents 
recalled that traditional leaders, including chiefs and clan heads once exercised “a 
stabilizing, a cooling effect on the people” in times of conflicts. [Hence] in any 
situation of potential conflict it is just a matter of bringing them over and they will 
be able to calm the people behind them (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). Although 
much of this adjudicatory role of chiefs has been curtailed in the post-independence 
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governance systems, chiefs remain important reference points for the resolution of 
conflicts that local traditions, customs, and practices govern.  
However, unlike during the colonial period when chiefs had considerable 
authority to preside over the settlement of a wide range of cases, the Constitution of 
Ghana and various legal provisions have severely curtailed the jurisdictions of 
chiefs and other traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution since independence. 
Consequently, access to justice is distanced from the community. Even the lowest 
grade courts are located in district capitals, requiring people who need to access 
their services to travel long distances at their costs. Women face additional 
challenges as the “court system is not friendly to them [as they are even subjected 
to] sexual harassment even within the court system” (Interview 206, 29 October, 
2014). As a result of this physical and psychological distancing of the courts from 
the populace respondents have remarked that most communities still try to “… 
resolve our differences through arbitration, through an elder” (Interview, 7 
February 2014), even though they are not vested with the power to do so. Hence,  
“… in this country, every day to day cases are settled out of court  may be with the 
chiefs, traditional rulers, with elders settling, most cases don’t go to court” 
(Interview 206, 19 October 2014). In some cases, religious leaders are the ones 
called in to mediate the conflicts (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Hence, 
informally, traditional leaders continue to play important roles in resolving 
conflicts at the community levels.  
Chiefs that have been quick to redefine their roles in the postcolonial state 
have retained their legitimacy, respect, and influence. Respondents noted the 
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current Asantehene as one traditional leader who has set the pace for redefining the 
space and role of chiefs in Ghana today for the promotion of peace and 
development. Through his numerous development initiatives, he has effectively 
reconstructed the role of traditional rulers by placing greater emphasis on their 
developmental roles. As one respondent noted, “…when the Asantehene speaks he 
says in those days as a Chief, I was supposed to be the Military Leader; leading my 
people to war. Now I lead them to war against ignorance; promoting education” 
(Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). Because of the tangible benefits his initiatives 
bring to his people and beyond, he has recloaked himself with the legitimacy that 
his forebears enjoyed before the colonial and postcolonial state robbed it away. As 
one respondent captured it, today, when “…the Asantehene says something, the 
people listen to him even more than the government (Interview 1, 5 February, 
2014). And this is because “when the chief speaks, it’s not just the chief speaking, 
people see him as the custodian of everything that represents the society; so it’s not 
just the human being speaking, he represents something so when he talks he has the 
backing of the people (Interview 206, 29 October, 2014).  
Other chiefs that have emulated the Asantehene in redefining their roles 
from warrior-leaders to champions of development for their people are also held in 
high regard, and therefore, are capable of speaking up in the name of their subjects 
in matters of national interest. Hence, in places where chiefs have held themselves 
to the honor of their customs and traditions, citizens have sometimes believed 
“…the chieftaincy institution is more important than who is president of the 
country” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). Where they have adhered to the cultural 
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injunctions to demonstrate “…neutral, inclusive, and objective leadership [they 
have also] played critical roles in rallying ethnic groups to support common courses 
in the new state. Unfortunately, however, current partisanized leadership within 
some traditional areas is posing threats to the unity” (Interview 208, 30 October, 
2014) of some ethnic groups. As a result, in some places the authority of traditional 
leaders is waning due to their indulging in corruption and the abuse of their offices 
for personal gain (Interview 3, 7 February 2014). 
 
Cultural Change and Peace 
Respondents were also keenly aware that culture is not static; it is ever 
changing, influenced by and influencing other cultures in their external 
environments. In a globalized world, not only is the rate of change ever faster, the 
content of change also moves in multiple and uncoordinated directions. For this 
reason, respondents expressed fear that our youth are losing that cultural touch and 
rather embracing the culture of the “hip hop generation” (Interview 209, 19 
November, 2014) because they are bombarded with “…films that seem to reflect 
western values […] and the western lifestyles that they want to bring to us” 
(Interview 11, 5 December, 2015). As a result the youth are becoming “…. 
products of only what is hidden and seen rather than what you imbibe as an integral 
part of your upbringing” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). The implications, a 
respondent asked rhetorically is: “If that is not part of you, what are you?” In a self-
response, he cautions that “We will never, no matter how well we speak English, 
conducted language in international affairs; we will always remain Africans in our 
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core values” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014). And when the Ghanaian loses 
that Africanness, the values that once restrained them from violence would have 
been lost. To that extent, the restraining influence of religion and culture on people 
in conflict situations is fast disappearing among the youth.  
 
 
Contribution of formal Education to Peace 
Ho13 Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the 
country enjoys 
Educational systems have a broad range of socializing and nurturing influence on 
people who pass through them. In addition to the centrally determined content of 
educational curricular; other characteristics of Ghana’s educational system include the 
nationalized  system of selection and placement of students from one educational level to 
the other; the predominant role  of boarding school systems in post-primary education; 
the system of placement of teachers and staff within the educational system; the post 
tertiary studies state-instituted national service scheme;  and the emergence of 
associational forms of life such as the alumni and alumnae associations, popularly called 
the “old boys” and “old girls” association, and even cross-institutional past students 
associations. All these factors create cross-regional, cross-ethnic, and cross-faith 
interactions and relationships among citizens who pass through the country’s schools. 
Hence, questions that guide the testing of this hypothesis are: to what extent do 
respondents believe the formal educational system in Ghana has contributed to the 
building of a culture of peace among Ghanaians; does the content of history courses give 
equal value to the history of all ethnic groups; what is the contribution of the content of 
the educational curricula to peace; how does the centralized posting of students to post 
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primary educational institutions contribute to peace; how does the boarding school 
system contribute to peace in Ghana; specifically how does the boarding schools system 
contribute to inter-cultural prejudice reduction. Other questions explore the extent to 
which the existence of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations create strong 
cross-cultural bonds among alumni and alumnae of the same schools; to what extent does 
the practice of posting teachings to schools outside their home districts or regions 
increase knowledge of other cultures among Ghanaians; has the promotion of sporting 
events between schools of different districts and regions increased intercultural 
acceptance among Ghanaians; what role, if any, has interschool intellectual competitions 
played in reducing cross cultural stereotypes and inferiority or superiority complexes 
among Ghanaians; and has the compulsory national service scheme helped to create a 
sense of oneness among Ghanaians? 
Figure 9 presents a comparative graph of the mean responses of the participants 
for the various variables filtered at   6.5,  7.5, and  8. It is observable that more than 
60% of respondents credited all aspects of Ghana’s education system for contributing to 
peace when the response ranges covered those who agreed to a moderate extent. 
However, when case selection is restricted to respondents who agreed to “High Extent or 
Very High Extent” on all the factors, only two of the variables were able to muster at 
least 30% of agreement rates among respondents. This suggests that the level of certainty 
with which respondents are willing to credit Ghana’s educational system as a contributor 
to the country’s peace is wobbly. Indeed, between those who indicated to a moderate or 
moderately low extent and respondents who were definitely sure education contributed to 
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the peace of Ghana from a high to a very high extent, there is an average of 47.5 
percentage point differences for all response categories – Appendix 20.  
Figure 9 
 
Mean Scores Contribution of Ghana’s Educational System to Peace  
 
 
 
Figure 10 presents the construct of means for the responses for all the variables 
measuring the contribution of Ghana’s formal educational system to peace, filtered at 
6.5, 7, and 8 on the 9 point Likert scale responses. Responses for the 6.5 cut off 
point include part of responses that indicated that Ghana’s educational system has 
contributed from a moderate extent to a very high extent to the peace in the Ghana. The  
7 cut off point covered responses ranging from “moderately high extent” to a very high 
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extent, while the     8 cut off point represents responses that indicated that contribution 
of the formal educational system to peace was to a “high extent” or a “very high extent”. 
The figure shows that only a third (33.7%) of respondents were definitely sure 
that all the factors enumerated above as part of Ghana’s educational system made definite 
contributions to the peace that the country enjoys from a high to a very high extent, while 
close to another third (26.8%) indicated that the contribution of education to peace in 
Ghana was only to a “high extent”.  
Figure 10 
Construct of Means: Education Factors in Ghana That Contribute to Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 presents a summary of the Pearson Chi Square test results for the   8 
point filtered responses (i.e. respondents who agreed from a High to Very High Extent) 
cross tabulated with the profile of respondents. Apart from the educational level and 
religion of respondents which turned up p >.05, indicating insignificant findings, all other 
respondent characteristics had significant findings with p < .05.  
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Table 27 
Respondents’ Profile and Perceived Contribution of Education to Peace in Ghana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, the survey finding that only 33.7% of respondents (n-1429) are 
willing to stake out that Ghana’s educational system has contributed to the nation’s peace 
from a high to a very high extent is a significant find. Indeed, for respondents of all age 
categories, gender, region of interview, and primary occupation, we can reject the 
hypothesis (Ho13) that Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that 
the country enjoys. In other words, respondents believe that Ghana’s formal educational 
system has had an effect on the peace that the country enjoys (H113).  
The factors within the educational system that have contributed to Ghana’s peace 
include the history lessons taught in schools in Ghana and how they promote 
inclusiveness and unity among Ghanaians; the curricula of the formal educational system 
that teaches values of co-citizenship; and how the centralized posting of students to 
secondary and vocational schools promotes inter-cultural learning among citizens. The 
use of the boarding system in post-primary educational institutions has promoted cross-
cultural and cross ethnic friendships that have lasted into adult lives of Ghanaians. The 
Responses 
Characteristics 
Pearson Chi-Square  
N of Valid 
Cases 
Value Df Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Age Category 1382 27.459a 8 0.001 
Region of Interview 1429 131.607a 9 0.000 
Gender 1414 5.325a 1 0.021 
Educational Level 1425 11.265a 8 0.187 
Religion 1410 9.901a 7 0.194 
Primary Occupation 1422 47.206a 19 0.000 
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boarding school system has also decreased ethnic and religious identity barriers, 
stereotypes, and prejudices among Ghanaians.  
Additionally, the activities of Past Students or Alumni and Alumnae Associations 
have created strong cross-cultural bonds among people who attended the same schools; 
while the posting of teachings within the Ghana Education Service to schools outside 
their home districts or regions has increased knowledge of other cultures among 
Ghanaians. Furthermore, the organization of sporting events between schools of different 
districts and regions has increased intercultural acceptance among Ghanaians; just as the 
engagement of students in interschool quizzes, debates, and other forms of intellectual 
competition have reduced the complexes of inferiority and superiority among Ghanaians. 
Finally, the posting of students graduating from secondary and tertiary institutions to 
work in regions or communities other than their own under the National Service Scheme 
has helped to create a sense of oneness among Ghanaians from a High Extent to a “Very 
High Extent”.  
Disaggregation of the responses by characteristics of respondents, however, 
shows that they differed on the basis of their religion and levels of education as p-values 
for the cross tabulation yielded p>.05. In other words, while all the other characteristics 
of respondents cited above did not seem to have influenced their perceptions on the 
contribution of Ghana’s educational system to the pace of the country, the religious 
affiliations and educational levels of respondents influenced their perceptions on the 
extent to which Ghana’s formal educational system has contributed to the peace that the 
country enjoys. 
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These nuances in the recognitions of the contribution of the educational system to 
peace notwithstanding, the results of this study suggest that while a larger percentage of 
the respondents believe that the educational system has made some contribution to the 
peace of the country, they were not sure or willing to credit it with a high level of 
contribution. Instead, the majority of respondents believe the contribution of the formal 
educational system to the peace of Ghana ranges from a moderate to a moderately low 
extent.  
Parallel to the results from the survey, respondents in the KII were also divided on 
the extent to which Ghana’s educational system can be credited with contributing to the 
peace of the country. Several respondents eulogized the cultural assimilatory role that the 
educational system, especially the boarding school system, offered as an instrument for 
building social cohesion. They pointed out that the boarding school effect goes beyond 
the ethnic and regional amalgamation of students; it cuts deep into and across the social 
strata of Ghana, as students from rich and poor homes often find themselves in the same 
dormitories, classrooms, and other common spaces within the educational establishments 
(Interview 217, 13 December 2014). Boarding schools therefore were melting pots that 
helped to gel and foster a sense of oneness among ethnically and socioeconomically 
diverse people within and across generations.  
In the view of respondents, without the boarding school system, most Ghanaians 
would have gone to post primary schools in their locality or not advanced in education at 
all, if there was no post-primary educational establishment in their vicinity. In such cases, 
their exposure would have been limited to their ethnic group and their immediate 
environments. However, with “the boarding school structure system people from 
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different areas converge in a boarding school and they begin to learn about each other; 
they grow to know each other; it fosters peace among them (Interview 206, 29 October, 
2014). As another responded noted, “…if you are from Greater Accra and you went to 
school in Sunyani where you met somebody from Wa, you met somebody from Takoradi 
you realize that you became friends and after the five years [of being together] you were 
able to understand the culture of that person” (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014). Hence, 
“…the idea of boarding houses […] encouraged interethnic mix (Interview 2, 7 February, 
2014). Bringing students from different parts of the country together for several years 
exposed them to different ideas and ways of doing things, including nonviolent 
approaches to problem solving. It also increased the sense of stewardship and common 
good; greater awareness of one’s environment; and built competencies in engagement 
with the world beyond us, including globally. (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 
12, 4 March 2014). For one respondent, the boarding school system:  
…has made people tolerant to each other’s cultures, each other’s 
temperaments.  People who have not gone to the Boarding House would 
find it difficult to relate to a particular group because of certain 
perceptions. If you are in a dormitory, the guy lying on top of you, and 
next to your face is from one of them, of those that you haven’t from, I am 
sure you realize that boardinization has helped a lot” (Interview 10, 27 
February, 2014). 
 
This gelling effect of boarding schools, in the words of a respondent is “…why I 
have a passion for boarding houses. For most of us it is through the formal education 
system, boarding houses that we first got real very close interaction with other ethnic 
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groups and made friends.” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Lamenting the weakening of 
the cohering effect of boarding schools among the younger generation due, in part, to the 
reduction of the number of years of secondary school education, another respondent 
observed that   
Our boarding system that took children from the communities and made 
them live together with other people in a neutral environment bound by 
certain principles, and a sense of nationhood, created a people who had the 
vision that transcended their cultural setting that they were born into..  
That generation they still have the sense of nationhood in them. But if you 
want a cut-off point you can easily say, most of the people who are 58 and 
above are the people in which you can find such sentiments.  Those who 
are 30 and below for the majority of them even 40, they do not have those 
sentiments because it was not inculcated through the educational system. 
(Interview 209, 19 November, 2014).   
 
Beyond the direct personal experiences of changes in perceptions, attitudes, and 
behaviors in interethnic engagements as a result of the contacts in living, learning, and 
playing with people from different ethnic groups, the boarding school system engendered 
several spinoffs that have positive effects on the peace that Ghana enjoys. First, the 
boarding schools create opportunities for friendships that last long after one has 
graduated out of the boarding house. In particular, the “old boyism, girl old girlism” or 
alumni and alumnae associations have provided a platform for extending and expanding 
those friendships beyond the walls of the school and across generations, since 
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membership of these associations cut across generational or cohort lines of friendships. 
People who have attended the same school grow up to be like “…sisters [and the]  
sisterhood, brotherhood, [that past students associations create] tend to let us live with 
each other, work with each other, and support each other…” (Interview 206, 29 October, 
2014). This is because “…when you meet as classmates you don’t see yourselves as Ewe, 
Konkomba, Nanumba, you see yourselves as classmates who have gone to training 
college, who have gone to secondary school, who have gone to university together” 
(Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). The bonds of friendship seem to grow stronger outside 
the school system and in later years. As a respondent recalled,  
…the sense of bonding [in such associations]; it’s like a family, I mean, 
and it wasn’t like that when we were in school; I don’t remember it to be 
like that; you had a few friends, but here, you know, everybody 
remembers the other person, is interested in the other person” (Interview 
218, 13 December, 2014).  
 
This sense of familial bonding derived from the relationships built out of the 
boarding schools “… has permeated the whole country [so much so that] before you do 
something you say oh, this is my old…” school mate (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). 
The implication for peace is that, in the words of a respondent:  
all of that in fact socializes Ghanaians so much that even if there is a 
conflict between the people of Saboba and the people of Yendi and then 
you are traveling to go and fight the people of Yendi and you go and meet 
your classmate [laughs] I’m just wondering how you would feel, you see? 
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So that has actually brought us to understand that we are one people with 
one destiny and I think that’s really very very important.” (Interview 6, 18 
February, 2014) 
 
A bonus from the boarding school systems is the “intermarriages [it has fostered] 
between people from different geographical, ethnic, and religious backgrounds” 
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) who were once school or classmates. This reinforces the 
position of the alumni and alumnae associations of boarding schools as platforms for 
peace. It is common to hear in discussions that people would say “… oh my wife comes 
from there, my sister is married to this – that intermarriage thing, the old students’ 
association thing, the intermarriages and all that are glues that bond Ghanaians together” 
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014).  
The creation of boarding schools effectively created concentrations of schools in 
certain geographical spaces. This warranted the posting of teachers and other educational 
workers from geo-ethnic regions that were more advanced educationally to the less 
endowed ones. The consequential “Free movement of people to different parts of the 
country for work” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) allowed “…Ghanaians to mix up with 
southerners coming to the north, northerners going to the south” (Interview 6, 18 
February, 2014).  
Beyond the world of social engagements and work, respondents said boarding 
schools also created the springboards for the formation of political alliances out of school 
contacts (interview 207, 29 October, 2014). A major contributory factor in the alliance 
building lies in the extracurricular activities such as sports, debates, and different learning 
clubs and associations that created spaces for students from different schools to encounter 
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peers from other schools. Such encounters created lifelong friendships that have spilled 
over into adult life. Even for members of associations such as the Young Catholic 
Students who recently discovered their members tended to shun going “… into politics, 
maybe [because] they see the political environment to be too hostile” (Interview 12, 4 
March 2014), there are nonetheless strong influential roles and relationships that cut 
across political divides. So strong are such bridge-builder effects of their student days 
experiences that when one of such persons (name withheld) recently “… died you had the 
representation from all parties, because of the gravitas of the person, at the funeral” 
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014).  
A third spinoff is that the boarding system of “education comes with its own 
culture” (Interview 1, 3 March 2014) In the case of Ghana, that culture was the non-
adversarial, nonviolent, and integrative type. To illustrate the point, a respondent narrated 
how 
…when we were in the Pan African Parliament, it is only the Ghanaian 
delegation that you could see moving together as a group. And the other 
delegations would ask us how we are able to do that. Other African states 
delegations you could see clearly opposition and government – you could 
see; they were not mixing” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).  
 
Another example was when in 2009 Ghana’s Ambassador to Namibia personally 
went to the Airport at Windhoek to welcome a Pan African Parliamentary delegation that 
the Deputy Minority (Opposition) Leader in Ghana’s parliament was leading to monitor 
Namibia’s elections. According to the respondent, the scene prompted delegates from 
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other countries to remark “we can never be like Ghana” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). 
Not only was it surprising that the Ambassador would come to meet someone from the 
opposition in his country; the cordiality the two exhibited did not indicate they were 
political adversaries.   
 
Non-intentionality of Peace Outcomes from Education 
In sum on the positive side, Ghana’s educational system, in the view of some 
respondents, has been very helpful in promoting interethnic integration and social 
cohesion. However, other respondents observed that “…it is kind of difficult to establish 
a direct relationship between education and peace in Ghana (Interview 201, 15 October 
2014), especially when viewed from the angle of policy intentionality in the set up and 
management of the educational system. Indeed, most respondents in the KII lamented the 
lack of intentionality in the use of education as an instrument for social cohesion and 
peace in Ghana. They viewed the contribution of education to peace as a coincidental or 
even accidental, as most of the positive examples cited derive from the incidental spin-
offs of the effects of boarding schools and the posting of teachers, rather than the 
intentional acts of curriculum development and implementation, for example. In the view 
of respondents, the major contribution of the educational system lies in the extra or non-
curricular activities that created spaces for students from various schools and 
backgrounds to encounter peers from other communities and schools (Interview 12, 4 
March, 2014). Summing up the view that the contribution of education to peace in Ghana 
is a byproduct, not an intentional product of the educational system, a respondent had this 
to say: 
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I will not sit down here and say our educational system has not played a 
role in contributing to producing individuals who saw themselves as 
Ghanaians rather than as ethnic individuals [but] is it the cause of 
education? No. I think our system may not have been directly informed to 
promote peace; the content does not promote peace, but the space and the 
structures that we put in place may indirectly; it’s a byproduct of that 
space (Interview 215, 10 December 2014). 
 
Respondents attributed the defects in the educational system of Ghana as an 
instrument of peace, now and in the future, to a number of interlinked factors. First, the 
content of education does not emphasize the teaching of history of Ghana to provide a 
shared understanding of how the ethnic groups in the country came to be together; are 
interrelated; and have managed to coexist largely peacefully. Instead, some text books 
distort historical facts (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014), and thereby contribute to the 
protraction of inter and intra ethnic conflicts in some locales. In other words, neither the 
content nor the delivery mechanisms in schools are deliberately designed to foster the 
sense of oneness among Ghanaians. Hence, in the view of a respondent: 
In terms of curriculum, [Ghana’s educational system] hasn’t helped much 
because I think that […] the education system in Ghana has not 
emphasized history. People finish a certain level of education even 
university and all they know is general West African history; what they 
know is European history; they have not consciously studied the history of 
settlements, of relationships between the different ethnic groups, […] if 
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we have to promote peace we need to know our history”. (Interview 2, 7 
February, 2014). 
 
Another respondent puts it this way: 
 
I do not think there is any conscious effort to do that.  What many of us, 
people have referred to is the Boarding House Concept that has become 
the melting pot.  Because I wonder if there are any serious curricula that 
talk about Peace and Conflict Resolution; they do not seem to be there at 
the University Campuses (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).   
 
To buttress the argument on the non-intentionality of the educational system in 
promoting the social gel of a nation, and the peace that Ghana enjoys, another respondent 
would point out that:  
you know in Ghana we don’t have peace education, in terms of it being 
part of the curriculum, even in the universities there is no strong conflict 
studies program in any of our universities and yet we have this peaceful 
environment ok, so in that respect one would not give full credence to the 
educational system of being a factor; just that we are lucky that the culture 
and religion seem to be able to carry us through any such upheavals 
(Interview 201 – 15 October, 2014). 
 
In other words, religion and culture and the institutions associated with them can 
take more credit for Ghana’s peace than the formal educational system. Indeed, on the 
wider question of the contribution of education to the building of a culture of peace in the 
country through the creation of patriotism, attitude of selfless service, and social 
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conscientiousness among the citizens, there is no conscious educational program. This 
led a respondent to state that: 
I am not too sure we have been very intentional and deliberate in 
facilitating patriotism in terms of our curricular and the pedagogic and so 
on and so forth.  I think that sector we need to do more. We’re studying 
alright; we’re churning out scholars – but it’s not just scholars, but people 
who will love the country and be prepared to die a little for their country; 
people who would acquire the knowledge, the skills and will not allow 
themselves to be bought because of the dollar, and would say that even 
though I am not making it, I want to make my contribution.  A lot of 
people completed school here and they want to go out” (Interview 8, 24 
February, 2014).   
 
Ghana’s Educational System as a Source of Conflict 
Respondents recalled that the missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a good 
job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized academic and 
character formation. Hence, the educational system at the time of independence was very 
good as it focused on character formation as much as academic attainments. However, 
with the passage of time in the postcolonial educational system, “…they removed certain 
lessons like religious studies, […] and that hasn’t contributed a lot” to building a culture 
of peace in the country (Interview 219, 14 December, 2014). Underscoring the need for 
intentionality in the design and implementation of an educational system that supports 
peace, one respondent pointed out that: “You can educate a lot of people, but if you do 
not instill discipline in them, patriotism in them” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), the 
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essence of education and its contribution to peace and national development would be 
lost. The fact that one is educated is not necessarily a force for good, and education 
without character formation is worthless to nation building. Unfortunately, under the 
current educational system, we have reached a point where “…our values, traditional 
values are vanishing and they are being replaced by individualism, the desire for wealth, 
acquire wealth at any cost (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014), a respondent stated.  This 
has come about because under the current educational policies “…the principles that 
should guide us are left out” (Interview 208, 30 October, 2014). This is the result of 
government’s persistent threat to de-emphasize the teaching of religion in schools 
(Interview 9, 26 February, 2014).  
To buttress the argument, respondents cited several examples of how the amoral 
educational system has increasingly resulted in situations where the educated people are 
using their knowledge and competencies to manipulate less educated co-citizens into 
violence (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014). With reference to the perpetuation of localized 
conflicts, for instance, respondents observed that “somebody might say that the higher the 
level of literacy the greater the prospects for peace; well I don’t think it is true because 
who leads the non-literate sections of the population [into violent confrontations]; well, it 
is the literate ones” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). In other words, in all the localized 
protracted inter and intra ethnic conflicts, it is usually the literate people who are the ones 
who (mis)lead the illiterate ones to initiate and sustain the recurrence of violence.  
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Limited Social Dividends of Education to Society 
Respondents also questioned the social dividends that education has brought to 
communities from which educated people came. Beyond their immediate families, the 
societal dividends of education are very limited or missing. Instead, respondents 
indicated that the educational system has produced negative role models for most 
communities. Hence, respondents have questioned the transformative function of 
education as, in some cases, going to school has done little to transform the lives, 
mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors of those who claim to be educated. Rather than use 
their acquired knowledge for good, some educated people are using their knowledge to 
foment troubles and mislead others into conflicts.  As a respondent remarked:  
On the negative side we also have people who have had education but 
education has not passed through them. Their behaviors show that well, as 
if they had not been to school at all; and some through the little education 
they had, they try to influence others not for good but rather to take to 
violence” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014).  
 
In the view of a respondent, the “…educated people who are the ones, [though] 
fortunately or unfortunately are occupying high positions of political power, have often 
not shown good example” (Interview 2, 7 February, 2014). Beyond indulgence in 
corruption and selfishness, there are only “…isolated examples where people, educated 
people, have gone back [and] given to their people, […] but largely you don’t see that 
happening. [Instead] education has sometimes isolated people from […] their roots 
because they are educated above [laughs] their local people”. (Interview 2, 7 February, 
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2014). In other instances, you encounter a “… well-educated, a prominent person of a 
Political Party and yet [he or she] comes to say things and you wonder whether the 
person is correct” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Giving specific examples, 
respondents noted that in most of the protracted and very violent chieftaincy disputes 
dotted across the country, you will:  
…find well-educated people promoting conflict, taking very hard 
positions and not negotiating; you would expect that educated people 
should be better negotiators and by and large maybe they are but there are 
instances that you can point out examples of educated people taking very 
hard (stressed) positions in terms of chieftaincy issues which tend to 
promote more community chieftaincy conflicts in those areas. (Interview 
206, 29 October, 2014) 
 
Educational System as the Epicenter for Future Conflicts 
 
Respondents also raised a number of emerging negative trends that, if not 
addressed, will make education a negative force for peace. In their view, part of the 
reason why the educational system is failing to deliver high quality, employable 
knowledge and skills is the constant and multi-directional policy changes the system has 
witnessed since independence. As a result, “the educational sector is the sector that has 
been experiencing a lot of turbulence in the sense that every regime that comes wants to 
make an impact in education” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). Accordingly, they set out to 
make changes in accordance with their whims or “Party Manifestoes that their own 
people are not even familiar with” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). These partisan 
approaches to managing the country’s educational policy framework do not create shared 
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values, vision, and direction for change that would serve as the basis for continuity in the 
evolution of consistent policies and programs for the sector. The policy relevance to the 
consumer population of such changes is questionable, as these endless changes are: 
…usually not in the interest of the thousands of youth that are going 
through education” [because even though all governments] would claim 
that [what they have done] is for the good of the system but at the end of 
the day the products that are coming out [from these schools] become the 
victims of this … constant change (Interview 13, 5 March 2014).  
 
As a result, the first flashpoint for violence that respondents signaled is the large 
number of young people spewed out of the country’s educational system with little to no 
employable knowledge and skills. They recalled for instance, that tertiary educational 
institutions have burgeoned since the 1980s, with well over fifty Universities now 
operating in the country; up from only three in the late 1980s. Together “…they are 
turning out graduates at a rate that the economy cannot absorb at all. So the mass of 
unemployment is moving up not just from the literates, illiterates, semi-literates but even 
to highly qualified people” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014; see also Interview 209, 19 
November, 2014). This, in the view of respondents is a huge threat to peace (Interview 5, 
14 February, 2014). A one respondent  observed: “I see a situation whereby if things do 
not change, if the products of this educational system continue coming out and not 
finding employment because of the way the system has trained them, yeah, we could find 
ourselves in a serious situation” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).  
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Respondents made reference to the comment of the National Youth Coordinator 
that “Unemployment comes with national security threat” (Midley, 2014), to buttress the 
danger inherent in the current educational system and its contribution to youth 
unemployment. Already, the situation is exacerbating tensions with better technically 
trained and equipped foreign workers in the construction and other sectors (Interview 5, 
14 February, 2014). But the major security threat lies in the future, in the view of one 
respondent who summarized the situation as follows: 
the number of children that have increased on our streets begging and just 
hawking anything and just to make ends meet has increased, just looking 
with my eyes, without doing any statistical studies, yeah, is just incredible 
and very worrying because I see these children and I think in 20 years 
what would they be doing? They would become the stitchers (sic), they 
would become armed robbers, they would become thugs because they 
have to live so they would do everything that they need to do to survive 
and that child, that boy who was today wiping your windscreen so that you 
can get them GHC1 or GHC2, they will be breaking it in 20 years’ time to 
steal. So those are the huge concerns; and that’s why we need to fix our 
educational system because it is just crumbling; it is crumbling and the 
evidence is what we see in the streets. Apart from these young boys you 
also have those that have been half baked because they’ve had access to 
basic education and that’s it. So, they’re really not skilled to take up any 
meaningful employment that would give them the kind of life that is 
decent (Interview 213, 9 December 2104). 
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Another worrying sign in the educational sector as it relates to its contribution to 
peace is the intrusion of politics into academia. Respondents noted that political parties’ 
invasion of the educational institutions, especially the tertiary ones, has made them the 
seedbeds of partisan politics. They have become the political battlefields for capturing 
and grooming young political leaders into the political parties. Respondents see both 
positive and negative sides of the development. The positive dimension is that some 
young members of Parliament and Ministers have emerged out of that system. On the 
down side, however, respondents worried about the increasingly partisan and politically 
polarized atmospheres that have taken root on the campuses of tertiary educational 
institutions in the country (Interview 214, 10 December 2014). So strong are these 
divisions that the National Union of Ghana Students, which used to be a strong public 
policy advocate, is now sharply divided along partisan lines; all because “You have all 
these groups [that] are die-hard political supporters [of the two major political parties] on 
the campuses.  ” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). 
In sum, the boarding schools of Ghana’s educational system created spaces for 
people of different ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds to get to know each other, and 
thereby fostered the reduction of interethnic prejudices. However, this outcome was 
never planned or intended as a direct product of the educational system. That it happened 
must be due to other circumstantial factors other than the design of the educational 
system itself. On the converse, respondents see that the current structure and operations 
of the educational system is eroding this accidental benefit. In the stead, it is producing 
young people who lack not only the knowledge and skills for gainful employment; they 
are also missing the character formation and values inculcation that the educational 
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systems once offered to older generations. This, in the view of respondents, makes the 
educational system a potential negative contributor to Ghana’s peace.  
 
 
Ho14 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward people of 
other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys.  
This hypothesis offers an opportunity to explore how the personal attitudes, 
behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians may have contributed or not to the existence and/or 
promotion of social cohesion and peace in the country. Previous hypotheses focused on 
respondents’ perceptions, beliefs, and views on observed phenomena in the general 
society that they believe may have contributed to peace or not in Ghana. The guiding 
questions for testing this hypothesis, however, give respondents a chance to 
introspectively examine their personal beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, practices, and 
lived experiences, and by extension those of all ordinary citizens, in daily encounters that 
have positively or negatively contributed to the building of social cohesion and peace in 
Ghana.  
Social cohesion, however, is a multi-dimensional concept (Jenson, 2010; 
Reeskens, 2008) whose measurement  cannot be restricted to a narrow set of variables. 
Berger-Schmitt (2002) defines two dimensions of social cohesion. The first is the extent 
to which members of a society create and promote equal opportunities for all its members 
through the reduction of disparities and inequalities, as well as, ensuring inclusivity of all 
in private and public engagements. The second measures the extent to which society 
manages diversities positively through the creation of operational frameworks, capacities 
and opportunities for its members to interact, live, and work together across different 
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lines of diversities such as religion, ethnicity, and race, among others. Jenson (2010) adds 
a third dimension of social cohesion related to citizen’s engagement with the institutions 
of governance in their respective localities or country.  
Kearns and Forrest however proposed five dimensions for the concept. The 
attributes they evolved ranged from shared values and active civic engagement; presence 
of social control mechanisms that minimize disruptions; systems and processes for 
reducing economic disparities within the population;   the existence of inclusive networks 
that facilitate member participation in the public life of the community, and the shared 
sense of belongingness and collective identity within a common geographical space 
(Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Markus, on his part, views social cohesion as a “never-ending 
process of achieving social harmony” (Markus, 2013, p. 13); one in which several 
political, economic, socio-cultural, identity, social justice and equity; opportunities for 
citizen participation in public life; inclusive and accommodative behaviors, and the 
experience of self-worth are important contributory factors to achieving and sustaining 
that harmony.   
Building on the foregoing definitions, this study used a set of eleven (11) 
variables to gauge the contribution or otherwise of personal beliefs, values, attitudes, 
behaviors, and practices to the building of social cohesion and the peace that Ghana 
experiences. These variables include the extent to which respondents would go to i) make 
an effort to include people of other ethnic backgrounds in group discussions or 
conversations; ii) ensure that others from different cultural backgrounds accept the 
respondent’s values as more important; iii) ensure that their cultural views are accepted 
over others in a group discussion; iv) intentionally avoid mixing with people of other 
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cultures; v) ensure the views of others on national issues are considered important and 
valid.  
Other variables assessed in the study are the extent to which respondents will try 
to understand issues and events from the perspectives of those directly affected by them; 
consider the ethnic background of candidates when they vote in an election; and the 
degree of willingness on the part of respondents to accept posting to any part of the 
country other than in one’s home region. Measures of practices that promote social 
cohesion included the extent to which respondents would accept that members of their 
families marry to people of other ethnic backgrounds; the extent to which respondents 
would use the legal means to address their conflicts with people of other ethnic groups; 
and indications of extent to which the personality of candidates or the issues they stand 
for determine the voting choices respondents make at elections. In sum, together, the 
variables explored different ways in which respondents’ personal beliefs, values, 
attitudes, behaviors, actions, or inactions provide insights into how the individual 
attitudes and actions of Ghanaians may have contributed to the creation and maintenance 
of a cohesive society and the peace of the country.   
Figure 11 provides a summary of the results for each variable. The results show 
that, except for the variable testing attitudes and behaviors related to cultural superiority, 
all other variables returned out more than 70% response rates on positive attitude and 
behaviors of respondents that may have contributed to the peace of Ghana.  
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Figure 11 
Effect of Personal Attitudes, Beliefs, and Practices on Peace in Ghana.  
 
 
 
Crosstabulation of the various responses with the demographic characteristics of 
respondents yielded significant finds with p- values < 0.05 for all the variables except for 
the cross tabulation between Age categories of respondents and inclusive attitude, as well 
as, value for other’s views; primary occupation and valuing others’ views. Similar results 
emerged for religious affiliations of respondents cross-tabulated with inclusive attitudes, 
cultural superiority; conflict avoidance; support for intermarriages, and accepting 
postings to other places other than one’s home region. The cross-tabulation of the 
variables with gender produced p-values > 0.05 for gender and inclusive attitudes; 
cultural superiority; avoidance; accepting postings to places outside one’s home region, 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
87.2 
51.3 
75.3 78.3 
98.8 
78.1 
90.5 
73 
86.6 87.8 
70.1 
12.8 
48.7 
24.7 21.7 
1.2 
21.9 
9.5 
27 
13.4 12.2 
29.9 
Selected Not Selected
235 
 
 
 
and support for intermarriages. All other measures had p-values < 0.05 – See Appendix 
21. Overall, although different characteristics of respondents influenced their perceptions 
on how personal values, beliefs, and attitudes contributed to the different dimensions of 
social cohesion in Ghana, the generality of the results indicate that we can reject the 
proposition in Ho14  that Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians 
toward people of other ethnic or religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana 
enjoys.  
The findings from KII reported in various sections of this study have in many 
ways responded to the questions raised under this hypothesis; namely, the assessment of 
the extent to which the personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices of Ghanaians toward 
people of other ethnic or religious groups have contributed to the peace that Ghana 
enjoys. We have observed, for instance, the natural tendency of Ghanaians to be tolerant 
and receptive of people from all backgrounds (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). We 
observed how respondents indicated that all the cultures of the ethnic groups in Ghana 
“are quite tolerant of other cultures” (Interview 213, 9 December 2014). They share 
common traits of “respect for human dignity, respecting the truth; respecting the 
institution, respecting the rule of law [while shunning] and superiority complex [so that] 
you don’t say that I’m from this [therefore] I’m better than you, no; we are all the same” 
(Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). In particular, inter-religious tolerance is high and the 
relationship between Muslims and Christians in Ghana has been described as one of the 
best” [on the continent, as] you don’t have that kind of religious fundamentalism” 
(Interview 213, 9 December 2014) we see elsewhere.  
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Respondents pointed out that this predisposition to intercultural accommodation is 
essentially because most cultures in Ghana are very open, tolerant, and ready to accept 
people and all circumstances easily (Interview 14, 5 March 2014). Consequently, the 
socialization processes across all ethnic groups “…teach the people to be tolerant [and] to 
learn to co-exist (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). Hence, the pervasive and nested 
influence of culture and religion on the lives of Ghanaians makes what “…may have 
influenced the actions of someone […] difficult to determine whether it’s coming from 
the religion or the culture (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). The result of this cultural 
infusion is that Ghanaians do not want to do anything to offend God and the stranger, 
whom, respondents have observed, could be the reincarnation of a deity. The cultures of 
all ethnic groups therefore provide support for intercultural comingling of people, 
accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. Accordingly, a 
respondent from the south stated that “I will not go to Tumu [in the north] and for people 
[there] to say he comes from there so we will not help him […] culturally you are 
accommodated until you prove yourself that you are evil and of course no society 
condones that… (Interview 2, 14 December, 2014).  
The attendant freedom of all Ghanaians to move to and settle anywhere in the 
country has enabled them to appreciate each other’s cultures and lifestyles. Intercultural 
assimilation is therefore a common practice. Many Ghanaians easily adapt to the diet, 
dance, and dress codes of their host communities without hesitation; and many speak at 
least one other Ghanaian language other their mother tongues. As one respondent recalled 
from personal experiences: 
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I speak Ga very fluently, although I am not a Ga; it is simply because I 
lived there; I speak Twi but I am not an Akan; it’s simply because I lived 
there; I speak a bit of Ewe, I am not an Ewe.  It’s simply because I learnt 
to appreciate other people’s cultures and tolerate them more than I would 
have done if I had not been exposed to them (Interview 7, 19 February, 
2014).  
 
Getting to know each other through the educational system, business travels around 
the country, intermarriages, or other forms of cross-cultural engagements have also 
significantly reduced any interethnic prejudices, stereotypes, and superiority/inferiority 
complexes among the ethnic groups in Ghana. In particular, respondents returned to how 
the “boarding houses [have] made people tolerant to each other’s cultures, each other’s 
temperaments.  People who have not gone to the Boarding House would find it difficult 
to relate to a particular group because of certain perceptions” (Interview 10, 27 February, 
2014). Recounting her personal experience of the leveling effect of education, a 
respondent pointed out that the fact that she sat in the same class with girls from other 
parts of the country, and even did better than them in examinations, made her have no 
“basis for [feeling of] inferiority complex or superiority complex” (Interview 206, 29 
October, 2014).  
Respondents attributed this congealing influence in part to the fact that in the run 
up to independence, “… the national identity was emphasized more and the diversity less 
so we felt more as one than 52 different ethnic groups” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). So 
strong was this sense of oneness that cultural absolutism was virtually nonexistent. This, 
in the view of the respondent, “may even explain why we do not have a national language 
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[since] …no particular ethnic group has felt so superior [as] to impose its language on the 
nation.”  On the contrary, “…there is that mutual respect among the ethnic groups so that 
one does not exert itself too much especially against the smaller and the weaker ones” 
(Interview 13, 5 March 2014).  
Another respondent who had experience living in other countries in West Africa 
believes the Ghanaian experience is unique because the socialization systems in Ghana 
shield children from the negative stereotypes and pejorative discussions about members 
of other ethnic groups. Hence, the children don’t grow up imbibing some sense of 
cultural superiority or inferiority (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). In addition, past 
military and political alliances between ethnic groups, as well as, the friendship and 
joking relationships between ethnic groups is another equalizing factor that suppresses 
ethnic bigotry and superiority complexes (Interview 206, 29 October 2014; Interview 7, 
19 February, 2014). 
Ethnicity does not affect the voting behaviors of respondents. Respondents 
recognized that political parties in Ghana do have strong ethnic constituencies and that 
the two major political parties in Ghana derive large chunks of their votes from certain 
ethnic enclaves. However, in the view of respondents, this cannot be construed to mean 
ethnicity necessarily influences the voting behaviors of individuals. As respondents 
pointed out, political parties in Ghana are, by law and reality, not ethno-regionally based 
(Interview 12, 4 March 2014). They are national in character. In reality also, all the major 
political parties make strenuous efforts to ensure that they portrait this national character 
in the choice and presentation of their candidates. Hence, even though the New Patriotic 
party is “being tagged as an Ashanti party” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014), all its Vice 
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Presidential candidates have been northerners. Similarly, the National Democratic 
Congress has had either it’s Vice Presidential or Presidential candidates being from the 
north or most of its key ministers are chosen from the north. For this reason, with respect 
to the use of ethnicity as a criterion for voter choices during elections, respondents have 
cast doubts on the idea. In their view, the multi-ethnic composition of political parties 
serves as a bastion against ethnic bloc voting or mobilization for political purposes.  
Respondents also cited the political freedoms such as the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of association which allow Ghanaians of all creeds and ethnicity the 
right to join any political party of their choice, as major contributory factors to the 
country’s peace. Everyone is free to join a party of his or her choice and is free to 
exercise their vote as they wish. As one respondent noted, it is common to see “…people 
move from one political party to another; people from one  family two brothers; one can 
belong to NDC, the other for NPP, that is ongoing” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014; see 
also Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). And as has been illustrated before, the political 
divisions may even cut across family lines. As one respondent pointed out “… in every 
community you have political opponents and nobody is ever stopped from commenting 
his or her views about what is happening” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014). Hence, the 
possibility of articulating an open ethnic agenda in Ghana’s election is very limited. As a 
respondent summarized it: 
our political parties may have, you know, people from certain ethnic 
groups dominating but they’ve also had a strong presence of people from 
all ethnic groups. So if a party wins, there isn’t that feeling that it is this 
ethnic group [that has won] so people who are on the other side may be 
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dissatisfied, but it has been very difficult for them to mobilize an ethnic 
constituency against the other party because the party that would have 
won would have a lot of elements from the ethnic groups that would have 
been mobilized  and so they can be a counter force to prevent  the other 
ethnic groups from mobilizing that is one” (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014)  
 
 
Because of the conscious effort to ensure ethno-regional balance in the composition 
of political parties, and especially in the choice of national level candidates, respondents 
have argued that ethnicity per se is not the determining factor in individual’s choice of 
candidates in the elections. On the contrary, people vote for political parties, not the 
individual candidates representing the political parties. This is why, in their view, the 
Peoples National Convention (PNC), a party that the late President Hilla Limann, a 
northerner created, a party that has been led largely by northerners in all elections since 
1992, has consistently performed abysmally in the north in terms of total votes accrued.  
In contrast, the NDC won heavily in the north in two successive elections (1992 and 
1996) with a South-South ticket.  
Beyond the selection of candidates, political parties strive to demonstrate their 
national outlook even in matters such as the selection of venues for their congresses and 
other events. Hence, if a political party is seen to be holding its events  “…in one region 
the party begins to say no, we must be seen to be moving round because that’s the way 
we demonstrate to the whole country that we are for everybody” (Interview 12, 4 March 
2014).  
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Some respondents expressed worries about recent attempts to ethnicize politics, as 
they noted that “…some politicians are playing the ethnic card against the national 
identity and if we do not put a halt to this it could affect us. For example somebody wants 
to be elected and would say that ‘vote for me because I am one of you’ irrespective of 
competence, irrespective of the person’s capabilities” (Interview 13, 5 March 2014). 
However, other respondents suggested that the Ghanaian voter has become so 
sophisticated that even the offer of money by candidates is no longer an enticement for 
their votes. As one respondent noted,  
people try to influence others with monies…but I will say also people are 
not stupid; if there are four candidates they also know the person who is 
really qualified and so there have been cases too they take your money but 
they don’t vote for you [instead] in the final analysis they would vote for a 
person they feel would be able to handle” the position (Interview 5, 14 
February, 2014).   
With respect to the acceptance of job placements in other parts of the country, 
respondents found no problems with it. It has been a normal practice, although there have 
been isolated stories of people from the south resisting posting to the north. But there 
have equally been stories about such people resisting posting back to the south once they 
have tasted the life of the north. In particular, respondents recalled that in the 
Acheampong era you had Regional Commissioners superintending regions where they 
did not come from. So blended and accepted were these Commissioners that, even today 
“… you go to the Volta region and they are talking about Kabore etc.; you come to the 
Northern Region and they are talking about Col. Zumah; you go to the Upper Region, 
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they are talking about Aquaye Nortey” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014). This is the 
example that the concept that we are “…one nation, one people, with a common destiny” 
(Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; see also Interview 4, 12 February, 2014; and Interview 
6, 18 February, 2014) has taken root in the psyche of Ghanaians. 
 
Summary of Findings from Field Studies 
 
 
The findings from the quantitative survey and key informant interviews all 
confirm that Ghana’s peace is relative. It is peaceful only in comparison to other 
countries in Africa that have the same or similar mixes of historical, economic, ethno-
political, and cultural challenges but which have succumbed to violent national level 
conflicts.  Internally, there are parts of Ghana that would not consider themselves as 
being at peace due to persisting inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts. Nonetheless, to the 
extent that these conflicts have been containerized within their localities, Ghana is seen as 
peaceful. Finally Ghana is also said to be peaceful from the perspective of a historical 
timeline of the nation. In the view of respondents, there are certain periods of the 
country’s history that cannot be described as peaceful. 
Ghana therefore is a country in a state of negative peace equilibrium where a 
balance of forces has successfully prevented the country from exploding into nationwide 
violence. Incidentally, the same forces have not been able to lead the country toward 
positive peace. On the contrary, respondents noted clusters of force fields, or action 
points whose synergistic engagements cancel out the tilts towards violence or progressive 
positive peace. Instead, they always manage to restore the country to the state of negative 
equilibrium at every turn.   
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On the positive side, the nested relationships between culture and religion 
constitute the bulwark of positive forces restraining Ghana from a decline to the abyss. 
The systems and networks of values, beliefs, institutional engagements, and private actors 
using the platforms of religion and culture constitute the threads and weavers of peace 
that constantly stitch and hold together the fraying and otherwise centrifugal parts of the 
socio-political fabric called Ghana. The threads of collective beliefs, values, and practices 
from religion in particular have crafted a shared sense of oneness among the ethnic 
groups in Ghana. The faith-based leaders that pop up, when most needed, to weave 
together the politico-ethnic and geographical divides of the country; heal wounds; and 
foster reconciliation, are the weavers credited with keeping the fraying social fabric 
cobbled together. The faith-based organizations that never fail to speak up and out on 
national issues, when it matters most, represent the interests of the voiceless, as they 
speak truth to power. In the process, they create and sustain the bonds that keep hope 
alive and violence at bay.  
Closely associated cultural values of hospitality and intercultural accommodation 
have provided the threads for weaving the webs of inter-ethnic and cross-faith marriages; 
multi-ethnic and multi-creed human settlements across the country; as well as, historical 
politico-military inter-ethnic alliances that underwrite unspoken non-aggression pacts 
between major ethnic groups in Ghana. Culture also underwrites the geo-ethnic economic 
interdependencies arising from the freedom of movement of persons, capital, and 
unrestricted access to economic resources across the country. This makes it possible not 
only for business people to invest anywhere in the country; less endowed citizens are able 
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to travel to any part of the country in pursuit of their economic interests. This builds 
cross-ethnic stakes in the peace of any part of the country and the country as a whole.  
However, the patriarchal structure of Ghana’s traditional and religious 
establishments provide very limited frontline spaces for women and the youth to be 
active weavers of the country’s peace. Beyond championing the organization of prayers 
for peace, respondents have cited women in particular as playing largely background, 
behind the scenes, nature, and nurturing roles in Ghana’s peace. Men dominate the 
decision making spaces, be it in politics, at the pulpit, or in the field of business. Women 
and the youth bear the brunt of poverty, especially in its relative terms, especially when 
they add on responsibilities for fending for their families.   
Education, particularly with its boarding school system, has been cited as a 
positive thread that builds cross-ethnic bridges through the lifelong friendships and 
alliances it creates among alumni and alumnae of post primary educational institutions. 
However, the non-intentionality of this outcome from the design of the educational 
system has come under scrutiny. Besides, respondents have also faulted the country’s 
educational system for the burgeoning unemployed and largely unemployable youth who 
constitute current and future peace and security threats to the country.  
Similarly, respondents have positively noted individual and collective acts of 
some political leaders in the country as the glue that keeps Ghana together. In particular, 
Kwame Nkrumah’s ability to build cross-ethnic bridges in the political landscape did not 
only disperse and diffuse ethno-centric political organization and mobilization, it sowed 
the seeds for creating the political alliances that held the nation together. Ghana may be 
split in the middle along the historical arch rivalry lines of the Nkrumaist tradition on the 
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one hand, and the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition on the other. However, the cross-
ethnic composition of these political blocks, which Nkrumah nurtured through his 
Convention People’s Party, and decreed through the constitutional provisions that debar 
ethno-political parties, have successfully intertwined inter-ethnic political elites in their 
party enclaves. This makes it harder for one ethnic group to claim exclusivity of political 
rights. Power is shared across all ethnic groups, when won by either member of the 
duopoly. When ethnic inclusivity is construed to equate equity in participation in the 
public sphere, the room for galvanizing and channeling ethnic grievances into political 
conflicts is quite restricted. Chapter 5 provides more in-depth consideration of these 
findings, among others.  
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CHAPTER 5:  Discussion And Implications Of Findings Of The Study 
 
Introduction 
 
Respondents in this study consistently characterized Ghana as a patchwork of geo-
politically, socio-culturally, and eco-economically disparate ethnic groups that the 
accident of colonialism cobbled together as a nation-state.  Although this amalgam of 
ethnic groups has managed to stay together for 58 years without a major national level 
violent conflict, findings from the study underscore a split view of Ghanaians on whether 
or not Ghana is an oasis of peace. In particular, respondents of the Key Informant 
Interviews, who had the opportunity to explain their assessment of Ghana’s peace, were 
quick to provide qualifiers that relativized or otherwise conditioned their assessments of 
Ghana’s peace on centrifugal as well as centripetal external and internal factors that, on 
the balance, have managed to hold together the unstable, precarious, and unpredictable 
semblance of peace that Ghana has. This view of Ghana as a state riding on negative, 
unstable peace is, incidentally, not a new development. Hansen provides a historical 
capture of the fragility and unpredictability of Ghana’s peace in observing that: 
Ghana seems to have a great capacity for deceiving both her admirers and 
her critics. At times events move in a certain direction, and both groups 
begin to imagine possible subsequent trends, but then everything changes 
dramatically to confound all observers. Thus two years after colonial 
administrators had described the country as a 'model colony' and a 'peace-
loving' people, it was to be plunged into a violent conflict with the 
colonial administration for independence” (Hansen, 1968, p. 24). 
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Ghana’s capacity for deception on the nature of its peace has run through its post-
independence history. Barely two years after gaining model status as the first sub-
Saharan African country to gain independence, and to do so without prolonged violent 
confrontation with her colonial masters, Ghana quickly abandoned the ideals of 
multiparty democracy and plunged in for the fashionable single party dictatorship of the 
time; a choice that would initiate a period of human rights abuses, arbitrary arrests and 
incarcerations, and various forms of repressions that would trigger a culture of counter 
violence as witnessed in the bomb throwing incidents of the 1960s (Daily Guide, 2013b). 
The repressive state system would lead to a military coup d’état that set yet another 
model for how the country would be governed for the next twenty (26) years. For much 
of the 1970s confrontational politics that pitched governments of the period against civil 
groups became the model for how Ghana would manage her political space. Student-
government confrontations were the norm of the period, with faith-based institutions and 
civil society groups lending a hand on the side of the students in the protests over harsh 
economic conditions and the demands for a return to civilian rule. Hence, during the late 
1960s, “Ghana [remained] a particularly interesting case of confrontation politics because 
the government, rather than the students, assumed the initiative” (Finlay, 1968, p. 51) in 
the cycle of violent demonstrations that characterized the period. These student-
government confrontations continued into the 1970s, as students used their 
demonstrations against the Supreme Military Council (SMC) government to push for a 
return of the country to multi-party democracy  (Hettne, 1980; Chazan, 1979)  
The semblance of peace and stability in the politics of Ghana that the bloody 
military coup d’états of 1979 and then 1981 imposed on the country for the next eleven 
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(11) years would end with little change to the status quo ante. The PNDC government 
that prided itself with bringing peace, security, and stability to Ghana’s politics from 
1981 to 1992 admitted that the peace it so boasted of bestowing on Ghana was neither 
complete nor durable. Ironically, this was the period when JJ Rawlings declared the 
“democratization of violence” (Clottey, 2008, p. 1; McDonald, 2010) as a state policy 
that allowed him to put guns in the hands of non-security service personnel, ostensibly to 
cow the opposition to his revolution. The attendant “culture of silence” (Agyeman-Duah, 
1987b, p. 625; Sangaparee, 2012, p. 2) and fear that ensued created the semblance of 
peace that his regime would pride itself in. It would turn out, however, that Rawlings was 
not shielded from the illusory nature of the peace he credited to his regime, as he would 
openly confess later that his regime had to “devote [a lot more time] to the issues of our 
nation's security instead of being there with the people” (People's Daily Graphic).  
Aware of the unsustainable nature of his kind of peace, Rawlings had to 
unwillingly concede to democratization efforts to address the perceived lack of 
legitimacy of his regime, which fueled the incessant public unrests and attempts to 
overthrow him. As a respondent noted, “but for the pressure that was put on that Regime, 
[Rawlings and his PNDC cronies] would not have even gone that way” of trying to return 
the country to constitutional rule. They launched the process “…as a kind of pacification 
to the people” (Interview 212, 9 December, 2014).  Accordingly, the PNDC activated the 
decentralization of governance through the creation of the District Assemblies and other 
local government structures. That decision initiated the carefully choreographed and 
thoroughly mined process that would lead to a return to the use of the ballot box rather 
than the barrel of the gun to determine who rules Ghana.  
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But since the uptake of that democratic process in 1992, Ghana’s peace has 
remained as fragile and unpredictable as ever.  As respondents in this study have amply 
illustrated, the contemporary eulogizing of Ghana as an oasis of peace should not be 
taken on its face value. If anything, attention must be given to Hansen’s caution that “The 
fact that Ghana is noted for deceiving external observers and even perceptive ones like 
Austin and Apter seems to indicate that the picture usually painted for us is far from 
reality and that the actual situation is much more complex” (Hansen, 1968, p. 24). 
Indeed, what is more predictable about Ghana’s peace is the unpredictability of what  
factors and forces have kept and can continue to keep the country in this state of unstable 
equilibrium of negative peace.  
 
Grappling with the Yins and Yangs of Ghana’s Peace 
 
What this study has tried to do is to seek greater understanding of what are the 
factors or forces that have so successfully maintained this unstable peace equilibrium? 
What makes it possible for Ghana to successfully wax between the descent into violence 
and the maintenance of the semblance of peace?  Participants in the study have provided 
various perspectives on how and why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into 
violent national conflicts despite the very tenuous nature of its peace. In evaluating these 
perspectives, however, Smit cautions that one cannot rely on the respondents' intentions 
as an incontestable guide to interpretation. Respondents or participants perceive and 
define situations – including the researcher's intentions – according to their understanding 
of their own motivations and of the contexts in which they act” (Smit, 2002, p. 67). 
Accordingly, the factors that the study participants have isolated as contributing to 
Ghana’s peace must be interrogated to explore if and how they, on their own or in 
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combination with other factors and actors, have so consistently operated over the years to 
keep Ghana’s uneasy peace from tipping towards the abyss.  
Smit’s observation highlights the fact that far from being mechanisms for moving 
toward higher levels of resolution of Ghana’s unstable peace situation, whatever factors 
respondents have identified as sustaining the fragile peace of the country could be mere 
sets of unstructured and uncoordinated initiatives that have, nonetheless, managed to 
keep the semblance of peace, but have been unable to find higher level and lasting 
solutions to the underlying causes of the fragile peace. Hence, the recurrence of the 
cycles of deceptive peace, as Hansen describes it. The questions that such a situation 
triggers are: Could it be that the factors and forces that have held Ghana together have 
reached the ends of their creative potentials and are therefore incapable of inventing 
newer and higher order solutions to break the jinx of negative and fragile peace that 
Ghana seems to be trapped in? If so, what steam keeps them holding the country up, and 
yet is incapable of pushing them to the next level of finding lasting solutions to the cycles 
of near violence?  
Meadows (2008), notes that “…if you see a behavior that persists over time, there 
is likely a mechanism creating that consistent behavior” (p. 25). Meadows’ further 
observation that “…the consistent behavior pattern over a long period of time …is the 
first hint of the existence of a feedback loop” (p. 25), leads us to explore what feedback 
loops might exist in Ghana’s conflict management system to create this state of negative 
equilibrium. The concept of feedback loops as the mechanisms that hold an otherwise 
fraying system together reinforces the perception of Ghana as a patchwork of peace, and 
makes the analogy of the art and science of sewing or weaving an appropriate lens for 
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searching for the threads, stitches, and weavers that hold this patchwork together; despite 
the factors and forces that have threatened to pull it asunder since its conception as a 
nation-state.  
This brings into perspective the constitutive elements that give form and meaning 
to the imagery of sewing or weaving as the process of building Ghana’s peace. A thread, 
a principal ingredient for sewing, usually consists of a “…thin strand of cotton, nylon, or 
other fibres used in sewing or weaving” (Oxford University, 2014) or to stitch, tie, knot, 
or hold otherwise separate pieces of things or members of a set together. Intertwined into 
ropes, combinations of threads can hold things that are not necessarily contiguous or 
share any natural bonds, together.  Depending on their length and strength, threads also 
permit the binding of things over long distances together. In this respect, the combined 
strength of threads can build bridges across geospatial and cultural spans to hold together 
elements that are otherwise asunder. 
In its noun form, a stitch, on the other hand is defined as  “a loop of thread or yarn 
resulting from a single pass or movement of the needle in sewing, knitting, or crocheting” 
(Oxford University, 2014). Stitches hold things together or keep elements of a common 
group together. Stitching presumes physical contiguity of the elements being stitched 
together. This could be shared spatial boundaries, identities, or value systems, as in the 
case of this study. While the initial stitches in surgery bind the separated parts, the 
ultimate aim is to create a seamless bonding between these parts so that the binding and 
the binder become no longer necessary.  
The concept of a stitch then connotes the purposive use of threads to hold or bind 
otherwise disparate pieces, elements, or in the case of this study, groups of people 
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together in such a way that they become one piece. Purposiveness means there must be a 
higher intent beyond the materials and act of stitching. It also requires an actor or weaver 
who carries out the stitching process. In order words, threads and stitches alone do not 
produce patches or eventual bonds; there must be an agent who finds need for the thread 
and uses same to purposively craft a union between disparate entities. But the actors, be 
they known or unknown; visible or invisible; conscious actors or unconscious ones; may 
be credited or not credited for their acts of stitching. Regardless, their actions are what 
create the binds, bonds, and bridges that bring and keep the disparate elements together. 
The binding and bonding effects of stitches brings into focus the 
conceptualization of social cohesion as the product of the binding, bonding, and bridging 
processes that societies engage in to hold together otherwise centrifugal groups. In that 
context, binding initiatives are viewed as externally engineered acts or processes that 
bring and hold together otherwise distinct, standalone, or even mutually repelling 
elements. What is bound together may never gel together into any inseparable form. They 
require the external bind to keep them together.  
Hence, in the context of this study, while a shared territorial unit, such as national 
boundary or an ideological construct such as a constitution, with its associated symbols 
and signs of the state, may bind disparate groups together as co-citizens in the same 
geographical space; such co-citizens are not necessarily a united nation. They may indeed 
be as distrustful, resentful, and alien to each than they are to members across another 
national frontier. In other words, they could be “inner enemies …whose membership 
within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it” (Simmel, 1908 in 
Lemert, 2010, p. 185). Hence, a bond is stronger than a bind. 
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Focusing on the bonding and bridging dimensions of social cohesion building, 
Larsen et al define social capital as networks, norms, and trust that promote collective 
action for mutual benefits. Communities with strong social bonds are more likely to 
engage in joint problem-solving initiatives (Larsen et al., 2004). They recall the 
distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding social 
capital occurs within groups, which in the context of this study would include families in 
their extended forms; ethnic groups; faith groups, among others. Bonding, therefore, is 
endogenic i.e. it comes from within the group. It is natural and often derived from deeper 
emotional attachments or shared values, and beliefs. It is not forced; it is free-willed.  
However, as is the case with chemical bonds, social bonding also requires 
something between the otherwise opposite elements to get them bonded. And, that which 
comes between to facilitate the bonding must occupy an important and large enough 
space to, as it were, create the attractive force that brings the opposing elements closer 
together. The process of bonding must be completed with the sharing of something of 
value between the opposing elements. In chemical bonds, opposing elements engage in 
sharing or transferring electrons between themselves. Social bonds must function the 
same way. There has to be a shared interest or the sustained transfer of valued factors that 
bring and keep together otherwise disparate and centrifugal individuals or groups. The 
strength of these factors is what keeps social groups together. When that is lost, they fall 
apart. Strongly shared mutual beliefs and values from culture and religion are the valued 
items that respondents in this case of this study have identified as the magnet and glue 
that keep Ghanaians together.  
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Unlike the binding and bonding processes which are intra-group by nature, 
bridging takes the social cohesion process one step further to create engagements 
between or across groups. This involves crossing the identity gulf to reach out to the 
other. Social bridges consist of structures, institutions, and processes that create 
frameworks and channels for the flow and exchange of information and actions between 
otherwise disparate groups. Hence, the bridging social capital, on the other, are “…cross-
cutting ties [that allow] members of one group connect with members of other groups to 
seek access or support or to gain information” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66). While bonding 
serves intra-group interests, bridging has the effect of promoting intergroup actions that 
have value for the groups involved.  
Finally, even though “bonding social capital is a necessary antecedent for the 
development of the more powerful form of bridging social capital […] this form of social 
capital does not necessarily result in collective action” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65 & 66).  
This is essentially because bonding social capital is preoccupied with provisioning and 
serving the survival needs of its members. It is a coping mechanism that allows its 
members “…to cobble together enough resources to survive, [but] their efforts never 
extend beyond their immediate network” (Larsen et al., 2004, p. 66).  
Be it through binds, bonds, or bridges, what is coming out from this study is that 
multiple forces are at work to create and sustain the intra and inter-ethnic, regional, and 
religious engagements that keep Ghana in its conditions of stable negative peace.  The 
findings of this study also affirm that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon that can be 
neatly packaged in dyadic terms into silos of countries that are peaceful or not peaceful; 
neither can peace be assigned absolutist values such as negative or positive. On the 
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contrary, respondents in this study have consistently pointed out the relativism in the 
consideration of Ghana’s peace; a point of view that would be applicable to any other 
country. While aggregated perspectives may permit the classification of a country as 
peaceful or not peaceful, the views that participants in this study have shared emphasize 
the need to keep disaggregated perspectives in mind as well; and to recognize that while a 
nation may not be at war, some of its citizens may well be living in war riven conditions.   
Finally, the findings of this study provide field evidence that the business of 
weaving the fabric of national peace cannot be the work of one actor such as government. 
On the contrary, it is the work of a multiplicity of actors and institutions, working in 
tandem or even in different directions. However, the net effect of their actions is what 
produces the negative equilibrium that constitutes Ghana’s peace. 
The concept of negative equilibrium has been applied in different fields. According 
to Poulson, Mosddeq, an Iranian ideologue, applied the concept in the field of 
international relations and diplomacy to advance a national policy position of neutrality 
and non-alignment in Iran’s search for an independent foothold in the bipolar post World 
War II environment. The policy was designed to prevent both the United States and the 
Soviet Union from having any controlling influence on Iran’s internal affairs (Poulson, 
2005).  In the world of finance and economics, Levy, Levy, and Edry (2003) used the 
term to illustrate how, even in times where economic indicators such as long term real 
interest rates or “…real cost of debt” (Levy, Levy, & Edry, 2003, p. 97) tend toward zero 
or even in the negative, an overall stable macroeconomic environment can still be 
maintained due to the positive trends in other factors such as high inflation.  In the 
context of this study, negative equilibrium defines the situation where the balance of 
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positive and negative forces underpinning Ghana’s peace have operated in such a way 
that the net effect is the maintenance of a state that can neither be described as peaceful 
or not peaceful, as respondents have observed. The relevance of the concept in this study 
rests with the recognition that certain predisposing conditions must exist to ensure that 
the net effect  of the interactions between the negative and positive factors or forces in the 
country do not tilt the country towards a downward spiral into violence or an upward 
movement out of the trap of persistent tensions.  
Systems theory suggests that the progression of states from negative to positive 
peace or vice versa is a function of the conflict management system of the country. 
Conflicts occur within patterns of reactions in which all parties play different roles in 
initiating, sustaining, or resolving them (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). The patterns of 
reactions are products of the  “system stock” (Meadows, 2008, p. 17) or the quantum and 
nature of the stock of shared values, beliefs, and information storage and “…flows within 
the system” (Meadows, 2008, p. 18) that determine the direction and rate of interactions 
between the parties to move the conflict towards violence or peace. Hence, for conflicts 
to degenerate into national level violence, it is necessary that “… the values of nation and 
state become biologically [so] nefarious [as to] lead to war and to the killing of 
innumerable human beings” (von Bertalanffy, 1969 p. 197).  
A converse reaction is necessary for conflicts to resolve positively. In other words, 
in all conflicts a network of processes and actors must work together to influence the 
dynamics of the conflict (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007). In such cases, interactions that 
maintain the status quo or push the conflicts out of control are often perceptible. In other 
words, conflicts are perpetuated, exacerbated, or resolved only when members of the 
257 
 
 
 
conflict system act in some way or the other to keep the chain reactions or feedback loops 
functioning (Wilmot & Hocker, 2007).  By extension, at least one of the parties has to 
initiate change in the conflict pattern, direction, scale, speed, and outcomes. Otherwise, 
the system will keep feeding itself and self-maintain at the current levels of inertia.  
The foregoing suggests that however incapable Ghana’s conflict response 
mechanism may be in breaking the cyclical ebbs and flows of conflict that keeps it in the 
state of unstable peace, there has to be some backstage organizing principles that ensure 
that the unstable equilibrium is kept from tipping over to one end or the other. Hence, the 
search for the elements that constitute the system stock that have enabled Ghana to weave 
and sustain its patchwork of negative peace makes systems theory a valid framework to 
use in this study. It “gives us the freedom to identify root causes of problems and see new 
opportunities” (Meadows, 2008, p. 2) for catalyzing the pattern of reactions away from a 
downward spiral towards violence or an upward one towards positive peace.  This is 
important because of participants’ observation in this study that while Ghana may have 
succeeded to sustain a negative peace equilibrium, current challenges such as the growing 
frustration among the unemployed youth pose new demands that the current system may 
not be able to contain. As respondents noted, the fact that the youth are beginning “…to 
identify what they think are the causes [of their impoverishment) and therefore may 
choose to attack” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014), makes it imperative to delve 
beyond conventional views on how Ghana has managed to pull back from the brink 
(Interview 212, 9 December, 2014).  
Added to the youth question are concerns about the growing distrust of the conflict 
management capacity of institutions of state such as the courts and the Electoral 
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Commission to guarantee justice and hold free and transparent elections respectively 
(Kumbalonah, 2012). The increasing public disenchantment with perceived corruption in 
public offices; state failure to sanction identified cases of corruption amidst the display of 
opulence by some public officials implicated in such acts (Guide, 2014; Peace FM 
Online, 2013); and the emergence of Christian-Muslim disagreements over rights of 
worship in Christian administered schools (Daily Graphic, 2015), among others, all 
constitute flash points for Ghana’s peace. All these cannot guarantee that the state of 
negative equilibrium will not be disturbed and the tilt towards the abyss would not 
happen.  In other words, there is a high risk that the resilience of Ghana’s current conflict 
management systems can be breached, if newer, more effective, and more sustainable 
structures and systems are not evolved to deal with the emerging conflict dynamics.  
As noted previously, conflict management systems are either resilient or brittle 
(Meadows, 2008), depending on their capacity to self-evolve to handle new and 
unexpected situations.  Even though Ghana’s conflict management system may appear 
stable, its ability to meet the new challenges is suspect, as it is far from being resilient. 
Resilience is not the same as static stability. Stability is visible by its constancy or 
changes; resilience is invisible. Hence, a long standing ability to avert violence is not 
necessarily resilience, since it might actually mean doing the same thing over time 
without adaptations to suit changing or newer conditions and contexts. Resilience of a 
system goes beyond the ability to survive from one potentially violent conflict to another. 
It requires the development of the capacity to “learn, create, design, and evolve ever more 
complex restorative structures [which] are self-organizing” (Meadow, 2008, p. 76) 
systems. In order words the ability of a system to adapt to changes is evidence of the 
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complexity and resilience of the system.  This complexity continuously resolves to 
“resilience at a still higher level” (Meadows, 2008, p. 76) or meta-resilience where the 
system of resilience evolves an ability to repair or restore disruptions wrought on a prior 
system of resilience.  
It is against this background that we interrogate how effectively the factors that 
have been identified in this study as underwriters of Ghana’s peace have functioned, 
individually and collectively, to keep the patchwork of peace that the country has from 
fraying and falling apart, despite the cycles of palpable tensions that have taken the 
country to the brink. What individual or networked factors and forces kept the country 
from tipping over when it reached the end of the cliff?  More importantly, why have 
whatever web of factors and forces that have continuously held the stitches of Ghana 
together failed to resolve themselves into higher order initiatives capable of moving 
Ghana to the higher level of positive peace? How capable are these factors and forces for 
self-reinvention to be able to confront and deal with the emerging conflicts centered on 
the youth bulge, religious intolerance, and increasing distrust of the country’s conflict 
regulatory institutions 
This study has identified shared history, culture, and collective mindsets as 
constituent elements of the system stock that have underpinned Ghana’s ability to 
maintain herself in a state of negative peace equilibrium up to now. Can Ghana continue 
to rely solely on these constitutive elements of its conflict management system stock to 
avert a decline into the abyss, or better still, trigger an upsurge that would enable the 
systems to “complexify” and take on the higher level responsibility of managing the new 
challenges more positively? Meadow offers hope in suggesting that “You can use the 
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opportunities presented by a system’s momentum to guide it toward a good outcome” 
(Meadows, 2008, p. 24). Heeding this, the subsequent sections of this chapter focus on 
examining the factors that respondents have identified as important underwriters of 
Ghana’s peace with the view to isolating what aspects of that momentum can be 
strengthened to enable Ghana evolve a more robust conflict management mechanism to 
face the new challenges.  
 
Super Ordinate Categories, Categories, and Subcategories of findings 
 
 
The multiple iterations of the coding and categorization processes used in the 
analysis of the transcripts of the Key Informant Interviews yielded two Super Ordinate 
Categories, with four second level Categories that produced a total of fourteen 
Subcategories. Each subcategory comes with its dimensions as well. Figure 12 depicts the 
knotted relationships between the Super Ordinate Categories, their respective the 
Subcategories, and between the four sets of categories and subcategories. The Cycle of 
Super Ordinate Categories at the middle of the diagram presents the magnetic center that 
pulls together and coordinates all engagements in the various subcategories to ensure 
harmony and synergy. The religious beliefs, values, and worldviews under SOC 1 
permeate the thin line of separation between religion and culture to infuse the lived 
cultural attitudes and behaviors represented under SOC 2.  
The constant interaction between religion and culture constitute the force field 
that constantly tugs at the actions and engagements in the wider action fields within and 
between Categories 1 through four. In this way, religion and culture, working together, 
create the unified field of action in which the centrifugal and centripetal forces balance 
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out their influences to account for how Ghana holds here peace together. Details of how 
these elements pull together to produce the peace that Ghana has are presented in the 
subsequent pages.  
 
Category 1 – Trans Geo-Ethnic Social Bonds 
 
This category groups the various factors that respondents have identified as the threads 
and stitches that have woven together cultural, economic, social, and political bonds 
within and across ethnic, regional, and religious lines throughout Ghana. Four main 
subcategories of factors relating to sanguine and familial bonds; socio-cultural conjugal 
bonds; multilayered bilateral interethnic friendship bonds; and bonds of historical 
politico-military alliances bring together the intra and inter-ethnic forces of unity and 
peace among Ghanaians. The constituent elements of these subcategories are discussed 
below.  
 
Subcategory 1.1 – Sanguine and Family-centered bonds and Safety Nets 
 
Sanguine and extended family bonds are strong strands that serve as the 
foundation for Ghana’s conflict carrying infrastructure. These relationships have very 
strong transactional values at the social, economic, and even political levels. There are 
several dimensions to this subcategory of factors.  
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Figure 12 Relationship of Categories of Factors that Weave Ghana’s Peace 
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Social location as footholds in the public sphere:  
 
Socially, every Ghanaian is rooted in a web of sanguine and quasi-sanguine 
relationships inherent in the intricate network of extended family systems. This web is 
traceable from the nuclear family into which one is born through to the clan, lineage, and 
to the ethnic level. This, in the words of one respondent is the “…basic template of social 
organization” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) across all ethnic groups. And, so 
seriously is this taken that “every Ghanaian belongs to a lineage; very few can say they 
don’t belong to a lineage if you are a Ghanaian” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). 
Indeed, even the slaves and strangers brought into any social setting had to find their 
place in this “… template of our culture and social organization” (Interview 205, 29 
October, 2014). Accordingly, people who find themselves in certain locations as 
“…strangers had to attach themselves to lineages or they constituted themselves into 
groups recognized as outsider lineages … made to belong” (Interview 205, 29 October, 
2014).  
So serious was this need to belong that all ethnic groups developed sophisticated 
means of identifying their own, even if they came from completely different and distant 
communities or even ethnic groups. Tribal marks, the structure of names, and/or recall of 
family/clan taboos were important identifiers. Among the Dagara, recalls of family 
histories, clan totems, clan or family eulogies, or even palmistry are used to determine the 
stranger’s patrilineal or matrilineal lineage and, by extension, social location within the 
host community. Even interethnic relationships are similarly traced, especially among the 
chiefly ethnic groups in the north (Interview 206 29 October, 2014). 
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Social belongingness has both economic and political repercussions. Membership 
of a family creates rights of access to productive resources such as land. It also creates 
rights of ascent to political offices within the traditional authority structure. Hence, giving 
the rationale for this impulsive structuring of society, the respondent cited above 
continued that “you can look at this from the Marxist point of view - because the family 
was property owning, the family has always had the power, political power, first in 
organizing its own people, giving them the basis of sustenance and so forth” (Interview 
205, 29 October, 2014). Hence without family roots, one risked losing out in the political 
and socioeconomic life of the community. In particular, the political relevance of family 
belongingness is of high value as would be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Family Social Safety Nets and the discharged state:  
 
Economically, family ties, even in their extended form provide the only safety net 
for the majority of Ghanaians without stable sources of income and any form of 
insurance. As one participant in the key informants’ interviews in this study put it, in 
“…the extended family system we support one another. So somebody who is not even 
working may not feel it as much as somebody in Europe would feel because the family 
structure is such that if you have and I don’t have you try to take care of me; the little you 
have you share with me…” (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014). Another participant 
illustrated how these family social safety nets constitute the shock absorbers that cushion 
society from state failure when they create economic opportunities for the common good. 
He recounted his own experiences of how he had to bail out a brilliant nephew of his who 
could not go to the university because of the inability of his biological parents to cough 
up the money for his fees and upkeep (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014). His story 
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epitomizes the experiences of most Ghanaians with some economic wherewithal.  
Sizeable portions of their incomes service the payment of fees for nephews and nieces; 
hospital bills for uncles and aunts; or the provision of start-up capital for the petty trade 
of one relative or the other. 
While there is no data available to quantify the contribution of such internal 
family-based financial safety nets and transfers, data from family remittances from 
outside Ghana provide proxy indications of the magnitude and importance of this 
informal economy as a contribution to GDP.  Sophism estimates that of the over $4.5 
billion that Ghana received in 2005 from external transfers, “about 30 percent of this 
amount ($1.5 billion) came from individuals” making transfers to families to support 
consumption and investment needs. The steady increase of the “…. value of migrants’ 
remittances … from $201.9 million in 1990 to $1.55 billion in 2005 [contributed to 
making remittances Ghana’s] … largest foreign exchange earner [and a] more stable than 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)” 
(Sophism, 2006, p. 165).  
In a limited self-report study on Ghanaian perspectives on remittances, it is 
estimated that as much as 25% of the remittances come through informal channels such 
as self-carriage, friends, and relations. These informal transfers are unaccounted for in the 
official records (Sam, Boateng, & Oppong–Boakye, 2013). This means the total 
contribution of private remittances to families could be much higher than recorded. 
Indeed, a larger study of the Ghanaian remittance transactions suggests that 
“…unregistered remittances in Ghana can comprise as much as 65% of total remittances” 
[which would up the Bank of Ghana’s] estimate of US$1 billion …closer to US$3 
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billion” (Mazzucaw, Boom, & Nsowah-Nuamah, 2005, p. 139). In other words, the 
contribution of private remittances to the GDP of Ghana in comparison to ODA and FDI 
could be much higher than estimated.  
Apart from buoying up the national economy, such transfers represent substantial 
let offs on the social safety net responsibilities of governments. Cash savings aside, all 
Ghanaians in want of some financial support for social service needs pile the pressure on 
their family members, not the state, to provide the wherewithal to meet such needs. 
Consequently, the anger that state failure to create the conditions for citizens to earn their 
living could have unleashed in the public domain is contained within the private sphere. 
It is not allowed to spill over into collectivized agitations in the public domain. This 
effectively discharges the state of its responsibilities towards its citizens.  
 
Families, Community, and Ethnic Affiliations as Launch Pads for Access to Political 
Power and the Public Purse 
 
The role of ethnicity in Ghana’s politics has already been sufficiently referenced. 
At the political level, family, lineage and ethnic ties have high political values as well. In 
both the formal and informal sectors, social networks are key to accessing economic 
resources such as land or political power in the traditional authority systems. In the non-
state political arena, chieftaincy succession in all ethnic groups is conveyed exclusively 
either via agnatic descent or matrilineally. Traditionally, one cannot become a chief or a 
queen mother if one does not belong to a family recognized to have the right of ascent to 
the stool or skin. Hence, strict recognition and enforcement of membership of such social 
networks is central not only to one’s ability to aspire to a chiefship, but also the 
conferment of the rights for one’s descendants to so do.  
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The implications of this for the peace in Ghana, especially when considered in 
relation to intermarriages will be highlighted in subsequent sections of this study. For 
now, suffice it to say that the political import of social bonds cannot be underestimated as 
a key underwriter of Ghana’s peace. Indeed, most of the intra-ethnic conflicts in Ghana 
arise from disputes over rights of some individuals to occupy their local stools or skins as 
chiefs.   
In respect of gaining footholds in the modern state system, family ties are 
important. For instance, many families make strategic calculations in the distribution of 
family members across political lines. For most ordinary citizens, the postcolonial state or 
aban in the Akan language, is an external entity that has little to no direct impact on their 
livelihoods. What trickles down by way of jobs and benefits from state-sponsored social 
programs reach those with political access or connections to power holders. For most 
people then, it is logical that the State should be avoided, when one can, as in the case of 
people slipping out of the tax system (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014); or exploited when 
one has access to its resources, as with the case of the plunder of state resources by public 
officeholders (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014; Interview 8, 24 February, 2014; Interview 
9, 26 February, 2014, and Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). What is aban di  (in Akan) i.e. 
what is State property belongs to none; it is a fallen elephant (wob nu lo, in Dagara) and 
anybody who can must chunk off as much meat as his or her resourcefulness permits.  
Under the circumstances, the struggles of families and ethnic groups for inclusion 
in the state systems via representation in government is not a fight for the common good, 
but a struggle for a foothold in the state for the private, and at best family or ethnic gain. 
In sum, politics and political participation are all about “what I can grasp for myself and 
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my family” (Interview 210, 21 November, 2014). It follows the Dagara folks logic that 
bie ma mi be ko yir o di ko saab to wit, it is only when your mother is at the center of 
affairs in the funeral home that you can expect to partake of the funeral meal.  
To explain the operation of this principle in Ghana’s political landscape, KII 
participants cited several examples where family, community, or even ethnic 
participation in political parties is a matter of rational economic choice rather than belief 
in the ideology and programs of a party. To illustrate the point, a participant cited the 
case where in 1992 when the: 
 
democratic system came about and people formed parties,  the brothers 
came together and the senior one said look, there are three strong parties, 
let’s take one each; the senior brother said which party do you want; the 
junior brother take one; you take one; and it’s left with this one, ok I take 
that one. Whoever wins we are in it; the family will not lose; but if we are 
all in one party, we may have problems (Interview 1, 5 February, 2014) 
 
Beyond the family, entire communities or even ethnic groups make similar rational 
choices and cost-benefit calculations in determining how to apportion the investment of 
their political capital – manifest political allegiances and their votes. In such 
computations, benefit maximization go hand in hand with risk minimization, as the 
following example a respondent in this study offered illustrates:  
Somebody told me he went to his home town and everybody there was 
one Party, except one family.  So when he went to find out [he was told] 
that the community selected us to represent their opposite party, so that 
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when the other Party comes they know they have some people they can 
count on” (Interview 201, 21 November 2014).   
 
The foregoing epitomizes the depth to which Ghanaians equate access to political 
power to access to public resources. Chapter 4 cited the perception that being a 
messenger of the party in power is better than being the head of a party in opposition to 
illustrate this same point (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). Manifestation of the operation 
of this principle at the ethno-regional levels is evident in the posturing of political leaders 
across all party lines. Operationalization of the principle became manifest in April 2014, 
when a sitting Member of Parliament from the Ashanti region berated his fellow MPs 
from the same region for failing to use their “huge presence in Parliament” (GNA, 2014, 
p. 1) to influence public policies and programs that would inure to the benefit of their 
constituents. This ordinarily legitimate and harmless concern, however, takes on a 
regionalist or ethnocentric tone when the MP goes on to charge the President of Ghana of 
being discriminatory in imposing what he perceived as a “stupid thing” (GNA, 2014, p. 
1) on the people of his region, instead of in the regions where the President has his 
political strongholds.  
On the reverse side, the President received threats from the Volta Region, 
considered the stronghold of his party, when he reassigned his Chief of Staff to an 
ambassadorial position. The two week ultimatum that the executives of the President’s 
party in the Volta region issued speaks for itself:  
We give the President two weeks ultimatum to reinstate Prosper Bani else 
we will not take part in any party activities…If they dare not reinstate 
Prosper Bani in the next two weeks, we will advise ourselves and they 
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shouldn’t forget that next year is election year and the campaign has just 
started…They shouldn’t forget that if Volta region is peeved, it will be a 
disaster for NDC (Manu-Quansah, 2014; Starr FM, 2014) 
 
In sum, respondents in this study have cited the sanguine and extended family 
bonds as a contributor to the peace that Ghana enjoys. However, the foregoing 
discussions strongly suggest that the national level peace value of these family-based 
social bonds and safety nets rest on the fact that “our culture provides safety nets, and 
those safety nets are holding us together and holding us together in a way in which they 
remind us that there are certain lines that you don’t cross and so people are prepared to 
get to that point and to back off” (Interview 12, 4 March, 2014). Multiple micro-level 
economic and political incentives discussed later would underscore why such safety nets 
constitute effective restraints on Ghanaians from pushing national level conflicts towards 
escalated violence. For the macro-level, however, so crucial is this role of the safety nets 
in partly underwriting the peace of Ghana that one participant suggested the family-based 
social safety nets need to take on more to prop up state failures. In his words, the “family 
systems must come when government is failing to help the social cohesion we are trying 
to build” (Interview 217, 13 December, 2014).  
Some interviewees, on the other hand, have argued that it is precisely this approach 
of supplanting government responsibility with private or family-based solutions that 
encourages state disengagement or abdication from its responsibilities to citizens. In turn, 
state failure reinforces the kind of civic disillusionment, alienation, and disengagement 
from the state that has perpetuated the negative peace that the country enjoys.  It 
constitutes a dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems (Interview 
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4, 12 February, 2014) which aids the displacement of the search for solutions for citizens’ 
economic burdens from the state to private citizens. Essentially it enables the state to 
offload its responsibilities onto the traditional/family social safety net that relies on 
relations and friends who have to absorb the economic burdens of family members who 
don’t have.  
This then shields the state from public anger, making it possible for citizens not to 
interrogate and demand accountability from the state for the use and misuse of public 
resources. Conversely, this approach to managing public dissatisfaction with state failures 
increases pressure on public officeholders, who have access to public resources, to loot 
and share with their family members. This in turn supports the creation and perpetuation 
of the vicious cycle of “negative consensus” (interview 4, 12 February, 2014) behaviors 
which some KII participants have credited with restraining the political elite from 
pushing the buttons of war in Ghana.  
In brief, while the family bonds are effective in keeping networks of individuals 
together as the base fabric on which Ghana’s peace is stitched, these networks have had 
no transformational effect on the public sphere to move the country towards more 
positive and sustainable peace. If anything, the findings of this study are consistent with 
the views of Larsen et. al., (2004) that family-based social safety nets such as those 
captured above are a form of bonding social capital whose preoccupation with self-
preservation of its members do not allow them to reach out and engage the wider society 
in any transformative way. While they may provide a ladder for some of their members to 
reach into the public sphere, their agenda is not to engage and transform the public sphere 
for the common good. Their aim is to see what their own can bring or throw back from 
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the public sphere for their self-preservation. But as the competition for public resources 
becomes fiercer or as the economic challenges push family safety nets beyond their 
tolerance limits, the public anger that has been contained in the private sphere may boil 
over into the public domain without warning.  
 
Subcategory 1.2 Trans-ethnic conjugal bonds and bridges; identity dissolution; and the peace of 
Ghana 
 
 
Webs of Interethnic Marriages 
 
Respondents in this study have made multiple references to the role that 
intermarriages play in sustaining the peace in Ghana. In the world view of most 
communities in Africa, marriage is probably the most important institution because of its 
triple effect of creating bonds, binds, and bridges across otherwise disparate and non-
contiguous groups. Consequently, in the cultures of most ethnic groups in Ghana, the 
customs and rituals for its consummation place a premium on inculcating in the couple 
the fact that the marriage is not between them; the couples are merely the interface points 
for bonds that extend to their respective families, clans, lineages, and ethnic groups. In 
particular, conjugal bonds take on an added peace value as binding cords and bridges 
when the marriages are exogamous i.e. outside the immediate in-group to involve couples 
of different ethnic, regional, or religious backgrounds. This is why respondents in the KII 
have hailed intermarriages in Ghana as the cord that establishes relational bonds between 
families, communities, and entire ethnic groups. In the words of one respondent: 
 
One of the things Ghana has done differently is that there have been large 
inter-marriages.  You get somebody from Ashanti Region who is married 
to somebody from the Volta Region, an Ewe.  You get up to go and fight 
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your in-law? The inter-marriages contributed to a very large extent” 
(Interview 7, 19 February, 2014).  
 
In the view of another respondent, in Ghana:  
 
…we are one of the few countries in which intermarriages go across 
religion/ that you can have a Christian going to church, but the wife is a 
Muslim and the wife is not compelled to come to church but they have 
enjoyed a very healthy relationship and there have been no problem when 
it comes to even their children and when it comes to the in-laws and how 
they relate and how they are able to go about doing things” (interview 12, 
4 March, 2014) there are no visible problems.  
 
Asked how widespread interethnic marriages are, another participant noted that “It 
is increasingly wide-spread, especially against the hitherto rival ethnic groups like the 
Ashanti and Volta Regions” (Interview 10, 27 February, 2014). Another interviewee 
would note that “In Ghana you have a healthy development of inter-ethnic marriages.  
What I experience as a member of the Pan African Parliament is that my colleagues in the 
other African countries tell you … in other African countries there is taboo in inter-
marriages” (Interview 11, March, 2014). A different respondent in the KII highlighted the 
cohesive force of these intermarriages and their capacity to stem the escalation of 
intergroup conflicts, with the observation that, what he has “come to appreciate is the 
whole mix of our interethnic relationships [since] in our country now there is no ethnic 
group that has no relationship with another ethnic group, either through marriage or one 
form of engagement” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014).  
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This reality, in the view of the participant, has cushioned Ghanaians against the 
excesses of conflict because “…anybody who wants to become violent would have a 
thought in his or her mind that you have relations in that group so why should that group 
become a target. That has kept us abbey and I we have been able to manage it through 
that channel” (Interview 13, 5 March, 2014). Echoing the same sentiments, another 
participant pondered what would happen should he decide to participate in such a 
national level conflict. In his view, “Either I am fighting against my in-laws, brothers-in-
law, sisters-in-law and so on and so forth etc.” (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014) or other 
close relations and friends. Yet another would buttress the point with this personal 
example: 
 
one of my sisters married in a Mamprusi family so I have a nephew and a 
niece who are from a marriage that relates to the Mamprusis. So ... I 
cannot do something to hurt my own nephew; so my mother might be 
from one side [of the conflict] , but what about my nephew and my niece? 
What about my sister who married on that side? “(Interview 12, 4 March, 
2014) 
In brief, intermarriages among Ghanaians have created a wide web of relationships 
that constitute an effective bond between families, clans, and ethnic groups.  It is 
for this reason that Ghanaians do not look strictly at where they are and create 
fortresses around themselves; they understand that in one way or the other they are 
related with one area or the other in the country.  Reinforcing that argument, 
especially in respect of political conflicts at the national level, another respondent 
provided the following illustration:  
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Let’s take for example if you take Ewes and may be Ashantis, you may 
say they don’t get on well, but if you look at the intermarriages that have 
gone on between the two, it is very high; so whenever there is a problem, 
you can get somebody from the Eweland who has some relations at the 
Ashanti side and vice versa and it cuts across, north-south, east and west, 
it’s like that; and that is also helping. That’s how I see it; that is keeping 
people from fighting; otherwise looking at our situation, the elections that 
we have had, these things would have happened, but always we have 
people to intervene. (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).  
 
Intercultural Osmosis 
 
 
The foregoing highlights how the intricate web of social relations that 
intermarriages weave in Ghana serves as an important foundational piece for the peace of 
the country. However, intermarriages are not unique to Ghana. Countries like Burundi 
and Rwanda that have protracted violent interethnic conflicts also have long and deep 
histories of interethnic marriages. The questions that Ghana’s presumed exceptionalism 
poses in respect of intermarriages are:  why have intermarriages seemingly worked to 
create and/or sustain peace in Ghana but failed elsewhere such as Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, among others? Why didn’t the intermarriages between Hutus and Tutsis 
in Burundi and Rwanda attenuate their conflicts and prevent the genocides and other 
forms of violent interethnic engagements? What is there in the Ghanaian situation that 
makes it different from the other cases?  
Respondents have already made references to how intercultural exchanges among 
the ethnic groups in Ghana have led to the blending of beliefs, values, and world views 
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that have made interethnic accommodation and incorporation possible.  As one of them 
noted in respect of the dissolution of cultural differences:  
Yes, we have many ethnic groups but I don’t see that their cultural 
practices are in conflict with each other. […]I don’t see strong differences 
in the cultures of the different ethnic groups in Ghana. You can look, we 
defer to authority, we defer to people on the basis of age, women are in the 
background, we resolve our differences through arbitration, through an 
elder. I’d say that the cultural practices, the values, the elements of the 
different cultures are similar (Interview 3, 7 February, 2014). 
 
The intercultural borrowing and sharing that made this cultural blending had a 
wider significance, especially among the larger ethnic groups, especially the Ashantis.  
As one respondent recalled:  
…there was this mesh that was already in place through which people 
were exchanging goods, contacting persons, etc, and carrying on cultural 
borrowings. It is very important to me to have been told in my own ears by 
an Ashanti who said that look the Ashanti culture is a composite. When 
the Asantehene sits and they are bring out the treasures, I told you I sat 
with this Okyeam – he pointed to me and said “Wei y di fir Denkyira na 
baa y/ Wei,  y Dagomba fo4; wei fir ha, wei fir Dormaa, wei fir so and 
so” (to wit, this came from Denkyirah; that one from the Dagombas; and 
that from Dormaa…) but having borrowed, they put them together and 
created a synthesis that is unique in profile and content you see. So there 
wasn’t only material exchanges, exchanges of ideas, exchanges of norms, 
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exchanges of proverbs, exchanges of all kinds of things, political ideas.  
Ashanti itself, the structure of Ashanti was borrowed. It is the Akwamu 
people who went and taught them (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). 
 
The recollection of this historical borrowing from other ethnic groups for the 
construction of the architecture of the Ashanti Kingdom has a sobering effect as it makes 
the Ashantis mindful, and humble about their lack of ethnic or cultural purity. At the 
same time, the other ethnic groups can find space within the Ashanti culture to relate with 
them, as they see bits and pieces of their own culture and history in the Ashanti 
chieftaincy architecture. Either way, the intercultural borrowing leads to the narrowing of 
cultural boundaries, and so creates spaces for incorporation of members of different 
ethnic groups into other cultures.   
 
Ethnic Identity Dissolution from intermarriages 
 
The cross identity marriages and the intercultural borrowings and sharing of values 
have profound effects on ethnic identity maintenance for most groups in Ghana. Several 
respondents have already pointed out how the uniqueness of Ghana’s systems of 
intermarriages is embedded in the open systems approaches to intercultural engagements 
across all ethnic groups in the country. At the material and artistic levels, high levels of 
cultural exchanges have blurred identity distinctions from causal observers. As one 
respondent in the KIIs noted: 
…a lot of Ashantis when they are dancing the damba festival you won’t 
realize that they are Ashantis; the Ewes when they are dancing an Ashanti 
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dance, you won’t believe it; Y nara a sa si ni” is a song that was 
composed by an Ewe, not an Ashanti, Ephraim Amu.  So all of that, more 
or less weaves us together” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).  
 
The identity blending of Ghanaians alluded to here, however, goes beyond the 
artistic realm. At the social level, Ghanaians in principle self-classify by the ethnic 
lineage of either their father or mother. However, cross ethnic marriages have led to 
identity dissolution, as it blends and blurs the ethnic identities of the offspring of cross-
identity marriages. We have referenced how one’s location in a social structure is 
important for the Ghanaian. However, children of cross identity marriages often have 
difficulty finding their loci in either of their parents’ identity group.  
Several respondents shared personal stories of their own mixed ethnic backgrounds, 
as well as, those of prominent Ghanaian citizens, current and past, to illustrate the point. 
But the complexity of the identity question is best illustrated by two out of several of the 
examples that came through in the interviews. A participant in the KII gave her life 
example to illustrate the complexity of this web of relationship and its restraining force in 
times of conflicts. Responding to a question on how Ghana’s state of economic 
development might have influenced the country’s experience of peace, she acknowledged 
the effect of development on peace, but hastened to state that: 
…I would say it is intermarriages and I will give myself as an example. 
My mother was a Ga, she married an Ashanti, so I am half Ga, half 
Ashanti. So that’s why when you asked me where I came from it was 
difficult for me to answer. I am married to somebody who is half Ewe, 
half Ga-Adangbe. Our children therefore are Ga, Ga-Adangbe, Ashanti, 
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and Ewe. So for example if there should be a war between Ashantis and 
Ewes it’s an issue for me; it’s difficult to be part of such a war or conflict. 
 
Figure 13 maps the complexity of relationships that emerges from the scenario 
given above. It also illustrates the increasingly irreversible dissolution of ethnic identities 
arising from intermarriages, as the relationships move from heterogeneity, through 
hybridity to miscegenation. Step 1 in the relationship modeling represents ethno-cultural 
heterogeneity. The couples on either side retain their ethnic identities. It is their mutually 
sustained love that provides the only social capital or bond between their respective 
families and ethnic groups. It’s a temporary bond as it can, in principle, easily be reversed 
through one form or other of the dissolution of the marital bonds such as separation, 
divorce, or death.   
Step 2 begins the irreversibility of the interethnic bonding process. Once the hetero-
ethnic marriage produces an offspring, ethnic hybridity kicks in, as the offspring of both 
sides becomes an incorporation of the ethnicity of both parents. When step 3 involves 
marriage between two hybrids, as is the case in the story above, then ethnic 
miscegenation is taken to its highest level. The offspring from such a marriage take on 
split identities across four cultures, at least.   Interethnic relationships become further 
complicated if either of the hybrid parents have siblings who also have mixed marriages. 
Then the network of cousins, aunties, uncles, and grandpas and grandmas spiral out of 
control, literally. When miscegenated offspring have children of their own with other 
hybrid or miscegenated persons, as a result of Step 4, identity dissolution is taken to a 
higher level yet.  
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Figure 13 Mapping of Identity Dissolution Through Intermarriages 
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have enough diluted identity and social bonds not to feel so strongly attached to the 
accepted nominal group. It will be difficult such a person to delink himself or herself 
from the other constituent elements of his or her ethnic identity. This is the dilemma that 
the respondent above expressed when she found it difficult to say where she belonged.   
The second case we cite illustrates further the complexity of the spiraling relations 
and identity dissolution for offspring of mixed marriages. It relates to a respondent who 
indicated that of the family of four boys and one girl, only the female married within their 
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ethnic group. All the four boys have wives from four different ethnic groups scattered 
around the country – one from the Upper West Region, the second from the Western 
Region, the third from the Northern Region, and the fourth wife in the family has roots in 
the Volta Region. The question that arises is – what is the ethnic group of their children? 
Figure 14 presents a schema of the complexity of the relationships that this family now 
lives with. Actual ethnic groups are altered to protect the respondent’s identity. 
The immediate and practical impact of such multilateral intermarriages and their 
implications for the peace that Ghana experiences are best captured in the words of one 
respondent who observed that, when you want to see the complexity at play:  
...all you have to do is to sit and listen to the obituary notices being read 
these days [on radio or television] and you will wonder:  Hajia so and so is 
dead and who are the chief mourners:  Nana Kofi Ankobea [an Akan), 
Togbe Dzasraku [an Ewe] through marriages, there is intermarriages; we 
are marrying and so  I call marriage as a chain – we are linking so that I 
may be an Ashanti but I may have relatives there in the Volta Region, 
there in Northern Ghana, in different places.  So I think that dimension of 
two ethnic groups really confronting each other is over-hyped, as far as I 
am concerned” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). 
 
The term Hajia is a title for a Moslem woman who has performed the Hajj. She is 
presumably from the north, as most Moslems are. However, she has an Akan and an Ewe 
chiefs and their relations as the principal bereaved persons for her funeral. This one 
funeral therefore brings together people from different ethnic, regional, and religious 
backgrounds.   
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Figure 14 – Multiple Identity Dissolution and Miscegenated Generations  
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Respondents cited several other living examples of the capacity to invoke these 
conjugal relationships as instruments for peace at the local and national levels. In the case 
of the interethnic conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana, for instance, a respondent 
observed that: “If you look at the Konkomba-Dagomba war you would see that one of the 
things that has actually brought the tempo of conflicts [down] is the intermarriages. The 
current regent in Yendi (a Dagomba); the mother is a Konkomba; his wife is a 
Konkomba, can you imagine this man getting up and saying my people, Dagombas, go 
and fight Konkombas?” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).  
At the national level, the marriage between Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings 
(an Akan royal) to Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, who has an Ewe mother and considered 
an indigene of the Volta Region, was repeatedly cited. This marriage established, 
politically, a significant relational bridge between the Akans and Ewes, who are known to 
usually belong to opposing political divides since independence. Given the tradition that 
one marries into a family, clan, lineage, and even the entire ethnic groups, Akans see and 
have accepted former President Rawlings as their “Akonta” - their brother-in law. Hence, 
in the run to the 2000 general elections, when it was feared that then President Rawlings 
might not hand over power if his party lost the selections, the Akan-based main 
opposition party invoked this relationship and churned out their campaign message on the 
slogan that “Akonta b si fom” to wit, – “Our brother-in-law shall come down or our 
brother in law shall give up power”.  
The phrase did not only become an electioneering slogan for the opposition party; 
it became, what would be termed today, a viral peace message that assured Ghanaians 
that the long ruling brother-in-law from the predominantly Ewe-preferred party, the 
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National Democratic Congress, shall hand over power peacefully, presumably to his 
brothers-in-law in the New Patriotic Party,  – an Akan-based party. The slogan did not 
only serve to put a light emotional touch to the campaigns; more importantly it averted 
recourse to language that could otherwise have demonized Rawlings and his party, and 
set the stage for a veritable political showdown. For there were indeed signs that 
Rawlings was not prepared to hand over power (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).  
 
Subcategory 1.3 Historical Politico-Military Alliances, Interethnic Friendship Bonds, and Peace 
 
Bonds of Interethnic Friendships and Joking Relationship 
 
The third subcategory of trans-ethnic bonds derives from historical alliances and 
friendship arrangements that continue to underpin interethnic relationships in the 
postcolonial state.  Respondents in this study cited interethnic joking relationships and 
their contribution to peacebuilding. Examples of the joking relationships between the 
Kokombas and Bimobas; Dagombas and Moshis;, Dagartis and Frafras;. the Gonjas and 
Chokosis, among others were mentioned (Interview 7, 19 February, 2014; Interview 206 
29 October, 2014). These relationships are peculiar to the ethnic groups in the north. 
A sizeable body of literature exists already on this subject (see for example 
Zartman, 2001; Freedman, 1977; Hammond, 1964). In the context of this study, however, 
a respondent narrates how even security officers of the state can invoke such 
relationships as instruments of conflict management. However, the literature to date on 
joking relationships in Ghana focuses on describing what it is, with little drilling into how 
and why it works; or under what circumstances it works best. In the example that a 
respondent gave in this study provides pointers to how this tool can be used even in a 
state-centric conflict management framework. As the respondent recounts, the 
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Commander of a Police contingent dispatched to intervene in an intercommunal conflict 
in Zaare, in the Upper East region used the tool to great effect as narrated below:  
…at that time the Police Commander arrived at the scene and his police 
officers were in riot gear and they had gone full force to arrest and when 
they were in this area…very casually the Commander said, aahh, I never 
knew they are just Frafras fighting over dog meat. Useless people, and 
they have wasted my afternoon […] it immediately came across to them 
[the feuding parties] that this person must be a Dagao and they all started 
saying ‘useless man how can this man be a Police Commander’; and right 
there and then the flames were dowsed…(Interview 12 – 4 March 2014). 
 The example reflects the continued relevance of joking relationships beyond the 
traditional settings. It points to the potency inherent in such indigenous conflict 
management practices that can be and have been used as instruments for resolving 
conflicts within and between ethnic groups, especially in the north of Ghana. Above all, it 
gives a concrete example of how it has been used in a specific state-centric conflict 
management context. However, as indicated under Chapter 6 below, further research is 
required to clearly delineate the possibility frontiers for incorporating these indigenous 
conflict resolution mechanisms in such state-managed contexts. Such research should 
provide opportunities to fathom how and why such indigenous practices work and to 
what extent they can be added to the repertoire of tools for peacebuilding practitioners. 
 
Historical Political and Military Pacts 
 
In discourses on interethnic relationships in Ghana, not much is said about the 
existence of networks of historical politico-military bonds and alliances between ethnic 
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groups that continue to influence their collective behaviors in the postcolonial state. 
Several ethnic groups in Ghana lay claims to having established and managed kingdoms 
prior to the colonial encounter. The demands of survival and consolidation of their 
political spaces in an ever hostile pre-colonial environment warranted the creation of 
mutual defense cooperation agreements between some of the larger and powerful ethnic 
groups in the country. While some of these pacts were contracted in peace times, others 
were sequels to wars between the contracting ethnic groups.   
In an era where military expeditions were largely by foot, the only means for 
institutionalizing rapid response mechanisms in furtherance of the defense pacts was to 
station military outposts in each other’s backyards. Hence, among the Dagombas of 
northern Ghana, this phenomenon manifests today in the presence of the Kambose unit, 
headed by the Kambon-Naa, who are officially the musketeers of the Dagbon military set 
up, in the smallest village chiefdom to the apical skin in Yendi. The word Kambose and 
its derivatives such as Kambon-Naa, is the name northerners give to the Ashantis. 
Accordingly, the Kambose units were initially made up of the Kambose people or people 
from Ashanti origin that were posted to Dagbon to support the military structure of that 
kingdom.  
To date, the Anufos or Chokosis of Chereponi - a unique linguistic group in the 
north that is akin to Akan – trace their origins to Nzema, in the Western Region. They 
were posted to Dagbon as a military detachment of the Ashanti army. A similar Nzema 
outpost is reported to exist in the northern parts of the Volta Region. In reverse, Bantama, 
the nerve center of Kumasi’s economic and political activity, is reputed to be the home of 
the immigrant Dagomba military detachment that was attached to the Asantehene’s 
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military and administrative structure. The name “Bantama” is said to be a corruption of 
the Dagomba phrase “Mba nti ma” which means “my father gave it to me” (Interview 
205, 29 October 2014). It was used in reference to the parcel of land that the reigning 
Asantehene at the time of their arrival gave to the Dagomba permanent delegation to 
settle in Kumasi. In the words of a respondent who narrates a story he was told in an 
interview with the Tumu Kuoro (chief):  
…when they (the Ashantis) established Kumasi; for the security of 
Kumasi, these northern elements who had fought with Osei Tutu, were 
given that whole area to be close to him; and Bantama, is virtually the 
center of Kumasi; the traditional Kumasi was given to the Dagombas. So 
from that time, they have always declared, Baa nti ma, baa nti ma; and if 
you look at the people […] Bantimahene who died I think during Opoku 
Ware’s reign was very tall; and you look at some of their chiefs [very tall 
as well] (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). 
 
In Ewe tradition, Okomfo Anokye, the spiritual founder of the Ashanti kingdom is 
claimed to be an Ewe from Nortsie, who became the spiritual founder of Ashanti. On the 
reverse side, the Ashantis seem to have impacted, militarily, on the formation of the 
chieftaincy structure among the Ewes. Although Amenumey (1986) disputes it, Tsikata 
and Seini (2004) believe otherwise and point out that the Ewe “…chieftaincy titles which 
are linked to battle formations such as “dusifia” and “miafiaga” of the Anlo state, for 
example, are distinctly Akan (Tsikata & Seini, 2004, p. 15).  
Be it as it may, the exchange of permanent military detachments induced cultural 
and biological integrations that have come to further dilute the ethnic purity of Ghanaians 
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across board. To buttress this view, a respondent recalled an interview with R. P. Baffuor, 
one time Vice Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
and “…an icon of the Elmina elite [who proudly queried the respondent] “…do you know 
that I am of Dagomba origin, ancestry?” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). The story 
unravels that as part of the military pact between the Dagombas and the Ashantis, a 
Dagomba princess was given in marriage to the Asantehene. However, rather than keep 
the princess to himself, the Asantehene in turn gave the princess to a royal in Elmina, 
then the trade hub between the Europeans and the local people. In this way, a tripartite 
pact came into existence.  
While Ashanti’s friendship with Dagomba was the product of a mutual defense 
pact; its friendship with coastal peoples had a militaro-economic objective. First, the pact 
with the people of the coast ensured access to the arms and armaments from the white 
man, as well as, opportunities of trade with the Dutch. Second, the Elmina connection 
had a military purpose because the word baffuor in Akan translates into the military 
equivalence of Field Marshall (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).  In other words, the 
princess was given to the Asantehene’s coastal commander, ostensibly to retain his 
loyalty. This marriage of the princess became the thread that tied the knots of friendship 
between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis in the center, and then between the 
Ashantis and the people of Elmina on the southern coast. Later, through similar 
intermarriages cited in the previous chapter, the Anlos to the Southeast would be added to 
the alliance. The militaro-economic pact that emerged would be known as the Kotoko 
Alliance in which:  
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…you have Asante Kotoko, you have Dagomba Kotoko, you have Edina 
Kotoko, and you have Anlo Kotoko – the kotoko alliance – and these 
were alliances that were created to give military support but more 
importantly to enable the citizens of these different ethnic groups to feel 
free in Kumasi. So if an Elmina person went to Kumasi to misbehave, 
and I will tell you an Elmina person can even go and sleep with the wife 
of the Asantehene, he cannot be killed […] that is the essence of it. So an 
Nzema man, Elmina man can stand in Kumasi and even abuse the 
Asantehene and if they touch him and he says “mi y Nzema ni” (I am 
an Nzema) that is it. It is a privileged relation (Interview 205, 29 October 
2014).  
 
While the relationship between the Dagombas in the north and the Ashantis is the one 
that has currency in the literature, other prominent ethnic groups had similarly had similar 
mutual diplomatic relationships with Ashanti. As a respondent recalls, this persisting 
historical relationship dismantles security and protocol barriers between the royals of the 
north and the Asantehene. In this instance, a Mamprugu chief is reported to have told the 
respondent that:  
… oh when I go to Kumasi and walk into the Asantehene’s palace, I walk 
in straight and talk to him. I don’t need anybody to direct me because they 
feel there is some historical linkage between them, the chiefs; generally 
they feel there is some historical linkage and they support each other one 
way or the other and they also think that the Nayiri [paramount chief of 
the Mamprusis] is recognized by the Asantehene as a prominent chief 
290 
 
 
 
from the olden days back, linked up to today …. (Interview 206, 29 
October 2014).  
Figure 15 illustrates the spatial structure of the alliance. So strong are these 
alliances to date that “…when the Asantehene dies one of the first groups of people who 
should be informed are the Zongo community, the Muslim community [descendants of 
the Dagomba];  they have to be informed to offer prayers before (stresses) the 
announcement is made” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014). This shows the depth of the 
persisting pre-colonial interethnic relationships arrangements that continue to serve the 
purpose of peace and unity in Ghana today. Similar courtesies exist between chiefs of 
some groups in the Volta Region and the Asantehene’s palace, even if it is not to the 
same elaborate extent (Interview 14, 5 March, 2014).  
The conflict management relevance of this historical relationship between the 
ethnic groups would come to the fore, when the government had to turn to the 
Asantehene, the  Yagbon Wura, Paramount Chief of Gonja and the Nayiri, Paramount 
Chief of Mamprugu, to “find a traditional way to resolving the [long standing 
chieftaincy] conflict” (Ghana News Agency, 2004, n.p) among the Dagombas which led 
to the beheading of the Paramount Chief of Dagbon and at least 40 others in March 2002. 
The configuration of the Committee of Eminent Chiefs charged with the resolution of this 
conflict took into account the historical relationships between the four ethnic groups i.e. 
the Ashantis, the Dagombas, the Gonjas, and the Mamprusis. In particular, the 
appointment of the Asantehene as the Chair of this Committee reflected the governments 
knowledge of and appreciation of the relevance and the place of historical ties that bind 
ethnic groups in intermediating in matters of state that lie within the realms of history, 
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culture, and traditions. While the Committee of Eminent Chiefs is still struggle to keep 
the mediation efforts on track and moving toward a resolution, its existence per se has 
provided a safe and more neutral space for the feuding cousins to discuss their differences 
and seek ways to resolve the conflict. The centrality of the Asantehene in this process 
lends credence to the continuing relevance of the Kotoko Alliance, depicted in Figure 15.  
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Figure 15: Map of Spatial Connections of the Kotoko Alliance 
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Beyond the Dagbon crisis, the alliance remains an effective reference point in 
interethnic relationships among the ethnic groups that belong to it. As respondent 
summed it up, the contemporary peace value of these relationships resides in the fact that 
“… when you take the knife to say that you are going to kill an Ashanti or you are going 
to kill a Fanti or you are going to kill a Ga, (pause) in your own consciousness, whom are 
you going to kill? Probably your brother or your ancestral relations; and this is very 
significant in the consciousness of Ghanaians” (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).  
While this “…historical matrix gives us an indication of why we are so bonded” 
(Interview 205, 29 October 2014), how much of this historical memory actually 
percolates into contemporary political behavior and public policy is hard to quantify right 
now. For one thing, this history is not actively taught in the schools. Therefore, it is 
doubtful that the younger generations of Ghanaians, who are increasingly taking over 
political leadership in the country, have this historical knowledge to guide their 
interethnic engagements in private and in the public sphere.   
At the very least, the highly polarized atmosphere that has characterized Ghana’s 
politics since independence suggests that although the binding, bonding, and bridging 
force of this history may continue to be powerful at the subconscious level, it definitely 
has lost its potency in the public domain. The political battle over who rules Ghana at the 
dawn of independence was fought between sons and daughters of the five members of the 
Kotoko alliance – Kwame Nkrumah, an Nzema leading the CPP; the Danquah-Busia 
coalition led the predominantly Akan based NLM; the Northern Peoples Party had 
prominent Dagombas in its forefront; and the Togoland Congress had Anlo champions as 
well. One point of research would be why this history, which must have been more 
294 
 
 
 
current in the pre-independence era than now, failed to unite the Kotoko Alliance in the 
fight for independence. In more recent times, why has the alliance not worked to tone 
down the increasingly vitriolic political discourse in the country? Why have the Ewe-
centric NDC and the Akan-centric NPP become the dominate features of the political 
map and colors of Ghana? 
 
Category 2 – Bonds and Bridges from Education, and Associational Life 
 
Subcategory 2.1 – Binding and Bonding Effects of Boarding Schools  
 
In Africa, education has been recognized as a unifier of the continent’s multiethnic 
citizenry. Azam (1999) argues that the unifying force of education and its power to create 
and maintain a culture of peace on the continent rests in the state’s capacity to purchase 
ethnic loyalties through the cooptation and corruption of the urbanized elite.  According 
to this view:  
Not less important is the fact that sending educated members of the ethnic 
group to the city, via the education system, is a means to ensure political 
participation for the group. In peaceful African countries, a sophisticated 
system of inclusion of the educated people from the different ethnic 
groups in various organisations (students unions, single party, etc.) has 
evolved, whereby the state purchases loyalty from the groups through their 
educated urbanite ‘delegates’ (Azam, 1999, p. 2). 
 
In consonance with this view, available literature and responses from both the 
quantitative and Key Informant Interviews of this study strongly credit Ghana’s 
educational system, especially the boarding school system, with the peace of the country. 
As one literature source noted: 
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Perceived ethnic bias, while not necessarily an illusion, has been 
overestimated. Ethnically diverse, Ghanaians have managed this diversity 
quite well. It is widely believed that decades of interethnic marriages and 
integration in boarding schools at young ages have lessened the role and 
impact of ethnicity in the political discourse of Ghana (Arthur, 2009, p. 
70). 
 
According to this line of thought, so outstanding is the contribution of the boarding school system 
to Ghana’s peace that it has become the envy of other countries in West Africa. As another source 
noted  “Even some fellow West Africans believe that a similar system may have altered 
the tragic script of their own country's political history” (Sakyi-Addo, p. 2). For a 
respondent in this study, however, Ghana’s exceptional peaceful nature within Africa is 
such that: 
Nobody has really understood what it is except for the neighborliness and 
the intermarriage and the classmatism and those things that [have made] 
the networks … so strong that when you are talking about something you 
realize the next person you are talking to is your relative (Interview 9, 26 
February, 2014). 
 
This, in the view of respondents, is because the boarding system has enabled people 
from all over the country to get to know each other.  Most professionals are school mates, 
dormitory/house mates, or classmates. If not, they know someone who shares a 
professional or educational affiliation with another person. This leads to the emergence of 
various forms of formal and informal networks that hold society together. In brief, 
Ghana’s educational system, especially the boarding schools provided the spaces for 
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increased cross identity interactions which led to reduction in identity-based prejudice 
and stereotyping. It also facilitated cross-identity lifelong engagements such as marriages. 
While the contribution of Ghana’s educational system, especially the boarding 
school system to Ghana’s peace cannot be denied, the subject requires some 
interrogation. Boarding schools are not unique to Ghana’s educational heritage. It is a 
legacy of the British educational system that was bequeathed to its colonies, including 
Australia, Canada, the United States, Sierra Leone, and other countries in Africa. Indeed, 
in Sierra Leone’s pioneering role as the hub for western education in West Africa, the 
church and the state joined hands in a rare show of partnership “…to create separate 
villages [to host boarding schools]  as a key strategy for inculcating European and 
Christian values into children ‘untainted’ by the influence of their parents” (Smith, 2009, 
p. 27). The same principle of isolating children from the corrupting influence of their 
pagan communities informed the establishment and operations of boarding schools in the 
Gold Coast, and subsequently, other parts of that is Ghana today (C.K. Graham, 1971, 
2013).  
While boarding schools have played an important role in the education of Africa’s 
political and civil elite, their influence as forces of social cohesion builders is not shared 
in all contexts. Indeed, the record of experiences with boarding schools in all these 
countries is not particularly benign. On the contrary “…boarding school experiences [in 
all these countries are noted to be] particularly brutal” (Smith, 2009, p. 28) with 
intergenerational traumatic experiences that have scarred lives and societies. Why then is 
Ghana’s experience of boarding school an exceptional cohesive factor when the same 
system failed to confer similar effects on other countries that ran similar systems?  
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Second, while the contribution of boarding schools to the creation of a national gel 
of civil, religious, and political elite in Ghana is not in doubt, the instrumental role 
assigned to in respect of Ghana’s peace, it is questionable on a number of grounds. The 
2010 Housing and Population census in Ghana, the most recent in the series, reports that 
28.5% of Ghana’s population 15 years or older have never been to school. Additionally, 
11.6% of the same age category had only a primary school education; while 22.5% had 
an education to the Junior Secondary, or Junior High School. Another 13.6% had only 
been to school up to the Middle School.  All of these are the terminal points for Ghana’s 
basic education system. In general, except for a very few emerging private basic schools 
that offer boarding facilities, all pre-second cycle institutions in Ghana are non-residential 
schools. This means that at least 76.2% of Ghana’s current population has never been 
through a boarding school system (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, pp. 61,  Table 22a).  
Access to post primary educational institutions was much lower in the pre and 
immediate post-independence era than now. In 1963, for instance, Foster estimated that 
the 59 public schools in Ghana could only take in about 14,000 students. Hence, “…the 
chances of any student who enter[ed] middle school ultimately to enter a public 
secondary school [was] no more than 5%” (Foster, 1963, p. 155). Hurd and Johnson 
would even put the chances of progression from basic to secondary school lower in their 
1964 study when they noted that “…less than 2% of the output of the educational system 
was passing through secondary schools” (Hurd & Johnson, 1967, p. 60).  Fewer still will 
progress to the universities and other tertiary institutions where boarding facilities are 
offered. For this reason, therefore, attribution of the pervasive influence of a culture of 
peace in Ghana to its boarding school system may be an overstatement, given the small 
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percentage of the population who had direct experience of boarding schools to have 
established the kinds of alumni and alumnae relationships considered as the educational 
threads that weave Ghana’s peace.  
In sum, while Ghana’s boarding school system, and by extension, the educational 
system has been credited with being a major contributor to the peace of the country, 
further research is required to solidly root the suppositions in evidence. For instance, in 
the absence of direct policy intentionality in the set up and use of boarding schools as the 
spindles for drawing out the threads of relationships that weave Ghana’s peace, the 
boarding school systems can only be said to have provided an enabling medium for some 
pre-existing, innate or acculturated, peace-centric traits to sprout and grow. Therefore, 
Ghana’s boarding school system may have been one of the seedbeds, not the seed for 
Ghana’s peace.  
Similarly, given the lack of consistency in the structure and functioning of past 
students’ associations, the contributions that old boyism, girlism or classmatism make to 
the politics, and by extension Ghana’s peace, is more coincidental than intentional. 
Again, the fact that these associations may have influenced Ghana’s peace may be due to 
the existence of some predisposing factors that stimulate and sustain the mobilization of 
peaceable political constituencies out of associations of past students of any school. 
Consequently, the predictive value of its replication in other settings cannot be 
established. 
At any rate, the evidence so far on the contribution of education to peace in Ghana 
seems to indulge in post hoc attribution of intent. A couple of issues stand out. First, 
Kwame Nkrumah has been widely credited in this study and in other literature with the 
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introduction of the boarding school concept and its use as an instrument for national 
integration and cohesion building. However, questions that have not been interrogated in 
the literature include: did Kwame Nkrumah actually create boarding schools with the 
intent of making them instruments of interethnic unity, marriage, and peaceful 
coexistence? Was there ever a deliberate policy objective to use boarding schools as 
melting pots for blending together the disparate ethnic groups in the country or was the 
boarding school concept simply a pragmatic solution to the pressing challenge of 
accelerating access to secondary and tertiary education?  
Available evidence suggests that Kwame Nkrumah’s role in the establishment of 
boarding schools in Ghana has been overstated in the interviews of this study, as well as, 
in other literature in the public domain. Boarding schools existed before the emergence of 
Kwame Nkrumah on Ghana’s political scene (Bening, 1990b; C. K. Graham, 1971; 
Odamtten, 1978). Kwame Nkrumah merely adopted the concept, as a matter of political 
and economic expediency, to facilitate the expansion of access to post primary education 
under his accelerated education program. But as has been pointed out above, even then, 
the impact of boarding schools on Ghana’s peace may have been over extended, given 
the relatively small percentage of the population that had the privilege of going through 
boarding schools, which were mainly operational at the post-primary level of education.  
In brief, however laudable the accidental contribution of boarding schools to the 
building of social cohesion among the educated elite of Ghana is, there is a great risk of 
over attribution of Ghana’s peace to this single phenomenon as the gel that binds Ghana 
together. The risk lies in the complacent basking in an accidental occurrence without a 
more intentional capitalization of the opportunities it offers deepening and expanding the 
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cohesive strands that the educational system offers. More intentional approaches are 
required to fully understand how and why boarding schools in Ghana have been 
successful as social gels when this has not been the experience in other countries. 
Unearthing the elements that make Ghana’s boarding schools fertile grounds for 
nurturing social cohesion will take the discourse beyond anecdotal speculations.  
 
Subcategory 2.2 Post educational associational life and peace in Ghana 
 
Another area in which Ghana’s educational system has been credited with 
contributing to peace in the country is its creation and sustenance of associational life 
beyond the walls of the boarding schools in particular, and other educational institutions 
in general. Alumni and alumnae associations, popularly known as Oldboyism, girlism or 
old/past students’ associations are particularly cited as providing the locus for sustained 
engagements, friendships, and consensus building in the public sphere.  There is no 
gainsaying that Old boys and Old Girls Associations have social, economic and even 
political value. They serve as the social and political capital that members leverage to 
advance their individual or collective agendas within the public sphere.  
However, whether or not this was the express aim for these associations is unclear. 
Similarly, the establishment of past students’ associations was never intended as 
networks for political mobilization, much less as an instrument of peace in the country.  
For instance, there is no evidence of state-level political agendas ever being designed and 
executed by members of any alumni or alumnae association. The intent in the formation 
of these associations was for the preservation of social and friendship ties and networks 
gained while in a common place of learning. Beyond that, the associations were designed 
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to maintain some connection with the Alma Mater, as evidenced by the organized visits 
to and donations members make to their alma mater occasionally.  
Indeed, questioning whether they are actually a force for the good of the country, 
some respondents have argued that the concepts of Old boyism/girlism create bonds of 
alumni and alumnae of schools which have become associated with political and 
economic patronage and cronyism. Well-connected past students of older and better 
endowed schools create and distribute opportunities of political and economic access to 
their members. In other words, the past students’ associations are no more than the social 
capital bonds that Larsen et al (2004) observed to be only good in promoting the private 
and survival needs of their members with little to no capacity for impacting on the public 
sphere.  
Buying into the negative consensus theory that a prior respondent proffered, 
another respondent in this study attributed the force of the negative consensus proposition 
to the fact that it is founded on the old boyism and old girlism platform. In the words of 
the respondent, the negative consensus “…factor has quite some merit [because] the elite 
in this country are made up of groups of old school (chuckles) old school cronies or old 
school, yeah, affiliations and cuts across ethnicities, cuts across religious faiths and that 
helps to bring people together” (Interview 202, 27 October 2014). This convening factor 
is what makes it possible for the principle of negative consensus to operate. This is 
because these associations often become nodes of counter-state action that allow their 
members to circumvent the inefficiencies of the state machinery in order to access state 
power and resources for personal gain.  
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Subcategory 2.3 Ancillary and Co-curricular educational activities and peace in Ghana 
Education 
 
Ghana’s educational system provides opportunities for cross-ethnic engagement of 
students through various co-curricular and associational activities. Interschool sports, 
debates, quizzes, and quasi-religious group activities such as the Ghana United Nations 
Students Association, the Young Christian Movement (YCS), the Scripture Union, and 
the equivalents in other creeds, periodically bring students of different educational 
institutions together. One interviewee from the Upper East Region recalled that it was 
one such event that first brought him into contact with the Upper West Region and 
students from other parts of the country (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). Recounting his 
experiences, the respondent noted: 
when I was in secondary school Form 2, I went to the national congress of 
YCS in Nandom … I could never have gone to Nandom secondary school 
if I was just in school; it’s because I was a member of the YCS and  the 
YCS sent me to Nandom Secondary School;  …so the YCS opened me to 
the whole country …so you have a kind of an open perspective […] those 
who were boys scouts, those who belonged to Ghana United Nations 
Students Association, those types of inter exchanges were  provided by 
our educational institutions (Interview 12, 4 March 2014). 
 
Such engagements have generated lifelong friendships and promoted cross identity 
respect and recognition, especially when pupils from relatively unknown schools stand up 
to and even beat colleagues from the bigger name schools in sports or  intellectual 
exercises such as debates and quizzes; or when girls’ schools compete favorably with 
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boys’ schools in academic competitions. However, as respondent in Interview 12 noted, 
such friendships have not been structured and canalized into a form of political capital 
that can engage and transform the public sphere for good. Worse still, they have not been 
purposefully used as instruments of peace. In many cases, they were vehicles of student 
organization without specific contents for civic, political, and peace education.  
 
Subcategory 2.3  Learning Peace Through Education  
 
The concept of peace education has been expanded to go beyond the provision of 
specific knowledge and skills in conflict resolution (mediation, facilitation, negotiation, 
etc.) to include general level of formal education of a population (De Rivera, 2004). This, 
however, makes the measure of the contribution of education to peace complicated and 
impracticable. Hence, de Rivera (2004) uses reduction in homicide rates as the proxy 
indicator of the contribution of education to a culture of peace. According to this view, an 
inverse relationship exists between the level of educational attainments in a society and 
homicide rates.  
By this assertion, Ghana, with a literacy rate of 74.1% (Ghana Statistical Service, 
2012) for people 11 years and older can be said to have an adequate level of education 
that should directly impact on peace. However, equating general levels of education in a 
society to the peaceable nature of its citizens without reference to the content of the 
education is problematic. A cardinal principle in the evaluation of the outcomes or 
impacts of social interventions is the need to be careful in the attribution of outcomes to 
interventions. For, observed results that accompany any development intervention can be 
the product of any of multiple matrixes of outcomes. What is observed to follow 
interventions can be planned or unplanned, intended or unintended, positive or negative, 
304 
 
 
 
desirable or undesirable (OECD, 2012). A four level matrix of intervention outcomes can 
include, for instance: 
i) planned, intended, and desirable outcomes - t his is the zone of intentionality 
ii) planned, intended, but undesirable outcomes -  this is the blind spot 
iii) unplanned, unintended, but desirable outcomes -  represents positive spinoffs 
iv) unplanned, unintended, and undesirable outcomes -  this is the off guard zone 
Viewed against this background the contribution of Ghana’s educational system 
would belong to the positive spin-off category, since the observed positive outcomes of 
the educational system on the country’s peace are unplanned, unintended but desirable 
consequences. This has happened because the spaces and opportunities in the educational 
system that Ghanaians used to manifest attitudes and behavior traits that have contributed 
to the peace of the country were not set out intentionally to create national cohesion and 
violence avoidance behaviors. In other words, it was never the express objective of the 
educational curricular, boarding school system, the computerized school selection and 
placement system, the national service scheme, the system of placement of teachers in 
schools etc., to foster violence avoidance behaviors, national unity, and cohesion for 
peace among those who pass through these educational institutions. On the contrary, the 
educational system simply offered white spaces that accidental groups of citizens chose 
to use to live out their pre-existing values and beliefs. They voluntarily provided content 
and processes that have contributed to Ghana’s peace.  
In terms of intentional creation of instructional frameworks for peace, it is 
noticeable that the concept of peace education is very new in the Ghana, and has been 
restricted largely to the domain of post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
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efforts of the NGO community. Peace education is not integrated into the formal 
educational curricula at any level. Therefore, formal peace education through the 
educational system cannot be said to be an important contributor to the building of a 
culture of peace among the 52+ ethnic groups in Ghana. Consequently, there is the need 
to look into how indigenous non-formal cultural training and socialization processes may 
have inculcated the values and attitudes for peace across the ethnic groups in Ghana.  
On the converse side, the educational system, has unplanned, unintended and 
undesirable consequences as well. The emergence of highly partisan political camps that 
have created rifts in the hitherto united front of students that once championed the causes 
of the voiceless citizens is one example. The reported emergence of occultism in 
boarding schools is another. The spewing out of large numbers of unemployed and often 
unemployable youth who are now considered a security threat to the country is a third 
(Midley, 2014). What these examples signify is that, for the educational system to be the 
incubator of peace-loving citizens, there is the need for more intentionality and directed 
policies and programs that recognize, capture, and retool the white spaces in the 
educational establishment to maximize the positive peace benefits while minimizing the 
negative ones. Otherwise, the contribution of education to Ghana’s peace will continue to 
be more coincidental than intentional. 
 
Category 2.4 – Migration, Interethnic cohabitation, economic interdependencies, and 
Ghana’s peace 
 
An oft recalled feature of Ghana’s peace in this study is the widespread migration, 
peaceful interethnic cohabitation, and the resulting economic interdependencies among 
all the ethnic groups in the country. As one respondent captured it: 
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… we have chosen to settle in different parts of the country irrespective of 
where we actually come from.  You go to the Ashanti Region and you 
have a large number of Ewes.  You go to the Volta Region and you have a 
very large number of Akan-speaking [people], especially in Worawora in 
the Northern part of the Volta, the Akan areas and so on. So the fear has 
been, if I victimize those from other areas in my place then my brother is 
at the other person’s land too, and the person will be victimized in 
retaliation. For the sake of these victimizations I tend to tone down 
(Interview 7, 19 February, 2014). 
 
The question that this view triggers is: To what extent then does migration affect 
the 3Bs of binding, bonding, and bridging and socio-cultural incorporation in Ghana? 
Portes and Sensenbrenner suggest that among migrant communities, bonding-in becomes 
stronger than bridging-out when the migrant community faces hostility from the host 
community. External confrontation does not only reinforce pre-existing in-group 
sentiments and loyalties, it is actually capable of “creating such feelings where none 
existed before” (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 118). Since no hostilities exist against 
migrant communities in Ghana, such in-group feeling that would have created the ‘we 
versus them’ attitude is dissipated. But, Portes and Sensenbrenner point out that: 
…cultural differences and outside discrimination alone do not account 
fully for the observed differences in the strength of bounded solidarity 
among different migrant communities…The missing element seems to be 
the ability of certain minorities to activate a cultural repertoire, brought 
from the home country, which allows them to construct an autonomous 
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portrayal of their situation that goes beyond a mere adversarial reaction” 
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 2001, p. 119).  
 
In other words, self-imposed spatial, social, cultural and economic identity enclaves 
of migrant populations is what creates the differentness that can generate, sustain, or even 
widen the gulf of estrangement between the host and migrant communities. Put 
differently, migrant communities that hold unto their imported cultural preferences with 
little openness to engaging in intercultural exchanges with their host communities are 
more likely to estrange themselves from their host. Under such circumstances, cultural 
exchanges in the form of intermarriages, beliefs and values transmissions and reception, 
among others are limited. Even economic interdependencies can be curtailed. In such 
cases, social cohesion between the host and the migrants remains illusionary. As 
illustrated with the example of chemical bonding processes, no sharing of values or 
interests means no social bonding takes place. In such places, long periods of 
cohabitation are often not enough to ensure a right to belongingness. In Nigeria, for 
instance, distinctions are made between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” or “strangers” 
in many states such that: 
…the Tiv in Nasarawa and Taraba states [have] found themselves 
regarded as strangers or settlers in those states. Ironically, however, the 
Gwari do not have the same problem in Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa 
states. But the Hausas in Jos have the same problem as the Tiv (Adamu, 
2002).  
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Similarly, despite generations of cohabitation in the same political space, Liberia’s 
Americo-Liberians and their indigenous counterparts still remain estranged (Frempong, 
2001; Konneh, 1996). Although the mutual exchange and assimilation of some values 
and the construction of a common language derived from English and the native 
languages gives Liberians a unique identity (Allen, 2010), there is still much to be done 
to achieve a fully incorporated society. The symbols of national identity continue to 
“…reflect only the cultural and historical experiences of the Americo-Liberians” (Kieh, 
2009, p. 18) 
Emphasizing the role of exchange as the unifier in intercultural cohabitations, 
Simmel, believes the unique contribution that immigrants, as strangers, make to social 
cohesion rests in the fact that the stranger always brings something that the host 
community does not have. In Simmel’s example, the stranger or “the man who comes 
today and stays tomorrow… brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, 
indigenous to it” (Simmel, 1908, p. 185). These new skill sets or know-how that the 
stranger brings becomes the rallying point for a different kind of social and economic 
engagements in the host community. In other words, the  immigrant’s facilitative role in 
trade creates the catalytic and synergistic scaling up of economic activities and benefits 
beyond what indigenous “…the primary producer with his more limited mobility and his 
dependence on a circle of customers that can be expanded only very slowly”(Simmel, 
1908, pp. 185-186) can do.  
Simmel’s use of trade as the medium of interaction between the stranger and the 
host community is instructive because it highlights the role of sustained and mutually 
beneficial interactions as the route for gaining entry and acceptance or incorporation 
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between the hosts and the stranger. Steinberger, (1981) points out that pre-existing 
“communal ties magnify prior tendencies toward collective action” (Steinberger, 1981 in 
Larsen et al., 2004, p. 64). However, “Social ties alone are not enough. It takes 
efficacious individuals to organize and activate a public constituency” (Bandura in 
Larsen et al., 2004, p. 65). More importantly, the nature and frequency of interactions 
between the stranger and the host communities are key. An openness to engage and 
embrace the other is essential for incorporation and peaceful coexistence to emerge and 
grow.  
In the context of Ghana where the stock in trade for migrants is usually their labor 
services, their special contribution to the host economies is the potential for increased 
production and productivity that migrants offer. For example, the contribution of migrant 
labor from the north to the economic advancement of the south is self-evident. Since the 
colonial times, the north has served as the “labour pool for the cocoa, railway and mining 
industries in the south” (Brukum, 2005, p. 6).  So important was this to the economy of 
the colony that serious consideration was given to the idea of constructing a railway line 
from the south to the north to allow migrant labor to more easily move to the labor points 
in the south. As Cozens-Hardy recommended “...given cheap transport by rail, and fair 
price for agricultural products, labour may take the same course it has taken in the colony 
proper namely, to settle along and cultivate saleable produce in the vicinity of the 
railway” (Cozens-Hardy, 1924 in Brukum, 2005, p. 11).  
This consideration to facilitate the movement of migrant labor from the north to the 
south targeted population concentrations beyond the frontiers of what is Ghana today. It 
would have cut short the foot trek of the migrant labor from the hinterlands of what are 
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today Burkina Faso (then known as the Upper Volta), Mali, and Niger to cocoa farms and 
mines in the Gold Coast by several weeks. It would have consolidated the position of the 
Gold Coast as the preferred destination of Upper Volta’s migrant labor ahead of the Ivory 
Coast. However, where the British failed to take advantage of this opportunity, the 
French on the other side of the border succeeded in diverting Upper Volta’s labor pool 
toward the Ivory Coast. The strategies the French adopted and the consequences of that 
success, however, reverberates in the nature of the social cohesion that La Cote d’Ivoire 
today experiences.   
Tokpa (2006) discusses the Ivorian experiences with migrant Burkinabe 
communities and notes that while migration of the people from what was then Upper 
Volta into the then Gold Coast was voluntary, the diversion of this migrant flow into 
what is today La Cote d’Ivoire was  quasi-voluntary at best. Conscious French colonial 
policy designed and orchestrated the relocation of segments of the Upper Voltarian 
communities to the northern eco-transitional zones of northern Cote d’Ivoire in a way 
that would not disrupt their natural settlement plans and native cultures. The choice of 
settlement zone served two purposes. First, it provided a resident labor pool from the 
migrant community or the strangers who came and stayed (Simmel, 1908). Secondly, 
they served as magnets that would attract seasonal migrant labor from the Upper Volta, 
away from their hitherto preferred destinations in the Gold Coast, into Cote d’Ivoire 
where they would find natural homes in the settlement communities within the zone, 
when they came for seasonal work.  
The voluntary nature of migrant settlements in the Gold Coast compared to the 
controlled settlement patterns for the same kind of migrants in La Cote d’Ivoire would 
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play out differently for the peace of the two countries for several reasons. First, the 
Ivorian migrant citizenship dilemma presents a particular case that Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (2001) described where cohabitation might have, by design, not translated 
into incorporation and co-citizenship. For, by design of the colonial policy, the Voltarian 
migrant communities settled in clusters of what became known as the colonial villages. 
Tokpa notes that it was indeed the Governor of the Upper Volta who, at the request of the 
Moro-Naba, initiated the creation of the Voltarian villages within Ivoirian lands. The 
settlements effectively became « ilots constitués des cases voltaïques » (Tokpa, 2006, p. 
21), to wit, tiny islands of Voltarian houses.  
As intimated above, some authors have argued that the creation of the colonial 
villages for the Voltarians was actually the operationalization of an express agreement 
reached between the colonial administrators responsible for the Upper Volta and the 
traditional leadership of the Moshis (Djoman, 2013). According to this view, the Moro-
Naba agreed to the relocation of the Moshi communities into La Cote d’Ivoire only on 
condition that they are allowed to retain their cultural and ethnic identities, including the 
names of their native villages. In other words, it was a strategic move to retain suzerainty 
over what he considered his split empire (Ginio, 2006). In doing so, the colonial policy of 
creating Burkinabe villages did not only reproduce and preserve ethnocentric political, 
economic, social, and cultural enclaves separate and distinct from their host communities; 
it perpetuated the identity segregation between the migrants and their hosts. It entrenched 
the sense of differentness between the strangers who stayed and their hosts. 
Incorporation, therefore, never happened; despite years of cohabitation and interactions 
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through the trade of labor and services between the Voltarian strangers who stayed but 
never became co-citizens with their hosts.  
This is why in La Cote d’Ivoire today, Ivoirians  still make differentiations between 
the autochtones, allochtones, and allogènes (Djoman, 2013). While the autochtones are 
the natives or sons and daughters of the soil, allochtones are those who have come from a 
different part of the country but now stay in their host communities. The allogènes, on 
the other hand, are the strangers who came and stayed – the immigrants and their 
descendants. They may have been born on the soil or stayed there for a long time, but 
they are not of the same ethnic stock as the natives. They are a different ethnic group 
(translation from Calan et al., 2011). They include the Burkinabes, as the Ivoirians prefer 
to refer to those immigrants from Upper Volta in the colonial villages.  
Hence, if migration did lead to the peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians in all parts of 
the country, it would not be the fact of migration per se that is the causal factor. One has 
to look at deeper causes peculiar to the Ghanaian context to find answers to why 
Ghanaians so easily intermingle and incorporate into different host communities. Lessons 
from the Ivorian experience and what respondents have shared in this study suggest that 
while the cultures and traditions of ethnic groups in Ghana seek sameness through 
accommodation, integration, and even incorporation of other ethnic groups, the cultures 
of ethnic groups in other countries seem to emphasize, reinforce, and even institutionalize 
difference. History, traditions, and religion are important cementing factors in Ghana’s 
capacity to foster interethnic accommodation and incorporation.   
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Category 3: Political disillusionment, Citizen Engagement, Disengagement, And 
Peace  
 
Subcategory 3.1 Citizen Despondency, Disillusion, Disengagement, and Withdrawal from 
the public sphere 
 
Findings from this study suggest that the failure of past governments to deliver 
the dividend of independence and democracy i.e. promises of rapid development in all 
spheres, have created public disillusionment, disappointment, and disconnection from the 
public sphere. People subscribe to political parties and engage in elections with the faint 
expectation of some benefits from the politicians. They do not understand or care about 
the manifestoes of the political parties. On the contrary, they see politics as a big game 
not to be taken seriously (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014). They really do not expect any 
long term improvements in their conditions.  
Hence, even though “…people are disillusioned about the way resources are being 
shared” (Interview 14, 5 March 2014), the urge to stick out and fight to change the 
situation is smothered because the electorate believes all the politicians are the same 
anyway. They (politicians) agree only on matters that concern them; they don’t care 
about the common good. Hence, citizens are not willing to “…go out and die for 
somebody [who] would not do anything that would make my life comfortable” (Interview 
203, 28 October, 2014). As a result of this “… disconnect between the populace and the 
politicians […] people are not willing to go fanatic over politics. They would rather go 
fanatic over their ethnicity and their land. Particularly when it comes to land ownership, 
people would rather die for that than to go and die for somebody to get power” (Interview 
203, 28 October, 2014).  
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In the view of respondents, if Ghana’s political disagreements do not boil over 
into violent national conflicts, it is not because there are no grievances against the 
political system. It is because citizens feel it will be worthless to fight. It is also because, 
in a twist of irony, respondents have developed a tolerance and negative accommodation 
for the corrupt nature of politicians. They cynically credit their corrupt nature with the 
peace that Ghana enjoys. As one respondent noted “…one of the things that has helped  is 
because of the perceived corruption of the politician.  People have seen that in the long 
run, they take care of themselves.  So why should I die for you?” (Interview 9, 26 
February, 2014). But while Ghanaians may not be willing to go to war in support of 
corrupt politicians, respondents see that the persistence of corruption is what is likely to 
“…trigger the country into going into conflict [as people can no longer accept to] remain 
poor whilst they see people who are just becoming rich within a day” (Interview 14, 5 
March 2014) after going into politics. 
Respondents also identified the scavenger role of development NGOs as a key 
factor in the appeasement of rural anger against the failures of duty bearers to deliver on 
their mandates. The NGOs and FBOs with socioeconomic development agendas are 
picking up after the lapses of the state, public, and corporate institutions by filling the 
gaps in their deficient social and development service delivery. By literally cleaning up 
after governments, the activities of development NGOs effectively mollify collective 
citizen anger or deflect that anger away from the public sphere. Although data on the 
quantum of resource investments by NGOs in Ghana is not readily available (Danquah, 
2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2009), one source indicates NGOs in 
Ghana are estimated to manage “…  annual development expenditure of between $150-
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$200 million [which, among others, is applied to] provide between 45-50 per cent of all 
health-care services and over 50 per cent of all family planning services” (Danquah, 
2011), among others . Similar contributions to the educational sector, agricultural 
development, among others have helped to cushion the unserved and under-served rural 
communities around the country.  
In many places, especially in the north, NGOs and FBOs are the only providers of 
development services. As a result, in such places citizens look up to NGOs for solutions 
to their problems rather than engaging government and other public sector duty bearers to 
demand that they live up to their mandates to provide what the communities deserve. 
This, in the view of respondents, takes the Government off the hook. It also keeps the 
population outside the public sphere, since they are unable then to articulate agendas for 
engagement with public office holders.  
Besides inducing the lull effect on citizens, subcategories of the NGOs and 
international development agencies in Ghana make direct contributions of NGOs to 
Ghana’s peace both at the national, as well as, community levels. In the latter case, 
development initiatives create spaces of (re)engagement in dialogues of action for peace. 
NGO-sponsored initiatives have encouraged members of rival communities to work 
together either directly to promote peace, or through engagement in joint economic or 
community development activities of mutual interests. In the process, community 
members learn the benefits of interethnic cooperation and peace. This is what has 
contributed considerably to the maintenance of peace in the eastern corridor of Ghana, 
which is the most volatile conflict zone in the country.  
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True as this may be, recent developments, however, suggest the NGOs and their 
funding partners could be reaching their restraining limits in holding society at bay from 
the public sphere. The emergence of groups such as the Alliance for Accountable 
Governance (AFAG); OccupyGhana movement; InsideGhana; among others represents 
the mobilization of the urban middle class whose development challenges are beyond the 
capacities of the traditional development NGOs.  Ironically, some of these movements 
are gaining entry into the public sphere under the banner of NGOs or registered CSOs. 
Their ability to sustain peaceful means in their pursuit of change in the governance 
structure will depend to a large extent on the responsiveness of government and the 
public sector to their issues and demands. Genuine corridors of dialogue and engagement 
will encourage peaceful engagements. As in the case of urban youth groups recounted 
below, ignoring these middle class action groups can only push them to the fringes and 
lead some to consider alternate means of making change happen for them.  
 
Subcategory 3.2 Elite and Middle Class Escapism  
 
The contention that the middle class has chosen to exit the public sphere through 
the use of private solutions to public problems provides an important frame for 
examining what makes Ghana peaceful. Respondents who subscribed to this view have 
pointed out that Ghanaians in the middle class often choose to fill in the gaps of state 
deficiencies in public service delivery, rather than engage and demand their rights from 
duty bearers. They would pay for the construction of the road leading to their newly built 
house; pay for the extension of electricity, water, and telephone services to their 
premises; or pay for the drilling and mechanization of a borehole to deal with their water 
needs. The purchase and installation of generators to address public sector deficiencies in 
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providing regular electricity exempts them from the Dumsor phenomenon.  Purchase of 
private healthcare rather than use of the deficient public healthcare system; and decisions 
to send their children to private schools are ways in which the middle class manages state 
failures.  
As a result of the middle class self-provisioning, they do not feel the pain of 
public sector failures. Consequently, there is no urge for them to play the agential role of 
mobilizing and leading the citizenry to demand performance and accountability from 
pubic office holders. For this reason, Ghana suffers from the absence of a critical mass of 
disenchanted activists who can champion protests over the non/poor performance of the 
state and public sector institutions and demand that the right things be done. This 
epitomizes how the escape of the middle class from engagement creates a void in the 
political middle. The masses are left to the mercy of the political elite, as nobody talks 
about the misgovernance or wants to do anything about it. Instead, citizens seem to have 
resigned to the fate of the political system and the underperformance of the state system. 
In the process, what should have become publicly expressed anger at state failures 
become private concerns.  
Part of the reason why the elite is missing in the fight against state failures, in the 
view of some respondents, is the presence of negative consensus amongst them. In the 
view of respondents, the elite only agree to disagree on the principle of “dibi na mi dibi”, 
which translates into take your share of public resources and let me also have mine. In 
other words, there is common agreement that political and public offices must be 
exploited for private gain. Hence, there is an unspoken acknowledgement that 
irrespective of who has access to power and state resources, they would practice the same 
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principle of setting up alliances with political and private sector cronies “…to create, loot 
and share the resources of this country as if a brigade had been set up for such an 
enterprise” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1). This summation of the situation that  Justice 
Dotse, (SJ) gave in respect of the “… €40 million judgment debt paid to Waterville 
Holdings Ltd and the GH¢51.2million (about USD14.6 million) paid to businessman, 
Alfred Agbesi Woyome” (Daily Guide, 2013a, p. 1;  see also The Chronicle, 2014), when 
passing judgment in the second case, resonates with ordinary Ghanaians. It encapsulates 
the popular feeling that elites who can have access to state resources, have conspired not 
to rock the boat of state through organizing agitations, respondents averred.  
As an extension of the negative consensus escape route for the middle class, 
grassroots party members who have access to such elite agree and accept the principle. 
This has led to the emergence of the concept of “foot soldiers” who do all the footwork 
and dirty jobs for their political patrons and parties to win. In return they expect that they 
would be compensated with contracts, jobs, and other booties when their party is in 
power. As a result, everyone in the party with adequate connections is either satisfied or 
encouraged to close their eyes to nonperformance of the state, as long as they get their 
share of the booty. Those in the losing political camp wait for their turn – fight to win the 
next elections and do same.  
The phenomenon has led to the entrenchment of petty crony capitalism, which 
translates into jobs for the boys, irrespective of the level of their job readiness. The result 
is the bloated government payrolls as a result of misfits in positions of authority simply 
because they campaigned for the party (IMANI Ghana, 2015; Vinokor, 2015). Political 
entrepreneurship has become the most lucrative and surest rewarding business in Ghana. 
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The depth of its practice would cause the Asantehene to declare that “Politics has 
substantially eroded the innate creative mind and enterprising spirit of modern day 
Ghanaians as many resort to it as the surest way of making it in life…” (Myjoyonline, 
2014). 
In sum, political competition is about access to power to do the same thing as the 
opponent has been doing. This is why the one thing that “…puts us in the category of 
negative peace is corruption” (Interview 2, 7 February 2014). And several respondents 
have “…talked about the negative peace [in Ghana] because of corruption” (interview 2, 
7 February 2014) “which now has become a canker in the country” (Interview 5, 14 
February, 2014) and it is this “…corruption and injustice in the system that could easily 
open our doors for violent behavior” (Interview 8, 24 February, 2014). They conclude 
that peace built on this ravenous situation is not peace that can be sustained.  
 
Subcategory 3.3 Permanent and Seasonal Migration as the hatch for Rural and Working 
Class Escapism  
 
Unable to deal with the state’s failure to meet their needs, rural-urban migration 
offers the hatch for rural people to escape from the traps of poverty. Such migrations are 
either permanent i.e. people leave and find permanent residences elsewhere or seasonal. 
In the latter case, people go through an annual cycle of leaving their rural settings to the 
urban areas, usually during the off-farm season and return only for the brief periods of the 
cropping season to tend to their farms and to leave again.  As a result of this seasonal 
migration “…people from the North can come down South and tap into the wealth of the 
South and go back.  People in the rural areas can come to the urban areas and tap and go 
back” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).  
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In between the permanent and cyclical migrants, are the fortune migrants who 
may go for extended periods of time in search of resources to come back and start a 
business, get married, or meet some other social commitments. Counted among these 
would be people seeking startup capital for their dream ventures or funding to continue 
their education. These include the exodus of mainly young girls principally from the 
Northern Region to Kumasi and Accra to serve as head porters “Kayayei”. The 
proliferation of street vendors in urban areas is another manifestation of this fortune 
seeking migrations. For the braver ones, it is the staging ground for further migration, as 
they accumulate resources for that visa and a ticket to take on their Europe, America, or 
Asia bound sojourns. And if the money is not trickling in fast enough, a trek across the 
desert is often an option they would consider (Daily Guide, 2010).  
The peace dividend of such youth migration lies in the fact that since everyone is 
busy finding an escape route out of their traps, there is no critical mass of “…angry 
young men in the community” (Interview 4, 12 February, 2014) who will engage state 
institutions and other duty bearers to demand accountability and efficient delivery of 
services. Respondents, however, noted the emergence of the phenomenon in urban areas, 
especially in the urban slum areas, where critical masses of enlightened and angry youth 
are beginning to self-mobilize to take on the state for poor or non-delivery of services. 
This marks a turning point for Ghana’s peace. If youth in the rural areas can’t organize, 
they are beginning to do so once they get to the urban areas and find that their escape 
hatches were false ones. Urban poverty is as bad, if not worse than the rural one. Already, 
the youth demand for state attention to their plight is done violently, as witnessed in the 
Ashiaman youth protests over poor road networks (Jafaru, 2013; Myjoyonline, 2013a) or 
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the violent reactions of Muslim youth in Kumasi over the purported theft of a baby born 
to an illiterate mother (Abdulai, 2014). Their example could be a precedent for the 
emerging middle class protesters cited above, if state engagement for peaceful dialogue is 
not forthcoming.  
 
Subcategory 3.4 Humor as a hatch of escape 
 
Jokes play important cathartic roles in every society. However, in oral societies, 
they are also effective means for encoding and transmitting historical events and folk 
wisdom across generations. Jokes can breach social barriers, allowing for the use of role 
reversals to portray alternate realities. As Cochran recalls, in some jokes, “The message is 
turned on its head, hierarchy is undone, the mighty are fallen, the would-be-emperor is a 
window washer” (Cochran, 1989, p. 1). In addition, jokes are effective means for 
participatory reconstruction of realities and collective narratives, since everyone who 
retells the joke may add or take away from the original facts to make the joke appealing 
to the current audience. The multiple recounts of the jokes makes the facts of the trigger 
event fade; and with that fades also the original emotions (bitter or sweet) attached to the 
trigger facts and events of the joke.  Hence, jokes are ways to reconstruct or deconstruct 
narratives to make what should otherwise be a painful experience turn into a light one. 
They are tools for managing memories or helping to soothe and heal hurt feelings. 
In consonance with these views, respondents in this study have observed that 
Ghanaians have a high sense of humor that enables them to laugh at and laugh off 
virtually everything, including things that should make them angry. As one respondent 
noted, “We joke about otherwise serious situations and the laughter that comes with it has 
a very therapeutic effect on all concerned” (Interview 218, 13 December, 2014). Another 
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respondent would add that: “Yes, we laugh over everything; we make jokes over 
everything, you know” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). These views find support in a 
recent observation that Ghanaians seem to have a penchant for “…allowing yourselves to 
make serious things appear funny because it looks like one of the ways to satisfy us is to 
just give us something to entertain ourselves with and we’ll entertain ourselves with it for 
life” (Pastor Otabil in Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1). As a result, issues that should 
ordinarily make Ghanaians angry easily become “national jokes” which dull the 
collective consciousness to the evil inherent in the trigger event. Consequently there is no 
critical mass of people that can be mobilized to hold to account political and civil 
authority or other duty bearers that have failed their obligations to citizens in respect of 
the event.  
Examples of how serious national issues can be trivialized, masked, and tugged 
away abound. When in 1994 long standing interethnic tensions escalated into Ghana’s 
most violent and widespread conflict yet, the episode was quickly labeled The Guinea 
Fowl War. Similar derisory accolades and jokes have been conferred on similar conflicts 
across the country. When the management of the Savannah Accelerated Development 
Authority could not account for how,  after sinking Fifteen Million Ghana Cedis (Azure, 
2012) - about US$4.3 million at the exchange rate of GHC3.5 -  into a guinea fowl 
project they could not produce a single guinea fowl to justify the investment, a joke 
would be made that the SADA guinea fowls were allowed to fly into Burkina Faso to 
save them from staging a coup d’état in Ghana (Dorfe, 2014).  
Ghanaians also use jokes to blur lines of division when it attracts the therapeutic 
laughter from all sides. Even if momentarily, such collective laughter eases tensions 
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between those who partake in it. When the National Secretary of the NPP was hauled 
before the Supreme Court justices hearing the Election Petition of 2012 to answer 
contempt charges for making remarks that “…had the tendency to derail the country’s 
peace and endanger the lives of its 24 million citizens” (Daily Graphic, 2013), counsel of 
the accused resorted to jokes, including a request that his client be pardoned as a birth 
day gift to he, the counsel. The trick worked in extracting leniency from the bench.  
An unanswered question is whether the joking nature of Ghanaians is a conscious 
strategy designed to enable Ghanaians not to remember the pain that the object of the 
joke created or exacerbated. For, the joking nature of Ghanaians seems to be closely 
related to their short memories as well. Ghanaians tend to forget otherwise serious 
national issues or the pains they have been through once they have been able to laugh it 
off. President Mahama endorsed this view when he bemoaned the fact that Ghanaians 
would soon forget his good works when the power crisis, among others, are over.  
Statesmen such as Dr. K.B Asante would agree that “…President Mahama is not far from 
the truth for saying Ghanaians have short memories” (Ultimate Radio, 2013, p. 1); and 
Nana Akufo Addo, Presidential Candidate in 2008 and 2012 for  Ghana’s largest 
opposition party  is reported to have expressed similar sentiments (Jackson, 2012).  
Ghana currently faces its worse power generation and distribution crisis since 
independence. Factories are reported to be closing down, industries are laying off 
workers, and private informal sector businesses that depend on electricity for their work 
are either shutting down or are facing serious disruptions to their operations. But 
Ghanaians seem to be able to cope with the situation when they joke over the Dumsor 
phenomenon. Coined in the Akan language, the word Dumsor, a literal description of the 
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frequent and unexpected on and off power outages, is an example of the creative use of 
language to comically express otherwise serious matters. The term “Dumsor”, for 
instance, would soon be appropriated and used in all sorts of ways to make light the crisis 
that the nation faced. As President Mahama himself would note:  
We had the energy crises, which was popularly called ‘Dumsor’ and I was 
appropriately labeled the “apostle of ‘Dumsor’, ‘Dumsor” and Ghanaians 
in their usual humour crafted a very interesting greeting that said “Yema 
mo dumsor oo,”… then another responds “Yaa Mahama” …However, 
very often in Ghana we have a very short memory. [Wait till] The energy 
crisis is solved and we don’t remember the darkness we were in (Addo, 
2013, p. 1). 
 
Some public officeholders latch onto the double doze effects of trivialization and 
collective amnesia that jokes induce to deflect or dampen criticism against their 
performance failures or to whittle away important issues into nothingness. A respondent 
recalled how Members of Parliament from both the NDC and the NPP have appropriated 
the term “greedy bastards”, once used by former President Rawlings to express his 
exasperation at the unbridled corruption among officials of his own party that prided 
itself of being a party of probity and accountability. The MPs are reported to use the term 
jokingly to tease each other (Interview 26 February, 2014). The joke then trivializes the 
recriminations the former President intended for them. And since it is a joke, they don’t 
really have to worry about doing anything to address the concern.  
In defense of the culture of jokes and joking, some observers have stated that this 
tendency to make “somehow serious things [as] a joke to us” (Otabil in 
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Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1) epitomizes the collective disillusionment of Ghanaians 
at the persistent failure of duty bearers to address the issues at stake. Jokes therefore are 
an expression of Ghanaians’ resignation to their fate. It is an essential ingredient of the 
conflict bearing capacity of Ghanaians. As one respondent put it, “Yes, it’s good [to joke 
over serious issues] to help us carry on; it gives us patience, and it gives us capacity for 
long suffering and all that (Interview 11, 3 March 2014).  
However, others believe that Ghanaian’s are taking their jovial nature to the 
extreme, to the point where it is becoming a serious block to a national consciousness and 
collective will to tackle important national issues with seriousness. As a respondent put it, 
jokes may be good in easing tensed situations, “but where we over indulge in that we run 
away from our responsibilities” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014). The danger of abdication 
from the collective responsibility to confront and deal seriously with national issues 
would force a senior pastor to recently observe that even though joking is:  
…the way we survive’ but that way we survive is killing us…“We’re 
polluting ourselves. We have issues we can’t solve. We have problems we 
can’t solve. We are overwhelmed all around us, yet we have a lot of time 
to joke and to laugh and to act as if this is the most normal environment to 
live in” (Otabil in Radioxyzonline.com, 2014, p. 1).  
 
Whatever their forms, Ghanaians have used these jokes as important escape 
hatches. They enable them bear the pain of the moment in difficult political, economic, 
and even social times; granting them the space to transition to another place where the 
pain would not be remembered. But as the concerns of Otabil indicate, glossing over 
painful situations does not make them go away. If anything, the gloss of laughter leaves 
326 
 
 
 
the wounds unattended to. Such wounds can only fester and manifest again, probably, in 
worst forms sooner or later. The question that Otabil’s statement provokes is whether 
Ghana’s inability to dig herself out of her state of negative peace is not precisely because 
of her inability to take matters seriously; take the bulls by their horns and deal with issues 
in ways that would break the cycle forever.  
Subcategory 3.5 Visible and Invisible Weavers of Peace 
 
Peace is the product of actions or engagements. Even when predisposing elements 
of peace exist in a community, there is the need for “...agents for peace [who] can act to 
mitigate or limit the effects of violence” (Neufeldt et al., 2002, p. 91). To be effective, 
such “…key agents of change, [must have the] capacity for building vertical and 
horizontal integration” (Neufeldt et al., 2002). In support of this, respondents have amply 
cited examples of how individuals and institutional actors have on their own or acting in 
concert with others have steered some of Ghana’s very volatile and potentially violent 
conflicts towards peaceful ends. Such efforts are nested in long histories of similar 
voluntary initiatives that fostered peace in the country.  
A couple of examples will illustrate the point. In the mid-1970s, unarmed students 
championed the campaign against the military government’s Union Government Concept 
designed to entrench the military in power. Even though the referendum the government 
was able to force through declared a win for the concept, the students had created enough 
public aversion to the concept to provide an excuse for a palace coup that stopped the 
implementation of the plan. In a similar way, students and professional bodies 
championed the campaign for a return to civilian rule between 1981 and 1990, when it 
was obvious that the PNDC regime under Rawlings had no intent of handing over power 
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to an elected civilian government (Ameyibor, 1996; Gyamfi, 2014; also see Interview 
212, 9 December 2014). The regime used the composition of the Consultative Assembly 
to try to dilute, if not eliminate the influences of the professionals and other intellectuals 
the PNDC considered hostile to its agenda of self-perpetuation (Gyamfi, 2014). Although 
the Ghana Bar Association and other professional bodies boycotted participation in the 
Constituent Assembly, certain individuals broke ranks with their peers and worked their 
way into the Assembly just so they could make sure that a workable constitution was 
framed. The Transitional Provisions that were inserted into the draft constitution may 
have been intended to set a trap for its rejection at the referendum, and thereby retain the 
PNDC in power. Again, realizing the trap that this arrangement was setting, individuals 
and institutions mobilized the citizenry to vote for the constitution, irrespective of its 
defects (Interview 212, 9 December 2014). Other examples of individual initiatives to 
protect the common good abound.  
Besides civil actors, respondents in this study have credited matured political 
leadership of the two major political parties as major contributory factors to Ghana’s 
peace. When the New Patriotic Party felt the 1992 elections had been rigged, it chose to 
write a book - the Stolen Verdict - rather than mobilize its supporters in to the streets to 
protest the alleged rigging of the elections. In 2009, the National Democratic Congress 
also chose to go to court to contest the December 2008 Presidential elections instead of 
taking to the streets.  The NPP would use the same route in 2013, when it had grievances 
over the conduct of the 2012 Presidential polls. The willingness of the political leadership 
to listen to counsel from the civil society, faith-based, and traditional leaders has also 
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been mentioned as yet another trait in the Ghanaian political space that has contributed to 
the peace of the country.  
Ghana’s transition from the 27 years of rule by a military dictator turned civilian 
in 1990 is often cited as the high point of Ghana’s peaceful nature. What is little known, 
however, is the plot to botch that transition and maintain J.J. Rawlings in power beyond 
the two term mandate in 2000. It would take the agency of one individual,  the Chief of 
Defense Staff at the time, who was obviously working with a counter insurgency network 
of security operatives, to uncover the plot and to botch it to ensure that the transition 
process went on smoothly (Agyeman-Duah, 2012). Additionally, respondents in this 
study have highlighted the fact that the much lauded peace architecture that emerged after 
the 2000 transition could not have come into being without the unsolicited actions of 
individuals and groups, acting on their own or on behalf of their institutions, to engage 
duty bearers across partisan and institutional lines to hold them accountable to their 
duties and make sure that they worked for peace. 
The foregoing suggest that all the predisposing conditions notwithstanding, Ghana 
may just have had a certain crop of individuals who at the most critical times of the 
nation’s evolution, where willing to step out and up from their comfort zones and take on 
the challenge of steering the country away from the descent into violence. The question 
that begs to be asked is what has Ghana’s political, religious, traditional, and civil society 
leaders done differently from their counterparts in other countries that have descended 
into violence for the same or similar reasons that threatened Ghana’s peace? What pushes 
Ghanaian leaders to act the way they do to stem the descent into violent conflicts? 
Answers to these questions will provide pointers not only on how Ghana might 
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strengthen her capacity for peace; other countries could learn a thing or two from such 
experience sharing.  
 
Category 4 – Constitutionalism, The National Peace Architecture and peace in 
Ghana 
 
Category 4.1 The Constitutions of Ghana and Peace 
 
Respondents in the quantitative survey heavily endorsed the constitutions of 
Ghana since independence as major contributors to Ghana’s peace. In the words of one 
respondent, “Ghana is a country where the constitution holds us all together” (Interview 
6, 18 February 2014). Collaborating this, other respondents in the key informant 
interviews cited the constitutional provisions that debar ethno-regional or religious 
political parties by requiring that all political parties have representation in all regions of 
Ghana; and by extension, provide opportunities for all ethnic groups to be members of 
the party. The preference for the unitary state system as against the federalist structure 
has been commended for fostering a sense of unity among Ghanaians. The constitutional 
requirement on regional balance in the appointment of Ministers and other public officers 
also improves cross-ethnic inclusivity in the public sphere.  
The fact that members of the same family can belong to different political parties 
reinforces political freedoms and reduces the tendency for regionalism and exclusionary 
ethno-political organization and political divisions along ethnic or regional lines.  These, 
in their view, are concrete ways in which the constitution has contributed to establishing 
social harmony, minimizing political polarization, and fostering national unity and peace 
in Ghana. In the words of one respondent “…the national constitution has epitomized 
everything to the extent that Ghanaians moving to any part of the country would not see 
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themselves as visitors or strangers anywhere. I believe that it is one of the strong reasons 
there has been so much peace in this country” (Interview 6, 18 February, 2014).  
Despite these positive traits of the constitutions of Ghana, respondents identified 
several challenges, especially in respect of the 1992 Constitution that is currently 
operational. They noted various aspects of the 1992 constitution as polarizing society and 
being destabilizing factors or threats to the stability of the country. First, they point out 
that the Rawlings led PNDC regime which superintended the drafting process of the 
constitution, carefully managed and mined the process and the outcomes to suit the 
persona of Rawlings. They find support in the view that “Ghana’s 1992 constitution is 
‘Rawlings phobic’ the articles in it are raw and was crafted to suit Rawlings’ persona” 
(Akwa, 2014, p. 1).  
Indeed, “Throughout the drafting process the PNDC retained the right to insert 
and alter the constitution as it saw fit. The PNDC exercised this right when, at the end of 
the process, they added a blanket indemnity clause for PNDC members” (Princeton 
University, 2014). Not surprisingly, respondents cited the inclusion of the Transitional 
Provisions which preclude any form of holding to account former military officers who 
used “…brute force that kept us in check” (Interview 11, 3 March 2014), as one of the 
defects of the constitution. Knowing that “Ghanaians would call for accountability to 
justify their actions one day [the PNDC had to] plant these mines to prevent it [and to 
make the possible review of these clauses so difficult that] by the time you get to 
amending these things, most of the players would have left the scene” (Interview 212, 9 
December 2014).  The entrenched constitutional clauses that ensure that such people 
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cannot be held to account for their acts and omissions that infringed on human rights has 
bottled up grievances that could explode in different ways.  
Also, the winner takes it all political arrangement in particular has been singled 
out as the most dangerous threat to political stability (Interview 214, 10 December 2014; 
Interview 217, 1 December 2014; Interview 206, 29 October 2014, among others). The 
concentration of power in the Executive to the exclusion of the other arms of 
government, especially when the margins of win are less than 1% heightens the stakes at 
the polls and increases the chances of electoral violence. 
The Constitutions have also entrenched inherent contradictions in their forms. In 
particular, the place and role of traditional rules in the governance structure will be 
discussed later. For now, suffice it to note that for periods that Ghana’s has been under 
constitutional rule, the provisions of the constitutions have not been exceptional in 
comparison to what obtains in other Africa countries. Indeed, the basic organizing 
principles, frames, and content of the constitutions that have been in force in Ghana were 
imposed or imported from those of the British or American constitutions; both of which 
also provide guidance for the framing of the constitutions of other countries. 
Additionally, Ghana has not had one type of constitutional arrangement for any sustained 
period of type. The country now runs on its fifth constitution. Between the Constitutions 
of 1957, 1960, 1969, 1979, and 1992, she has flirted with different constitutional models. 
The immediate post-independence era saw a switch from the inherited Westminster 
system of government to an executive presidency under the 1960 Constitution, when 
Kwame Nkrumah transitioned from Prime Minister into President. The country then 
switched back to the Westminster system when constitutional rule was re-established 
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under the 1969 constitution. Ghana would return to the executive presidential system 
under the 1979 constitution;  and then back to a hybrid between the executive and the 
parliamentary system with the 1992 constitution.  
From the constitutional point of view, therefore, what may be working for Ghana 
is not in the letter of the constitutions, but in the spirit that its citizens have breathed into 
it. Constitutions are social constructs, deriving their essence, principles, and values from 
the collective experiences and will of the people who adopt them as their rule books. To 
that extent then, constitutions are only as good as the people want and accept them to be. 
Once written, people can choose to abide by them or not. We have noted how the 
constitution making process for Ghana’s current constitution was carefully managed to 
protect the interests of some people. Defective as it was, 92% of Ghanaians voted to 
approve it at the referendum. In a comical turn of events, both the opposition and the 
government campaigned for the acceptance of the draft constitution, but with different 
motives. From the opposition’s point of view: 
if you rejected the Constitution, it means that you are prolonging the stay 
of the Government and anything than nothing at all which can later on be 
looked at.  You have been under the yoke of an Authoritarian Ruler for 
near 19 years.  Yes, you just wanted anything that would take them off. 
That was the idea.  [Even though they noticed] some of these flaws [in the 
constitution] were noticed but to go back and have changed would meant 
prolonging the process; and people will be eager to get back to Multi-Party 
Democracy.  We have, so to speak, the shell of what will takes us there; 
we can fill in the blanks later (Interview 212, 9 December 2014).  
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That spirit of partial solutions, abandoning the quest for perfection by accommodating 
and working with the imperfect in the hope that time will heal or provide the opportunity 
for correction, is perhaps, an attribute that makes Ghana sustain its negative peace 
equilibrium. For the Ghanaian, rather than push the limits for the perfect solution, they 
adopt the attitude that “whatever that they cannot control we don’t go further to explore 
… we just revert to God; leave it to God” (Interview 201, 15 October, 2014). The origins 
and import of this philosophical orientation of the Ghanaian to politics and public life 
would be taken up further in the subsequent section of this study. Suffice it to say, to the 
extent that the 1992 Constitution is an embodiment of this spirit of accommodation and 
tolerance, it has served the peace of Ghana, even if tenuously.  
 
Subcategory 4.2 Peace Architecture and Peace Infrastructure 
 
a) The National Peace Council 
 
The concepts of peace architecture (Ojielo, 2007), peace infrastructure (Hopp-
Nishanka, 2012), and peace support structures (Berghof Peace Support, 2010) represent 
overlapping and sometimes interchangeable terms that describe a set of actors, 
institutions, systems, and processes that directly influence the management of conflicts to 
prevent their escalation into violence. In particular, peace infrastructure has been defined 
as the “structured, systematic” (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012, p. 2) network of international and 
domestic actors or the “dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, 
resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society” (Kumar 2011, p. 385 in Hopp-
Nishanka, p. 2). They comprise of “…anything from a rugged shed housing a local peace 
334 
 
 
 
council in a remote South American village, to the elegantly designed high-rise office of 
a national truth and reconciliation commission in the capital of an African country [with 
the sole object of assisting parties in conflict] in the process, or the implementation of 
process results” (Hopp-Nishanka, p. 2) from conflict resolution efforts. In other words, 
peace infrastructure represent intentionally created institutional frameworks that facilitate 
the management of conflicts.  
In Ghana, the National Peace Council (NPC), is the pyramidal structure that 
embodies the peace architecture or infrastructure, which has also been credited with the 
peace in the country (Ojielo, 2007). However, the NPC became a legal entity only in 
March 2011 under Parliamentary Act 818, which provided for national, regional, and 
district structures for the promotion of peace. Since coming into being, the NPC has been 
instrumental in intervening in some conflicts, especially those related to electoral 
disputes, to prevent them from escalating into widespread violence. It has provided a 
canopy under which all faith-based and civil society initiatives for peace and good 
governance can come to confer, strategize, and act in synergy. At the regional and sub-
regional levels, the decentralized structures have been active, in some places, in 
intervening in local conflicts as well. But as noted in Chapter 4 of this study, resource 
restrictions due to inadequate budgetary allocations have constrained the decentralized 
deployment and operations of the NPC.  
Influential as the NPC is becoming in securing Ghana’s peace, it is essential to 
recognize that given the recent nature of its creation, its existence and operations as 
Ghana’s peace infrastructure does not and cannot explain the historical consistency with 
which Ghana has been able to avoid violent national level conflicts in the country since 
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independence. Indeed, we have noted elsewhere that its coming into being was merely a 
regrouping and christening of the efforts of various faith-based and civil society 
individuals and organizations that championed the course of peace since Ghana’s 
independence. Therefore crediting the national peace infrastructure in Ghana with 
Ghana’s peace since independence overstates the contributions of this infrastructure. 
 
b) The Traditional Authority System 
 
Historically, the chieftaincy institution presented the veritable locus of any form 
of peace infrastructure in the pre-colonial and colonial times. Chiefs were the major 
dispensers of justice and mediators in conflicts. The colonial administration recognized 
and harnessed this to effect under the native courts systems where chiefs had explicit and 
legally backed jurisdiction over certain cases. For instance, the Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance of 1910, made “…local chiefs' courts the first compulsory step in the judicial 
system” (Sutton, 1984, p. 42). The arrangement consolidated the pre-existing role of 
chiefs as the adjudicators of conflicts within their jurisdictions, in concert with the 
councils of elders. This function has however been restricted to original and appellate 
jurisdictions over chieftaincy succession conflicts only under the 1992 Constitution. 
Nonetheless, in the rural areas, people still take their cases to the courts of the chiefs for 
adjudication.  
Going by the above, the traditional authority systems are, in principle, are 
important constitutive institutions of the governance structure of the post-independence 
state through various constitutional arrangements. In recognition of this, all the 
Constitutions of Ghana since independence have upheld the relevance of the chieftaincy 
institution in the governance of the country. This has been a major source of recognition 
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and appeasement for some ethnic groups, and has helped to secure their allegiance to the 
state. In practice, however, the evidence suggests that the postcolonial state has 
persistently tried to hook and containerize the traditional authority system from playing 
any direct role in the affairs of state. Accordingly, all the constitutions of Ghana since 
independence have either directly sort to eliminate the chieftaincy institution or applied 
the principle of exclusion by inclusion to significantly diminish their roles in the affairs 
of state. Hence, while recognizing the importance of chiefs in their respective 
communities, the constitutions very adeptly and purposefully confined their roles in 
affairs of the state to ceremonial ones, at best.  
For instance, the restriction on the role of chiefs in partisan politics has been cited 
as effective instruments of Ghana’s peace. However that restriction also means chiefs 
have limited functional powers in the administration of the state, irrespective of their 
professional competencies. Besides, chiefs have legitimacy, influence, and even authority 
that most elected and appointed state officials can only envy. Most politicians will have 
to align with the chiefs in their constituencies if they want to win their elections.  
However, as Kofi Kumado noted in his preface to a recent book on peacemaking 
in Ghana (Darkwa, Attuquayefio, & Yakohene, 2012), the import of this constitutional 
duality that co-occupy the public sphere in the country – the traditional and the modern 
state systems  - is masked and often overlooked in the political discourse on Ghana.  
Chapter 22 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the existence and operation of Chiefs, but 
Article 276 of the constitution debars chiefs from actively engaging in politics or 
presenting themselves for election to any public office (Constituion of the Republic of 
Ghana, 1992). This effectively hoodwinks chiefs in the public sphere. Unless 
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Government appoints them to a post for which they are qualified, they have limited 
public role in the formal state system.  
But as one respondent remarked, despite the attempt to circumscribe the role of 
chiefs in public life, the reality, however, remains that “…our nation has two levels of 
political organization – you have the traditional system and then you have the national 
constitutional body at the top” (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014). This has in effect 
created the dual state system that literally translates Ekeh’s “two publics”  (Ekeh, 1975, 
p. 91) into two republics; the postcolonial and the pre-colonial or vestigial colonial 
traditional authority systems. They command considerable legitimacy from their 
respective ethnic populations, as well as, wield considerable influence and power in 
matters of the state. However, they are only nominally integrated into the governance 
structures of the state. They also have little to no accountable responsibilities to anyone 
beyond what the customs and traditions of their respective jurisdictions mandate.   
Ironically, because of the constitutional cocooning of the functional role of this 
second tier of political authority in the executive affairs of the post-colonial state that 
Ghana is, chiefs find themselves in a political limbo in respect of the management of the 
affairs of state. It is also a contradiction in itself in respect of the roles of chiefs in the 
development and peace in the country. Even though they have custodial responsibilities 
over the land and natural resources in their jurisdictions, they do not control their 
exploitation and use. They have influence over their people, but the country’s ability to 
fully leverage the legitimacy and grassroots connections of this institution for national 
unity and development is restricted. Other official policies of state or ruling political 
parties reinforced this seclusion of chiefs from public life even where their role and 
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influence in the promotion of development and the maintenance of peace are recognized. 
For instance, chiefs are not allocated any resources of state for any community actions 
that could enhance their status and spheres of influence among their subjects. Hence, the 
effective capacity of chiefs to be instruments of peace is greatly minimized. 
Ghana’s relative peace has been attributed to the localized and containerized 
nature of recurrent and protracted inter and intra-ethnic conflicts.  Oddly, most of these 
conflicts have to with issues related to this second tier of power. For, the issues that 
generate, sustain, and episodically trigger the outbreak of violence are chieftaincy 
succession, land ownership and tenure, and disputes over ethnic boundaries. All these 
squarely fall within the cocooned space of the traditional authority systems.  
Paradoxically, also, Ghana’s ability to withstand the political stresses in her 
history and to rebound from the brinks of violent conflicts is attributed to the rootedness, 
stability, and trust that these same traditional institutions bring to the body politic of the 
nation. More than half of Ghana’s 57 years of independence has been under military rule, 
where the preceding constitutions were suspended or otherwise rendered non-operational. 
Therefore, much as the constitutions over time have elements that reduce interethnic, 
inter-regional and political tensions, they cannot be said to be the sustaining and 
stabilizing factor in Ghana’s ability to avoid national level violent conflicts since 
independence. Conversely, for all the times that the constitutions have not been 
operational, the traditional institutions have provided the only form of stability and hope. 
As a respondent noted, “…when coups happen you see the constitutional body collapsing 
but the substratum [the traditional authority structure] is firmly in place; the same applies 
to our economy; when the formal economy is not doing too well, Ghanaians are able to 
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exist (Interview 205, 29 October, 2014) because of the strength and rootedness of the 
informal economy.  
 
Super Ordinate Categories (SOC) 
 
The discussion of the findings thus far illustrates the extent to which each of the 
four categories of factors and their subcategories have contributed to Ghana’s current 
state of peace. We have also highlighted the limitations of these factors as standalone 
categories for explaining why Ghana has avoided descent into violent conflicts. Each 
category with their associated subcategories constitutes systems of engagement in and of 
themselves. But as noted, none of the categories can lay sole claim to creating and 
sustaining Ghana’s peace.  
Hence, the current state of Ghana’s peace is the product of the net effect of the 
interactions within and between the four categories and their sub components. In other 
words, the four categories must be interconnected in some way to be able to produce a 
result that is greater than the sum of the results of the individual subcategories 
(Bertalanffy, 1969; Meadows, 2008). This “interconnectedness, [is] the relationships that 
hold the elements together”  (Meadows, 2008, p. 13) and ensures that the yins and yangs 
of their interactions nonetheless produce  the “steady state” (von Bertalanfy, 1969) of 
negative peace that Ghana finds herself in. This state of steady negative peace must be 
such that “… the composition of the system remains constant in spite of continuous 
exchange of components” (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 159).  
In other words, even if one set of categories of actions slip in and out of the action 
matrix over time, the net effect should still be the same, since the other components will 
be able to make compensatory adjustments to the loss of contribution from the 
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component that is out of service. For instance, if conflict regulatory subsystems of the 
state such as the Electoral Commission and the Judiciary are failing to uphold the peace 
of Ghana in one way or the other, other components of the peace sustenance mechanism 
will compensate for this temporary dissonance to ensure the state of peace is maintained.  
For this to happen, however, definable values, rules, and regulations or the “system 
stock” (Meadows, 2008) must be capable of providing adequate and timely “… signals 
that allow one part to respond to what is happening in another part” (Meadows, 2008, p. 
13).  
These values, rules, and regulations that comprise the intangibles of the system, 
are traceable to the religious and cultural foundations of the Ghanaian society. These two 
components, then, constitute the Super Ordinate Categories of the combination of factors 
and forces that govern Ghana’s ability to maintain its state of negative equilibrium of 
peace. The constitutive elements of these Super Ordinate categories and how they operate 
to provide effective governance to Ghana’s state of steady negative peace equilibrium are 
taken up next.  
 
Super Ordinate Category 1: Polyroute, polyvalent monotheism 
 
Respondents in this study have consistently highlighted the centrality of religion 
in the lives of Ghanaians. Ghana, they emphasize, is a religious country, with more than 
90% of its population subscribing to one faith tradition or the other. The acclaimed 
religious nature of Ghana is consistent with what obtains in other countries on the 
continent.  As one writer has observed, “Everywhere on the continent, the bond between 
religion and society remains strong” (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67). The foundations 
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of this bond are to be found, not in the new forms of religion that now dominant the face 
of Africa, but in the beliefs, values, and traditions of Indigenous African Religions.  
 
Indigenous African Religion – The Base for Ghana’s Spirituality  
 
Christianity and Islam, which together account for 88% of Ghanaians as their 
adherents, are both imported religions that did not come to meet a faith vacuum in their 
host communities on arrival. On the contrary, they have been grafted onto deep rooted 
and very vibrant faith foundations of indigenous African Religions (IARs).  Belief in a 
Supreme Being who can only be approached through the intermediation of objects of His 
creation or objects of nature considered as lesser gods; recognition of the vivant 
interconnectedness between the material and the spirit worlds; constant awareness of the 
sustained interest of the dead in the temporal affairs of the living; and the ability of the 
ancestors to exact punishment and confer rewards for current behaviors, among others, 
constitute the fundamental tenets of faith for all IARs. These beliefs underwrite the 
values that govern individual and collective behavior in all societies.  
Hence, Christianity and Islam have not supplanted these tenets; they are 
superimposed belief systems that often serve to clarify or justify the beliefs and practices 
of IARs; or in other ways, reinforce the relevance and validity of their creeds and 
practices. Alternatively said, Christianity and Islam, and all foreign religions, for that 
matter subsist very strongly on the sap of Indigenous African Religion (IAR), which still 
wields paramount influence on the lives of Ghanaians. This is in consonance with the 
reality that irrespective of the religion of practice that Ghanaians, and all Africans for that 
matter, profess their values and worldviews are still grounded in and governed largely by 
the tenets of IAR. As Houphouet-Boigny is noted to have remarked, all Africans, “From 
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African archbishops to the most insignificant Catholic, from the great witch doctor to the 
most insignificant Moslem, from the pastor to the most insignificant Protestant, we all 
have an animist past” (Houphouet-Boigny cited in Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 67). 
This animist past or innate religious tenets of IAR creates a common base from 
which Africans engage in and with the world around them. Its tenets are the first 
principles that guide action, voluntarily or involuntarily. Indeed,  
The existence of this common base is so real that some anthropologist 
question whether imported religions – Christianity and Islam – have really 
affected African ancestral beliefs or given Africans different ways of 
understanding the contemporary societies in which they live (Etounga-
Manguelle, 2000, p. 67).  
 
At any rate, for the open-minded adherents of any of the modern faith traditions, 
the tenets of IAR are often not considered incompatible with those of the imported faiths. 
For instance the belief of Catholics in the intercessory powers of saints on behalf of the 
living equates to the intercessory role of the ancestors in IARs in mediating with the 
Supernatural Being or lesser beings for blessings, rewards, or the warding off of evils. 
The belief of other Christian sects in the power of pastors to invoke blessings, healing, or 
ward off imminent evil, mirrors Muslims’ recourse to Mallams and Imams for similar 
celestial interventions in temporal affairs. In turn, and both the Christian and Muslim 
practices map directly onto the IAR’s use of its priests and mediums for similar 
interventions.  
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Under such circumstances, boundaries between the fundamentals of the three 
major faiths – Christianity, IAR, and Islam - are either dissolved or rendered so porous as 
to permit joint or cross-faith consultations for celestial favors. As one respondent in the 
key informant interviews noted: 
If you look at Dagbon for instance which is very strongly Moslem the 
influence of tradition in the practice of Islam among Dagombas make 
them not very much different from the non-Moslem ethnic groups that 
surround them.  So their values, their way of life have been the same 
(Interview 3, 7 February, 214).  
 
Among the Dagara of the Upper West Region, also, Tengan points out that 
Christianity, particularly Catholicism caught on rapidly with them because they found 
strong similarities between the tenets of that faith and their own indigenous religion. 
Above all, it was easy for them to pick out and incorporate elements of the Catholic 
belief system into their cosmology centered on their indigenous belief systems (Tengan, 
2000). Indeed, one of the pioneer missionaries sent to convert the Dagaaba would later 
indicate that: 
It was not difficult to speak to them about God because …they believed in 
Him and had always done so as far back as they could remember in their 
collective history. […] The idea of God as Creator was not new to them 
either. He was the All-Powerful Supreme Being, Master of all Creation, 
whom they respected … (McCoy, 1988, p. 63) 
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Ghanaians therefore see nothing wrong when Christians and Muslims pray for 
peace of the nation because in the minds of Ghanaians, institutional religion creates no 
barriers for the practice of the deep seated faith, which is the vertico-horizontal, personal, 
and ritually unrestrictive faith that IARs instill. Under this world view, there is one God, 
but there are many ways to getting to Him; and all ways are covalent, depending on your 
situation at any time. Therefore, irrespective of debarment by their official adopted faith 
traditions, most Ghanaians believe it is valid for a Christian seeking answers to a life 
question to consult an Imam or a traditional spiritualist, just as it is valid for a Muslim 
seeking healing for an ailment to go to a healing service led by a Christian pastor. Hence 
it is common at mixed faith functions and meetings, from the community to the national 
levels,  to have Christian, Muslim, and traditional African religious prayers said serially; 
with all present responding to the prayers in the manner of their respective religions. In 
times like this both Muslims and Christians would bow down their heads and respond to 
the prayers of either faiths with the Amen or Ameen; and, as the Muslims lift up their 
palms to their faces to make the sign that concludes their prayer, the Catholics make the 
sign of the cross.  
Under the circumstance, not only is it possible for practitioners of the two faiths 
to cohabitate in the same space; religious tolerance becomes a matter taken for granted. 
This implies religious absolutism is suppressed. Instead, interfaith inclusivity and 
accommodation is the norm. Hence what dyadic thought systems would label as 
syncretism, the polyvalent thought systems of the Ghanaian society finds very normal 
expressions of their belief in one Supreme Being who can be approached through many 
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routes. Each and every institutional religion then is seen as one of the means, but not the 
only means to an end.  
This concept of polyroute monotheism – belief in one Supreme Being, but many 
routes to reach out to him or her – means in the IAR worldview, there are no societal 
restrictions or compulsions to adhere to any one faith. Traditionally then, just as members 
of families are free to join political parties of their choice, they are also free to practice 
any faith of their choice. Hence, despite the emergence of some degree of family 
intolerance to religious pluralism as a result of the newer religions, many Ghanaians are 
still able to freely choose and follow the faith of their choice. In short, “…we do not have  
what I will call religious fanaticism or bigots in this country - people that hold strong 
views of their religion; [that] apart we see ourselves as brothers first” (Interview 212, 9 
December 2014).   
This is what has made intermarriages between people of different faiths possible, 
as respondents have reported in this study. Religious tolerance remains a cherished ideal 
among Ghanaians. This is why recent events around the demand of Muslim students for 
rights of worship and the right not to attend Christian religious services in Christian 
schools have not garnered widespread support. On the contrary, religious leaders on all 
sides rallied round in attempts to find non-confrontational solutions to the issue, under the 
auspices of the National Peace Council. Many have cautioned calm as they describe the 
issue as alien to the Ghanaian politico-cultural and religious landscape.  
 
Values of Faith as the Foundation for Peace in Ghana 
 
In chapter 4, several respondents captured the fundamental principle of the 
Ghanaian religiosity encapsulated in the axiom of “Fa ma Nyame” – give it to God; the 
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saying which epitomizes the total dependence on God to provide everything. It is 
essential, however, to emphasize that spirituality must not be confused with religiosity, or 
the ritualistic aspects of being spiritual. Spirituality goes beyond ritual religion to include 
the belief in the innate disposition of all persons to be good and to demonstrate that 
through a willingness to sacrifice their own desires in order to be good to others. The 
respondent in Interview 210 provides a good summary of the Ghanaian spirituality 
behind this apparent self-abandonment to or refuge in the divine that is embodied in the 
“Fa ma Nyame” philosophy when he notes that:  
In Ghana we say “Fa ma Nyame;  b y yie”, to wit, let us give it to God; 
it shall be well.  That has also been a very important cultural practice in 
our system – [the attitude] that God will deal with it in his own time. 
[…this is] the issue of the spirituality aspect which grounds people in 
something beyond this world.  These are some of the things I will say we 
need to watch.  So far these are what has held us together. 
 
Interview 201 already referenced, this God-centered “…attribute of Ghanaians” 
conditions total reliance on God for answers to whatever they believe they cannot control. 
Rather than rely on their human capacities and “…go further to explore, we don’t want to 
get any scientific explanation; we just revert to God, leave it to God and that shows the 
extent to which religion has influenced the attitudes of most Ghanaians. That [attitude] is 
very important in looking at why Ghanaians have been seen generally to be peaceful” 
(Interview 201, 15 October 2014).  
This total reliance on divine providence to fill the gaps in their human needs 
dovetails into another foundational spiritual principle of “n ny hwee” –literally 
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meaning, this is nothing; it does not matter. Under this principle, Ghanaians are consoled 
or entreated to let whatever has happened go, even if there is no hope of divine 
interventions to right wrongs for them. Closely associated with this is another principle 
that exhorts patience and forbearance - huru a b dju, to wit, whatever boils will 
definitely cool down.  
Rather than representing attitudes of fatalism, hopelessness, helplessness, or 
abdication from personal responsibility, recourse to these exhortations have considerable 
significance and impact on how Ghanaians individually and collectively deal with crisis 
situations that they encounter. First and foremost, invocation of these principles has a 
therapeutic effect on those minded to accept them as ways of managing the crisis that 
confront them. For instance, rather than take matters into their own hands or rely on 
human means to resolve a conflict, the recourse to divine intervention under the Fa ma 
Nyame principle takes the conflict resolution process out of human hands and places it in 
that of the divine. Leaving it to God in this way places no obligation on the offended to 
seek redress, by whatever means, on this earth. In this way, Fa ma Nyame fosters 
disengagement from the conflict situation and has the potential to elicit reciprocal 
disengagement and abandonment of the course of violence or reprisals to the divine from 
the opposite side. In other words, the “Fa ma Nyame [principle] … leads us to adopt the 
let sleeping dogs lie attitudes and mindsets; making us not to pursue things that which 
otherwise would have escalated conflict situations” (Interview 218, 13 December 2014). 
Hence, recourse to any acts that can escalate the violence is averted in this way.  
The “n ny hwee” principle, on the other hand, characterizes a predisposition to 
forgiveness, or the “… willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, condemnation, 
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and subtle revenge toward an offender who acts unjustly” (Enright & Human 
Development Study Group, 1996, p. 108). Faith is the foundation of this principle since 
“…persons initiate and choose to forgive because granting forgiveness is congruent with 
their personal or religious beliefs” (Amour and Umbreit in Umbreit & Armour, 2011, p. 
233). This predisposition to forgiveness is closely linked to the other two spiritual 
principles, the first of which has been discussed above.  
The last principle invokes patience, tolerance, and forbearance in times of 
conflict. Rather than use violent confrontations, Ghanaians are exhorted to use the 
gradual incipient approaches to change – based on the principle that “ huru a b dju” – 
to wit, whatever boils will definitely cool. huru a b dju then invokes patience as it 
literally points out that since whatever boils will definitely cool at some point, all one 
needs to do is to patiently wait for the right time for the right temperatures that ensure 
situations have calmed down before one can engage in any effort at reconciliation.  
The Akan renditions these principles have their equivalence in the other 50+ 
languages that coexist in Ghana. For instance, among the Dagara of the Upper West 
Region, “ huru a b dju” principle finds expression in the symbolic and ritualistic use 
of water and ashes in conflict mediation and trauma healing processes. These elements 
have very strong symbolic significance that convey the import of the Akan articulation of 
the same principle. Water douses fire and cools down anything that is hot, including 
tempers and anger. It is therefore the symbol of pacification; and its ritual use is always 
designed to convey and inculcate this reality among the feuding parties or for the 
traumatized person. Ashes are the products of fires that have cooled down. Their ritual 
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use in conflict mediation and trauma management convey the same principle that 
whatever is hot can and will eventually cool down, like the ashes.  
These worldviews are counterintuitive to the principle of striking while the iron is 
hot. For attempting to solve conflicts that way can only knock the process out of shape 
into an escalating spiral.  Nonetheless, they have informed the way Ghanaians choose to 
manage their personal and national conflicts. We have cited the examples of how 
Ghanaians have chosen to play by and use the rules, however defective, to make change 
happen, rather than fighting the rules; the overwhelming vote for the 1992 Constitution, 
despite its defects being an archetypical case to cite.  
Respondents, however, cautioned that while such faith foundations remain very 
critical to Ghana’s peace, there is a danger coming for the newer religious sects which are 
preaching the gospel of prosperity to the neglect of the transcendental rootedness that 
faith traditions such as IAR and the original tenets of both Christianity and Islam 
preached. One respondent believed that as long “As we reinforce these things [IAR 
values] then we can hold the peace together.  The moment we do not (jumps), for 
instance, some Churches are preaching prosperity and people are having faith more in, if 
I prosper, if I have material things, then I am ok” (Interview 210, 21 November 2014). 
This, indicated, is dangerous.  Probed on this view, he pointed out that the danger 
inherent in the gospel of prosperity is that: 
The message going out now is rather preaching anti-Christ, anti-Religion, 
i.e. you are blessed when you are prosperous.  It does not matter which 
means by which you make it.  Some of the Church Leaders themselves 
and their opulent life styles, and some people now get the sense that they 
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are just fleecing the poor. The moment people begin to lose faith and trust 
in these Institutions; where else do you turn to?  If I do not take matters in 
hand, there is nobody else to do it (Interview 210, 21 November 2014).  
 
In brief, religion may have held Ghanaians together and enabled them to navigate 
through challenging political and economic times without recourse to violence. However, 
that faith foundation is under erosion from the individualistic gospels of prosperity that 
are undermining the traditional emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. If that 
view supplants the traditional values of we before I, then the structural integrity of a 
critical pillar of Ghana’s peace would have been seriously compromised. When that 
happens, the peace that Ghana has, however, tenuous, cannot be expected to hold for 
long.  
 
Faith in Practice - Religious Leaders Following the Lead 
 
IAR is a lived religion; not an occasional, closet ritual that one goes through. It is 
not a dichotomized private affair devoid from one’s public life; faith must manifest in the 
public lives of its adherents. Consequently, adherents are expected to live out the tenets 
of their faith, as embodied in the values, beliefs, and practices it espouses, at all times. In 
the view of IAR, “Every activity [is] a religious exercise and the individual [is] left to 
relate to his or her maker according to how it satisfied the spiritual and material life” 
(Quashigah, 2009). Indeed, because “…religious beliefs and practices permeate all 
aspects of life of the Ghanaian [the] ... homo ghaniensis (a Ghanaian) is a homo 
radicaliter religiousus - a radically religious man – religious at the core of his being” 
(Quashigah, 2009). 
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This influence of IAR is carried into the newer religions – Christianity and Islam. 
Social dissonance occurs when belief is not mapped onto practice. To minimize this, it 
becomes incumbent on religious leaders not only to preach what they belief; they must 
also practice what they believe and lead their folk to do the same. Therefore, if peaceful 
coexistence of different people, accommodation, patience, tolerance, and peace is what 
they preach, they feel the pressure of duty to step out of their pulpits and prayer bays to 
intrude into the public sphere to speak truth to power on behalf of their followers, and to 
engage the public sector actors in ways that create the enabling environment for their 
congregations to live out their beliefs. In this world view, the concept of separation of 
church and state is considered a false dichotomy that should be jettisoned in toto. Little 
wonder then that Church leaders and some scholars have reiterated the inalienable right 
of the church to participate in national politics, arguing that “We are clear in our minds, 
that the church has a valid case to be involved in the affairs of the State in all aspects 
including national politics.” (Kudajie & Mensah, 1991, p. 33). 
The demands to make faith manifest in both the private and public lives of citizens 
mean religious leaders in Ghana can only follow the lead of their congregations in the 
quest for peace and harmony in a multicultural, multi-faith environment. Subcategory 3.5 
already highlighted the role that religious leaders played, overtly or covertly, to direct the 
ship of state towards nonviolent resolution of national crisis. As one respondent noted, 
“…in fact the least provocation in the country [and] quickly you find the Christian 
Council, the Moslem Council, all these other groups, bishops and others coming to 
register their concerns and all that and making appeals left and right for peace to prevail” 
(Interview 201, 15 October 2014). Giving more specific examples, a respondent from the 
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civil society network who has been very closely associated with the leadership role of 
faith leaders in national crisis would emphasize this critical role when he noted that, in 
this incessant search for peaceful means of resolving conflicts, especially the political 
ones: 
There are life players involved - Cardinal Turkson, [and other] Eminent 
[religious] people who are part of the National Peace Council, the kind of 
work they did behind the scenes, is unknown to most Ghanaians.  He 
[Cardinal Turkson] is interested in the work.  Even from the Vatican he 
calls to find out where we are with what we are doing.  He is championing 
the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC); how far we had gone. 
 
Faith leaders have the courage to enter into and exercise such leadership functions 
in the political realm, which normally should not be their arena of play, because they 
know they have the backing of their congregants and that they have the responsibility to 
speak truth to power on behalf of not only their sects, but the entire nation. It is this 
knowledge that gives the National Chief Imam the grounding to address all Ghanaians in 
the period leading up to the announcement of the Supreme Court verdict in respect of the 
Election Petition that the opposition brought against the 2012 Presidential Polls. His 
exhortation to the nation was: 
Fellow Ghanaians, let us all be calm and kneel before Almighty Allah 
again as we did in 2012 for peace after the final verdict at the Supreme 
Court and as we are waiting for the verdict we should try to make up our 
minds to accepting whatever comes out of the court and also know that 
Ghana is first always before anything else” (Sharubutu, 2013).  
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When he addressed the nation in this way, the Chief Imam knew that it is not only 
members of his Islamic sect, nor Muslims of all sects alone who would  be paying 
attention; he was assured that the Christian majority in the country as well would listen 
and heed that call. Similarly, when Christian leaders speak, they speak to all, not their 
own alone. And, Ghanaians heed the exhortations of their religious leaders because they 
see the prophetic voices of the religious leaders as a guide to moral behavior for public 
officeholders. But as Interview 210 cautioned, this moral legitimacy that religious leaders 
derive from the entirety of the Ghanaian society will last only as long as they are seen to 
be championing the collective interest. That legitimacy will self-erode if the current trend 
towards the gospel of prosperity paves the way for faith leaders to lead opulent lifestyles 
at the expense of their poor and suffering congregations (Interview 210, 21 November 
2014).  
Ghanaians “…have a lot of trust in what their religious leaders say, […] and … 
there is a lot of trust in the faith-based organizations and institutions” (Interview 4, 12 
February, 2014) that they represent. Therefore, religious leaders have been and continue 
to be key bastions to Ghana’s democracy and peace. In the main, they are seen as honest 
brokers, even if some of them have been labeled with political colors of one party or the 
other. They must do everything to retain the legitimacy and trust that their followers have 
in them. Above all, they must justify this trust through active, non-partisan, and proactive 
leadership and guidance to their folk in how they might constructively engage with the 
state to ensure that faith inspires actions in the public domain and guides the ship of state 
towards the fulfillment of the common good. If religious leaders in Ghana lose their 
neutrality, credibility, and get sucked into the highly partisanized and politicized public 
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discourses, Ghana would lose a central beam of its peace architecture. At that point, its 
ability to resist a descent into the abyss can no longer be guaranteed.  
 
 
Super Ordinate Category 2: Intercultural Openness to Accommodation, 
Incorporation, and Identity Dissolution 
 
The predisposition to war or peace in any society is a function of the values, 
beliefs, behaviors, and practices of the society. Hence, the peace architecture must be 
built on a solid foundation or sub structure that has a high conflict bearing capacity. That 
capacity lies in the psycho-social infrastructure such as faith, culture, social networks, 
intercultural accommodation and other intangibles that constitute the elements that create 
and sustain the conflict bearing capacity. Without this, no amount of investments in peace 
infrastructure can stand.  
Adams (1995) defines a culture of peace in the following words:  
A culture of peace consists of values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of 
life based on nonviolence, respect for human rights, intercultural 
understanding, tolerance and solidarity, sharing and free flow of 
information and the full participation of women (Adams 1995, p. 16 in 
Ratković & Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 11) . 
 
Boulding (2000) adds that this culture also depends on the contextual or 
“…institutional arrangements that promote mutual caring and well-being as well as an 
equality that includes appreciation of difference, stewardship, and equitable sharing of 
the earth’s resources among its members and with all living beings” (p. 1). This culture of 
peace also includes larger concerns for the environment, collective security, the creation 
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of safety nets for the weak and vulnerable in society. A culture of peace is an active, ever 
changing process that requires the cultural participants to constantly engage  in the 
“…shaping and reshaping of understandings, situations, and behaviors in a constantly 
changing lifeworld, to sustain well-being for all”(Boulding 2000, p. 1 in Ratković & 
Wintersteiner, 2010, p. 12).  
Ghana is blessed to have these characteristics engrained in the collective psyche, 
values, and beliefs of the ethnic groups that constitute the country. These in turn 
underwrite the personal and collective attitudes, behaviors, and practices of the 
individuals that move the country towards peace more than toward violence. Though 
weak, Ghana’s public institutions strive to live by these tenets as well. Hence, Ghana’s 
successful management of the ethnic, regional, religious, economic, and other forms of 
political and social diversities of its population is founded on the culture of peace 
inherent in the socialization processes of all ethnic groups, as well as, the commitment of 
its institutions to play by the rules, even if imperfectly.  
Additionally, respondents in this study have frequently cited the spontaneous and 
successful incorporation of ethnic groups in Ghana through intermarriages between 
ethnic groups, faith traditions, regions, etc. as attributes of the culture of Ghanaians to 
embrace the other. We cited the existence of family or friendship safety nets used to 
mollify the effects of the failure of national economy and by extension, government’s 
failure to cater for the weak and vulnerable in society as important ingredients of Ghana’s 
culture of peace. The gelling effects that the freedom of movement of people and capital 
within Ghana brings to the incorporation of Ghanaians into any community they choose 
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to settle in are examples of how Ghanaians cherish and embrace diversity. All of these 
constitute the intangible threads of the culture that help weave the peace of Ghana.  
This study highlights the fact that there are many contributory and interacting 
parts that account for Ghana’s ability to maintain the steady state of negative peace.  
Therefore, any attempt to isolate any of the elements as the major contributor; 
proportionately attribute Ghana’s peace to the elements in isolation of each other; or 
establish some rank ordering of the relative importance of the contribution of each 
element to Ghana’s peace can only obfuscate the nested and mutually reinforcing nature 
of what makes Ghana peaceful. Above all, there is a great risk of missing out on how that 
peace is actually created. For it is not the elements standing or acting alone that create the 
peace; it is the totality of the synergistic interactions between the elements that create 
something bigger than the sum of the parts of the elements.  
Consequently, no one component can adequately explain Ghana’s peace. As von 
Bertalanffy points out, the essence of the saying that “‘the whole is more than the sum of 
parts’ is simply that constitutive characteristics are not explainable from the 
characteristics of isolated parts” (1969, p. 55). For instance, to isolate the separate effects 
of religion, culture, or education on an individual religious leader’s decision to wade into 
the public sphere, as it were, and engage in actions, solicited or unsolicited, that have 
helped to create the peace in Ghana will be misleading at best. For, the action of an 
individual may be the product of that person’s cultural, religious, and educational 
upbringing that makes his or her predisposition act in the way they do greater than any 
one of these factors alone could have produced. This is what would explain, for instance, 
why people who have been through the same school system; are members of the same 
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faith group; or members of the same ethnic group with the same kind of cultural 
upbringing would, nonetheless, find themselves on different sides of the positive and 
negative field forces that have sustained Ghana’s state of steady negative peace. 
Additionally, the process and rate of development of the collective trait of 
peacefulness among Ghanaians can be masked when the contributions of the different 
elements are viewed separately. As von Bertalanffy (1969), observes, “While we can 
conceive of a sum as being composed gradually, a system as total of parts with its 
interrelations has to be conceived of as being composed instantly” (p. 55). Hence, we 
cannot periodize the development of the different moments when the traits of Ghana’s 
peace-loving or conflict aversion nature congealed into the culture of peace that seems to 
hold Ghana together. In other words, for any individual or group that has been engaged in 
the search for peace in Ghana, it will be difficult to isolate and categorically say which 
factor came first as the initiator and which one came last as the capping factor for the 
peace in Ghana - is it culture, religion, influences from the educational system, or the 
practical dictates of economic interdependencies that triggered or sealed the development 
of Ghana’s culture of peace? The congelation process of these elements must have been 
instantaneous, practically sprouting out from the different seeds of peace inherent in the 
various elements that respondents have identified as sources of Ghana’s peace.  
The foregoing suggest that those studying the peace that Ghana has must be 
careful not to over attribute it to the recently established peace architecture, or the direct 
actions of the state. Conversely, state actors must be careful not to over ascribe the peace 
of Ghana to their policies, programs, and actions and thereby take the peace of the 
country for granted and behave in ways that would threaten the foundations of the values, 
358 
 
 
 
systems, and private actions that have shielded public anger from the state. On the 
contrary, they must strive to understand how the different elements have worked together 
to create the peace that Ghana has. This understanding must inform how leaders in the 
state system, traditional authority system, FBOs, CBOs, CSOs among others, can work 
together to uphold and strengthen the centerpieces that bind and bond Ghanaians 
together, namely, their faith and their culture. The day these pillars are left to collapse, 
that would be when Ghana would know no peace.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Emerging Theories 
 
General Conclusions 
 
Available literature holds out Ghana as an oasis of peace in a continent beset by 
violent and protracted conflicts. Findings from this study, however, indicate that 
Ghanaians are divided on whether their country is peaceful or not. They see Ghana’s 
peace only in relative terms – relative to other countries and/or when viewed from a 
global perspective without taking into account the violent and protracted conflicts that 
beset various parts of the country. Respondents were also reluctant to classify Ghana’s 
peace as positive or negative, arguing that Ghana’s peace can be seen as neither positive 
nor negative because it is difficult to tell the difference between negative peace and 
positive peace in the case of Ghana (Interview 207, 29 October 2014). In the view of 
respondents, there are a host of factors in a force field, some of which are pushing Ghana 
towards the abyss, while others are propping her up from descent into violent national 
level conflicts. Somehow, these forces always manage to self-neutralize, leaving Ghana 
in a steady state of negative equilibrium of peace – neither descending into violence nor 
progressing into sustainable positive peace. As respondents saw it, the range of forces 
falls into one of three categories – the positives, the negatives, and the grey. 
Among the positive factors, respondents hold that religion and culture provide the 
backbone support for the other reinforcing positives. Indeed, respondents gave religion 
and culture more credit for Ghana’s peace than the formal educational system, which 
conventional literature has extolled as being the backbone of Ghana’s peace. In 
particular, they exalted the influential role of Indigenous African Religion to the peace of 
Ghana, given its personalized, peaceful, open, and therefore accommodative overture to 
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other faiths and traditions. Its beliefs, values, and practices, are ample and tolerant 
enough to accommodate those of other faiths.  
Although adherents of Christianity and Islam numerically outnumber those who 
profess to the IAR, the latter still has pervasive influence on the world views of 
Ghanaians of all faiths as its tenets still underwrite social values, beliefs, and behaviors. 
In the view of respondents, the overall influence of religion on peace derives precisely 
from the fact that Ghanaians find a lot of congruity between the deeper spiritual values of 
their respective current imported faiths – Christianity, Islam, or others – and the 
foundational values of African spirituality rooted in the Indigenous African Religious 
beliefs and practices. They debunked the belief that Ghana’s peace is attributable to the 
dominance of Christianity and/or Islam with pointers to the fact Rwanda, Burundi, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among others, have predominantly Christian 
populations as well,  and yet they experienced some of the most brutal and protracted 
violent conflicts in Africa. Similarly, most of the conflict hotspots currently ravaging in 
Africa are either in countries that self-identify as Islamic or ones that have significant 
Moslem populations.  
Set in a nested relationship with religion, shared cultural values across all ethnic 
groups in Ghana were also cited as key pillars to Ghana’s peace. Family, clan, and ethnic 
bonds retain strong transactional value in the socioeconomic and political lives of 
Ghanaians. Socio-political and economic organizations of all ethnic groups emphasize 
collective property ownership, and shared responsibility for ensuring the common good. 
Traditional values frowned on private gain at the expense of the public good. Hence 
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traditional social safety nets ensured that those who have, support those who do not. This 
serves as a natural bonding factor within and between families.  
At the interethnic level, the openness of the cultures of all ethnic groups in Ghana 
to embracing ethnic and religious diversity have reinforced the automatic integration and 
incorporation of ethnic groups across cultures, especially through the practice of cross-
identity conjugal relationships. This openness to others has not only encouraged 
extensive permanent and cyclical migration of persons and capital across all regions; it 
has enhanced economic interdependencies between ethnic groups. This, in itself, has 
become a stitch for the peace of Ghana.  
Respondents repeatedly voiced that Ghanaians, for practical and spiritual reasons, 
are welcoming to strangers. They also abhor the shedding of blood. Put together, these 
two factors have promoted intercultural comingling of people, interethnic 
accommodation, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence of Ghanaians. In furtherance of 
these, the traditional palaver concept, with its emphasis on let’s sit down and talk 
(Interview 5, 14 February, 2014), has also been recognized as an important cornerstone of 
Ghana’s cultural preference for the use of dialogue over violence to resolve conflicts. 
This attribute has projected itself into the public sphere in the modern state system.  
Culture is rooted in history, and that history continues to guide interethnic 
engagements in the postcolonial state. Historical interethnic social relationships and 
politico-military and security alliances have been cited as an important stitch for Ghana’s 
peace. In particular, the existence of pre-colonial military alliances between ethnic groups 
located in the key cardinal points of the country – the Dagombas in the north, the 
Ashantis in the center, the Anlos in the south east, the people of Edina (Elmina) in the 
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south-central, and the Nzemas in the south west, is a factor cited as an important 
historical thread that still functions to keep the participant ethnic groups bound together. 
The concomitant conjugal alliances often transformed into mutual defense pacts, as well 
as, treaties of non-aggression between the key ethnic groups that, in contemporary 
popular view are political rivals, retain their subtle but powerful force of unity. 
Within this frame, the centrality of Ashanti as the organizing and unifying factor 
in creating military and conjugal alliances between the dominant regional blocs of ethnic 
groups has been key in building a network of crossethnic alliances between large ethnic 
states in the pre-colonial era. In other words, rather than using its military might to be a 
dispersal force, antagonizing the other ethnic groups, Ashanti practiced and promoted 
intercultural integration and incorporation within its militaro-security structures, enabling 
all to be part of its greater empire without overt coercion. These historical memories of 
alliances, reinforced by intermarriages, have run as the background rules and regulations 
or software that govern interethnic engagements in the public sphere. This is what has 
given confidence to the view that no matter how much Ashantis and Ewes yell at each 
other in the public domain, they will never get to the point of going to war against each 
other (Interview 205, 29 October 2014).   
Other bilateral and multilateral interethnic relationships on the basis of chieftaincy 
lineage across regions in the north, such as exists between Dagbon, Mamprugu, Nanung, 
Wala, and some groups in Upper East Region, all claiming descent from Mamprugu, are 
important historical threads as well that tie these groups together underneath the surface. 
A shared ancestry, history, and socio-political organizational structure – the hierarchical 
structure of chiefs rotated along the systems of gates – are historical bonds that still have 
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contemporary relevance to them. Other interethnic threads such as the joking and 
friendship relationships prevalent largely in the north are key to maintaining a sense of 
sameness rather than difference among the ethnic groups in this part of the country. This 
helps in the interethnic incorporation, as people settle in different places across the 
country. Leaders seeped in this history find strength and reason from these deeper sources 
to enable them step up and out to champion the courses of peace in times of crises.  
The agential role of some political, religious, and traditional leaders in birthing 
and nurturing Ghana’s peace has also been highlighted. Very neutral, inclusive, and 
objective leadership of the chiefs in all regions played a critical role in rallying ethnic 
groups to support common courses in the legislative deliberations leading up to 
independence. In particular, the early recognition of the economic interdependencies that 
existed between all parts of the country led to the creation of a leadership that 
championed the need for unity for the exploitation of the resources of the south for the 
mutual benefit of all. Hence, starting with willful unions between ethnic groups, as 
described in the various alliances that emerged, the immediate pre-independence era 
witnessed the striking of political concessions, especially between the north and Ashanti. 
This eventually led to the merger of the political parties representing the two geo-political 
spaces into what is today the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition in Ghana’s politics.  
In the run up to independence, the nascent nucleus of confederates of ethnic states 
that the aforementioned pre-colonial politico-military alliances created, and the inter-
ethnic consensus building that was emerging in the Legislative Assembly came under 
strain, when separatist ethnic independence movements threatened to tear it apart. The 
singular efforts and statecraft of Kwame Nkrumah in avoiding this break up stood out for 
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respondents in this study. Not only did he succeed in bringing Ashanti, the Northern 
Territories, and the Transvolta Togoland, into a unitary state structure with the Gold 
Coast; he successfully suppressed, through legal and constitutional means, the nascent 
attempts to erect political parties based on religion (the Moslem Association Party) and 
ethno-regional blocs such as the National Liberation Movement, (NLM) for Ashanti; the 
Northern Peoples Party, NPP; and the Togoland Congress Party, TCP.   
Though controversial in some respect, his redrawing of intra and interethnic 
boundaries in the post-colonial state served to disperse ethnic power bases and create the 
relevant spaces and distances that helped to mollify conflicts. For instance, the creation of 
the Brong Ahafo Region in 1959 separated the Brongs and the Ashantis, while the 
creation of the Upper Region in 1960 also split the Mamprugu state, resulting in the 
separation of the Kusasis from the Mamprusis. While these redefinition of ethnic 
boundaries did not altogether eliminate the conflicts, and in deed, those conflicts still 
exist, the effect of the creation of jurisdictional boundaries was to separate the influence 
of existing ethnic overlords over large portions of the country. This pre-empted the 
entrenchment of ethnic states, which would have hampered the creation and sustenance 
of the spirit of a unitary state.  
Since independence, other leaders have striven to keep the unitary state concept 
intact. In particular, the role of religious leaders from both Christian and Islamic faiths in 
proactively engaging in the public sphere, jointly or severally, to speak truth to power and 
demand that the right things be done to keep the peace of the country, stand out strongly 
in this study. Backing this are leadership roles of military and other security forces in 
creating and maintaining a professional and largely neutral security services that have not 
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lent themselves to political manipulations. Conversely, since 1993, citizens’ memories of 
military brutalities in the past, when they stepped in to govern the country under the 
banners of redeeming, liberating, revolutionizing, or otherwise provisionally leading the 
country out of chaos, have served as deterrence to any acts that would give the military 
course to re-enter politics via coup d’états. 
While women are recognized as playing important roles in securing the peace of 
Ghana, respondents believe such roles are largely behind the scenes and restricted to the 
nurturing, advisory, and custodial roles normally reserved for women in traditional 
patriarchal settings. Hence, women are not seen as frontline activists for peace, except 
when they champion intercessory prayer sessions seeking divine intervention for the 
peace of the country. Otherwise, they play the moderating, mediatory, and conciliatory 
roles behind the scenes. For this reason, their roles in the peace of Ghana are not seen in 
the public domain. Consequently, respondents had difficulties pinpointing what specific 
roles, if any, women have played in Ghana’s peace. This is in spite of the fact that women 
took an early interest in politics in the pre-independence era, helping to finance and 
organize Nkrumah's championing of the independence movement.  
Although accentuated ethno-regional economic disparities can be the cause of 
violence, in  Ghana, however, the existence of regional economic inequalities are not 
seen as deliberate acts of neglect, punishment, exploitation, or exclusion. On the contrary, 
the disparities are largely seen and blamed on colonial policies and natural or 
environmental disadvantages. Besides, the freedom of movement of persons from the less 
endowed areas to the richer natural resource zones of the country affords people from the 
poorer parts of the country – the north and the rural areas – access to the economic 
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resources of the more naturally endowed south of the country. This happens directly or 
indirectly through homeward income transfers from migrant workers. Additionally, 
though limited in scope and impact, there are nonetheless visible efforts of central 
government to redistribute resources in favor of the poorer areas. Therefore, the poorer 
segments of communities see no reason for regional or ethnic mobilization for violent 
inter-regional confrontations on the basis of perceived horizontal inequalities or 
interethnic deprivation.  
Finally, Ghana also benefits somewhat from the looking-glass self effect (Cooley, 
2010) . Her poster child position as a peaceful country predated the colonial era. Hence, 
right from colonial times, Ghana has been regarded as a model in different ways. It 
became the reference point for British colonial administration in Africa. The fact that she 
is even considered an oasis of peace is yet another model role conferred on her. In the 
view of respondents, this positive international perception of Ghana as a role model, and 
the respect she and her illustrious citizens have earned in international circles, makes her 
leaders and people want to behave in ways that conform to the expectations of the 
international community. Hence, Ghanaians feel some pressure to keep up this model 
image. In the view of respondents, it is this “noblesse oblige” (Interview 205, 29 October 
214) factor which makes Ghanaians not want to mar their positive reviews to date.  
On the negative side, respondents see contemporary politics, especially political 
exclusion, as posing a higher risk for pushing Ghana towards violent national level 
conflict than the horizontal inequalities in the distribution of development across geo-
ethnic regions. The duopoly that the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic 
Party enjoy in the country has so highly polarized the political environment that no single 
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issue of national significance can be discussed without evoking entrenched partisan 
positions. Consequently, politicians have failed to forge a unified range of national 
policies that would guide the governance of the country. On the contrary, the manifestoes 
of political parties have become the guide books for setting and pursuing the 
development agendas of the country in all spheres. As such, no sooner has a political 
party lost power than its manifesto and associated policies and programs are jettisoned, 
often in totality.  
Besides, appointments to ministerial positions and other public offices are carried 
out on partisan lines, and often without regards to the competence of the appointees. Even 
the allocation of development resources to different parts of the country are usually made 
through partisan lenses. These approaches do not foster unity, respondents observed.  
Hence, while political parties nominally provide the space for the jellying together of the 
interests of like-minded people from different ethnic groups, and to that extent, can be 
considered unifiers within the political sphere of the country, their modi operandi are 
sources of worry for Ghana’s peace.   Consequently, across parties and at the national 
level, the posturing of political parties is not considered a major unifier, since there is no 
national agenda that provides a common base for consensus building on national 
programs. As a result, political accountability is nonexistent as there is no nationally 
accepted standard for judging the performance of political parties in power. Instead, 
political parties in and out of power judge themselves by their own standards – their 
manifestoes and what they claim to have achieved. This only serves to further polarize 
and even trivialize important national discourse as the parties merely bicker over who has 
done or not done much of anything.  
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Additionally, respondents felt political parties are incapable of impacting 
positively on Ghana’s peace because they lack the organizational presence and depth 
across the country. The majority of them are organizationally weak and operationally not 
good examples of adherence to the democratic culture that they profess to champion. Of 
the 23 registered political parties in the country, only two, the NDC and the NPP have 
met the constitutional requirement of having physical presence and functional offices in 
two thirds (2/3s) of the districts in the country; are able to prepare and submit annual 
audited accounts; and are able to furnish the Electoral Commission with the expenditure 
returns on each candidate after every elections and furnish same with their locations, and 
physical addresses, within 90s of the conclusion of an election. The rest are noncompliant 
with the law and therefore, technically, should have been taken off the roll. Many exist 
only in name, and resurface only during elections. They are unable to sustain the 
articulation and championing of their own political agendas. Their officers often jump on 
the bandwagons of or get coopted to champion the agendas of one or the other main 
parties. Consequently the duopoly that has literally partisanized the country to crippling 
levels will continue for a long while.  
Beyond the parties, respondents have also faulted the political elite for failing to 
champion the common good of the country and the fostering of peace on a number of 
grounds.  In particular, respondents cited the tendency of the elite to seek private 
solutions to public problems. This, respondents averred, is one of the challenges to 
galvanizing the citizenry in ways that would move Ghana beyond the trap of negative 
peace equilibrium in which the country cyclically manages to stave off violent national 
level conflicts, while being incapable of finding more sustainable solutions that would 
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promote positive and sustainable peace. Beyond the procurement of private resources and 
services to circumvent the failure of the public sector to deliver same, a more insidious 
dimension of the concept of private solutions to public problems resides in the situation 
where citizens’ discontent against inefficiencies and perceived raging corruption in the 
public domain is individualized. According to this perspective, public outcries of civil 
society and faith based organizations against corruption have not translated into 
mobilizing the individual discontents into collectivized and purposive outrage. This is 
because ordinary citizens see no stake in the state, which is seen as an external entity to 
avoid or exploit.  
Besides, Ghana remains trapped in corruption partly because national discourses 
on corruption are quickly politicized and partisanized. This stifles the emergence of any 
form of unified leadership that has an agenda or mechanism for championing the fight 
against corruption. In the process, any possible group action against corruption is snuffed 
out. The individual Ghanaian resigns to living and let live those who have access to 
resources of the state to plunder as they can – a tacit subscription or reinforcement of the 
negative consensus ideology. It also reinforces political patronage as the means for 
redistributing national resources, as the foot soldiers and those who cannot directly access 
state resources wait for their patrons to kickback what they choose, to feed those who 
wait in queues to vote them into office.  
The foregoing surfaced the concept of negative consensus among explanations 
respondents offered for Ghana’s peace. According to this view, the political elite condone 
corruption because they are wont to indulge in same when they have access to state 
power and resources. For this reason, respondents believed another elite consensus to 
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keep out the military from returning to power supersedes the initial negative consensus as 
the primary organizing principle for elite agreement to avoid political conflict that might 
give the military an excuse to re-enter the political space. In other words, the elite have an 
agreement not to rock the boat so that they can have access to state resources when they 
can. As a respondent in the key informant interviews framed it in respect of the issued 
“…raised about the elite consensus, the elite believes in that and so the people who are 
leading political parties, who can use political parties as organizations to cause conflict 
are people who also believe in maintaining the status quo…” (Interview 9, 26 February, 
2014). 
The combination of the effects of elite consensus and the use of private solutions 
to manage public problems has produced the phenomenon of political entrepreneurism, 
since having access to political power is a sure way to get rich enough to circumvent the 
public problems. Consequently, people are willing to invest their money and time into 
making sure that they or their parties win the elections so that they can gain access to 
national resources from which they can benefit personally, ethnically or otherwise. This, 
respondents explained, is one of the reasons why young people coming straight out of 
school with no professional experience choose to go directly into politics. The pay-off is 
rapid and substantial as within months of accessing State power and resources such 
young people flaunt their wealth in houses in ostentatious lifestyles while his mates in 
school still have no job at all (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014). Such political careerism 
do not only stifle initiative, innovation, and the urge to achieve among the youth, it 
reinforces the sense of hopelessness and helplessness among those youth who cannot or 
do not want to get out of their poverty through this route. The frustrations that is 
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mounting among such youth, accordingly to respondents, is one of the “kegs of gun 
powder” (Interview 209, 19 November, 2014) visible around the country that is waiting 
to explode (Interview 207, 29 October, 2014; Interview 219 – 14 December, 2014; 
Interview 206, 29 October, 2014). 
For the middle class citizens and young graduates from the educational system 
who do not have the wherewithal to purchase private solutions; cannot access political 
office and national resources directly; or do not have the connections to do so indirectly; 
resignation to the fate of the situation and disengagement from the affairs of the state is 
what they resort to. For the adventurous ones, state exit through migration are the options 
open to them. Those who stay resort to what has become known as “kpa kpa kpa” – the 
phenomenon of being in constant movement around one’s environment, looking for 
anything to do, except stealing, to survive the economic hardships (Joy News, Nov 11, 
2014; Myjoyonline, 2015).  
Although in recent times, the middle class is beginning to engage in the public 
sphere to demand more responsive governance, accountability, and the economic 
dividends of the democratic dispensation, the depth, scale, and sustainability of such 
engagement remains suspect, given the demonstrated intransigence and recalcitrance of 
government in responding to the demands of the new middle class. Under the 
circumstances, apart from physical exit from the battle ground through migration, a  
return to the status quo ante -  finding private solutions to public problems - remains the 
fall back option for the frustrated elite. As respondent in Interview 9 captured it, “… 
people get frustrated about the system and either they leave the country or they say let me 
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stay in my own corner and do my own thing and make exactly the same thing … I drill a 
borehole, I buy a tanker, I buy water, etc.” (Interview 9, 26 February, 2014) 
A greater danger that this phenomenon engenders is the growing feeling among 
the youth that hard work and honesty do not matter; one only needs to engage in politics, 
get access to political resources, and make the most of the opportunity to enrich oneself, 
as noted above. This moral degradation, which is leading to a collective conscience 
defamation that holds that getting rich is good, irrespective of the means, has some 
respondents and national figures worried. They fear that this could be the break point for 
Ghana’s peace. Coupled with the winner takes all electoral system that Ghana has, and 
the tainted confidence in state institutions to guarantee free, fair, and transparent 
elections, respondents fear this approach to managing national resources can only lead to 
more intensified and violent contestations of polls – a development that can only break 
down the restraints that have kept Ghana peace.  
While regional economic disparities are not considered a high risk factor, other 
forms of economic disparities are. For instance, respondents have cited the economic 
marginalization and pauperization of the youth through unemployment in the midst of 
opulence displayed by political leaders and government officials as high risk factors for 
Ghana’s descent into violence. While they youth struggle with their unmet basic needs, 
they are equally aware of the unresponsive and unaccountable government systems and 
structures that facilitate or condone the misappropriation of public resources for private 
purses. They are increasingly exasperated by this and are beginning to demand 
accountability, sometimes in not so peaceful ways. Respondents cited examples of 
violent demonstrations in Ashiaman and elsewhere to illustrate this.  
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The political elite are aware of the security threat that the persistence of this 
situation poses to the country. The State therefore needs to demonstrate a higher level of 
commitment in managing the existing structural and systemic imbalances in the economy 
to eliminate the poverty-related violence in the social, economic, and political arenas. In 
the view of respondents, policies and programs that specifically target the growing 
number of unemployed and largely unemployable youth that are taking over the streets of 
the country in desperate search for means of survival, is crucially important to averting 
the descent into violence. Additionally, the ever widening gap between the few rich and 
the majority poor poses a danger for the emergence of a class-based violence. However, 
respondents did not see this taking the form of organized armed conflicts as in 
conventional or guerrilla wars any time soon. Rather it would manifest in increased rates 
of violent crimes, such as armed robbery, which would nonetheless undermine national 
security and the peace of Ghana.  
Finally, public confidence in state institutions to deliver non-partisan services is 
fast eroding. Despite continued public faith in Ghana’s governance structure, respondents 
noted that the institutions of state are weak, heavily politicized, and highly partisan in 
their management of public policy. Respondents cautioned that citizens’ resignation to, 
and tolerance of the weaknesses of public institutions does not amount to an indication of 
the strength of the institutions in maintaining the peace of the country. Paradoxically, it is 
rather the high degree of citizens’ tolerance for the failures of State institutions that must 
be credited with the semblance of peace the country has. In particular, respondents 
expressed fears about the breakdown of the rule of law due to corruption of the judiciary. 
In their view, when people no longer have confidence that they can get justice from the 
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courts, they will take the law into their own hands. They expressed similar sentiments in 
relation to the capacity of the Electoral Commission to reignite public confidence in its 
operations. Specifically, they expressed fear that in the next elections, people would seek 
to sort out all electoral disputes at the Polling Station level, as they have lost confidence 
in the ability of the Electoral Commission and Supreme Court to administer what they 
believe would be transparent and impartial decision on elections or deliver fair judgments 
should any electoral disputes wind up in court.  
With respect to the grey areas or risk factors that respondents identified as 
predisposing Ghana to the potential descent into violent conflicts; education came in for 
strong mention. While the contribution of education to Ghana’s peace is recognizable, the 
evidence suggests that its proportionality to other factors that have also contributed to 
Ghana’s peace seems to have been over hyped in the conventional literature. As 
respondents observed, it is kind of difficult to establish a direct relationship between 
education and peace. They noted that missionaries, both Christian and Muslim, did a 
good job in laying the solid foundations for quality education that emphasized both 
academic and character formation.  However, the evolution of the educational system 
after independence gradually de-emphasized religious and moral education. 
Consequently, much of the contribution of education to peace in the postcolonial state 
derives from incidental spin-offs of the effects of boarding schools; activities of students’ 
associational lives and, to a limited extent, the posting of teachers across ethnic 
boundaries, rather than the intentional acts of curriculum development and 
implementation.  
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The absence of any concrete policy or structured programs of peace education in 
schools lends credence to the non-intentionality of the educational system in building a 
culture of peace in the country. Perhaps the only evidence of a direct and intentional 
policy action that aimed to use the educational system as a unifying force for Ghanaians, 
according to a respondent, was Nkrumah’s debarment of the establishment of religious 
denominational schools meant solely for adherents of the particular faith. According to 
this viewpoint, Nkrumah forbade the setting up of such schools in order to liberalize 
access to education across faith lines. This ensured that the fostering of strong and 
compartmentalized religious identities did not emerge to supplant efforts at constructing a 
national identity or Ghanaianness that brought all citizens together, irrespective of region 
of origin, ethnicity, religion, or the type of school one attended (Interview 205, 29 
October 2014).  Beyond this, educational policymakers did very little else in the area of 
intentional educational policies and programs to carve out an inclusive national identity. 
As respondents pointed out,  the real history of the people of Ghana is either not taught in 
the school, or when it is, the content is so skewed as to produce imbalanced views of 
what makes Ghana what it is. Rather than promoting peace, such biased historical 
accounts have been the triggers of violent conflicts in the hotspots around the country.  
Even in the case of boarding schools, the fact that only a small percentage of 
Ghana’s population ever goes through the boarding schools system casts doubts on the 
leveraging effect of this subset within the educational sector as the catalyst for the peace 
that Ghana has. Conversely, respondents identified the “old boys and old girls” 
phenomena embedded in the post educational association life of alumni and alumnae of 
certain schools as a major contributor to the existence of the culture of negative 
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consensus among the educated elite. This, in their view, makes crony politics and 
political horse-trading behaviors the bane to the building of transparent and efficient 
governance institutions, systems, and procedures. Additionally, education that was once a 
social leveler is gradually losing its egalitarian effect due to the increasing differentials 
between the private and public school systems. People who attend the relatively more 
expensive and better equipped private schools are getting uneven head starts in life over 
children who are condemned to attend the poorly equipped and poorly managed public 
schools. Hence education which once created a level playing field for all, and gave equal 
chances of social mobility to all according to their innate abilities, is now becoming a 
social divider on the basis only of one’s conditions of birth, place of origin, social status, 
or financial abilities. This portends a risk for destroying the social cohesion that has held 
the country together.  
The failures of the educational system have also occasioned the youth bulge 
phenomenon, which presents a huge human and environmental security threat. Limited 
employment and income-earning opportunities for the poorly trained and ill-equipped 
youth exposes them to political exploitation. This then predisposes them to the use of 
violence as a route to meeting their economic needs, as referenced above.  A greater 
danger, respondents fear, lies in the risk that unscrupulous persons could easily exploit 
the poverty of the youth and use them as avant-gardes to import and deploy 
fundamentalist politico-religious conflict models into Ghana, to advance their personal 
agendae. This is highly plausible as the hope for better times, which once kept the 
tolerance levels of the youth high and restrained them from recourse to violence, is fast 
waning due to repeated unmet promises from political leaders. Hence, there is genuine 
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fear that the throngs of youth begging or hawking in the streets of Ghana’s cities today 
could become the violent adults of tomorrow. In the view of respondents, this is because 
while Ghanaians may have been patient and tolerant, their stress bearing capacities, 
especially for the youth, are being overstretched and the breaking point is very close. 
Concrete results from state policies and interventions must justify hope; otherwise hope 
dies, giving way to despair, and the recourse to violence as a way to manage differences. 
Religion that set the foundation for Ghana’s peace could well be its undoing as 
well, if incipient trends of religious fundamentalism are left to take root. Indeed, 
respondents in this study have debunked any theory of Ghanaian exceptionalism in 
religiosity. They have pointed out that other countries are equally, if not more religious, 
and yet, ironically, some of the most violent conflicts these countries have experienced 
have been prosecuted in defense of religion. Cautioning Ghana against any complacency 
that their religiosity and prayers can protect the country from those who wish to import 
violence, one respondent paraphrased an unknown source to state that, “they are none 
who do evil with great abandon as those who do it in the name of religion” (Interview 9, 
26 February 2014).  
In other words, given the right kind of retooling of their faith, those same people 
who “flock to the churches” (Interview 5, 14 February, 2014) and mosques could be the 
same ones wielding the guns and machetes against their co-citizens. Hence, apart from 
the fear established earlier in relation to the potential hijack and mercenarization of the 
desperate youth for political ends, respondents have cited the increasing voice and 
influence of the gospel of prosperity that newer versions of Christianity are preaching as 
a potential negative factor for Ghana’s peace. Similarly, they have cited recent agitations 
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from the Muslim community over rights of women to wear Islamic head gear while 
taking facial identification photographs or in public work places as inklings of incipient 
extremism.  
In the course of this research, media reportage and discussions on the demands by 
some Muslim youth to skip mandatory morning assemblies or prayer events in Christian 
schools they are attending have sparked considerable interfaith debates uncharacteristic 
of the culture of religious tolerance that Ghana has known. In particular, the presentation 
of these issues in various fora in the format of fights for religious freedoms portends a 
feeling of long accepted suppression that must now be thrown off. The foregoing 
episodes have raised fears of incipient religious fundamentalism on both Christian and 
Muslim fronts that could pose challenges to Ghana’s peace.  
Respondents observed that Ghanaians have a high conflict carrying capacity 
embedded in the rapid onset of collective amnesia. This makes people accept otherwise 
intolerable situations such as economic hardships and move on with their lives. An 
alternative explanation is that Ghanaians are used to the fact that they can’t expect 
anything good from governments. Therefore, they simply ignore government’s failures 
and inactions and move on with their lives. However, respondents have also cited this 
collective short memory and amnesia as a long term risk for violence. In their view, as 
long as serious defects in the governance institutions and systems are not dealt with but 
are swept under the carpet, they can only sustain a state of negative peace, at best. At 
worst, the issues would fester and blow up in more violent forms without warning.  
Finally, respondents have viewed the media in Ghana as a double-edged sword 
because it has the capacity to socialize people for peace or violence. Overall, the media 
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has played a positive and responsible role thus far. Ghana’s free print and electronic 
media, especially the airwaves, are serving as vents for public anger. However, 
respondents fear the unbridled and unscrupulous media reportage that some media houses 
carry out under the machinations of politicians creates highly flammable flashpoints of 
violent national level conflict.  The growing use of vulgar and violent language by 
politicians and their suffragans runs the risk of socializing the youth towards violence. 
The converse is also true; if only politicians can retool their use of language in the media 
to promote peace, violence can be avoided. Unfortunately, under the current trend of 
events, “…Ghana could be next in line for a state of political unrest if excesses in the 
Ghanaian media landscape are not checked” (Dadzie, 2014, p. 1). 
The foregoing all suggest that Ghana’s state of peace, however qualified, cannot 
be attributed to any one cause or set of causes. On the contrary, there are multiple 
centripetal and centrifugal factors in a field force that are acting for and against peace. 
Indeed, the same factor that promotes peace can also instigate a descent into violence, 
depending on how it is instrumentalized.  The examples of religion, education, and the 
media, to give a few cited in this study, provide insight into the multiplicity of uses to 
which such social instruments can be used for peace or for war. This is a pointer that the 
conventional unidimensional view of the instrumental role of such phenomena on peace 
and conflict risks missing their multi-alternate potentialities and how they might be 
retooled for peace or violence.   
Fortunately, this study points out that these instruments for social engineering are 
not metal-cast instruments; instead they are themselves malleable products that can be 
reworked and retooled to achieve purposes otherwise unimaginable. Similarly, they 
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should not be understood to be stand-alone instruments, totally different from other 
makes of the same instrument or even of other categories of instruments. As respondents 
have adduced, there is considerable congruence between the values of Indigenous African 
Religion and those of imported cultures, even if their scripts and rituals differ in form. 
Likewise, the congruities between cultural the beliefs and values of the different ethnic 
groups in Ghana are what have facilitated interethnic miscibility and incorporation.  
In the same vein, the study points out that peace is not a monolithic phenomenon 
under which countries can be neatly classified as peaceful or not peaceful; nor can the 
nature of the peace be simply dichotomized as negative or positive.  Peace is a relative 
construction embodying different shapes and hues, depending on the time, space, and 
perception of those who feel or do not feel it. In other words, peace perceived from the 
outside is not the same as peace perceived from within. In every context, there are bound 
to be nuances, localized or generalized, that caution against dyadic generalizations or 
categorization of countries as peaceful or not peaceful.  
Like a deep, calm, flowing river, peace is not built from a single source. It gathers 
its strength and vivifying force from the trickles of water from drains, rivulets, creeks, 
and streams that run into the tributaries that feed the mightiest of rivers. The waters from 
these various sources bring with them their flotsam and jetsam, as well as, the life giving 
minerals eroded from the soils and rocks on their way. The flora and fauna along the path 
of the river draw their livelihoods - water and minerals for their sustenance and growth – 
from the river as it meanders by, weaving together a beautiful vegetative landscape of 
peace for those who have an opportunity of a bird’s eye view.  Its cleanliness is as much 
a source of strength as its dirt. Both give life to the environment that feeds on the passing 
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river. But the degree of cleanliness or dirt may never be discerned from looking at the 
river from the banks. Only the flora and fauna within can tell, if they had a chance. 
 In this study, Ghanaians, perhaps, for their first time, have had a chance to talk of 
the peace that they experience. And the respondents have unequivocally stated that this 
peace has its hues and contours that the outsider may not fathom. It is culture and faith, 
not the state or its sponsored policies and programs, that constitute the two major 
tributaries that feed the river of peace; a river not so pure and not so dirty but whose 
inadequacies, nonetheless, sustain an environment of peace not so positive and not so 
negative. While those looking from the outside see peace flowing calmly along, 
Ghanaians do not agree that they are a peaceful nation or that peace is a calm and 
graceful one. The semblance of peace is tentative and fragile. There are lots of tensions 
and kegs of gun power concealed everywhere, to borrow the words of the respondent in 
Interview 212 that can flare up easily and plunge the country into national level violence. 
A common agreement, though, is that drawing their inspirations and motivations from 
both the positive and negative forces that underscore Ghana’s peace, individuals and 
institutions in Ghana have successfully managed to hold the fragile and unpredictable 
negative peace in a steady state since Ghana’s existence as a nation-state.  
This study has highlighted the centrality of culture and faith and their associated 
systems of belief and values, as well as, institutional actors that constitute the cords that 
hold Ghanaians together, given the failure of the state to do same. Whether via reliance 
on traditional safety nets to cushion each other from the effects of state failure; the use of 
private solutions to address public problems; escape from the failures of the public 
system through migration; or recourse to political entrepreneurism to find the means to 
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beat the hardships that state failure imposes on citizens, the evidence is that citizens are 
not waiting for the state to solve their problems. They have revived and retooled the 
essence of their indigenous knowledge systems and practices to circumvent the state’s 
inability to serve them. Directly or indirectly, citizens’ disengagement from the state 
undermines the legitimacy of the latter while reinforcing that of the traditional systems of 
socio-economic and political organizations.  The paradox then is that citizens’ 
disengagement from the public sphere to manage their affairs in the private realm seems 
to keep the machinery of state afloat, albeit in a precarious state.  
For ordinary citizens, therefore, the relevance of the Westphalian state system as 
the principal guarantor of social, political, economic, and human security for its citizens 
is called into doubt, as they can subsist beyond the bounds of its actions, using the 
multiple and different exit routes available to them, according to their situations in life. 
However, the escape hatches have their limitations, and indigenous crises management 
systems have their breaking point as well. Hence, as state failure continues and worsens, 
without a matched citizen re-engagement to get it back on track to fulfilling its 
responsibilities, the extended family systems will be hard put to manage the increased 
offloads of state responsibilities into the private realm.  
At that point, the strains of family reliance on members with some economic 
wherewithal could lead to increased individualism, as they abandon the social capital 
bonds of communitarianism, in favor of self-preservation. Between ethnic groups, 
increased competition for natural resources could lead to ethnic protectionism of their 
resources. The consequential escalation of the Darwinian situation of survival for the 
fittest in the competition for control of political power and the public purse, will 
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destabilize the fragile peace, as political conflicts escalate.  At that point, what has been 
the central cords for Ghana’s peace, religion and culture or ethnicity, may well become 
the rallying point for mobilizing the fighting forces. This is the fear and the warning that 
respondents in this study have expressed.  
 
Emerging Grounded Theories From Study 
 
This research tries to understand how and why Ghana is considered peaceful 
based on the expressed views and experiences of participants in the research, as well as, 
supplementary data on the subject from other sources. Charmaz (2006) identifies two 
categories of grounded theory – the constructivist and the objectivist categories. While 
the constructivist method follows the interpretive approach to theory generation, the 
objectivists lean on positivism as the frame for theory making. The analysis and synthesis 
of the various views and shades of opinion that the participants gave, and the comparison 
of same to other sources of data, including the researcher’s interpretation of the meanings 
the data from participants and other sources sought to convey, place the theory making 
for this research squarely in the domain of the constructivist tradition.  
While the research has made every effort to ground the emerging theories in the 
quantitative and qualitative data generated in the course of this research, as well as, in the 
supporting literature accrued along the line, ultimately, the theoretical perspective derived 
from the data “…depends on the researcher's view; it does not and cannot stand outside 
of it” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130). Since the emerging theories are interpretations of 
participants’ perceptions of how and why the various factors and forces they unearthed 
are crucial to Ghana’s peace, the theories offered below are by default larger and much 
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broader, perhaps, than how the research participants would have framed their 
perspectives in the form of a grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006).  
Timmermans and Tavory recall that the “…ultimate goal of grounded theory [is] 
the construction of new theories [using] creative process of producing new hypotheses 
and theories based on surprising research evidence” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 
170). To achieve this, however, requires a departure from the constraints of traditional 
inductive and deductive theorization processes, which generally begin with rules or cases 
that guide the theory making process. Instead, they invoke Peirce’s conception of 
abductive approach, which is “the only logical mechanism that introduces new ideas into 
a scientific body of knowledge” (in Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, p. 170). The approach 
provides both a theory-based and atheoretical approaches to research that requires that 
“researchers should enter the field with the deepest and broadest theoretical base possible 
and develop their theoretical repertoires throughout the research process” (p.180). With 
its emphasis on looking out for surprise findings in research, “Abductive analysis 
specifically aims at generating novel theoretical insights that reframe empirical findings 
in contrast to existing theories” (Timmermans & Tavory,  2012, p. 174). Thorough 
knowledge of the theoretical frames around the research question often lead to situations 
where “empirical contradictions” (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012, 175) emerging from the 
data as matched to existing theories provide the window for generating new, and 
previously unforeseen theories. 
The broad range of issues explored in this study lends themselves to both 
theoretical and atheoretical approaches to embracing surprises in the findings. The 
findings from the study have highlighted a number of cases where respondents’ views 
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discredited or otherwise devalued standing theories that have been used to explain why 
Ghana has defied the norm in Africa to remain largely peaceful. First, respondents 
expressed considerable ambivalence about whether or not Ghana is a peaceful country. 
Next, for those who affirmed that Ghana is peaceful, the reasons ascribed for this peace 
have discounted existing theories of why Ghana has managed to stave off descent into 
national violent conflict, despite having the same or similar historical, socio-political, 
economic, religious, and geo-ethnic tensions. In particular, respondents of the study point 
out that the institution of the national peace architecture is too recent to explain Ghana’s 
historical trail of avoidance of national level violence since the country came together as 
a unitary state.  
Similarly, respondents and complementary data available to the research both 
suggest that Ghana’s educational system that has been touted as a major contributor to the 
country’s peace lacks the evidence of policy intentionality to make it a deliberate 
instrument of peace. In particular, the evidence undermines the credibility and validity of 
the purportedly singular contribution of the boarding school component of the 
educational system to Ghana’s peace. Incidentally, the literature has exalted this 
component as an envied backbone of peace in Ghana. If the evidence effectively 
challenges the validity of the explanations of how Ghana’s peace has been achieved; 
what alternative theories then can emerge from  the various insights respondents gave for 
Ghana’s peace? 
 
Abducted Meso Theories Emerging From The Study 
 
Following the abductive model that Timmermans and Tavory have proposed, and rooted 
in the findings of this research, four tentative grounded theories pop up for this study. 
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The logic for their proposition and the tentative framing of the theories are detailed 
below. The specific theoretical formulations are italicized.  
 
Emerging Theory 1:  Sprouting the seeds of culture and faith in multi-identity 
relationships: 
We have seen how Ghanaians of different ethnic, cultural, religious, socio-
economic, and political backgrounds tend to cohabitate and cooperate within the same 
physical, socio-economic, cultural, and political spaces for mutually beneficial ends. 
Faith-based institutions, civil society organizations, citizens’ associations, among others 
have all provided platforms outside the state system for mutually beneficial economic 
engagements or collaborative efforts for engaging the state to ensure it creates the 
enabling environment that further the interests of the parties. Such ultra-state spaces also 
provide the platforms for consensus building among different groups for sustaining 
opportunities that enable them to make the best out of their private endeavors. It would 
seem then that When cultural and religious norms and values of different identity groups 
are mutually tolerant and accommodative, citizens find it easier to create, move into, and 
use collectively inhabited physical, socioeconomic, and political spaces, among others, to 
minimize the propensity to use of violence to resolve conflicts, while promoting 
cooperation, incorporation, and interdependencies that would uphold peaceful 
coexistence.  
 
Emerging Theory 2:  Construction of cross-identity value-neutral culture of peace:  
Respondents in this study have attributed the aversion of Ghanaians to violence to 
the fear of blood or abhorrence of murder; fear of retribution from God or the gods for 
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any acts that spill human blood; and the fear of desecrating the earth through the spillage 
of human blood. It is considered particularly abominable to spill the blood of a relation, 
no matter how distant that relation might be. At the same time, the roots of Ghanaian 
hospitality have been traced to the need to take care of strangers, as they might actually 
be gods on a visit. Plus, the very extended systems of relationships are such that the so-
called strangers are really never strangers in the strictest sense; as some form of 
relationship -  sanguinal, affinal, or historical - can always be traced to link the stranger to 
the hosts. These sacro-cultural attributes are so internalized across all ethnic groups in 
Ghana that valuing diversity and peaceful coexistence is almost second nature to most 
Ghanaians. As a result, Ghanaians seem to have a nag for searching out for opportunities 
to validate, reinforce, and operationalize attitudes, behaviors, and practices that put a 
premium on peace. Whether through engagement or disengagement from the public 
space; use of private solutions to public problems; exit from hardship or conflict 
situations through migration or any of the other forms of managing conflict that this study 
has reported, peace is always the ultimate objective.  
A plausible theory for explaining this is that groups in multi-identity environments 
that find common grounds in their cultural and religious beliefs and values, create and 
use voluntary channels of engagement and incorporation that lead to identity disillusion;  
the identification and intensification of shared interests; and the development of a value 
neutral culture of peace that radiates from the private engagements into the public realm. 
This makes aversion to, and avoidance of violent national level conflicts that could 
destabilize the achievement of their personal and collective interests and priorities. The 
value neutrality of this culture of peace rests in the fact that participants may choose to 
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engage, disengage, escape, or do anything that would minimize opportunities for the 
occurrence of violence that affects them or maximize their noninvolvement in any form of 
violence that might disturb their personal and collective peace. 
 
Emerging Theory 3: Perceived Economic interdependencies between otherwise 
centrifugal groups: 
 
Respondents in this study have emphasized the role that the freedoms of 
migration, settlements, and trade across all regions of Ghana have contributed to the 
creation of the sense of We-ness or Ghanaianness among citizens of this country. This 
highlights Simmel’s revelation of the integrative force of trading activities or expanded 
economic opportunities that the stranger brings to the host community to the building of 
social cohesion. Where intermarriages between the stranger and host communities are 
permissible, they can help enhance trust, transparency, and identity conflation between 
the hosts and their guests or settler communities.  
In the case of Ghana, also, the homeward transfers of incomes and economic 
resources from the migrants to those left behind provides a strong motivation for both the 
migrant and their families to keep good relationships with their host communities. 
Beyond securing livelihood and health security needs of communities, the intensity and 
the perceived direct and indirect benefits of economic engagements would seem to be a 
strong unifying force for building social cohesion and promoting the culture of 
nonaggression between groups engaged in such exchanges.    
A meso theory that this research offers for explaining Ghana’s peace is that 
perceived strong economic interdependencies embedded in the open and equitable access 
to natural resources across ethnic boundaries enhances the sense of belongingness and 
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shared symbiotic worldviews between the host and stranger community. This in turn 
promotes greater awareness among all the parties of their co-responsibility to protect the 
relationships that feed them and the peace that makes the pursuit of their economic 
engagements possible.  
Emerging Theory 4: Biological, Cultural, And Economic Incorporation And The 
Disarming Of Potential Ethnic Hegemons  
 
The 2010 Housing and Population Census results show the Akan ethnic group 
constitutes 47.5% of the population. This ethnic group also happens to be located in the 
most natural resource endowed parts of the country. They have a proud history of empire 
creation through conquests and the building of cross ethnic alliances that span the entire 
country. They are therefore well positioned to exhibit hegemonic tendencies within the 
postcolonial state. To the contrary, respondents have recounted the unifying force of the 
Akan, and the Ashantis in particular, who are the dominant subgroup of the Akan. First, 
the maintenance and respect of the historical alliances with ethnic groups dispersed 
across the cardinal points of the country keeps a semblance of oneness, at best, among the 
major ethno-regional blocs of the country. Second, the Ashantis’ preference for trade as 
their economic mainstay enjoins them to seek peace and peaceful relationships at all 
times to create the enabling environment for their businesses. Third, the sheer demand for 
extra hands to work their farms and other businesses makes the Ashantis mindful of the 
need to keep labor inflows from other ethno-regions coming in, not only cyclically, but as 
permanent residents as well. Fourth, and most crucially, the matriarchal structure of 
socio-political organization of the Akans places considerable emphasis on the role of 
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women to produce offspring that would ensure continuity of the political community, be 
it at the smallest village level or at the apical seat of the Asantehene.  
Closely associated with this duty of women to ensure the continuity of political 
succession within the matriclans of the Akans is the cultural liberty granted to Ashanti 
royal women to have children out of wedlock to guarantee the contention of their lineage 
to political power through the birth of children. In the performance of this duty, they are 
do not have to be saddled with the constraints of marriages that may not be reproductive. 
In the Ashanti worldview, “a queen mother is not required to be married, [but] is 
expected to have children, and is permitted to have male friends…” (Stoeltje, 2003, p. 
12). This permissiveness is considered critical for the role of the queen mother in Akan 
culture “…to make sure that the royal lineage remained intact… since a particular royal 
lineage remained [a contender for the chiefship of their political community] so long as 
female progeny existed in the lineage” (Boaten, 1992, p. 91). This means that the 
paternity of children born into an Ashanti matriclan could come from any ethnic group 
that the queen mother chooses. This fact is the basis for the proverb cited in Interview 
205 that “obi n kyere obia si” or “one does not reveal the origins of another person” (29 
October, 2014).  
What this cultural trait does then is to open up the Akan, especially the Ashanti 
sub clan, for the admission or incorporation of people who share identities with other 
ethnic groups, into the respective lineages. And since some of the hybrid or even 
miscegenated products of such unions could end up on chiefship positions at any level 
within the Akan socio-political organization, ethnic purity is decimated and identity 
disillusion takes root. Under the circumstances, the accommodative overtures of the 
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historical, geographical, cultural, and economic centrality of the Ashantis has become a 
coalescing factor for the creation of the culture of aversion to violence that underscores 
Ghana’s peace. A theoretical perspective that can be adducted (Timmermans & Tavory, 
2012) from this situation then is that where culture and economic interests of a potential 
ethnic hegemon disposes it to accept and incorporate, biologically, culturally, and 
economically, members of the other ethnic groups within the country, enlightened self-
interests, and increased awareness of shared identities and interdependencies dissuades 
mobilization for violence against the out group.  
 
Directions for Overarching Theory Development  
 
The current formulation of the four theoretical frames offers them as stand-alone 
theories for explaining Ghana’s peace. However, as highlighted above, no single theory is 
capable of fully accounting for why Ghana has managed to stay peaceful, given the 
multiplicity and divergence of factors that seem to work together in diametrically 
opposing directions to create the web of tensions that self-regulate to produce the tenuous 
but time tested peace that Ghana has experienced to date. Hence, each of the four 
theoretical frames effectively provides insights into how different subsets of action zones 
contribute in their own way, some of the forces that feed into the network of factors 
holding Ghana together.  
The preliminary disaggregation of the explanation into these four theoretical 
components is, therefore, useful in breaking down the “…undifferentiated wholeness [of 
what makes Ghana peaceful] to differentiation of parts” (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) of 
that whole. Identifying these components in their own states and how they “…become 
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fixed in respect to certain action” (von Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 70) then permits a greater 
understanding of how the parts work together seamlessly to hold Ghana together in one 
piece, when they are progressively mechanized (von Bertalanffy, 1969). It sheds more 
light on the chain of causality and feedback loops between the different components and 
how they self-regulate to return to the state of negative peace equilibrium, even when the 
system is significantly jolted, as in the case of the disputes over the results of the 2012 
Presidential Polls, which in any other context would have sent Ghana into the abyss of 
violent conflict. In the case of Ghana, this did not happen.  
Self-regulation between independent or loosely related entities of a system is, 
however, only possible if the these components answer to a higher level or superordinate 
system from which they take instructions that override their internally generated 
instructions that might be at conflict with each other. To be effective, systems must 
function synergistically, as “…the dynamic interactions of parts [makes] the behavior of 
parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole.” Hence, it is essential that 
we use a holistic approach  to understand “how the different parts of the system work 
together” (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 39).  
The stability and growth of a system, in turn, depends on the existence and 
effective functioning of a hierarchies or multiple layers of mutually reinforcing 
subsystems that accept and operate by coordinating instructions from higher level 
subsystems to create “stable, resilient, and efficient structures” (Meadows, 2008, p. 82). 
The hierarchies facilitate the work of subsystems and the subsystem level activities must 
be directed to help achieve the overall goal of the whole system.  System brittleness, 
rigidity, failures, or suboptimization occur when the achievement of a “subsystem’s goals 
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dominate at the expense of the total system’s goals” (Meadows, 2008, p. 85). Conversely, 
overcentralization of control in the hope of achieving overall goals of the larger system 
can stifle the effective functioning of subsystems. To avoid this, the system has to have 
“…elements, interconnections, and a function or purpose” (Meadows, 2008, p. 11) which 
work together to keep the system alive and functioning. 
This “hierarchical order [or] hierarchical structure and combination [of lower 
level, independent components] into systems of ever higher order” (von Bertalanffy, 
1969, p. 4) is an essential part of socio-cultural phenomena that ensures that order is 
created and maintained out of the divergent forces of society.  Hence, while the four 
theoretical frames that this research offers may explain, individually and jointly, how 
Ghana’s peace is created and maintained, it is essential to look for the higher level order 
of structures, rules, and regulations that have ensured that the subsystems that these 
theories represent actually worked together to produce the wholeness that portrays Ghana 
as an oasis of peace. The four theories identified in this study, therefore, serve as meso 
level theories whose interrelationships can only be more fully explored beyond the limits 
of this study. Further research and reflections on the interrelations of these theoretical 
subcomponents outside the scope of this study should lead to the establishment of a more 
comprehensive and overarching explanation of how and why these factors interact to 
keep Ghana peaceful.  
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Suggestions for further studies 
 
Being more or less an exploratory research, this study has raised a number of 
interesting issues that warrant further enquiry to deepen the findings here or provide 
alternate perspectives that would enrich insights into how and why Ghana has managed 
to stay relatively peaceful in the midst of crippling conflicts in neighboring states. The 
list of research leads is fairly long. However, the following present key entry points for 
sequel research on the issues that this study has tried to understand: 
 
Use of Axiological Approaches to understanding the bonding and bridging effects of 
intergenerational ethno-communication and education systems in fostering peace:  
 
This study used a combination of a national quantitative survey and key informant 
interviews as the principal instruments for data collection.  However, Ghanaians, like 
most African communities, are oral societies. Historical knowledge and indigenous 
wisdom are often coded and transmitted across generations using a repertoire of 
indigenous knowledge accumulation, management, and sharing devices that include 
songs, proverbs, riddles, and other oral communication techniques. In such oral 
traditions, it is often easier to communicate volumes of information or to explain very 
complex phenomena with one proverb than an entire textbook can hope to do.  
In the course of this research many respondents used some of these devices to 
articulate and express views in their respective local languages to better express ideas that 
they wished to communicate. In this way, they were able to better explain what they 
intended. In some cases, use of the indigenous communication devices actually kicked up 
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important issues requiring further probing that would ordinarily not have come up if the 
normal conversational language in English were used. Despite the onsite probing that this 
study did, several of the views and ideas captured in the proverbs and adages could be 
more deeply explored using other qualitative data gathering methods. 
One way, therefore, to explore the deeper insights into some of the issues raised in 
this research and to unearth the cross-ethnic, interfaith, and interregional perspectives on 
some of the critical factors that respondents identified as the pillars of Ghana’s peace will 
be to use the axiological method of enquiry. In particular, use of the axiological approach 
to create space for respondents to explore the deeper historical, cultural, spiritual, and 
socio-political significance of the thoughts they wished to convey. Findings from this 
kind of research could greatly enrich our knowledge how and why Ghanaians have 
managed to construct and maintain their state of steady negative peace.  Besides 
advancing knowledge on the why part of the question on Ghana’s ability to stay relatively 
peaceful, such a study could also lead to the amassment of an arsenal of stories, proverbs, 
axioms, and other folk wisdom that local peacebuilders  can use in community 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes.    
 
Exploring extent of validity of culture and indigenous conflict management systems in 
promoting peace:  
 
The study has highlighted the role that shared cultural and religious beliefs, 
values, and traditions have played in creating and sustaining Ghana’s peace. Ironically, 
one reason why respondents characterized Ghana’s peace as negative or unstable is 
because of the presence of pockets of protracted violent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts 
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around the country. Nearly all governments that have ruled Ghana have had to deal with 
most of these conflicts. And yet, several Commissions of Inquiry and/or court cases after, 
these conflicts remain as entrenched as ever; and groups that invariably share the same 
ethnic spaces or boundaries, cultures, religious traditions, and socioeconomic fields of 
transactions such as farms and markets, have proved incapable of resolving their conflicts 
using their shared values and beliefs.  
Questions that require further explorations are a) why has intercultural 
incorporation seem to have worked at the national level to foster peace among Ghanaians, 
but has failed to do same at the local levels? b) Why have these groups not been able to 
use their shared histories, cultural and religious values, as well as, their indigenous 
conflict resolution mechanism in resolving their conflicts? c) To what extent has recourse 
to state-centric approaches to managing these conflicts affected the ability of the feuding 
ethnic groups to find lasting resolutions to their conflicts? d) What needs to happen to 
enable these ethnic groups regain control of the processes for resolving their conflict and 
to ensure that sustainable peace is found? 
 
Exploring The Effects of sub-state level Economic Independencies  within and between 
ethnic groups as cords of peace:   
 
The study has also highlighted how economic interdependencies, embodied in the 
free movement of goods, persons, and private capital across ethnic boundaries seem to 
have encouraged Ghanaians to avert descent into violent national level conflicts. This 
brings into focus Simmel’s seminal works on the role of the stranger-trader as an 
economic, social, and even cultural integrator. However, conventional literature in the 
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studies of peace and conflict has not adequately explored the peace dimension of 
economic engagements and trade-related interethnic migration and incorporation. While 
literature abounds on the role of trade and economic interdependencies in building 
détente and peace between states, not much exists to illustrate how the creation of 
mutually beneficial economic interests can promote peace at the subnational levels. This 
research provides some pointers. However, further works in this area could help unearth 
the binding, bonding, and bridging force of interethnic trade in goods and services, and 
the existence of economic interdependencies as the foundations for interethnic peace. 
What elements in these exchanges provide the glue for the multi-ethnic settlements in 
Ghana? 
 
Understanding the role of women in building Ghana’s peace:  
 
Although respondents of all gender categories have acknowledge that women do 
play a role in Ghana’s peace, they have qualified such roles as restricted largely to 
prayers, advisor services, and other “behind the scene” functions. Women are not seen as 
frontline players in promoting Ghana’s peace. Similarly, respondents in this study made 
observations in relation to the willingness of women to take front stage in other political 
spaces such as in local government structures i.e. the District, Municipal, and 
Metropolitan Assemblies. Several respondents alluded to the male dominance of the 
Ghana political space as the plausible reasons why women take the backstage in Ghana’s 
peace.  
A question that requires further interrogation is - is patriarchy the only factor 
preventing women from step up and out in the political space, especially in the matters of 
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peacebuilding, which respondents say is the preoccupation of women? Further research 
of the role of women in building Ghana’s peace in particular and in politics in general 
will create greater understanding of the obstacles that block the participation of women in 
Ghana’s public spaces. In particular, a listening project that solicits and brings in the 
voices and views of women on how and why the choose or do not choose to engage in the 
public sphere visibly should provide the foundational blocks for initiatives that foster 
women’s participation in politics and peacebuilding.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Table of Presidential results from 2000-2012 
 
YEAR NPP NDC TOTAL RESIDUAL NO. OF 
CANDIDATES 
2000 48.4 44.8 93.2 6.8 7 
2000 ROUND 2 57.4 42.6 100 0 2 
2004 52.2 44.6 96.8 3.2 4 
2008 49.13 47.92 97.05 2.95 8 
2008 ROUND 2 49.77 50.23 100 0 2 
2012 47.74 50.7 98.44 1.56 8 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, retrieved from various links to 
http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php on 5 May, 2013. Links to data by year of election are:  
2000 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2000%20PRESIDENTIAL%20ELECTION 
%20RESULTS%282%29.pdf 
2004 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/assets/file/2004PresidentialResults.pdf 
2008 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/page.php?page=395&section=51&typ=1 
2012 - http://www.ec.gov.gh/index.php  
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Appendix 2: Cluster Sampling Methodology and Determination of Sample Size  
 
Sample sizes were calculated with the following formula: 
 n = z
2
(pq)/d
2
 
where n =  sample size; z = statistical certainty chosen; p = estimated prevalence/coverage 
rate/level to be investigated; q = 1 - p; and d = precision desired. 
The value of p was defined by the coverage rate that requires the largest sample size (p = 
.5).  The value d was based on the precision, or margin of error, desired (in this case d = .1).  
The statistical certainty was chosen to be 95% (z = 1.96).  Given the above values, the 
following sample size (n) needed was determined to be: 
 n = (1.96 x 1.96)(.5 x .5)/(.1 x .1) 
 n = (3.84)(.25)/.01 
 n = 96 
 It takes much time to randomly select an identified individual from the survey 
population, and then perform this selection 96 times to identify a sample of n = 96.  Time 
can be saved by doing a 30 cluster sample survey in which several individuals within each 
cluster are selected to reach the required sample size.  However, in order to compensate for 
the bias from interviewing persons in clusters, rather than as randomly selected individuals, 
experience has shown that a minimum sample of 210 (7 per cluster) should be used given 
the values of p, d, and z above (Henderson, et. al., 1982).  In general, when using a 30 
cluster sample survey, the sample size used should be approximately double the value n, 
when: n = (z x z)(pq)/(d x d).  In this case, a sample size of 300 (10 per cluster) has 
traditionally been selected using the JHU 30-Cluster method so as to ensure that sub-
samples would be large enough to obtain useful information. 
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 The estimates of confidence limits for the survey results were calculated using the 
following formula: 
 95% confidence limit = p + z(square root of pq/n) 
 where: p = proportion in population found from survey; z = statistical certainty 
chosen (if 95% certainty chosen, then z = 1.96); q = 1 - p; and n = sample size 
 
Sample Size for the Study 
As noted above, traditionally, the 30-cluster sampling methodology aimed for 300 
respondents in a survey. However, in nation-wide surveys, such as the Afrobarometer 
studies, a sample size of 1,200 to 2,400 is determined to be adequate for ensuring 
representativeness of the study population and validity of the outcomes. For Ghana, the 
Afrobarometer’s “randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allow inferences to national 
adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or minus 3 
percent with a confidence level of 95 percent” (Asunka et al., 2008, n.p). In this study, a 
sample size of 1,500 (i.e. n= 1,500) will be used. This “…substantially larger sample size 
[is required] to achieve the same level of accuracy as a simple random sample” (Murphy 
& Schulz, 2006, p. 6). The sample frame (N) will be the total registered voter population 
for the 2012 elections, which is 14,031,680 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012). 
Hence, the survey will use the 2012 electoral register as the data source for its sampling. 
This is because, although Ghana conducted a housing and population census in 2010, the 
population statistics per localities have not yet been published. However, the Electoral 
Commission compiled a fairly detailed electoral registers, which provides population data 
down to community levels in all the 275 constituencies and 26,002 Polling Areas in the 
435 
 
 
 
country. The electoral register therefore provides a more accurate and up to date database 
for the selection of respondents.  
The 30-cluster sampling methodology developed for use in Knowledge, Practice, 
and Coverage (KPC) surveys will be adapted for the selection of study. Given the wide 
variation in population sizes between Polling Areas (ranging from n < 500 to n > 150, 
000), instead of 30, this study will select 50 clusters out of the 26,0002 Polling Areas as 
study sites. This larger number of study sites is also necessary to compensate for the 
clustering effect in the sampling process, given the anticipated wide variations in socio-
economic backgrounds of respondents between constituencies e.g.: rural versus urban; 
differing levels of literacy across regions; different experiences of poverty across regions, 
cultural variations across regions, etc. (Murphy & Schulz, 2006).  
The cluster sampling methodology was used to select the cluster sites or Polling 
Areas from which respondents will be drawn, using the principle of sampling by 
probability proportional to size of the Polling Areas. Under this method, all the 275 
Polling Areas in the country will be listed with their respective numbers of registered 
voters. The cumulative population of all the 275 Polling Areas will then be obtained by 
successively adding up the registered voters of the Polling Areas from the first to the last. 
The sampling interval will then be calculated by dividing by the cumulative population of 
the Polling Areas by the number of clusters to be sampled i.e. 50 clusters. A random 
number with the number of digits but is less than or equal to the sampling interval will be 
selected from a table of random numbers or by a random draw of the serial numbers of 
bills of the local currency. This number will determine the starting point of the selection 
of the first cluster or polling station from which interviewees will be drawn. The first 
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polling station which has a cumulative population less than or equal to the selected 
random number will be selected as the first cluster or polling station for the interviews. 
The second cluster or polling station will be selected by adding the sampling interval to 
the random number, and the cluster whose cumulative population is less than or equal to 
the sum of the two numbers will be selected as the second cluster or polling station for 
the interviews. Subsequent Polling Areas will be selected by adding the sampling interval 
to the previous number used in the selection of the prior cluster or polling station until all 
50 clusters or Polling Areas are selected. The list of selected Polling Areas or clusters 
will then be compiled and used as the interview sites.  
Level two of the cluster selection process starts after the 50 Polling Areas are 
selected. The electoral register for the selected Polling Areas will constitute the frame 
from which interviewees will be selected. For each polling station selected, thirty five 
(35) people on the electoral register for each polling station will be randomly selected for 
interviews, using the voter identification numbers listed on the voter’s registers for the 
draw of interviewees. The actual target number of interviewees per polling station is 30. 
However, the additional 5 potential respondents are replacement respondents in the event 
that some of the primary selected respondents are unavailable for interviews either due to 
death, extended travel outside the area, refusal to participate in the interview or failure to 
make contact after multiple rescheduling of interview sessions. Hence, the sample size, 
(n) for the survey component of this study will be 1,500.   
Ghanaians are highly sensitive to partisan politics, and given the legal challenge to 
the 2012 Presidential election results that have pitched two major parties in a political 
battle, it is essential that all perceptions of political motivation for the survey or partisan 
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bias in the selection of the interviewees be displaced upfront and transparently. In 
fulfillment of this, Polling Station Agents (PSA) of all political parties within the selected 
Polling Areas will be invited to participate in the selection of interviewees and 
identification of their locations. They will be briefed on the purposes, as well as, the 
apolitical and non-partisan nature of the study. The involvement of polling agents of all 
political parties will not only eliminate the perceptions of political bias in the selection of 
the interviewees; it will also facilitate the identification of the whereabouts of selected 
participants; their availability to participate (some may have travelled out of the area, or 
deceased); and facilitation of access to the selected interviewees.  
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Appendix 3: Procedure For Selecting Constituencies And Polling Areas For Survey  
a) Procedure for Selecting Polling Areas for Survey  
The Study used the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling process to select 
prospective constituencies in which the study will be conducted.  
Step 1: The national list of voters per constituency with the total number of voters 
for each constituency for the 2012 general elections was obtained from the website of the 
Electoral Commission of Ghana.  
Step 2: the cumulative total of voter population was then obtained by adding 
successive voter population from each preceding constituencies to the next one, in 
accordance with the order in which they were presented in the Electoral Commission’s 
spreadsheet that was downloaded in Step 1 above.  
Step 3: the Sampling Interval (S.I) for the total voter population of   14,031,793 
was computed using the formula S.I = Total Voter Population divided by number of 
Clusters (or desired study sites). Since the research is using 50 Polling Areas nationwide, 
the figure 50 was used as the denominator in the following computation:  
14,031,680 = 280,635.86 
     50 
 
The SI of 280,633.60 was rounded off to 280,634 as the SI. This was then used in 
the following steps for selecting Polling Areas as the sites for the conduct of the study:  
Step 4:  A six digit random number less than or equal to the SI i.e. 280,634 was 
generated using the random number generation function of stattrek.com - 
http://stattrek.com/statistics/random-number-generator.aspx . The function produced one 
(1) random number selected from within the range of 0 to 280,636. Duplicate numbers 
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were allowed. This table was generated on 7/19/2013. The random number generated 
through this process was 143,511  
Step 5: The random number (143,511) was used to locate the first constituency 
with a cumulative population greater than or equal to the random number. Accordingly, 
the Bokakokole Axim Constituency with Code No. A030502 in the Western Region with 
a total registered voter population of 469 and a cumulative population figure of 143,925 
was chosen as the first constituency where the study will be conducted.   
Step 6: The Sampling Interval of 143,511 was then added to the Random number 
of 280,636 to obtain the figure 424,147. Hence, the second constituency for the study was 
chosen by locating a constituency with a cumulative population total greater than or equal 
to 424,147. 
Step 7: To select the third Constituency from which a Polling Station will be 
drawn for the study, the Random Number of 280,636 was added to the computed results 
of Step 6 i.e. 280,636+424,147 to get the number 704,783, which was used to locate the 
constituency with a cumulative population figure greater than or equal to this number. 
This step was repeated until all the remaining 47 constituencies were selected. Appendix 
3 includes the list of the 50 constituencies that were selected as study sites, based on the 
procedure described above.  
Step 8: Selection of Polling Area for Study. The Electoral Commissions list of 
Constituencies used in the exercise above provides the number of Polling Station per 
each Constituency. The list of Polling Areas is available at the regional offices of the 
Electoral Commission.  
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To determine the fifty Polling Areas in which the study will be conducted, the list 
of Polling Areas with their code numbers in each selected constituency will be obtained 
from the Regional Offices of the Electoral commission. Two Polling Areas per selected 
constituency will be randomly drawn from a hat containing the codes of all the Polling 
Areas for the Constituency. The first Polling Station to be drawn will be the primary 
study site. The second Polling Station drawn will be the secondary study site.  
Step 9: The researchers will random draw a list of 50 names from the voters’ 
register of the Primary Study Site (see step 8 above) from which the first 30 respondents 
who agree to participate in the study will be interviewed.  
Step 10: In the event that the Primary Study Site chosen in Step 8 has less than 30 
persons who agree to participate in the study, the researchers will proceed to Study Site 2. 
Step 9 will be repeated i.e. 50 people selected but only the first set of people who agree to 
be interviewed to make up the balance on the 30 respondents required per constituency 
will be interviewed.  
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b) Sampled Polling Areas For Field Survey 
No Polling 
Station Code 
Polling Station Name Region 
Name 
District Name Constituency 
Name 
Total 
Voters 
1 A030502 Bokakokole Axim Western Nzema East 
Municipality 
Evalue - 
Ajomoro - 
Gwira 
469 
2 A080104 Asawa Prim. Sch. 
Mempeasem 
Western Essikadu-
Ketan Sub 
Essikadu-
Ketan 
871 
3 A130502 Cath. Prim Sch Insu Western Prestea/Huni-
Valley 
Prestea 
Huni-
Valley 
702 
4 A170505 D C Primary 
School, Kwaku 
Attakrom 
Western Aowin Aowin 478 
5 A220701 D C Prim Sch 
Antobia 
Western Juaboso Juaboso 977 
6 B022603 C P B  New Market 
Adisadel 
Central Cape Coast Cape Coast 
South 
666 
7 B063702 Catholic Prim 
School, Abaasa 
Central Ajumako 
Enyan Esiam 
Ajumako 
Enyan 
Esiam 
665 
8 B110103B Zongo 94 
Odupongkpehe (B) 
Central Awutu Senya 
East 
Awutu 
Senya East 
829 
9 B150902 D C 'B' Pri  Sch 
Foso 
Central Assin North Assin 
Central 
339 
10 C010111 Barbara Int'l Sch, 
Top Town-Ngleshie 
Amanfro 
Greater 
Accra 
Ga South Bortianor-
Ngleshie 
Amanfro 
1082 
11 C030202B Golden Door Hotel 
Tantra Hill (B) 
Greater 
Accra 
Ga-West Trobu 835 
12 C041004B Church Of 
Pentecost Central 
Taifa No 2 (B) 
Greater 
Accra 
Ga East Dome/Kwa
benya 
859 
13 C061023A Ebony Restaurant 1 
Pig Farm (A) 
Greater 
Accra 
Ayawaso Ayawaso 
Central 
652 
14 C071509A Alhaji Abbass 
Mosque, Nii 
Boiman (A) 
Greater 
Accra 
Okaikwei Okaikwei 
North 
978 
15 C081416 E P Church 
Lartebiokorshie 
Greater 
Accra 
Ablekuma Ablekuma 
Central 
846 
16 C100305A Fire Protection Co 
Ltd (A) 
Greater 
Accra 
Osu Clottey Korle 
Klottey 
743 
17 C120910B Presby Church 
Teshie Tsui Bleoo 
(B) 
Greater 
Accra 
Ledzokuku 
Krowor 
Ledzokuku 649 
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No Polling 
Station Code 
Polling Station Name Region 
Name 
District Name Constituency 
Name 
Total 
Voters 
18 C132403 Tema Parent J.H.S 
C.6 
Greater 
Accra 
Tema Tema-
Central 
674 
19 C151702B Amanier Hotel (B) Greater 
Accra 
Ashaiman Ashaiman 693 
20 D011302 L A Prim Sch 
Agorvinu 
Volta Keta Keta 207 
21 D041102 D/A Prim Sch 
Ayitikope 
Volta Akatsi South Akatsi 
South 
524 
22 D112702 R C Prim Sch 
Taviefe-Deme 
Volta Ho 
Municipal 
Ho Central 1013 
23 D181401 E P Prim Sch 
Bodada 
Volta Jasikan Buem 476 
24 D251202 D A Jhs Abunyanya 
No. 2 
Volta Nkwanta 
North 
Nkwanta 
North 
 
1047 
25 E053103 L/A Prim Sch 
Okomeso 
Eastern New Juaben 
Municipality 
New 
Juaben 
South 
112 
26 E100104 Temp Booth 
Pampamso 
Eastern Ayensuano Ayensuano 492 
27 E150502 R C Prim Sch 
Ahenbronom 
Eastern Akyemansa Ofoase/Ayi
rebi 
910 
28 E200901 R/C Primary School 
Asunafo 
Eastern Atiwa Atiwa West 803 
29 E253102 L/A Prim School 
Kwaehunu 
Eastern Afram Plains 
North 
Afram 
Plains 
North 
260 
30 F040801 R/C Prim Ofoase 
Kokoben 
Ashanti Bekwai 
Municipal 
Bekwai 736 
31 F082003 L A Prim Sch 
Ntensere 
Ashanti Atwima 
Nwabiagya 
Atwima 
Nwabiagya 
North 
1088 
32 F120404B Tiger Bay Adoato 
(B) 
Ashanti Bantama Bantama 693 
33 F151013 Americanus 
Buokrom 
Ashanti Manhyia Manhyia 
North 
412 
34 F190314 Open Bible Church Ashanti Asokwa Asokwa 748 
35 F230601A D/A Prim School 
Asenua (A) 
Ashanti Kwabre East Kwabre 
East 
693 
36 F260503 Ataneata D/A Prim 
School 
Ashanti Asante Akim 
South 
Asante 
Akim 
South 
397 
37 F331301 R/C Pri Sch Nintin Ashanti Mampong 
Municpal 
Mampong 525 
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No Polling 
Station Code 
Polling Station Name Region 
Name 
District Name Constituency 
Name 
Total 
Voters 
38 F383602 D/A Prim Sch 
Potrikrom 
Ashanti Ahafo Ano 
South 
Ahafo Ano 
South East 
346 
39 G053001 L A Prim Sch 
Asuboi 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Tano South Tano South 216 
40 G110602 St James Jhs 
Wamanafo 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Dormaa East Dormaa 
East 
466 
41 G172202 Presby Church 
Nkonsia 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Wenchi Wenchi 552 
42 G230301 R/C Church 
Amantin 
Brong-
Ahafo 
Atebubu/ 
Amantin 
Atebubu/A
mantin 
654 
43 H030803 Forestry Quarters 
Laribanga 
Norther
n 
West Gonja Damongo 547 
44 H100101 Local Council 
Offices Zabzugu 
N0.1 
Norther
n 
Zabzugu Zabzugu 748 
45 H172305 Kpalsong L/A 
Primary 
Norther
n 
Karaga Karaga 554 
46 H195202A Kanvilli Baptist 
Church (A) 
Norther
n 
Tamale Tamale 
North 
567 
47 H260303 Temp Booth Kauk Norther
n 
Bunkpurugu/
Yunyoo 
Bunkpurug
u 
490 
48 J061302 Akeriba Gunga Upper 
East 
Bongo Bongo 357 
49 J120601B Garu Catholic J H S 
(B) 
Upper 
East 
Garu-
Tempane 
Garu 572 
50 K063103 Temp Booth 
Potuoyiri 
Upper 
West 
Jirapa Jirapa 208 
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Appendix 4 Sampling Frame for Key Informants Interviews 
 
Key informants are priced for their personal arcane knowledge of the subject 
matter under study. However, for subject matters such as the quest of this research to 
understand how and why Ghana has managed to be peaceful,  it is essential to enlist 
historical recalls of times and events that may have influenced the nature, direction, and 
outcomes of the condition under study in its current state. In such cases, personal 
memories alone become limiting, especially if the key informants happen to be relatively 
new to a context. In particular, where institutions have played active roles in shaping the 
current state of the subject matter, it is doubly essential to elicit institutional memories 
that go beyond the times of current institutional representatives acting as key informants. 
for this reason, this study chose to constitute its sampling frame from among the 
following institution for the reasons assigned to each.   
Professional Bodies and Associations: Professional bodies and associations have 
been at the forefront of various engagements with state actors through dialogues, 
demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of civil action either to demand better conditions 
of service for their members or general political changes in the governance of the 
country. They were particularly vocal in the 1970s when they constituted one of the 
barriers to the attempts of the Supreme Military Council to transform the military regime 
of General I. K.  Acheampong into a civilianized Union Government. To tap into the 
memories and perspectives from such engagements, the study targeted to draw 
interviewees from among the leadership of Professional Groups and Associations such as 
the:  
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a. Ghana Medical Association 
b. Ghana Bar Association 
c. Ghana Nurses and Midwives Council 
d. Ghana Association of Bankers 
e. Ghana national Association of Teachers 
f. Trade Union Congress and affiliate institutions 
Students Unions: Students have been very vocal and politically active in the evolution of 
the governance systems of the country. Once presenting a unified front under the 
National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), student political activism has been splintered 
in recent times under the creation of rival national level associations, and the further 
polarization of student movements along political lines. The sampling frame for this 
category of respondents targeted the leadership of national students unions, which 
includes:  
a. The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) 
b. The National Union of Polytechnics Students 
Faith-based civil society actors and organizations, religious leaders representing 
national Christian and Islamic Councils: The Christian Council of Ghana (CCH), 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference (CBC), the Islamic Council, and other affiliated faith-
based organizations have been instrumental in shaping the political space in Ghana. As 
the US Library of Congress records note:  
The CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs function openly as 
independent national lobbies to promote common rather than special interests. They insist on 
negotiation and mediation in the management of national disputes, and they advocate policy 
alternatives that stress the long-term needs of society. In the past, they have taken bold 
initiatives to attain the abrogation of state measures and legislation that violate human rights 
or that threaten law and order. All three bodies share a commitment to democracy, the rule of 
law, and the creation of political institutions that reflect Ghanaian cultural traditions” 
(Library of Congress, http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm). 
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The study therefore contacted the leadership of the following national level religious 
institutions for interviews:  
a. Catholic Bishops Conference 
b. Christian Council of Ghana 
c. Pentecostal Council of Ghana 
d. Federation of Muslim Councils of Ghana 
e. Moderator, Presbyterian Church 
f. Moderator, Methodist Church 
g. Presiding Bishop, Anglican Church 
h. National Chief Imam 
i. Ameer of Ahmaddiya Muslim Mission 
Traditional Leaders and the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs: As indicated 
above, although the 1992 Constitution debars chiefs from participating in active politics, 
they have nonetheless been instrumental in influencing dialogue and processes in the 
public sphere. They represent an important political constituency as the “… National 
House of Chiefs and the ten regional houses of chiefs represent more than 32,000 
recognized traditional rulers who exercise considerable influence throughout Ghana, 
especially in the countryside” (Library of Congress, 
http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm) . 
To ensure capture of the perspectives of the traditional rulers the study targeted to 
interview some chiefs, especially those who also serve as representatives of their 
respective localities in the national or regional houses of chiefs.  
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Civil Society Organizations: Civil Society organizations have played very 
prominent roles in the public sphere, especially in respect of shepherding the 
transformation of the governance landscape since 1981. As the Library of Congress notes 
these organizations:  
played prominent roles in the transition to democracy [as they] took the provisional nature of 
the PNDC regime quite literally, calling for a quick return to democratic national 
government. Although NUGS and the GBA consistently demanded a return to multiparty 
democracy, the CCG, the CBC, and the national and regional houses of chiefs favored a 
nonpartisan national government. While the NUGS and GBA leadership used methods that 
frequently provoked confrontation with the PNDC, the CBC and the national and regional 
houses of chiefs preferred a more conciliatory method of political change, emphasizing 
national unity” http://countrystudies.us/ghana/95.htm . 
 
In this study, the leadership of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil 
Society Groups and organizations, and community-based organisations constituted a 
sampling bloc from which respondents were sought out and interviewed. The list of 
institutions contacted included, but not limited to the following:  
i. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) 
ii. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) 
iii. Media Foundation of West Africa 
iv. Ghana Anti-corruption Coalition 
v. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)    
vi. Ghana Journalists Association (GJA)    
vii. Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII)    
viii. Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF)    
ix. Forum of Religious Bodies (FORB)    
x. Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana (CDD) 
xi. Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) 
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xii. National Association of Graduate Teachers (NAGRAT) 
xiii. Teachers and Educational Workers Union (TEWU) 
xiv. Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) 
xv. Institute for Democracy and Governance (IDEG)  
The study successfully recruited several interviewees from these institutions.  
 
Independent Constitutional Bodies: The Constitution has prescribed functions for certain 
institutions in respect of promoting democracy and good governance. Efforts were made 
to recruit respondents from among the leadership of national Commissions and Councils 
such as  
a. National Media Commission 
b. National Commission for Civic Education 
c. Electoral Commission 
d. National Peace Council 
e. Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)    
Political parties: Political parties are the vehicles for articulating political views on 
governance processes. They also represent the mobilizing force for political activities 
across all regional and ethnic spectra. In this study, the National and regional 
Chairpersons of political parties were targeted for interviews. The tentative list of parties 
included, but was not be limited to the following:  
1. Convention Peoples Party (CPP) 
2. Great Consolidated Popular Party 
3. Ghana National Party 
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4. National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
5. New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
6. National Reform Party 
7. Peoples National Convention (PNC) 
8. United Ghana Movement 
9. Ghana Democratic Republican Party 
10. National Democratic Party 
11. Progressive People’s Party 
The Media: The centrality of the media in shaping the public space cannot be 
overemphasized. In particular, the proliferation of FM radio broadcast services since 
1983 has had a considerable impact on the generation and dissemination of information 
in various local languages. Community Radio Stations in particular provide avenues for 
the development and broadcast of local content. The popularization of cell phone usage 
has also afforded the inclusion of phone-in and SMS texting-in into radio programs. This 
has given a voice to otherwise marginalized persons in public discourses. The extent to 
which this liberalization of voices and views, through the combination of the liberalized 
airwaves and cellphone access, has influenced the political discourse and Ghana’s peace 
is yet undetermined. To gauge this impact, the study targeted and successfully  
interviewed print and electronic media representatives (i.e. chief executives or editors of 
TV, Radio, Newspaper editors). Hosts of popular political radio programs on selected 
radio stations with nation-wide coverage were also targeted for inclusion as interviewees.  
Other Opinion Leaders: Several think-tanks and research organizations influence 
public discourses through their research and publications. Accordingly, the leadership of 
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such groups were identified and targeted for interviews. The institutions included, but not 
limited to: 
i. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
ii. Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA) 
iii. Ghanaian authors and representatives of academia in Ghana 
iv. The Danquah Institute 
v. Imani Ghana 
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Appendix 5 Questionnaires Used in the Quantitative Survey 
 
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION 
 
Quantitative Survey Questionnaires For PhD Dissertation Research On  
Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of 
Peace 
 
 
First schedule      Rescheduled interview 
Date ___/___/2013   Time: _________     Date_____/____/2013 Time: _________                   
        (dd /   mm /)         (dd. / mm) 
Tel: ________________, _____________     Tel: ________________, _____________ 
 
Region______________________ District _____________________ 
 
Name of Constituency_________________ Polling Station Number________________ 
 
Name of Community where interview takes place_____________________ House 
No._______ 
                          
Name of Interviewer __________________________Supervisor ______________________ 
 
I. Profile of Respondents 
 
I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask: 
 
1. To which gender category would you say you belong?   
 
1) Male [  ]  2) Female [  ] 3) Other (specify) ______________________________ [  ] 
 
2. How old were you on your last birth day? 
 
1) (Please Indicate age in years) __________ 2) Don’t know my age (please mark) [  ] 
       
 
3. What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one) 
 
1) Never been to school       [  ] 
2) Less than six years of Primary Education    [  ] 
3) Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School  [  ] 
4) Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College  [  ] 
5) Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma  [  ] 
6) University Degree up to Bachelors level     [  ] 
7) University Degree up to the Masters level    [  ] 
8) University Degree up to the Doctorate level    [  ] 
9) Other (specify) _________________________________________  [  ] 
 
4. Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region? 
 
1) Ashanti Region   [  ] 
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2) Brong Ahafo Region  [  ] 
3) Central Region   [  ] 
4) Easter Region   [  ] 
5) Greater Accra Region  [  ] 
6) Northern Region  [  ] 
7) Upper East Region  [  ] 
8) Upper West Region  [  ] 
9) Volta Region   [  ] 
10) Western   [  ] 
 
5. In what kind of locality are you normally resident? 
 
1) National Capital City      [  ] 
2) Regional Capital      [  ] 
3) District Capital       [  ] 
4) Village or rural community     [  ] 
5) Town outside national, regional, or district capital  [  ] 
6) Other (specify)____________________________   [  ] 
 
6. What religion to you practice or are you affiliated to? 
 
1. African Indigenous Religion 
2. Agnostic (I do not know if there is a God) 
3. Aeithist (I do not believe there is a God) 
4. Baha’i 
5. Buddhism 
6. Christianity 
7. Hinduism 
8. Islam 
9. Other (Specify)____________ 
 
7. How would you describe your current primary occupation? 
 
No. Employment Category  Please 
tick one 
() 
1 Farmer  (crop production, animal husbandry, fishing, etc.)  
2 House wife   
3
  
Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament, 
Government Minister (of a Sector, at Presidency, Region); Metropolitan, 
Municipal or District Chief Executive  
 
4 Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency Executive 
of a Political Party)  
 
5 Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, department 
or agency)  
 
6 Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Researcher, or Teaching Assistant in an 
Academic institution).  
 
7 Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief 
Executive Officer, Other 
(specify)_______________________________________  
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No. Employment Category  Please 
tick one 
() 
8 Professional (Certified Accountant, Architect, Auditor, Banker, Medical 
Officer, Lawyer, Nurse, Paramedic, Teacher,  Other 
(specify)__________________________________________ 
 
9 Traditional chief or queen mother at the Paramountcy, Divisional, or 
Village  
 
10 Religious leader (Archbishop, Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional 
Religion)  
 
11 Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, 
Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and Preventive 
Services 
 
12 Student in Polytechnic, University or other Tertiary or Secondary level   
13 Worker in the NGO Sector  
14 Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman   
15 Employee in the Private Sector   
16 Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, 
Seamstress, Trader, Other 
(specify)_____________________________________________  
 
17 Other (specify) 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Ghana has been said to be an oasis of peace in Africa. To what extent do you agree that 
Ghana is peaceful? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] Skip next question 
6. Disagree  [  ] Skip next question 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] Skip next question 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] Skip next question 
9. No opinion  [  ] Skip next question 
 
Knowledge and Perceptions of the nature and sources of Peace in 
Ghana 
 
9. Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means even 
though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive laws, rules, and 
regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or can die silently. Positive 
peace means there is no open fighting and there are no situations that make people suffer or 
die in silence. Based on these concepts of peace, how would you describe the peace you 
witness in Ghana? 
 
1) Positive peace  [  ] 
2) Negative Peace  [  ] 
3) I don’t know  [  ] 
4) Other (specify) ________________________________________________________ 
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10. To what extent do the following factors influence Ghana’s ability to avoid descending into 
violent national level conflicts? 
 
N
o 
Influencing 
Factors  
             
           
Assessment 
Criteria 
1 
Very 
Low 
Exten
t 
2 
Low 
Exten
t 
3 
Moderatel
y Low 
Extent 
4 
Moderat
e Extent 
5 
Moderatel
y High 
Extent 
6 
High 
Exten
t 
7 
Very 
High 
Exten
t 
8 
No
t 
At 
All 
9 
Can’
t 
Tell 
 
1 High level of 
civic awareness 
among 
Ghanaians  
         
2 High degree of 
agreement among 
political leaders 
on important 
issues affecting 
Ghana 
         
3 Presence of 
strong, efficient, 
and neutral 
institutions such 
as Parliament, the 
Courts, and the 
public and civil 
Services 
         
4 Cultures of all 
ethnic groups 
value peace  
         
5 Strong influence 
of religious 
beliefs that value 
peace  
         
6 Prayers and 
intercessions by 
religious groups 
         
7 Strong bonds of 
intermarriages 
between ethnic 
groups 
         
8 Ghanaians have a 
high degree of 
respect for the 
rule of law  
         
9 Fear of being 
singled out for 
punishment  
         
10 Other          
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N
o 
Influencing 
Factors  
             
           
Assessment 
Criteria 
1 
Very 
Low 
Exten
t 
2 
Low 
Exten
t 
3 
Moderatel
y Low 
Extent 
4 
Moderat
e Extent 
5 
Moderatel
y High 
Extent 
6 
High 
Exten
t 
7 
Very 
High 
Exten
t 
8 
No
t 
At 
All 
9 
Can’
t 
Tell 
 
(specify)_______
_ 
_____________ 
 
       
11. To what extent do the following institutions and groups contribute to the peace that Ghana 
enjoys? (Please choose one answer for each of the listed institutions or groups) 
 
No Influencing Factors  
             
            
                 Assessment 
Criteria 
1 
Ver
y 
Low 
Exte
nt 
2 
Low 
Exte
nt 
3 
Modera
tely 
Low 
Extent 
4 
Moder
ate 
Extent 
5 
Modera
tely 
High 
Extent 
6 
Hig
h 
Exte
nt 
7 
Ver
y 
Hig
h 
Exte
nt 
8 
N
ot 
At 
Al
l 
9 
Ca
n’t 
Tel
l 
 
1 Civil Society (NGOs, 
Community-based 
Organizations, Farmer-based 
organizations women’s 
groups, etc.)   
         
2 Traditional leaders (including 
chiefs, queen mothers, elders 
at the community levels)
  
         
3 The National House of Chiefs          
4 The Regional Houses of 
Chiefs 
         
5 The Council of State          
6 Religious Bodies such as the 
Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference, the Christian 
Council of Ghana, the 
Pentecostal Council of 
Ghana, the Federation of 
Muslim Councils of Ghana, 
etc. 
         
7 Policy think thanks such as 
Center for Democratic 
Development, Institute for 
Democracy E Governance 
(IDEG), Center for Policy 
Analysis (CEPA), IMANI 
Ghana,  among others  
         
8 National Media Commission          
9 National Commission for          
456 
 
 
 
No Influencing Factors  
             
            
                 Assessment 
Criteria 
1 
Ver
y 
Low 
Exte
nt 
2 
Low 
Exte
nt 
3 
Modera
tely 
Low 
Extent 
4 
Moder
ate 
Extent 
5 
Modera
tely 
High 
Extent 
6 
Hig
h 
Exte
nt 
7 
Ver
y 
Hig
h 
Exte
nt 
8 
N
ot 
At 
Al
l 
9 
Ca
n’t 
Tel
l 
 
Civic Education 
10 Electoral Commission          
11 National Peace Council          
12 Professional Associations 
(such Ghana Bar Association, 
Ghana Medical Association, 
         
13 Trade Unions (such as TUC, 
GNAT, NAGRAT, etc.) 
         
14 Students and Students’ 
Unions such as NUGS. 
         
15 The Judiciary (Supreme 
Court, High Courts, and other 
Courts in Ghana) 
         
16 Parliament          
17 Political Parties operating in 
Ghana since 1992  
         
18 Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ)    
         
19 Office of the President           
20 Ghana Police Service          
21 The Ghana Armed Forces          
22 International Development 
Agencies (UN, World Bank, 
IMF, etc.) 
         
23 Governments and Embassies 
of other Countries 
         
24 Other 
(specify)_________________ 
 
________________________
_ 
         
 
 
12. To what extent do you believe that Ghana can still descend into a violent national level 
conflict such as a civil war, despite the peace it currently enjoys? 
1. Very Low Extent  [  ] 
2. Low Extent   [  ] 
3. Moderately Low Extent [  ] 
4. Moderate Extent  [  ] 
5. Moderately High Extent [  ] 
6. High Extent   [  ] 
7. Very High Extent  [  ] 
8. Not at all   [  ] 
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9. Can’t tell   [  ] 
 
13. Which of the following would you say Ghanaians respect most in order to contribute to the 
peace that Ghana enjoys? 
 
1. The Constitution of the Country  [  ]  
2. Religious beliefs and values   [  ] 
3. Traditional values and customs  [  ] 
4.  personal values and principles  [  ] 
5. Other (specify)______________________________________ [  ] 
 
Development and Peace 
 
14. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is more peaceful than its neighbors because it has a 
high level of economic development? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
15. To what extent would you agree that Ghana experiences peace because all regions of the 
country benefit equally from development initiatives of the government?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
16. To what extent do you agree or disagree that transparently negotiated natural resource 
management contracts contribute to Ghana’s peace? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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17. To what extent do you agree or disagree that equitable and fair returns to Ghana on the 
exploitation of her natural resources contributes to the peace in the country? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
18. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the equitable allocation of revenue from natural 
resources to development in all parts of the country contributes to the peace in Ghana? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
19. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because proceeds from its natural 
resources are used in ways that benefit the whole country? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Human Rights and Rule of Law 
 
20. To what degree do you agree that Ghana enjoys peace more than other countries in Africa 
because Ghanaians have more freedom to express themselves without fear of being arrested? 
  
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
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7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
21. To what extent do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians enjoy more political 
freedom than their neighbors in other countries? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
22. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because extra judicial arrests, detentions, 
torture, and disappearances of political opponents are minimal? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Ghanaians’ Respect for the Rule of Law 
 
23. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because everyone respects the law? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
24. How far would you agree or disagree that Ghana’s peace is due in part to the fact that 
government officials and public servants always make decisions and act in accordance with 
the laws of Ghana? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
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4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
25. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is at peace because Ghanaians have respect for 
the decisions made the courts of law in the country? 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Contributions of the Media to peace in Ghana 
 
26. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that the ability of Ghanaians 
to freely express themselves in the print media without fear of being cited for libel has 
contributed to peace in Ghana? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
27. How far would you agree or disagree with the view that freedom of expression on radio 
stations and televisions through broadcasts of news, debates, hosted discussions, and 
interactive SMS and phone-in programs has contributed to the peace in Ghana? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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28. In way would you agree or disagree that unrestricted access to news and information from the 
internet and social media platforms has contributed to Ghana’s peace? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Contribution of the Judicial System to peace in Ghana 
 
29. To what extent do you agree that Ghana has peace because the courts are independent from 
political interference and so can dispense justice to all without fear or favor? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
30. What is your level of agreement or disagreement to the assertion that Ghana is peaceful 
because judges are free from corruption and dispense justice fairly? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
31. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because people from all backgrounds are 
treated fairly and equally before the law?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
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8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
 
Gender and Peace 
 
32. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is a peaceful country because men and 
women have equal opportunities to participate in public decision making processes? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
33. To what degree do you agree that Ghana is peaceful because of the number of seats that 
women occupy in parliament? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
 
34. What is your degree of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana enjoys peace 
because women have the same access to economic opportunities (loans, contracts, financial 
services, markets for their produce, etc.) as men? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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35. How far would you agree with the statement that Ghana is a peaceful country because women 
have the same opportunities for education as men? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
36. At what level do you agree or disagree that Ghana is enjoying peace because women have the 
same employment opportunities in the public and civil services as men? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
37. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana’s peace is due to the fact that women 
play active roles in mediating conflicts at the national level? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
38. To what extent do you agree or disagree that role that queen-mothers and female chiefs play 
in the promotion of peace at the national level is an important contributor to the peace in 
Ghana? 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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Elections and Democratic Participation 
 
39. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its elections are 
usually free, fair, and transparent? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
40. Which of these factors would you say accounts for why violence over parliamentary elections 
do not spill over into national level conflicts? 
 
1. Ghanaians are afraid of war       [  ] 
2. Ghanaians do not really care about who wins an election    [  ] 
3. The courts are effective and efficient in handling such disputes   [  ] 
4. Political parties do not support such violence     [  ] 
5. Those who start the violence are usually ignored     [  ] 
6. Other (Specify)________________________________________________[  ] 
 
41. Which of the following factors best explain why disputes over results of presidential elections 
do not escalate into national level violence?  
 
1. Political parties lack the capacity to mobilize people to fight on their behalf [  ]  
2. Political parties take their cases to the courts [  ]      
3. Traditional rulers usually intervene to stop any efforts to fight [  ]    
4. Religious leaders usually mediate peaceful resolution of the disputes [  ]   
5. Ghanaians would not fight and die for any politician [  ]     
6. Other (Specify)______________________________________________________[  ] 
 
42. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful 
because everyone is free to run for office at any level within the governance structures of the 
country (i.e. Unit Committee, District Assembly, and National levels).  
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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43. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Ghana is peaceful because its citizens can vote 
freely in all elections? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
44. How far would you agree that Ghana has peace because anybody can join any political party 
of his or her choice? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
45. To what extent do you agree that Ghana’s peace is due to the fact Ghanaians do not consider 
the ethnic backgrounds of candidates in any election important determinants of whom they 
vote for?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Role of Government in promoting peace  
 
46. To what extent do you agree that it is the deliberate and proactive actions of government that 
has created the peace that Ghana enjoys? 
1. Very Low Extent  [  ] 
2. Low Extent   [  ] 
3. Moderately Low Extent [  ] 
4. Moderate Extent  [  ] 
5. Moderately High Extent [  ] 
6. High Extent   [  ] 
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7. Very High Extent  [  ] 
8. Not at all   [  ] 
9. Can’t tell   [  ] 
 
47.  How far would you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is because Governments over the 
years have created opportunities for civil society groups to work with State institutions to 
promote peace?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
48. To what degree would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments over the 
years have successfully helped to resolve conflicts before they escalate into large scale 
violence? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
49. To what extent would you agree or disagree that Ghana enjoys peace because governments 
have always been neutral in handling conflicts between different ethnic, political, or religious 
groups?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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50. How far would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Government works very closely 
with faith-based organizations in resolving major conflicts? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Religion and peace in Ghana 
 
51. How important is religion in the lives of Ghanaians 
 
1. Not at all important 
2. Not very important 
3. Somewhat important 
4. Important 
5. Very important 
6. I don’t know 
7. Refuse to answer 
 
52. What is your level of agreement with the assertion that Ghana is peaceful because most 
Ghanaians observe the teachings of their respective faiths to promote peace, not violent 
conflicts? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
53. To what degree would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because Ghanaians are very religious 
people? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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54. What is the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement that Ghana is at 
peace because people are not discriminated against on the basis of their religion when they 
are looking for employment or admissions to schools? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
55. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the view that Ghana is peaceful 
because people of different faiths can live together without any problem? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
56. To what degree do you agree or disagree with the statement that Ghana has peace because 
families readily allow their relatives to marry people from different religious backgrounds?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
57. To what extent would you agree that Ghana is peaceful because politicians do not use inter-
religious differences in their campaigns?  
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
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58. To what extent would you agree that Ghana enjoys peace because religious leaders of all 
faiths and denominations always work together to ensure that conflicts are resolved 
peacefully?  
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
59. To what extent do you agree that the peace that Ghana enjoys is due to the role that religious 
leaders and various religious councils and committees have played important roles in creating 
a culture of peace in Ghana? 
 
1. Very strongly agree  [  ] 
2. Strongly agree  [  ] 
3. Mildly Agree  [  ] 
4. Agree   [  ] 
5. Mildly disagree  [  ] 
6. Disagree  [  ] 
7. Strongly disagree  [  ] 
8. Very strongly disagree [  ] 
9. No opinion  [  ] 
 
Culture, Tradition, Customs and Peace 
 
60. To what extent do you believe that the values and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana 
openly welcome strangers and treat them on equal terms as their own citizens? 
1) I very strongly believe  [  ] 
2) I strongly believe  [  ] 
3) I Believe              [  ] 
4) I do not believe   [  ] 
5) I strongly do not believe [  ] 
6) I very strongly do not believe [  ] 
7) No opinion   [  ] 
 
61. To what degree do you accept that the culture and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana 
train people to be peaceful? 
1. Very High Extent [  ] 
2. High Extent  [  ] 
3. Low Extent  [  ] 
4. Very Low Extent [  ]  
5. Not at All  [  ] 
6. Can’t Tell  [  ] 
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62. The cultures and traditions of all ethnic groups in Ghana have strong sanctions for those who 
stir up violence or breach the public peace 
1) I very strongly believe  [  ] 
2) I strongly believe  [  ] 
3) I Believe              [  ] 
4) I do not believe   [  ] 
5) I strongly do not believe [  ] 
6) I very strongly do not believe [  ] 
7) No opinion   [  ] 
 
63. Traditional rulers have a strong control on members of their ethnic groups and can prevent 
them from going to war with other ethnic groups.  
 
1) I very strongly believe  [  ] 
2) I strongly believe  [  ] 
3) I Believe              [  ] 
4) I do not believe   [  ] 
5) I strongly do not believe [  ] 
6) I very strongly do not believe [  ] 
7) No opinion   [  ] 
 
64. How effective have traditional leaders been in ensuring that different ethnic, political, and 
religious groups living within their jurisdictions feel at home? 
1. Very effective   [  ] 
2. Somehow effective  [  ] 
3. Effective   [  ] 
4. Not effective   [  ] 
5. Can’t tell   [  ] 
 
Contribution of formal Education to Peace 
 
65. To what extent would you agree that the formal educational system in Ghana created a 
culture of peace among Ghanaians? 
 
1. Very Low Extent  [  ] 
2. Low Extent   [  ] 
3. Moderately Low Extent [  ] 
4. Moderate Extent  [  ] 
5. Moderately High Extent [  ] 
6. High Extent   [  ] 
7. Very High Extent  [  ] 
8. Not at all   [  ] 
9. Can’t tell   [  ] 
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66. To what extent do the following factors in Ghana’s Educational system contribute to the 
peace that Ghana enjoys? (Please choose one answer for each of the listed institutions or 
groups) 
 
No Influencing 
Factors  
             
                 
Assessment         
           Criteria 
1 
Very 
Low 
Extent 
2 
Low 
Extent 
3 
Moderately 
Low 
Extent 
4 
Moderate 
Extent 
5 
Moderately 
High 
Extent 
6 
High 
Extent 
7 
Very 
High 
Extent 
8 
Not 
At 
All 
9 
Can’t 
Tell 
 
1 The history 
courses in 
schools give 
equal value to 
the history of 
all ethnic 
groups 
         
2 Educational 
curricula 
taught values 
of co-
citizenship  
         
3 Centralized 
posting of 
students to 
post primary 
educational 
institutions 
promoted 
inter-cultural 
learning 
among 
citizens.  
         
4 Boarding 
school system 
has promoted 
cross-cultural 
and cross 
ethnic 
friendships 
that have 
lasted into 
working lives 
of Ghanaians. 
         
5 Boarding 
schools 
system has 
decreased 
ethnic and 
religious 
identity 
barriers 
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No Influencing 
Factors  
             
                 
Assessment         
           Criteria 
1 
Very 
Low 
Extent 
2 
Low 
Extent 
3 
Moderately 
Low 
Extent 
4 
Moderate 
Extent 
5 
Moderately 
High 
Extent 
6 
High 
Extent 
7 
Very 
High 
Extent 
8 
Not 
At 
All 
9 
Can’t 
Tell 
 
among 
Ghanaians 
6 Past Students’ 
Associations 
have created 
strong cross-
cultural bonds 
among alumni 
of schools 
         
7 Posting of 
teachers to 
regions or 
districts other 
than their 
home ones 
has increased 
knowledge of 
other cultures.  
         
8 Inter-school 
sporting 
events have 
increased  
         
9 Interschool 
quizzes, 
debates and 
other forms of 
intellectual 
competition 
have reduced 
the complexes 
of inferiority 
and 
superiority 
among 
Ghanaians.  
         
10 The 
compulsory 
national 
service 
scheme has 
helped to 
create a sense 
of oneness 
among 
Ghanaians 
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Social Cohesion Behaviors 
 
67. When I am in a meeting with people from other ethnic groups, I ______ try to ensure that 
everyone has an equal chance to participate in the discussions. 
 
1. Never  [  ]  2. Seldom [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ]  4. Frequently [  ] 5. Always [  ] 
 
68. When I am in a discussion with people from other ethnic groups, I _______ want to show 
why the values of my culture are important in assessing the issues being discussed. 
 
1. Always [  ]  2. Frequently [  ] 3. Occasionally [  ] 4. Seldom [  ]  5. Never  [  ] 
 
69. When I am engaged in activities with people from other cultures, I _____ insist on my views. 
 
1. Never  [  ]  2. Seldom [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ]  4. Frequently [  ] 5. Always [  ] 
 
70. Whenever I meet people from other ethnic groups, I _______ try to stay away from them for 
fear of getting into trouble with them.  
 
1. Always [  ]  2. Frequently [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ] 4. Seldom [  ] 5. Never  [  ] 
 
71. When discussing important national issues with people from other parts of the country, I let 
them know their views, feelings, or experiences are_______ mine 
 
1. More important than [  ]   2.  Equally important as [  ]  3.  somewhat important as [  ]  
4. Less important than [  ]  5. Not as important as [  ] 
 
72. When I listen to people from other ethnic groups express their views on national issues that 
affect them directly, I______ put myself in their shoes in order to understand the issues from 
their perspective. 
 
1. Never  [  ]  2. Seldom [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ]  4. Frequently [  ]   5. Always [  ] 
 
73. Whenever I vote in elections I______ consider the ethnic background of the presidential 
candidates before I choose whom to vote for. 
 
1. Always [  ]  2. Frequently [  ] 3. Occasionally [  ] 4. Seldom [  ]  5. Never  [  ] 
 
74. When I vote for a parliamentary candidate, I _________consider the issues they talk about as 
important as their personality and background 
 
1. Never  [  ]  2. Seldom [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ]  4. Frequently [  ] 5. Always [  ] 
 
75. I  would _____ accept postings to any part of the country other than my home region 
 
1. Very Willingly [  ] 2.Willingly [  ] 3.  Reluctantly [  ]   4. Seldom [  ] 5. 
Never [  ] 
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Practice 
  
 
76. If a relative of mine plans to marry a person from another ethnic group, I _____ support him 
or her 
 
1. Never [  ]   2. Rarely [  ]   3. Reluctantly [ ] 4. Willingly [  ] 5. Very Willingly [  ] 
  
 
77. When I have a conflict with someone from a different ethnic group, I _____ prefer to take the 
matter to the local chief, police, or court for resolution 
 
1. Never  [  ]  2. Seldom [  ]  3. Occasionally [  ]  4. Frequently [  ] 5. Always [  ] 
 
 
 
Thank you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
475 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 Interview Guide for Key Informant Interviews 
 
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION 
 
Guiding Questions for Key Informant Interviews For PhD Dissertation Research On  
Threads and Stitches of Peace– Understanding What Makes Ghana an Oasis of Peace 
 
 
First schedule      Rescheduled interview 
Date ___/___/2013   Time: _________     Date_____/____/2013 Time: _________                   
        (dd /   mm /)         (dd. / mm) 
Tel:________________, _____________     Tel: ________________, _____________ 
 
District _____________________ Name of Town ________________House 
No._______ 
                          
Name of Interviewer __________________________Supervisor 
______________________ 
 
I. Bio-data of Interviewee 
 
I would now like to begin by getting to know you better. Would you mind if I ask: 
 
1. Gender of respondent (please indicate)  
 
1) Male   2) Female  3) Other (specify) _____________________ [  ] 
 
2. How old were you on your last birthday? 
  
1) (Please Indicate age in years)________________) 
 
2) Don’t know my age (please mark) 
       
3. What is the highest level of education you attained? (Check one) 
1) Never been to school        
2) Less than six years of Primary Education      
3) Primary Education up to the Middle School/Junior Secondary School   
4) Completed secondary school or Teacher Training College    
5) Tertiary institution up to diploma/Higher National Diploma   
6) University Degree up to Bachelors level      
7) University Degree up to the Masters level      
8) University Degree up to the Doctorate level     
476 
 
 
 
9) Other (specify)_________________________________________   
 
4. Which region of Ghana would you normally call your home region? 
1) Ashanti Region    
2) Brong Ahafo Region   
3) Central Region    
4) Easter Region    
5) Greater Accra Region   
6) Northern Region    
7) Upper East Region    
8) Upper West Region    
9) Volta Region    
10) Western     
 
5. What is your nationality? 
 
1) I am a Ghanaian resident in Ghana    
2) I am a Ghanaian resident outside but visiting now   
3) I am a foreigner resident in Ghana    
4) I am a foreigner on a short visit to Ghana   
5) I prefer not to answer this question    
 
6. How would you describe your current major occupation? 
 
No.  Employment Category Choose 
One 
1 Elected or Appointed Political Leader (e.g., Member of Parliament, 
Minister of a Sector, at Presidency, Region; District Chief Executive 
 
2 Political Party Leader (e.g.: National, Regional, or Constituency 
Executive of a Political Party) 
 
3 Farmer   
4 House wife  
5 Civil or Public Servant (i.e. works in a Government ministry, 
department or agency) 
 
6 Academic (e.g.: Lecturer, Research, and Teaching Assistant in an 
Academic institution). 
 
7 Corporate Business Executive (Managing Director, Manager, Chief 
Executive Officer, Other 
(specify)____________________________________________ 
 
8 Professional (Certified Medical Officer, Lawyer, Banker, Teacher,  
Nurse, Paramedic, Other 
(specify)__________________________________________ 
 
9 Traditional chief or queen mother  
10 Religious leader (Bishop, Pastor, Imam, African Traditional Religion)  
11 Member of the Security Services (Ghana Armed Forces, Police 
Service, Immigration Services, Fire Service, Customs, Excise, and 
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Preventive Services 
12 Student in Polytechnic, University or other Secondary  
13 Worker in the NGO Sector  
17 Self Employed (owner) Private Businessman or woman  
 Employee in the Private Sector  
18 Self Employed Informal Sector (Mason, Carpenter, Hairdresser, 
Seamstress, Trader, Other 
(specify)_____________________________________________ 
 
20 Other (specify) 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
II. Key Informant Interview Guide 
 
7. What is your opinion on the view that Ghana is a peaceful country?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Peace is often described as negative peace or positive peace. Negative peace means 
even though people are not openly fighting, they live under situations (repressive 
laws, rules, and regulations, poverty, discrimination) that make them suffer and/or 
can die silently. Positive peace means there is no open fighting and there are no 
situations that make people suffer or die in silence. Based on these concepts of 
peace, how would you describe Ghana’s peace? 
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9. What are the critical factors that influence your assertion of Ghana’s peacefulness? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What role, if any, does the level of economic development in Ghana have on its 
experience of peace? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Ghana has had very tense moments in her political history since 1992 when 
everyone thought the country would descend into nationwide violence but this 
never happened. What in your opinion makes it possible for Ghana to stop short of 
descending into nationwide violent conflicts?  
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12. Ghana has a high dependency on the export of raw materials; competition between 
ethnic groups for political power; high differences in poverty levels between the 
north and the south, and between rural and urban areas.  These factors are said to 
cause violent conflicts in some countries in Africa. What, in your opinion, has 
Ghana done differently in managing the same issues to avoid violent national level 
conflicts? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Since 1992, elections in Ghana have been highly contested. What has made it 
possible for Ghana to avoid election-related violent national conflicts despite the 
high political tensions and electoral disputes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Ghana has witnessed several violent conflicts within and between various ethnic 
groups in the country. What, in your opinion, has prevented these conflicts from 
escalating into national level conflicts? 
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15. Competition for political power has created conditions for national level conflicts in 
some countries. What in your opinion accounts for Ghana’s ability to avoid 
nationwide violence as a result of elections and other forms of political 
competition? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16. What are some of the key factors that may have contributed to keep Ghana from 
degenerating into violent national conflicts when it has faced similar internal 
challenges as other countries that went to war? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Strong institutions are credited with keeping countries at peace. What institutions 
do you consider as key to keeping the peace in Ghana? How? 
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18. Culture plays an important role in all communities. Does culture play any part in 
making Ghana Peaceful? How?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. Ghana is multi-cultural nation. What makes it possible for these cultures to avoid 
the types of violent national conflicts that other states with the same mix of history 
and cultures have experienced?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Religion is an important factor for peace or war in the present world. What role, if 
any, does religion play in Ghana’s experience of peace?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. How do you assess the role of the youth in Ghana on the peace of the country? 
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22. What role, if any, do women play in preserving the peace in Ghana?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. How do you see the role of political parties in the peace of the country?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. How do you assess the role of the media in Ghana’s peace? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. How, if any, has the formal education system in Ghana made in creating a culture of 
peace?  
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26. In what specific ways do you believe the formal educational system in Ghana has 
helped to create this culture of peace?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. Is Ghana at any risk of descending into a violent national level conflict such as a 
civil war, violence?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28. What would it take for Ghana to descend into violent national level conflict? 
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29. What makes you hold the opinion you have just expressed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30. Are there any other thoughts or closing comments that you would like to share on 
why Ghana seems to have peace when other countries on the continent with the 
same or similar backgrounds and issues have not?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and responses.  
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Appendix 7 Map Showing Distribution of Survey Interview Locations  
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Appendix 8 Matrix Of Hypotheses, Variables And Indicators  
 
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of  respondents 
Gender 
(Q1) 
self-identified 
gender category of 
respondent 
Male, female or other 
as self-assigned 
 % of respondents in 
different gender 
categories 
Age 
(Q2) 
Self-report of age 
of respondent at 
last birth day prior 
to survey 
Age of respondents 18 
years and above as 
calculated from last 
birthday. 
 % of respondents in 
different ages 18 years 
and above as of their 
last birth day prior to 
the survey 
Educational 
levels  
(Q3) 
Highest level of 
formal education 
completed 
Self report on highest 
level of formal 
education attained 
ranging from no 
education through PhD 
and other. 
% of respondents in 
different categories of 
formal education obtained 
Region of 
origin 
 
(Q4) 
Self-identified 
region 
respondents call 
their home region.  
One of the 10 
administrative regions 
of Ghana respondents 
consider  their home 
region 
 % of respondents who 
select  different regions 
of Ghana as their home 
regions  
Locality of 
residence 
(Q5) 
Place where 
respondents 
regularly live 
National capital, 
regional capital, district 
capital, village, town 
outside urban area, 
others  
 % of respondents in 
indicate the different 
localities in which they 
live 
Religious 
affiliation 
 
(Q6) 
Faith group to 
which respondents 
considers self to 
be a member of or 
affiliated to. 
Self report of faith 
traditions that 
respondents consider 
themselves to be a 
member of or affiliated 
to. 
 % of respondents who 
identify religious 
groups to which they 
consider themselves as 
members of or 
affiliated to. 
Primary 
Employment 
category 
(Q7 
Description of 
kind of work 
respondent 
currently does as 
their main job.  
Respondent’s self 
placement in one of 17 
occupational categories  
 % of respondents in 
different employment  
categories 
 
Ho1 There is no difference in the perceptions of respondents that Ghana is a 
peaceful country (Q8) 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Perceptions of 
different age 
categories of 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
of different age 
Degree to which 
respondents of 
different age 
% of respondents of 
different age categories 
who agree or disagree 
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people on  why 
Ghana is 
peaceful 
 
categories on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
categories agree or 
disagree that y 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
that Ghana is peaceful 
% of respondents of 
different ethnic groups 
who agree or disagree 
that Ghana is peaceful 
Perceptions of 
respondents 
from different 
regions on  
why Ghana is 
peaceful 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
originating from 
different regions on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
Degree to which 
respondents of 
different age 
categories agree or 
disagree that Ghana 
is a peaceful country 
 % of respondents of 
different regions who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana is peaceful 
Perceptions of 
different 
gender 
categories of 
people on  why 
Ghana is 
peaceful 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
of different gender 
categories on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
Degree to which 
respondents of 
different gender 
categories agree or 
disagree that Ghana 
is a peaceful country 
% of respondents of 
different gender 
categories who agree or 
disagree that Ghana is 
peaceful 
Perceptions of 
respondents 
with different 
levels of formal 
education on  
why Ghana is 
peaceful 
Level of agreement 
between respondents 
of different levels of 
formal educational 
attainment on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
Degree to which 
respondents with 
different levels of 
formal education 
agree or disagree 
that Ghana is a 
peaceful country 
% of respondents of 
different levels of 
formal education 
completed who agree or 
disagree that Ghana is 
peaceful 
Perceptions of 
respondents of 
different 
religious 
affiliations on  
why Ghana is 
peaceful 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
of different religious 
affiliations on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
Degree to which 
respondents of 
different religious 
affiliations agree or 
disagree that Ghana 
is a peaceful country 
% of respondents of 
different religious 
affiliations who agree or 
disagree that Ghana is 
peaceful 
Perceptions of 
respondents of 
different 
employment 
categories on  
why Ghana is 
peaceful 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
of different 
employment 
categories on 
whether or not 
Ghana is a peaceful 
country 
Degree to which 
respondents of 
different 
employment 
categories agree or 
disagree that Ghana 
is a peaceful country 
 
 
% of respondents of 
different employment 
categories who agree or 
disagree that Ghana is 
peaceful 
Perceptions of 
respondents 
living in 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
living in different 
Degree to which 
respondents living in 
different localities 
% of respondents living 
in different localities 
who agree or disagree 
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different 
localities on  
why Ghana is 
peaceful 
localities on whether 
or not Ghana is a 
peaceful country 
agree or disagree 
that Ghana is a 
peaceful country 
that Ghana is peaceful 
Ho2   there are no differences in the level of perception on the nature and sources of 
peace Ghana enjoys. 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Perceptions of 
respondents on 
the nature of 
peace in Ghana  
(Q9) 
 negative defined as  
absence of direct 
violence but 
presence of 
structural and 
cultural violence 
that can lead to 
open violence or  
 positive peace 
defined as absence 
of direct, 
structural, and 
cultural violence 
 Level of agreement 
or disagreement 
among respondents 
on whether 
Ghana’s peace is  
negative  peace or 
positive peace  
 
 
% of respondents in who 
agree that Ghana has 
negative peace versus 
those who agree that 
Ghana has positive peace 
Factors 
contributing to 
peace 
(Q 10) 
 Perceptions of 
factors that 
contribute to peace 
in Ghana 
 Level of agreement 
on the extent to 
which different 
factors contribute 
to peace in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
indicate the extent to 
which various listed 
factors can influence 
Ghana’s ability to be at 
peace. 
Role of 
institutions on 
Ghana’s peace 
(Q 11) 
 Perception of what 
institutions 
contribute to peace 
in Ghana 
 Differences in 
perceptions of 
what institutions 
contribute to peace 
in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
identify different 
institutions listed in the 
question as the ones that 
contribute to peace in 
Ghana 
Susceptibility 
to national 
level violence 
(Q 12) 
 Belief that Ghana 
can easily descend 
into violent 
national level 
conflict 
 Degrees to which 
respondents belief 
that Ghana can 
easily descend into 
violent conflict at 
the national level 
% of respondents who 
belief that Ghana can 
easily descend into 
violence at the national 
level versus those who 
do not belief.  
Role of shared 
values and 
beliefs on 
peace in Ghana 
(Q 13) 
 Extent to which 
respondents 
attribute Ghana’s 
peace to shared 
regulations, values, 
and beliefs. 
 Perceptions of the 
role of the national 
constitution, 
religion, tradition, 
and customs on 
Ghana’s peace 
% of respondents who 
identify the constitution, 
religion, tradition and 
customs or other factors 
as the ones contributing 
to peace in Ghana 
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Ho3 Disparities  in the  distribution of development in Ghana has no effect on the 
peace in the  country 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Level of 
economic 
development on 
peace 
 
(Q 14) 
 Perceptions on the 
contribution of the 
level of economic 
development of 
Ghana on its peace 
 Level of 
agreement or 
disagreement that 
Ghana’s level of 
economic 
development 
contributes to the 
peace it enjoys 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
current level of Ghana’s 
economic development 
contributes to the peace 
in the country.  
Equality in 
geographical 
distribution of 
development on 
peace in Ghana 
(Q 15) 
 Perceptions of 
impact of 
geographical 
disparities in the 
level of 
development on 
the peace in Ghana 
 
 Variations in 
respondents’ 
perception of the 
extent to which 
disparities in 
development 
across different 
geographical zones 
(north-south; rural-
urban) affects the 
peace in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
difference in the 
distribution of 
development services has 
an effect on the 
sustenance of peace in 
Ghana.  
Transparent 
Management of 
Natural 
Resource and 
Peace 
(Q 16) 
 Contribution of 
transparent and 
equitable contracts 
for natural 
resource 
exploitation to 
peace 
 Negotiations of 
contracts for 
natural resource 
exploitation are 
transparent  
 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
natural resource 
management contracts 
that are transparently 
negotiated contribute to 
Ghana’s peace. 
Equitable and 
fair returns on 
natural resource 
contracts on 
peace(Q 17) 
 Effects of 
perceived 
equitable returns 
on Ghana natural 
resource contracts 
on peace 
 Contracts for 
natural resource 
exploitation are 
fair and equitable 
for the country 
 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
equitable and fair returns 
to Ghana on the 
exploitation of natural 
resources contributes to 
the peace in the country. 
Equitable 
allocation of 
revenue from 
natural 
resources to 
development in 
all regions 
(Q 18) 
 Perception of 
equitable 
allocation of 
revenue from 
natural resources 
to development in 
all parts of the 
country 
 Level of 
agreement on the 
contribution of 
equitable 
allocation of 
revenue from 
natural resources 
to development in 
all parts of the 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
equitable allocation of 
revenue from natural 
resources to development 
in all parts of the country 
contributes to the peace 
in Ghana. 
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country the peace 
in Ghana 
Efficient and 
Effective use of 
proceeds of 
natural 
resources for 
development of 
all 
(Q 19) 
 Effect of 
perceptions of 
effective and 
efficient use of 
proceeds from 
natural resources 
on peace in Ghana 
  Degrees to which 
respondents agree 
or disagree on the 
contribution of 
Ghana’s 
management of 
natural resource 
proceeds to peace 
 
 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
revenue from Ghana’s 
natural resources is used 
in ways that contribute to 
peace in the country. 
Ho4 The level of respect for human rights and the rule of law in Ghana have no 
effect on the peace that the country enjoys.  
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Effect of respect 
for freedom of 
expression on 
the peace that 
Ghana has.  
(Q 20) 
Respondents’ 
perceptions on the 
effects of respect 
for  freedoms of 
expression on 
peace in Ghana 
 
Extent of agreement 
or disagreement on 
the impact of  
freedom of 
expression of 
citizens on the peace 
the country enjoys 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
ability of Ghanaians to 
express themselves freely 
contributes to the peace 
in Ghana 
Impact of 
political 
freedom on 
peace 
(Q 21) 
Level of agreement 
on the impact of 
political freedom on 
peace in Ghana 
 
The ability of 
citizens to freely 
choose their 
political affiliations, 
stand for elections 
to public offices,  
and to vote  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
level of political freedom 
in the country is a 
contributor to peace in 
Ghana 
Effect of 
presence of 
extra judicial 
arrests,  
detentions, 
torture, and 
disappearances 
of political 
opponents on 
peace in Ghana 
(Q 22) 
Presence or absence 
of extrajudicial 
arrests, detentions, 
torture, and 
disappearances. 
Level of agreement 
on the effect of the 
presence or absence 
of extrajudicial 
arrests, detentions, 
torture and 
disappearances on 
peace in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
presence or absence of 
extrajudicial arrests, 
detentions,  torture and 
disappearances have 
contributed to peace in 
Ghana 
Ho5   There is no difference in perception on how the practice of respect for the rule of 
law by ordinary citizens and public officials contribute to peace in Ghana 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Perceptions on Level of agreement Contribution of % of respondents who 
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Citizens’ 
respect for the 
laws of the land 
(Q 23) 
on the effect of 
citizens’ willingness 
to respect  the laws 
of the country and 
peace  
citizens’ willingness 
to comply with the 
law, rules, and 
regulations without 
coercion or fear 
thereof.  
agree or disagree that 
citizens’ respect for the 
laws contribute to peace 
 
Public officials 
respect for the 
laws of the land 
(Q 24) 
Respect of the law 
by elected 
government leaders 
and public officials 
 
Perceptions on 
degree to which 
government and 
public officers act 
and make decisions 
in accordance with 
relevant laws 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree Ghana’s 
peace is in part due to the 
fact that state officials 
always to make decisions 
and act in accordance 
with laid down laws, 
rules, and regulations.  
Respect for 
decisions of the 
courts (Q 25) 
 
Respect for the 
decisions made the 
courts of law on 
peace in Ghana 
Perceptions of 
degree to which 
decisions of the 
courts are respected 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
adherence to the 
decisions of courts 
contribute to peace in 
Ghana 
Ho6   There is no difference in perception of how the freedom of the press in Ghana 
has contributed to the peace of the country 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Contribution of 
freedom of the 
print media to 
peace 
(Q 26) 
Presence or absence 
of legal and 
administrative 
controls on 
newspapers and 
other print media of 
information 
dissemination 
 
 Ability of the press 
to carry news 
stories without fear 
of repression or 
censorship by the 
state and other 
interest groups 
 Abolition of libel 
laws 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
ability of Ghanaians to 
freely express themselves 
in the print media without 
fear of being cited for 
libel has contributed to 
peace in Ghana 
 
Liberalization 
of the electronic 
media 
 
(Q 27) 
Freedom of 
expression on radio 
and television for all 
citizens 
Liberalized 
airwaves for radio 
and TV broadcasts 
of news, debates, 
hosted discussions, 
and interactive SMS 
and phone-in 
programs 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
freedom of expression on 
radio stations and 
televisions through 
broadcasts of news, 
debates, hosted 
discussions, and 
interactive SMS and 
phone-in programs has 
contributed to the peace 
in Ghana 
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Unrestricted 
access to news 
and information 
from the 
internet 
(Q 28) 
Citizens’ ability to 
freely access and 
share news and 
views through the 
internet 
 Unrestricted access 
to news and 
information on the 
internet 
 Unrestricted use of 
social media 
platforms 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
unrestricted access to 
news and information 
from the internet and 
social media platforms 
has contributed to 
Ghana’s peace 
Ho7   There is no difference in perceptions that the judicial system in Ghana is a 
major contributor to the peace of the country 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Independence of 
the judiciary on 
peace 
 
(Q 29) 
Ability of judges to 
dispense justice 
without interference 
from state officials 
or other influential 
persons.  
Level of agreement 
or disagreement that 
courts are 
independent from 
political interference 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
independence of  the 
courts from political 
interference is a 
contributor to peace in 
Ghana 
Corruption 
judges and 
peace 
(Q 30) 
Perception on ability 
of judges and court 
staff to administer 
justice without 
being influenced by 
personal interests or 
gains 
 Level of 
agreement on 
impact of 
perceived 
corruption in the 
judiciary and the 
peace in Ghana 
 
 % of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
the level of perceived 
corruption in the 
judiciary is a contributor 
to peace in Ghana 
Equality of 
citizens before 
the law 
(Q 31) 
 Effect of equality 
of all citizens 
before the law on 
peace in Ghana 
 
 Level of 
agreement on the 
practice of equal 
treatment of all 
citizens before the 
law and peace in 
Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
fact that all citizens can 
expect to be treated 
equally before the law 
contributes to peace in 
Ghana.  
Ho8  The level of experience of gender equality and equity has no effect on the peace 
that Ghana enjoys 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Gender equality 
in participation 
in public 
decision-making 
process and 
peace 
(Q 32) 
Equality of 
participation of men 
and women in 
public decision-
making processes 
and peace in Ghana 
Level of agreement 
on how gender 
equality in 
participation in 
public decision 
making processes 
affects the peace in 
Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
level of gender equality 
in participation in public 
decision making 
processes in Ghana 
contributes the peace of 
the country  
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Women’s 
participation in 
parliament and 
peace 
(Q 33) 
Level of 
participation of 
women in 
parliament and 
peace in Ghana 
 Level of 
agreement on 
whether or not the 
percentage of 
women in 
parliament 
contributes to 
Ghana’s peace 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
percentage of women in 
Ghana’s parliament 
contributes to the peace 
of the country 
Women’s 
economic 
participation 
and peace 
(Q 34) 
Effect of gender 
equality in access to 
economic 
opportunities on 
peace in Ghana 
Level of agreement 
that Ghana enjoys 
peace because 
women in the 
country have equal 
economic 
opportunities  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana’s peace is in part 
due to the equal 
opportunities that women 
in the country have in 
economic life.  
Gender Equality 
in access to 
educational 
opportunities 
and peace (Q 
35) 
Effect of gender 
equality on access to 
education on peace 
in Ghana 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
that Ghana’s peace 
is in part due to 
gender equality in 
access to 
educational 
opportunities 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana has peace because 
men and women have 
equal access to 
educational opportunities 
in the country. 
Gender Equity 
in access to 
employment 
opportunities in 
public services.  
(Q 36) 
Perception of effect 
of gender equity in 
access to 
employment 
opportunities in the 
public and civil 
services on peace 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
that Ghana has  
peace due to gender 
equity in access to 
employment  
opportunities in the 
public sector 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana has peace because 
men and women have 
equitable access to 
employment 
opportunities in the 
public sector of the 
country. 
Role of women 
in mediating 
conflicts at the 
national level 
(Q 37) 
Perception of role of 
women in mediating 
conflicts at the 
national level. 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
the contribution that 
women make in 
mediating conflicts 
at the national level 
to promote peace. 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
roles that women play in 
mediating conflicts at the 
national levels contribute 
to the peace that the 
country enjoys.  
Participation 
of women in 
traditional 
systems of 
governance (Q 
38) 
Perception of the 
role of 
queenmothers and 
female chiefs in the 
promotion of peace 
at the national level 
Level of agreement 
among respondents 
on the role of 
queenmothers and 
women chiefs on the 
peace of Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana’s peace is in part 
due to the role that 
queenmothers and female 
chiefs play in the 
traditional systems of 
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governance in the 
country. 
Ho9 The state of democratic practices in Ghana have no effect on the peace that 
the country enjoys 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Contribution of 
free, fair, and 
transparent 
elections to 
peace 
(Q 39) 
The organization of 
elections declared to 
be free, fair, and 
transparent and 
peace in Ghana 
Extent to which 
respondents agree or 
disagree that the 
regular organization 
of elections declared 
to be free, fair, and 
transparent affect 
the peace in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
regular organization of 
elections declared to be 
free, fair, and transparent 
affect the peace Ghana 
enjoys. 
Limiting factors 
on widespread 
violence over 
parliamentary 
elections 
(Q 40) 
Factors that 
respondents 
consider important 
in limit the spread of 
violence over 
electoral results for 
parliament  
Fear of war; apathy 
towards who wins; 
courts handle 
disputes effectively; 
political parties 
abhor violence; lack 
of support for 
violence-mongers; 
Others.  
% of respondents who 
choose or the other 
factors listed in the 
questions as the reason 
why disputes over 
parliamentary elections 
do not spill over into 
national level violence.  
Limiting factors 
on national 
violence over 
presidential 
results 
(Q 41) 
Factors that 
respondents 
consider important 
in limiting the 
eruption of violence 
over disputed 
Presidential election 
results  
Inability of political 
parties to mobilize 
fighters; recourse of 
political parties to 
court; intervention 
by traditional 
leaders; intervention 
by religious leaders; 
Ghanaians won’t die 
for a politician. 
% of respondents who 
choose or the other 
factors listed in the 
questions as the reason 
why disputes over 
Presidential election 
results do not degenerate 
into national level 
violence. 
Absence of 
restrictions on 
running for 
office  
(Q 42) 
Freedom of all 
qualifying persons 
to stand for 
elections at 
appropriate levels 
Freedom to stand 
for Presidential, 
Parliamentary, 
District Assembly or 
Unit Committee 
elections and peace 
in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
freedom accorded to all 
qualifying citizens to run 
for elections at any level 
of their choice contributes 
to peace in Ghana 
Freedom of 
citizens to vote 
(Q 43) 
Freedom of all 
qualifying persons 
to register and vote 
in elections 
Effect of the ability 
of all qualifying 
persons to register 
and vote on peace in 
Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
ability of all qualified 
Ghanaians to register and 
vote contributes to peace 
in the country 
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Freedom of 
citizens to join 
political parties  
(Q 44) 
Absence of 
restrictions on all 
citizens to join 
political parties of 
their choice 
Freedom to join any 
political party of 
one’s choice and 
peace in Ghana 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
freedom of all Ghanaians 
to join any political party 
of their choice affects the 
peace in the country 
 Role of 
ethnicity in 
electoral 
choices of 
Ghanaians (Q 
45) 
Influence of ethnic 
considerations in 
voting behaviors of 
Ghanaians 
Level of agreement 
of agreement or 
disagreement over 
the influence of 
ethnic 
considerations in the 
way Ghanaians vote 
at elections  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghanaians do not take 
into account the ethnic 
background of the 
candidates they choose to 
vote for during elections  
Ho10 The role that Government plays in mediating conflicts have no effect on the 
peace that Ghana enjoys. 
 Role of 
government in 
creating peace 
in Ghana  
 
(Q 46) 
Deliberate actions of 
Government that 
have created 
Ghana’s peace 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
whether the 
government of 
Ghana over the 
years has taken 
concrete actions that 
have created the 
peace that Ghana 
enjoys 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
government of Ghana has 
deliberately taken actions 
that have created the 
peace the country enjoys 
Collaboration 
between 
government and 
civil society for 
peace 
 
 (Q47) 
Government of 
Ghana consciously 
creates identifiable 
platforms and 
opportunities that 
for civil society 
groups and 
organizations to 
engage in promoting 
peace in Ghana 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
whether the 
government of 
Ghana over the 
years created 
identifiable 
platforms for civil 
society engagement 
in building a culture 
of peace in the 
country.   
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
government of Ghana 
over the years 
consciously created 
identifiable platforms for 
civil society groups and 
organizations to engage 
in building a culture of 
peace in the country.   
Successful 
resolution of 
conflicts by 
government 
before they 
escalate (Q 48) 
Government of 
Ghana takes 
proactive action to 
resolve or prevent 
conflicts from 
escalating into 
violence 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
the extent to which 
the Government 
over the years has 
taken deliberate and 
proactive actions to 
prevent conflicts 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
government of Ghana 
over the years has taken 
deliberate and proactive 
actions to prevent 
conflicts from escalating 
into violence 
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from escalating into 
violence 
Neutrality of 
Government in 
managing ethnic 
and communal 
conflicts (Q49) 
Government 
officials and 
agencies have 
impartially 
intervened in ethnic 
and communal 
conflicts to resolve 
them or prevent 
them from 
escalating into 
violence 
Degree to which 
respondents agree or 
disagree that 
governments over 
the years have been 
perceived as 
impartial in the way 
they intervened in 
ethnic and 
communal conflicts 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana enjoys peace 
because the government 
officials and agencies 
over the years have been 
neutral in the way they 
intervened in ethnic or 
communal conflicts  
Collaboration 
between 
Government 
and faith-based 
organizations  
(Q 50) 
Active engagement 
of government with 
faith-based 
organizations or 
groups to find 
solutions to conflicts 
at all levels. 
Degree to which 
respondents agree or 
disagree that 
governments over 
the years have 
always actively 
sought the 
partnership of faith-
based organizations 
in resolving or 
preventing conflicts 
from degenerating 
into violence.  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana enjoys peace 
because the government 
has always actively 
engaged faith-based 
organizations to resolve 
or prevent conflicts at all 
levels from degenerating 
into violence 
Ho11 Religion has no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Importance of 
religion in the 
lives of 
Ghanaians (Q 
51) 
Extent to which 
religious beliefs and 
values influence the 
attitudes of 
Ghanaians towards 
the maintenance of 
peace 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
how religious 
beliefs and values 
influence attitudes 
of Ghanaians 
towards the 
maintenance of 
peace 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
religious beliefs and 
values influence attitudes 
of Ghanaians towards the 
maintenance of peace 
Faith practice 
and peace (Q 
52) 
Extent to which 
Ghanaians’ 
observance of the 
teachings of their 
faith promote peace 
in Ghana 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement that 
Ghana is at peace 
because its citizens 
observe the 
teachings of their 
faith 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana is at peace because 
its citizens observe the 
teachings of their faith 
Religiosity and Extent to which the Degree of % of respondents who 
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peace 
(Q 53) 
religious nature of 
Ghanaians affect the 
peace in the country 
agreement or 
disagreement on the 
notion that Ghana is 
at peace because its 
citizens are very 
religious. 
agree or disagree that 
Ghana is at peace because 
its citizens are very 
religious. 
Religions 
discrimination 
in employment 
(Q 54)  
Absence of 
discrimination on 
the basis of religion 
in employment 
practices and peace 
Degree of 
agreement or 
disagreement that 
the absence of 
discrimination in 
employment 
practices has 
contributed to the 
peace in Ghana.  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
absence of discrimination 
in employment practices 
has contributed to the 
peace in Ghana. 
Coexistence of 
people of 
different faiths 
(Q 55) 
Ability of people of 
different faiths to 
coexist in the same 
spaces and impact 
on peace 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
that the coexistence 
of people of 
different faiths in 
the same 
geographical spaces 
contributes to peace 
in Ghana  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
coexistence of people of 
different faiths in the 
same geographical spaces 
contributes to peace in 
Ghana 
Intermarriages 
between people 
of different 
faiths and peace 
(Q 56) 
Absence of 
restrictions on 
marriages of people 
of different faith 
traditions and peace 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement that 
the unrestricted 
nature of marriages 
between people of 
different faiths 
positively affects the 
peace in the country 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
unrestricted nature of 
marriages between people 
of different faiths 
positively affects the 
peace in the country 
Exploitation of 
religious 
differences in 
political 
campaigns 
(Q 57) 
The use of religious 
differences to 
canvass votes in 
national and local 
elections 
Degree of 
agreement or 
disagreement that 
the use of religious 
differences to win 
votes from the 
electoral in all 
elections contributes 
to the peace in the 
country  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
use of religious 
differences to win votes 
from the electoral in all 
elections contributes to 
the peace in the country 
Interfaith 
collaboration 
for peace 
(Q 58) 
Leaders and agents 
of different religious 
traditions working 
together for peace 
Extent of agreement 
or disagreement on 
how leaders and 
agents of different 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that on 
how leaders and agents of 
different religious 
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religious traditions 
work together to 
promote peace 
traditions work together 
to promote peace 
Role of religion 
in creating a 
culture of peace 
(Q 59) 
Role of faith leaders 
(Christian and 
Muslim) and  
religious councils 
such as the Catholic 
bishops Conference, 
the Christian 
Council of Ghana, 
Federation of 
Islamic Councils, 
etc. in promoting a 
culture of peace. 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement on 
the view that 
religious leaders and 
various religious 
councils and 
committees have 
played important 
roles in creating a 
culture of peace in 
Ghana.  
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
religious leaders and 
various religious councils 
and committees have 
played important roles in 
creating a culture of 
peace in Ghana. 
Ho12 The culture, customs, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in Ghana 
have no impact on the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Relevance of 
values and 
traditions of 
ethnic groups to 
peace in Ghana 
(Q 60) 
Extent to which the 
values and traditions 
of different ethnic 
groups in Ghana 
promote peace 
Degrees to which 
respondents agree or 
disagree on the role 
that values and 
traditions of 
different ethnic 
groups in Ghana 
promote peace 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
values and traditions of 
different ethnic groups in 
Ghana promote peace 
Role of 
socialization on 
peace in all 
cultures in 
Ghana (Q 61) 
Ways in which 
socialization 
processes in all 
cultures in Ghana 
inculcate the values 
of peace in their 
members 
Level of agreement 
or disagreement 
among respondents 
on how socialization 
within various 
cultures in Ghana 
promote peace 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that 
socialization processes 
within various cultures in 
Ghana emphasize the 
promotion of peace 
 
Cultural 
sanctions for the 
breach of peace  
(Q 62) 
Extent to which 
cultural sanction’s 
for the breach of the 
peace deter 
adherents from 
promoting violence 
Degree of 
agreement or 
disagreement among 
respondents on how 
sanctions for the 
breach of the peace 
from various 
cultures in Ghana 
help to create peace 
in the country 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
invocation of sanctions in 
various cultures in Ghana 
for the breach of the 
instigation of violence 
help to create peace in the 
country 
Control of 
traditional rulers 
Extent to which 
traditional rulers in 
Differences in 
agreement between 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
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on members of 
their ethnic 
groups 
(Q 63) 
Ghana exert their 
authority on their 
members to ensure 
the promotion of 
peace 
respondents on the 
ability of traditional 
rulers in Ghana 
exert their authority 
on their members to 
desist from acts that 
breach the peace 
ability of traditional 
rulers in Ghana to exert 
their authority on their 
members to desist from 
recourse to violence acts 
contributes to the peace 
the country enjoys. 
Effectiveness of 
traditional rulers 
in promoting 
accommodation 
of people of 
different faiths, 
political 
affiliations,  and 
ethnicity within 
their traditional 
areas (Q 64) 
Ways in which 
traditional rulers 
promote peace 
through 
accommodating 
people of different 
ethnic groups, faith 
traditions and 
political affiliations 
within their areas of 
jurisdiction 
Levels of agreement 
or disagreement 
among respondents 
on the ability of 
traditional rulers to 
promote peace 
through 
accommodating 
people of different 
faiths, political 
affiliations, and 
ethnicity within 
their jurisdiction 
% of respondents who 
agree or disagree that the 
ability of traditional 
rulers in Ghana to create 
space for the 
accommodation of people 
of different ethnic and 
faith traditions within 
their jurisdictions 
contributes to the peace 
that Ghana enjoys.  
 
 
Ho13 Ghana’s formal educational system has no effect on the peace that the country 
enjoys  (Q 65) 
Contribution of 
formal 
education  to 
culture of peace 
Extent to which 
respondents believe 
the formal 
educational system 
in Ghana has 
contributed to the 
building of a culture 
of peace among 
Ghanaians.  
Assessed on a scale 
ranging from Very 
Low Extent, Low 
Extent, Moderately 
Low Extent, 
Moderate Extent, 
Moderately High 
Extent, High Extent, 
Very High Extent, 
Not At All, to Can’t 
Tell 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to each 
category of the grading 
scale 
Contribution of 
history courses 
in taught in 
schools to peace 
in Ghana 
Content of history 
courses give equal 
value to the history 
of all ethnic groups 
Respondents’ 
assessment of the 
extent to which 
history lessons 
taught in schools in 
Ghana promote 
inclusiveness and 
unity among 
Ghanaians 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that the 
history courses in schools 
promote inclusiveness 
and unity among 
Ghanaians.  
Content of 
Educational 
curricular and 
peace 
Contribution of 
content of 
educational 
curricula to peace 
Respondents’ 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
curricula of the 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
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formal educational 
system teaches 
values of co-
citizenship 
they assess that which the 
curricula of the formal 
educational system 
teaches values of co-
citizenship 
Effect of cross-
regional posting 
of teachers on 
peace in Ghana 
Contribution of 
centralized posting 
of students to post 
primary educational 
institutions to peace 
Respondents’ 
assessment of the 
extent to which 
centralized posting 
of students to 
secondary and 
vocational schools 
promotes inter-
cultural learning 
among citizens. 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that 
centralized posting of 
students to secondary and 
vocational schools 
promotes inter-cultural 
learning among citizens. 
Effect of the 
Boarding school 
system on peace 
in Ghana 
Contribution of 
boarding school 
system to peace in 
Ghana 
Respondents’ 
assessment of the 
extent to which use 
of the boarding 
system in post-
primary educational 
institutions has 
promoted cross-
cultural and cross 
ethnic friendships 
that have lasted into 
working lives of 
Ghanaians. 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that the 
boarding system in post-
primary educational 
institutions has promoted 
cross-cultural and cross 
ethnic friendships that 
have lasted into working 
lives of Ghanaians. 
Contribution of 
the boarding 
school to peace 
in Ghana  
Contribution of 
boarding schools 
system to inter-
cultural prejudice 
reduction 
Respondents 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
boarding school 
system has 
decreased ethnic and 
religious identity 
barriers and 
prejudices among 
Ghanaians 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that the 
boarding school system 
has decreased ethnic and 
religious identity barriers 
and prejudices among 
Ghanaians 
Role of Past 
Students’ 
Associations in 
promoting 
peace  
The existence of 
Past Students or 
Alumni 
Associations has  
created strong cross-
cultural bonds 
among alumni of the 
same schools 
Respondents’ 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
activities of Past 
Students or Alumni 
Associations have 
created strong cross-
cultural bonds 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that activities 
of Past Students or 
Alumni Associations 
have  created strong 
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among alumni of the 
same schools. 
cross-cultural bonds 
among alumni of the 
same schools. 
Effect of 
posting of 
teachers to 
regions or 
districts other 
than their home 
ones on peace 
The practice of 
posting teachings to 
schools outside their 
home districts or 
regions has 
increased 
knowledge of other 
cultures among 
Ghanaians. 
Respondent’s 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
posting of teachings 
within the Ghana 
Education Service to 
schools outside their 
home districts or 
regions has 
increased 
knowledge of other 
cultures among 
Ghanaians. 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that posting of 
teachings within the 
Ghana Education Service 
to schools outside their 
home districts or regions 
has increased knowledge 
of other cultures among 
Ghanaians. 
Contribution of 
Inter-school 
sporting events 
to peace 
The promotion of 
sporting events 
between schools of 
different districts 
and regions have 
increased 
intercultural 
acceptance among 
Ghanaians 
Respondents 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
organization of 
sporting events 
between schools of 
different districts 
and regions have 
increased 
intercultural 
acceptance among 
Ghanaians 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that 
organizing sporting 
events between schools of 
different districts and 
regions have increased 
intercultural acceptance 
among Ghanaians 
Contribution of 
Interschool 
quizzes, debates 
and other forms 
of intellectual 
competition to 
peace 
 The role that  
Interschool 
intellectual 
competitions play in 
reducing cross 
cultural stereotypes 
and inferiority or 
superiority 
complexes among 
Ghanaians 
Respondents 
assessment of the 
extent the 
engagement of 
students in quizzes, 
debates, and other 
forms of intellectual 
competition have 
reduced the 
complexes of 
inferiority and 
superiority among 
Ghanaians 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that 
intellectual competition 
have reduced the 
complexes of inferiority 
and superiority among 
Ghanaians 
Contribution of 
National 
Service Scheme 
to peace 
The compulsory 
national service 
scheme has helped 
to create a sense of 
oneness among 
Respondents 
assessment of the 
extent to which the 
posting of students 
graduating from 
% of respondents who 
provide responses 
corresponding to the 
different extents to which 
they assess that posting of 
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Ghanaians secondary and 
tertiary institutions 
to work in regions 
or communities 
other than their own 
has helped to create 
a sense of oneness 
among Ghanaians 
students graduating from 
secondary and tertiary 
institutions to work in 
regions or communities 
other than their own has 
helped to create a sense 
of oneness among 
Ghanaians 
Ho14 Personal attitudes, behaviors, and practices toward people of other ethnic or 
religious groups have no effect on the peace that Ghana enjoys. 
Variable Operational 
Definition 
Dimensions Indicators 
Inclusive 
attitudes and 
behaviors  
(Q 67) 
Effort to ensure all 
parties in a 
discussion have a 
chance to express 
their views 
Extent to which 
respondents make 
an effort to include 
people of other 
ethnic backgrounds 
in group discussions  
% of respondents 
indicating various extents 
to which they consciously 
try to ensure that people 
of other ethnic groups 
participating in a 
discussion are able to 
express their views.  
Ethnic 
superiority 
 
(Q 68) 
Tendency to show 
that the values from 
one’s culture are 
more important than 
those of others 
Extent to which 
respondents would 
go to ensure that 
others from different 
cultural 
backgrounds accept 
their values as more 
important  
% of respondents 
indicating the various 
extents to which they 
would go to ensure that 
their cultural values are 
accepted as more 
important than those of 
other cultures  
Accommodation 
of alternate 
cultural  views 
(Q 69) 
Insistence that one’s 
cultural  views 
dominate in a 
discussion  
Extent to which 
respondents go to 
ensure that their 
cultural views are 
accepted over others 
in a group 
discussion 
% of respondents 
indicating various extents 
to which they insist that 
their particular cultural 
views be accepted in 
discussions with others of 
different cultural 
backgrounds 
Avoidance of 
people of other 
cultures 
(Q 70) 
Intentional staying 
away from people of 
other cultures 
Extent to which 
respondents would 
go to intentionally 
avoid mixing with 
people of other 
cultures 
% of respondents 
indicating the extent to 
which they will 
intentionally avoid 
mixing with people of 
other cultures.  
Accommodation 
of views of 
others on 
national issues 
Giving equal value 
and respect for the 
views of others on 
national issues 
Extent to which the 
views of others on 
national issues are 
considered 
% of respondents  
indicating the extent to 
which they would accept 
the views of other people 
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(Q 71) important and valid on national issues as 
important and valid 
Empathy 
towards others 
(Q 72) 
Putting oneself in 
the shoes of others 
on events that 
directly affected 
them  
Extent to which 
respondents will try 
to understand issues 
and events from the 
perspectives of 
those directly 
affected by them.  
% of respondents 
indicating the extent to 
which they accept and 
respect the thoughts 
emotions, and views of 
people who are directly 
affected by events in their 
lives.  
Ethnic 
considerations 
in voting (Q 73) 
Weight placed on 
the ethnicity of 
candidates in voting 
during elections 
Extent to which 
respondents 
consider the ethnic 
background of 
candidates when 
they vote in an 
election 
% of respondents 
indicating the extent to 
which they place value on 
the ethnic background of 
candidates when deciding 
whom to vote for in an 
election   
 Willingness to 
accept job 
postings to any 
part of the 
country (Q 74) 
 Willingness to live 
and work in cultural 
milieus other than 
one’s own 
Degree of 
willingness to 
accept posting to 
any part of the 
country other than 
in one’s home 
region 
% of respondents’ 
indication of the extent of 
their willingness to locate 
and work in cultural 
milieus other than their 
own 
Acceptance of 
ethnic 
intermarriages 
(Q 75) 
Extent of 
willingness to 
accept that family 
members can marry 
someone outside 
one’s ethnic group 
Extent to which 
respondents would 
accept that members 
of their families 
marry to people of 
other ethnic 
backgrounds 
% of respondents’ 
indication of the extent to 
which they would accept 
that members of their 
family marry people of 
other ethnic backgrounds. 
 Mode of 
addressing 
disagreements 
with persons of 
other ethnic 
groups. (Q 76) 
Choice of medium 
for addressing 
conflicts with 
people from other 
ethnic groups 
Indications extent to 
which respondents 
would use the legal 
means to address 
their conflicts with 
people of other 
ethnic groups.  
% of respondents’ 
indications of the extent 
to which they would use 
the legal means to 
address their conflicts 
with people of other 
ethnic groups.  
Criteria for 
voting for 
parliamentary 
candidates in an 
election (Q 77) 
Choice between  
issues and 
personalities in 
voting for 
parliamentary 
candidates in an 
election  
Indications of extent 
to which the 
personality of 
candidates or the 
issues they stand for 
determine the voting 
choices respondents 
make at elections  
% of respondents’ 
indication of the extent to 
which the personality or 
issues candidates stand 
for influence their choice 
of candidates they vote 
for during elections.  
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Appendix 9 Significance Levels of Factors Influencing Ghana’s Peace 
 
  
Influencing Factors  
Age Category 
  
Gender Category 
  
Educational Level 
  
Region of Interview 
  
Primary Occupation  
Value Significanc
e 
Value Value Significanc
e 
Significanc
e 
Value Significanc
e 
Value Significanc
e 
High level of civic awareness among 
Ghanaians  
 
81.755 
 
.067 
 
14.32
0 
 
244.41
3 
 
.000 
. 
.074 
 
238.92
5 
 
.000 
 
358.60
1 
 
.000 
High degree of agreement among political 
leaders on important issues affecting Ghana 
 
120.10
2 
 
.000 
 
18.56
7 
 
194.23
0 
 
.000 
 
.017 
 
232.75
7 
 
.000 
 
320.14
1 
 
.000 
Presence of strong, efficient, and neutral 
institutions such as Parliament, the Courts, and 
the public and civil Services 
 
 
106.67
5 
 
 
.000 
 
 
33.53
0 
 
 
65.842 
 
 
. 054 
 
 
.000 
 
 
89.672 
 
 
.003 
 
 
200.95
6 
 
 
.000 
Cultures of all ethnic groups value peace   
77.555 
 
.030 
 
20.21
1 
 
92.472 
 
.000 
 
.005 
 
140.78
8 
 
.000 
 
218.38
5 
 
.000 
Strong influence of religious beliefs that value 
peace  
 
110.29
9 
 
.000 
 
20.78
8 
 
91.410 
 
.000 
 
.004 
 
116.76
5 
 
.000 
 
240.58
3 
 
.000 
Prayers and intercessions by religious groups  
216.05
3 
 
.000 
 
23.33
1 
 
72.521 
 
.000 
 
.001 
 
157.04
9 
 
.000 
 
191.54
1 
 
.000 
Strong bonds of intermarriages between ethnic 
groups 
 
144.06
3 
 
.000 
 
12.41
1 
 
60.856 
 
.119 
 
.088 
 
87.377 
 
.005 
 
241.43
3 
 
.000 
Ghanaians have a high degree of respect for 
the rule of law among 
 
89.553 
 
.003 
 
9.746 
 
126.46
1 
 
.000 
 
.203 
 
112.77
9 
 
.000 
 
199.43
5 
 
.000 
Fear of being singled out for punishment   
92.607 
 
.002 
 
10.27
9 
 
130.25
7 
 
.000 
 
.173 
 
117.85
5 
 
.000 
 
290.34
5 
 
.000 
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Appendix 10:  Significance of Economic Development on Ghana’s Peace 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
70.697 .264 10.733 .215 131.945 .000 156.729 .000 270.628 .000 
Geographical 
Disparities in 
Development 
75.857 .147 8.222 .412 139.571 .000 149.479 .000 166.530 .199 
Transparency 
of Contracts 
for natural 
resource 
Exploitation 
114.172 .000 4.543 .805 93.551 .001 74.057 .009 145.531 .632 
Returns on 
Natural 
Resource 
Contracts 
100.849 .000 5.933 .548 69.818 .027 110.009 .000 182.176 .003 
Allocation of 
Revenue from 
natural 
resources 
88.793 .022 5.557 .697 105.188 .000 90.179 .000 195.797 .010 
Use of 
proceeds from 
natural 
resources  
112.294 .000 14.869 .062 79.579 .021 123.767 .000 186.531 .030 
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Appendix 11 Significance of Respect for Human Rights on Ghana’s Peace 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Residence Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Freedom of 
Expression of 
Citizens 
155.608 .000 15.347 .053 96.488 .005 514.444 .000 203.512 .003 
political 
freedom 
383.833 .000 17.478 .026 161.696 .000 731.296 .000 212.523 .001 
Respect for 
Human Rights 
239.193 .000 20.136 .010 135.45 .000 760.013 .000 203.189 .004 
 
 
Appendix 12:  Significance respect for the rule of law on peace in Ghana 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Citizen’s 
respect for 
the laws of 
the land;  
80.932 .075 12.223 .142 75.447 .155 442.776 
.000 
152 
.000 
Public 
officials act 
in 
accordance 
with  the 
laws of the 
land; 
98.103 .000 9.335 .229 101.343 .000 774.470 
.000 
221.269 
.000 
Citizen’s 
respect for 
decisions of 
the courts 
have 
contributed 
to the peace 
in Ghana 
 .000 8.569 .285 93.598 .002 805.980 
.000 
187.379 
.001 
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Appendix 13: Gender Perspectives on Respect for Rule of Law on Peace 
 
Respect for Rule of Law Gender Total 
Male Female 
 
Very Strongly Agree 
 165 129 294 
 21.7% 19.9% 20.9% 
 11.7% 9.2% 20.9% 
Strongly Agree 
 211 184 395 
 27.8% 28.4% 28.1% 
 15.0% 13.1% 28.1% 
Agree 
 101 83 184 
 13.3% 12.8% 13.1% 
 7.2% 5.9% 13.1% 
Mildly Agree 
 158 156 314 
 20.8% 24.1% 22.3% 
 11.2% 11.1% 22.3% 
Mildly Disagree 
 48 52 100 
 6.3% 8.0% 7.1% 
 3.4% 3.7% 7.1% 
Disagree 
 60 35 95 
 7.9% 5.4% 6.8% 
 4.3% 2.5% 6.8% 
Strongly Disagree 
 11 6 17 
 1.4% 0.9% 1.2% 
 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 
Very Strongly Disagree 
 5 1 6 
 0.7% 0.2% 0.4% 
 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 
No Opinion 
 0 2 2 
 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 
 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Total 
 759 648 1407 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 53.9% 46.1% 100.0% 
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Appendix 14: Significance of the Freedom of the Press to peace in Ghana 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Freedom of the 
print media 
144.492 .000 21.040 .007 171.811 .000 1073.05 .000 233.515 .000 
Liberalization 
of the 
electronic 
media 
93.126 .010 17.493 .025 129.604 .000 370.870 .000 232.173 .000 
Unrestricted 
access to news 
and 
information 
from the 
internet 
100.812 .002 20.689 .008 191.449 .000 324.152 .000 239.993 .000 
 
Appendix 15: Significance of the Independence of the Judiciary to peace in Ghana 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Independence 
of Judiciary 
161.181 .000 6.671 .575 117.709 .000 897.920 .000 228.095 .000 
Corruptibility 
of the 
Judiciary 
98.858 .000 6.657 .574 106.413 .001 745.613 .000 318.746 .000 
Equality of 
Citizens 
before the law 
105.327 .001 16.505 .036 110.923 .000 801.608 .000 272.011 .000 
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Appendix 16: Significance of Gender-related factors to peace in Ghana 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Equality in 
Public Fora 
86.694 .031 8.211 .413 80.111 .084 656.718 .000 191.219 .017 
Women in 
Parliament 
66.447 .393 21.664 .006 144.117 .000 489.639 .000 287.314 .000 
Equal 
Economic 
opportunities 
82.853 .057 11.374 .181 101.289 .002 561.726 .000 205.599 .002 
Equal 
Educational 
Opportunities 
86.672 .031 15.230 .055 289.369 .000 459.368 .000 218.421 .000 
Equal 
Employment 
Opportunities 
118.808 .000 12.733 .121 204.984 .000 574.678 .000 228.449 .000 
Women in 
Mediation 
129.109 
.000 
13.063 .110 117.155 .000 454.390 .000 262.092 .000 
Queen Mothers 144.666 .000 17.299 .027 115.892 .000 562.660 .000 169.579 .156 
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Appendix 17: Elections and Democratic Participation 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation 
Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Free, Fair 
Elections 
132.660 .000 18.492 .018 176.334 .000 946.458 .000 273.867 .000 
Parliamentary 
Elections, no 
war 
45.724 .810 2.275 .810 94.668 .000 492.346 .000 213.556 .000 
Presidential 
Elections, no 
war 
47.512 .193 20.542 .001 96.968 .000 517.840 .000 158.654 .000 
Freedom to 
Stand 
Elections 
141.258 .000 11.301 .185 88.722 .022 845.749 .000 267.295 .000 
Freedom to 
vote 
147.940 .000 19.526 .003 64.102 .060 756.079 .000 291.807 .000 
Freedom of 
Political 
Association 
113.571 .000 12.562 .084 69.232 .110 746.355 .000 178.767 .005 
No ethnicity 
in Voting 
Behavior 
136.610 .000 25.672 .001 88.728 .022 475.798 .000 256.386 .000 
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Appendix 18: Significance Levels Of Religion To Peace In Ghana 
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation Religious Affiliation 
 Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance Value Significance 
Importance of 
Religion 
154.99 .000 8.277 .142 30.956 .847 300.546 .000 99.053 .368 135.639 .000 
Respect for Faith 
Values 
and peace 
149.903 .000 17.209 .028 75.139 .161 627.541 .000 325.384 .000 90.454 002 
Religious nature of 
Ghanaians 
144.164 .000 24.270 .002 117.062 .000 538.724 .000 218.199 .000 134.152 .000 
Religions 
discrimination in 
employment 
140.541 .000 28.623 .001 93.800 .043 706.111 .000 259.800 .000 84.368 .037 
Coexistence of 
people of different 
faiths 
122.343 .000 15.816 .045 146.324 .000 588.267 .000 232.173 .000 73.114 .062 
Intermarriages 
between people of 
different faiths and 
peace 
91.196 .014 10.923 .206 145.952 .000 407.204 .000 211.953 .001 58.895 .370 
Use religion in 
political campaigns 
233.893 .000 23.105 .003 119.986 .000 646.095 .000 277.773 .000 73.624 .057 
Interfaith 
collaboration for 
peace 
154.818 .000 13.833 .054 106.997 .000 677.945 .000 324.485 .000 65.104 .062 
Role of religion in 
creating a culture of 
peace 
120.912 .000 8.802 .185 59.335 .126 598.492 .000 223.772 .000 56.737 .064 
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Appendix 19: Significance of Traditions and Culture to Peace  
 
Variable Age Category 
 
Gender Category 
 
Educational Level 
 
Region of Interview 
 
Primary Occupation Religious 
Affiliation 
Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value 
Non-
Xenophobic  
Values and 
Traditions 
103.147 .000 7.869 .248 47.307 .501 381.866 .000 111.452 .550 49.233 .206 
Cultural 
socialization 
for peace 
143.487 .000 8.910 .113 83.249 .000 394.202 
.000 
130.218 .010 27.536 .812 
Cultures 
sanctions on 
violence 
170.101 .000 9.042 .171 53.622 .268 357.890 
.000 
218.787 .000 69.177 .005 
Strong 
Influence of 
Traditional 
Leaders 
127.767 .000 8.228 .144 51.974 .097 394.012 
.000 
114.600 .083 48.138 .069 
Effectiveness 
of Traditional 
Leaders 
104.448 .000 7.049 .133 68.780 .000 680.627 
.000 
210.703 .000 56.129 .001 
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Appendix 20: Summary of Agreements on Contribution of Education to Peace 
 
Variable 
Filtration at  
6.5 
Filtration at  
7.5 
Filtration at 
8 
Difference 
between 6.5 and 8 
Education system creates Culture of Peace (n = 1421) 80.3 47 33.3 47 
Teaching of History Civic Education  (n = 1394) 64.9 37.4 27.5 37.4 
Teaching of Civic Education in Schools  (n = 1429) 66 46.7 19.3 46.7 
Role of CSSP  (n = 1429) 68.6 47.9 20.7 47.9 
Boarding Schools and cross cultural education  (n = 1391) 82.5 57.3 25.2 57.3 
Boarding schools decreased barriers  (n = 1390) 80.7 59 21.7 59 
Past Students’ Associations & cultural bonds  (n = 1383) 63.6 34.2 29.4 34.2 
Posting of teachers  (n = 1429) 78.9 56.3 22.6 56.3 
Inter-School Sporting Events (n = 1388) 69.4 42.3 27.1 42.3 
Extracurricular academic engagements (n = 1380) 67.8 32.9 34.9 32.9 
National Service (n = 1372) 77.8 61.6 16.2 61.6 
     Average 47.50909 
 
Differences between 6.5, 7.5 and  8 Filtration Points of Mean Scores for Responses on The extent to which Various Factors In Ghana’s 
Educational System Contribute to Peace 
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Appendix 21: Significance of Personal Attitudes, Behaviors and Practices for Peace  
  
Variable 
Age Category Gender Category Educational Level 
Region of 
Interview 
Primary 
Occupation 
Religious 
Affiliation 
Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value Value P-value 
Inclusive Attitude 
50.800 
0.256 
5.502 
0.855 
86.316 
0.000 
373.011 
0.000 
185.802 
0.000 
61.874 
0.121 
Cultural Superiority 
104.308 
0.000 
25.185 
0.005 
64.936 
0.027 
761.631 
0.000 
182.220 
0.000 
53.930 
0.327 
Dominant Personal Attitude 
131.375 
0.000 
8.422 
0.588 
123.191 
0.000 
817.538 
0.000 
168.473 
0.000 
111.28
1 0.000 
Avoidance 
73.552 
0.005 
12.487 
0.254 
72.422 
0.006 
327.119 
0.000 
150.155 
0.000 
65.237 
0.073 
Valuing Views of Others 
50.835 
0.255 
2.672 
0.988 
189.622 
0.000 
234.172 
0.000 
97.651 
0.164 
5.786 
1.000 
Empathy 
86.245 
0.000 
6.500 
0.772 
78.042 
0.002 
447.283 
0.000 
159.197 
0.000 
131.56 
0.000 
Ethnic Affiliations in 
Elections  
73.649 
0.004 
8.383 
0.591 
115.351 
0.000 
480.267 
0.000 
136.137 
0.000 
74.781 
0.013 
Voting Criteria 
134.897 
0.000 
13.298 
0.208 
86.914 
0.000 
1052.72
9 0.000 
194.528 
0.000 
231.26
0 0.000 
Posting to other places 
136.909 
0.000 
26.006 
0.004 
134.230 
0.000 
738.487 
0.000 
197.243 
0.000 
65.300 
0.072 
Support for intermarriages 
106.7 
0.000 
22.550 
0.013 
73.461 
0.005 
442.450 
0.000 
142.497 
0.000 
24.131 
0.999 
Preferred Mediators in 
conflict Resolution 
 
109.505 0.000 
 
19.367 0.036 
 
134.064 0.000 
 
686.682 0.000 
 
238.493 0.000 
 
98.552 0.000 
515 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 22: Network View - Type of Peace 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Nodes count: 10 
Code Families  (1):  
CF:Type of Peace 
Codes  (9):  
Contributions to  peace - Affirmative sub {13-1} 
516 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 23: Network View - Effect of Culture on Peace in Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nodes count: 27 
Code Families  (1):  
CF:Effect of Culture on Peace 
Codes  (26):  
Continued relevance of traditional leaders {3-3} 
cultural change or loss of moral compass {5-1} 
Cultural homogenization {7-2} 
Cultural hybridization {1-4} 
Culture is important {10-8} 
Culture of peace {21-5} 
Economic interdependencies {1-5} 
Ethnicity - not a problem {11-5} 
Fa ma Nyame {4-8} 
Fear of reprisal attacks {1-3} 
Indigenous religion {0-7} 
Intercultural accommodation and assimilation {11-5} 
Intermarriages {6-12} 
Miscegenation {3-3} 
Patriarchy {2-6} 
Political culture of peace {1-7} 
Politicians respect law {4-5} 
Prayers {3-6} 
Role of women {2-7} 
Socialized behaviors {2-5} 
The Ashanti Factor {1-5} 
Traditional leaders {3-4} 
Visible institutional efforts {1-3} 
Women and peacebuilding in Ghana {1-3} 
Women as peacebuilders {1-3} 
Women as warmongers {4-4} 
517 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 24: Network View - Contribution of Religion to peace 
 
 
 
Nodes count: 14 
Code Families  (1):  
CF:Contribution of Religion to peace 
Codes  (13):  
Fa ma Nyame {4-9} 
Faith in action {2-3} 
FBO Interventions {8-4} 
GOG, FBO, CSO Collaboration {2-5} 
 
Good leadership {1-5} 
Indigenous religion {0-6} 
Interfaith actions {3-4} 
Interfaith dialogue {1-4} 
Intermarriages {6-11} 
Invisible roles {1-5} 
Prayers {3-6} 
Religious leaders {4-6} 
Religious nature of Ghanaians is important {11-5 
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Appendix 25: Network View - Exit Strategies 
 
 
Network View: Exit Strategies 
Created by: Super  2015-02-26T07:05:26 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Nodes count: 7 
Code Families  (1):  
CF:Exit Strategies 
Codes  (6):  
Exit - disengagement/resignation {7-1} 
Exit - Galamsey {1-1} 
Exit - Migration {1-3} 
Exit - Politics {2-1} 
Exit - Private solutions {2-2} 
Exit - Streetism {1-2} 
 
 
 
 
  
519 
 
 
 
 
Biographical Sketch. 
 
Hippolyt has more than 27 years of progressive leadership in rural and international 
development planning and management; governance and civil society programming; and 
peacebuilding initiatives in across Africa. From October 2009 to September 2014 he served as 
the Coordinator for peacebuilding, governance, and gender programming for Catholic Relief 
Services for all of Africa. In that capacity, he led CRS’ Africa Justice and Peace Working Group, 
which serves as the hub for CRS’ work in major conflict areas in Africa, to design and 
implement peacebuilding and governance interventions that contributed to the peaceful elections 
and referendum in the transition processes for Sudan and South Sudan (2009 through 2011). His 
team also supported the design and implementation of peacebuilding, governance, and gender 
programs in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. More recently, he led the Africa Justice 
and Working Groups engagements with faith-based and civil society leaders, the Anti-Balaka, 
the Séléka, and other armed but noncombatant groups in Central Africa Republic to explore 
nonviolent platforms for promoting peace, social cohesion, and peaceful administrative transition 
in that country’s ongoing civil conflict.  
Over the same period, he coordinated CRS’ annual Institute for Peacebuilding in Africa 
(IPA), which provides general and specialized capacity development training in peacebuilding 
and governance programming to staff of CRS, the Church, and Civil Society partners across 
Africa. Before then, he served in various positions within Catholic Relief Services, including 
working as the Deputy Regional Director responsible for program quality for the agency, first in 
Central and West Africa, and then exclusively for West Africa from October 2004 through 
September 2009.  He briefly served as CRS’ Regional Technical Advisor on Governance before 
taking on the DRD/Program Quality position.  
520 
 
 
 
 
In parallel to his work, Hippolyt has researched, written and presented conference papers, 
and published substantially on justice, human rights, governance, and the role of civil and faith-
based organizations in peacebuilding and gender promotion in Africa. He has special interests 
and capabilities in policy research and advocacy; development research; multi-disciplinary 
approaches to the planning, monitoring, evaluation, and learning in integrated rural and 
international development initiatives. He has great facilitation and training expertise in conflict 
analysis, transformation, and peacebuilding. He is a member of the International Society for 
Third Sector Research (ISTR); the International Advisory Board of the Life and Peace Institute; 
and the Development Management Forum based in Nairobi, Kenya.  
Hippolyt holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree and a Diploma in Education both from the 
University of Cape Coast, Ghana; a Master’s Degree in Social and Public Policy and a 
Certificate in Conflict Resolution both from Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA. He also has 
a Diploma in Development Planning and Management from the Akademie Klausenhoff, Rhede, 
Germany. He is married with four children.  
 
 
